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This is an attempt to study the foreign trade of India, 
during the opening three decades of the 20th century. 
In the study of a factor like the foreign trade of a country, 
the time element represented by these decades, while not 
very long, is a respectable enough unit for study,in an 
endeavour to understand its nature and lines of development. 
Without making undue claims for the period, it can readily 
be conceded that the first period of the 20th century 
is a very crowded one. In a very special way it is packed 
with events and developments,kaleidoscopic in variety, 
amazing in their striking contrasts,and momentous both in 
themselves and in their effects. It has keyed up the 
sense of mystery to the point of making - especially after 
the War - 'the next ten years' a favourite theme of specu- 
lation for historians and philosophers. 
There is no denying the facto-that much of the im- 
pulse to the astounding developments that the period 
witnessed was provided and inspired by nationalism and 
national feeling. The generation witnessed, as no other 
before it, marvellous developments in the means of com- 
munication and transport. Railways were perfected and 
railway mileage increased enormously. The motor car 
came into its own,and established itself as an integral 
factor in the service of transportation. After the 
Great/ 
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Great War there was remarkable progress in flying. As 
a result of all these developments,the world has shrunk 
and distance has been all but annihilated. 
There was a striking growth of population especially 
in Europe in the earlier part of the period and it was 
related both as cause and effect, to the equally striking 
development in the production of wealth. In the Pre - 
War period., while there was an extension of both primary 
and secondary industries, technological progress was in 
the main confined to secondary industries and expressed 
itself in an improvement in the rate of. output. In the 
post -war period technological progress necessitated and 
by the war, came to be applied under the cir- 
cumstances of the post-war situation to both primary and 
secondary industries with quite remarkable effects on the 
rate of output of wealth. 
This period,which witnessed such remarkable develop - 
the 
ments in^ technique of production, output of wealth and 
in the means of communication and transport, witnessed 
as an interesting psychological reaction a marked 
orientation of the ideas and ideals governing international 
commercial policy. It can safely be said that the period 
saw the complete rout of the ideal of free trade, and the 
ideal of national self sufficiency came to be, in so far as 
practicable, increasingly accepted as the national 
economic ideal. Towards the close of the last century 
William/ 
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William Smart wrote of the "return to protection ". 
In the pre -War period,that movement,was no more than 
a sporadic unco -ordinated grant of protection to home 
industries adversely affected by foreign imports. 
In the post War period there was a distinct change. The 
larger and heavier economic responsibilities of the state 
to its Nationals, brought to the forefront the need for 
a scientific approach to economic problems and much was 
heard of economic planning . The tariff came to be 
studied more closely and used more freely as the basis 
of an endeavour to secure a co- ordinated and scientific 
scheme of protection. Very much need not be said at 
this stage by way of explanation about this change but 
the following two quotations from different points of 
view hint at the possible explanation of the change. 
In the Halley Stewart lectures of 1931 Sir Basil 
B lackett said "Fatal to human progress as are the high 
tariff walls today, it has long been obvious that the 
philosophy of laissez -faire has no answer to a reasoned 
demand for wider opportunities of a balanced economic 
life for large new communities over seas,and for highly 
self- conscious national groups in old Europe" (The World 
Economic Crisis p.95). Grunzel in 'Economic Protectionism' 
diagnosed the reasons for the development in the following 
terms. "There cannot be a world economy or international 
economy/ 
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economy because a world will which would rank above 
national wills and in which they would find expression 
does not exist and international relations are not 
regulated in accordance with an ideal of the human race 
but according to the wills of the nations concerned 
We have not are international economic policy. We have 
only an economic foreign policy which is part of the 
National economic policy ". (Economic Protectionism 
p. 3-4) 
It has been claimed for the period that it provides 
some spectacular contrasts. Responsibility for this 
can in part be attributed to the record of money and 
monetary development. The first fourteen years of the 
period under review saw the international gold standard 
functioning smoothly. "One of the great justifications 
of the international gold standard was precisely that 
it was an international standard. So long as it existed 
international trade and finance, the two great links of 
the world economic order,had found the monetary vehicle 
which most closely corresponded to their necessities" 
(T.E. Gregory - "The Gold Standard and Its Future" p.78) 
The outbreak of the War in 1914 brought the career of 
the international gold standard to an abrupt end. 
With the end of War time control after peace was signed, 
the demoralisation of currencies was seen in all their 
grim/ 
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grim realisrn,when unparalleled inflation and fluctuation 
of the exchanges occurred. The Genoa Conference in 1922 
sounded the call for the return to the gold standard and 
in the course of the years that immediately followed 
many countries incontinently returned to the gold fold 
only to find themselves very uncomfortable in that habitat. 
The increasing discomfort led to the stampede from the gold 
standard in 1931. The MacMillan Committee in Great Britain 
summed up the position in its Report in the following words. 
"The economic difficulties of the post-war decade are 
primarily due not to any wanton misbehaviour on the part 
of the monetary factors themselves but to unusually large 
and rapid changes on the part of what are rightly described 
as non monetary phenomena, these non -monetary factors 
again themselves producing monetary changes" (Cmd 38979, 
1931, para 208-9.) 
During the post -war period there was a great deal of 
exchange instability and in this respect the contrast be- 
tween the pre -war and post-war periods of the 20th Century 
is striking. It is correct to say,that in the pre-war 
period stability of the internal price level was sacrificed 
to secure stability of the exchanges. The changed con- 
ditions of the post -war period made the stability of the 
internal price level more practicable and a sacrifice of 
it fraught with more danger. Thus .khig stability of the 
exchanges was in a way left to take care of itself. 
At/ 
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At all times,for the generality of countries,in_ternal 
trade is more important than foreign trade and it became 
more so in the post -war period when the ideal of 
National Self -Sufficiency became increasingly popular 
and led to a prolific crop of tariffs and in the light 
of this development the change in the attitude to 
stability of the exchanges and of the internal price 
level is quite intelligible. 
It may be safely said that Indian economic history 
reflected all these trends of development. The develop- 
ment of the means of transport and communication in 
India even if not so remarkable or spectacular as,for 
example,took place in Europe or America,was in terms 
of its own needs and life,quite a striking development. 
There was also an increase in the production of wealth 
though,here,once again,it did not come up to anything 
like that which took place in Europe and America 
because technological advance was, if anything, in its 
infancy and a rationalisation movement had not come into 
being. In certain factors affecting foreign trade 
which is the subject of this study, there were sign- 
ificant changes faithfully reflecting world developments 
in this matter. Among these may be mentioned 
(1) changes in commercial policy. From this standpoint 
the 30 years of the 20th Century get sharply divided 
into two periods by the war coming in between. The 
pre -war/ 
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pre-war period was a free trade period with a limited 
number of import revenue tariffs 'the lowest in the world'. 
The post-war period was entirely different. It was from 
its start one of soaring revenue tariffs with the free 
list considerably reduced. After 1924 there was a crop 
of protective duties following the change over from 
free trade to 'discriminating protection'. As in the 
rest of the world these tariffs in a world of falling 
prices were revised periodically and the phenomenon of 
specific duties gaining in popularity at the expense of 
ad valorem rates,was faithfully reflected. 
(2) Changes pertaining to Money. 
The gold standard was substituted in place of 
the silver standard in 1900. The main argument for the 
change was that 80% of Indian's trade was with gold 
standard countries and as a borrower,it would materially 
assist her to become one of. the 'gold' group. The 
Currency Commission that recommended this,suggested 
the gold specie standard,retaining the rupee in circu- 
lation. What eventually emerged was the gold- exchange 
standard. The change had a significance,because a 
gold exchange standard of any kind is less automatic 
and foolproof than the straightforward gold standard. 
The Rupee being an integral factor in the internal 
circulation,was given an exchange value of 16d in 
sterling and throughout the fourteen years from 1900 to 
1914/ 
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1914 was maintained at that. In the post -war period the 
exchange value of the rupee reflected the exchange 
instability of all world currencies. When eventually 
stability was attained the rupee unlike all other 
currencies emerged with a higher exchange value of 
18d at which it was maintained during the rest of the 
period. 
Such briefly are the lines of world development 
during the last 30 years. Being of importance for a 
study of foreign trade it is more or less the background 
of the study of Indian foreign trade. 
9. 
CHAPTER II. 
As this is a study of the foreign trade of India 
during thirty years of the 20th Century, it would help 
to preface it with a brief survey of the course of Foreign 
trade generally up to that time and the ideas that 
helped to determine that course. 
The modern period saw the emergence of a world 
composed of nation states. The economic implications 
of nationalism of the kind that thus emerged,were stated 
by gastable in his book on International trade. According 
to him,within a country there may be expected to be a 
far greater degree of the mobility of the factors of pro- 
duction, labour and capital, than that which exists be- 
tween a country and the rest of the world. Now, Bastable 
wrote thus, at a time when the opportunities for emigration 
and the foreign field for the investment of capital were 
large compared to what they have been since his day, 
for since his time the field for both, it will be generally 
agreed, has been considerably narrowed. The conclusion 
that seems fairly obvious from a position like this is 
that in a world composed of nation states the people of 
every country have in the main to look to their country 
and their country alone for work and wages - their liveli- 
hood. This is the economic problem of every country. 
Two factors that have gone to give the people of every 
country a heightened awareness of the importance of the 
problem/ 
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problem and a desire to solve it in the soundest and 
speediest manner possible are (1) the growth of popula- 
tion and (2) the fact that political and economic 
interests largely overlap and to a certain extent are 
inextricably intertwined. A sound political life and 
system can only be reared on a sound economic basis of 
national life and very often political instability, 
weakness or disorder in States is traceable to economic 
unsoundness at the root of it. 
If then the people of a country have mainly to earn 
their livelihood in their own country and a sound solu- 
tion of the national economic problem was an all important 
and imperative necessity to the wellbeing of the people, 
it followed that the way to try to achieve that end was 
to create conditions in the State whereby avenues of 
profitable employment of labour and capital could be 
increased and diversified and the output of national 
wealth increased. The ideal of national self- sufficiency 
thus got slowly crystallised as the national economic 
ideal. A word of explanation is necessary here while 
referring to the Ideal of National Self Sufficiency. 
It has been said that from the economic point of view 
up to a point 
progress lies in the multiplication of wants. Economic 
progress in the modern period has in a decisive manner 
contributed to the multiplication of wants. Human wants 
then/ 
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then,being unlimited in number,and tending to become habits 
the number of commodities used by individuals has tended 
to increase. Under these circumstances no country in 
the world can be or even aim at being self sufficient. 
The national ideal of self sufficiency aims at making 
the country provide itself with as many of the things it 
wants, and the economic limitations of it leave it with 
certain commodities that its people need which it cannot 
produce at all,and others,which it cannot produce as an 
economic proposition. The injury or hurt to the economic 
wellbeing of the people that would result from being 
deprived of these commodities,leads to the obtaining of 
these by importation from foreign sources and they are 
paid for with the specialities of the importing country. 
It must be said that essentially the typical nation states 
of the modern world arenas the result of a strong urge 
made up of many factors, dynamic and progressive, 
appropriating progress and the advance in every department 
of life to strengthen their self-sufficiency and their 
national life. 
Under the circumstances outlined above it is not 
difficult to see where exactly foreign trade comes into 
the national economy and what is its place. For the 
generality of such countries the internal production of 
wealth and exchange are far more important than the 
foreign trade and these two in relation to national well- 
being stand as complement and supplement respectively. 
12. 
Writing of the future of International trade T.E. 
Gregory in his book "Gold Unemployment and Capitalism" 
envisages a future in which with a growing greater degree 
of self sufficiency there will be a relative decline of 
international trade. The factors contributing to this 
change according to him are: - 
(1) the increasing importance of services and other 
sheltered occupations which cannot be imported. 
(2) the slackening of population growth and therefore 
of the rate of increase in the demand for the crude 
foodstuffs and raw materials which formed so striking 
an element in the international trade of the last 
century. 
(3) technological changes in agriculture of a very far 
reaching kind. 
(4) the march of scientific discovery in other fields. 
Summing these up he writes "If these tendencies work 
themselves out uninterruptedly the international trade 
of the world may come to possess a significance other 
than that to which we are accustomed. Climatic con- 
ditions will always ensure that inter -regional trade 
will remain of great importance and the growth of wealth 
may add to that importance The problem 
today is no longer the high cost of carriage but the 
increasing degree to which science is making the whole 
world/ 
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world independent of local circumstances in the produc- 
tion of necessaries coupled with an increasing determina- 
tion on the part of the agricultural peoples to emancipate 
themselves from the dominance of the advanced industrial- 
ised races ". pages 201 -204. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a brief 
historical survey to provide the verification of the 
main lines of development outlined above. The start 
is with the birth and progress of the Industrial Revolu- 
tion. "England was in 1700 a prosperous agricultural 
island with a considerable woollen industry but no other 
manufactures of any importance". (L.C.M. Knowles. 
"Industrial and Commercial Revolutions" p.4.) Then came 
the industrial revolution. The causes of the industrial 
revolution have been set down as the following: - 
"(1) the growth of population 
(2) the accumulation of capital by means of trade for 
Great Britain was an important commercial and manu- 
facturing country for at least a century before the 
industrial revolution. 
(3) the existence of overseas markets which were 
almost unlimited provided an atmosphere in which the 
inventions had a more far reaching importance than the 
inventors themselves could possibly have imagined ". 
The Industrial Revolution began about the middle of the 
18th/ 
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18th Century in England and transformed her from an 
agricultural into an industrial country with an extensive 
foreign trade in manufactured goods. Her five great 
groups of exports consisted of cotton and woollen goods, 
coal, iron and steel and machinery. The features then 
to be taken note of are (1) the great increase of pro- 
duction (2) the specialisation of production to which 
she got committed. She became a producer and exporter 
of manufactured goods and increasingly an importer of 
raw material and food products. Trade thus became 
vital to her prosperity, her exports rose from 24.9 
million £ in 1801 to 175.4 million Z in 1850 (Table 
V p.57 British Trade and Industry - G.D.H. Cole) . 
The markets for Britain's exports at this time were 
Europe, America and India. Committed to trade and de- 
pending entirely on it for her prosperity, it is not sur- 
prising that there appeared in the course of the 19th 
Century the Free Trade Movement. 
Meantime the industrial revolution passed on from 
England to France and Belgium in the early decades of 
the 19th Century, to Germany later and towards the close 
of the century to the United States of America. 
"Within the short space of a generation it transformed 
the sleepy mediaeval Germany of the fifties into one 
of the most industrialised countries of the world ". 
(Dawson - 'The Evolution of Modern Germany'.) Of the 
progress/ 
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progress of the industrial revolution in the United States 
Peel in his book "the Economic Impact of America "says 
"even in 1860 the United States of America had started in 
the industrial race. They were already estimated to be 
at that date fourth among the nations of the world in the 
total volume of their industrial output. By the year 
1894 they had attained the first place in the world. 
Thereafter they were unquestionably the leading manu- 
facturing nation of the world. They were producing 
£400,000,000 worth of manufactures in 1860. By 1914 
they were producing £5000,000,000 worth of goods a year ". 
(p.109). 
The reaction of all this on commercial policy is 
logically the next thing to consider. It has been seen 
already that with Great Britain committed to industrial 
specialisation and large -scale production, the abounding 
prosperity it brought her led to the birth of the Free 
Trade Movement. The Corn Laws were repealed in 1846 
by Peel and the structure of Free Trade was completed 
by Gladstone's budget of 1860. The typical British 
manufacturer of the Industrial revolution was a strong 
free trader both for Great Britain and for other 
countries for to persuade a foreign country to adopt 
free trade usually meant making him a present of its 
home market" (p. 55 G.D.H. Cole - British Trade and 
Industry past and future). 
The/ 
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The increasing production of wealth, the great improve- 
ment in the means of communication and the stimulating 
effect of the new gold supply caused a great expansion of 
British trade. British exports rose from £3 :10 /- per 
head of the population in 1854 to £8 in 1872 and imports 
rose from £5: 10 /- to £11 (Cole, p.72) This served to 
commend Free Trade to the rest of Europe. The Free Trade 
ideal seemed to be gaining ground and a great growth of 
inter - European trade followed the liberalisation of com- 
mercial treaties. The 'great depression' of the last 
quarter of the 19th Century however changed the face of 
things. The return to Protection began under the dis- 
couraging conditions of the fall in prices. France in- 
creased her duties in 1892. The United States of America 
adopted the high McKinley tariff in 1890 and the Dingley 
tariff of 1897 definitely consolidated the era of high 
protection. The German tariff, fairly low from 1890 to 
1902, rose sharply on manufactures and food stuffs. 
As an explanation of this development it may be said 
that "trade produces relations among economic commun- 
ities analogous,in one respect,to those among electric 
charges. Like repels like,and unlike attracts unlike. 
Two countries with closely similar economic conditions 
become trade rivals; with dissimilar economic conditions 
they would be one the imperialist expansion in 
which/ 
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which mercantilism expresses itself merely gives political 
form to these economic attractions and repulsions ". 
(R.G. Fiawtrey - The Economic Problem, p.257.) 
Great Britain reacted to this 'defection of her erst- 
while export markets by turning to her empire for what 
these countries denied her. Hence "the characteristic 
change in British commercial policy after 1895 is a re- 
(L .0 .M. Knowles 
action from world economics to imperial economics ",1.357^Cómmerc41 
revolutions 
She expected to call in a "new "world to redress the balance 
of the "old ". What happened may be taken account of. briefly. 
In starting to deal with her overseas possessions Great 
Britain's mental background was largely coloured by the 
old mercantilist tradition. L.C.M. Knowles in her 
economic development of the overseas empire (p. 53, 54 Vol.II) 
thus describes the old Colonial system: - 
(a) The Colonies had to import English commodities being 
encouraged thereto by prohibition or heavy duties on 
foreign commodities. 
(b) The Colonies had to refrain from certain manufactures 
which conflicted with the interests of English manu- 
facturers especially in iron and wool and hats. 
(o) The colonies had to export their products to England 
so that England would have first claim on them and 
would also be the great entrepot in International 
trade for such things as tobacco and dye woods. 
(d)/ 
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(d) The Colonies had to use English and Colonial shipping 
in the import and export trade. Knowles further 
states that "to enforce the system it was essential 
that all vital power should be in the hands of. the 
Mother country ". And to that end "every Act of the 
concerning Customs duties 
legislature of a colonyA had in it the statement that it 
was effective only in so far as it did not contravene 
any Act passed by Parliament at Westminster ". 
The loss of the American colony led to a liberalising 
of the British attitude to her colonies, . Thus the new 
regions peopled by the English race had by 1870 got self 
government or were on the road to it. It is obvious that 
as self governing dominions they would almost inevitably 
claim the right to decide their own commercial policy 
and would not be put off. Great Britain,having accepted 
the laissez faire policy of Free Trade,wanted the colonies 
also to adopt it, but the colonies facing their own 
economic problem,wanted to rear their own industries under 
what they considered the help of a protective tariff. 
How Great Britain had to recognise the claim and allow 
these colonies to go their own way is revealed by the 
following outstanding incident of British Colonial 
history. In 1859 Sir A.T. Galt, Minister of Finance, 
raised the existing Cayley tariff in Canada from 15% 
general and 20% special to 20% and 25% respectively. 
Upon this the Chambers of Commerce and manufacturers 
of/ 
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of Sheffield memorialised the Colonial Office on "the 
injury anticipated to their commerce by the increased 
duties ". Taking up their case,the Duke of Newcastle 
from the Colonial Office wrote objecting to the tariff 
on the ground "that it would adversely affect the 
exchequer of the colony and encourage smuggling ". 
He went on to say "I much fear the effect of the law 
will be that the greater part of the new duty will be 
paid to the Canadian producer by the colonial consumer 
whose interests it seems to me have not been sufficiently 
considered on this occasion ". Continuing he said 
"whenever the authenticated Act of the Canadian parlia- 
ment on this subject arrives I may probably feel that 
I can take no other course than signify to you the 
Queen's assent to it, notwithstanding the objections 
raised against the law in this country ". 
Galt's reply,which has become historic,was dignified 
and clear. "The government of Canada acting for its 
legislature and people cannot through those feelings 
of deference which they owe to imperial authorities, 
in any manner waive or diminish the right of the people 
of Canada to decide for themselves both as to the mode 
and extent to which taxation should be imposed 
Self government would be utterly annihilated if the 
views of the imperial government were to be preferred 
to those of the people of Canada" (Source: - British 
Colonial/ 
20. 
Colonial policy, Select documents, Bell & Morrell, p.368, 
369.) 
Thus the self governing dominions gained the right 
to determine the commercial policy best suited to their 
interests untrammelled by the Mother country. All of 
them set up protective tariffs. To Great Britain with 
her industrial specialisation and her vital need of 
trade, the situation that confronted her at the end of 
the 19th Century is realised from the following table of 
"Estimated ad valorem equivalent of the import duties 
levied by the undermentioned foreign countries and 
British possessions on the principal manufactures ex- 
ported from the United Kingdom. 




















131% Canada (Preferential tariff) 
76% New Zealand " 
71 Australia 















Source: - Second enquiry blue book 
page-292) 1903 -4 quoted from 
"the Empire and the Century", p.117. 
In the light of this,the shift of the trade in exports 
of British manufactures during the last quarter of the 
19th Century revealed by the following table is un- 
mistakeable. 
21. 
Exports of British Manufacture only shown at intervals of 













1870 80.7 million £ 55.5 136.2 44.9 181.1 
1880 81.9 " tt 47.4 129.3 67.6 196.9 
1890 87.2 " " 60.3 147.5 78.3 225.8 
1900 80.3 58.8 139.1 81.1 220.3 
1904 72.1 It " 70.0 142.1 97.2 239.3 
(Source: Enquiry Blue Book and Annual Statement of Trade 1904 
quoted from Empire and the Century p.115) 
During the period Exports of British Manufactures increased by 
58.2 million £ and British possessions accounted for 52.3 million 
of the increase. 
This explains the frantic search during the period. for new 
markets, and in the last 30 years of the 19th Century the British 
Empire grew by 4,754,000 square miles with an estimated population 
of 88,000,000 and at the outbreak of the War the British Empire 
had an area of 11,273,000 square miles and a population of 
417,000,000 of whom 315,000,000 were in India. In a world that 
was becoming increasingly protectionist the value of. the Indian 
market with a population of 315,000,000 to Britain could not be 
exaggerated. It remains to survey the economic policy pursued by 
Britain in India as an essential preliminary to the study of the 
foreign trade of India, for the foreign trade of a country is not 
an isolated thing and does not hang in the air but is definitely 
the product of policies and tariffs. This will be considered in 
the next chapter. 
22. 
CHAPTER III 
SECTION 1. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN INDIA IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY. 
The study of Indian foreign trade in the modern period re- 
veals the fact that India was more traded with than trading. 
The desire for trade brought the Portuguese, the Dutch, the 
French and the British to India. The connection of the first 
three nations with India was ephemeral. It was quite different 
with the British. They began with trade and set up British 
dominion over India. The setting up of British Dominion over 
India was a movement that spread itself over a century practi- 
cally from the middle of the 18th to the middle of the 19th 
centuries. Parallel, and synchronising in time with it, was 
the march and progress of the Industrial Revolution in England. 
The Industrial Revolution started in England the movement,which 
during the latter 18th and earlier 19th Centuries converted it 
from a predominantly agricultural into a predominantly in- 
dustrial country. Her main industries then were cotton and 
woollen textile manufactures, iron and steel, machinery and 
coal. It is also well to bear in mind that the period was 
one of a great growth of population in Great Britain. The 
implication of this position is that in the matter of the 
production of wealth Great Britain embarked on a career of 
specialisation and came to rely on the creation of a geograph- 
ical division of labour in the world at large, or at least 
as much of it as would be amenable to such a scheme, in which 
she would be the supplier of manufactured goods and be able 
to/ 
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to draw on the rest of the world for the vital food supplies 
and raw material that she would need for the feeding of 
the population and the carrying on of her industries. The 
fact that one after the other, the leading trading 
countries of the world at the time refused to fall in 
line with Great Britain's scheme of a world division of 
labour and resolved to go their own way, gives an added 
interest to the study of the economic history of India 
during the 19th Century. 
India is, and has always been pre-eminently an agri- 
cultural country. This is trite enough, but the picture 
might be filled in, by enlarging on the details of the 
Indian agricultural economy. These are, that India is 
an old country and its productivity in terms of agri- 
culture is not to be thought of in terms of the virgin 
soils of the new countries of the world. Then again, 
being an old country, the growth of population and the 
growing density of population are definite factors to be 
reckoned with. India depends on the monsoon for water 
supply for her agriculture, and this dependence has made 
inherent an element of instability in her economic life. 
Being an old country, time should have made the people 
acutely conscious of this fact and revealed to them by 
repeated disappointments that they were putting all their 
eggs in one basket in depending solely on agriculture. 
Besides, in a tropical climate the agriculturist has 
plenty/ 
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plenty of time on his hands while nature is at work in the 
fields and this may normally be expected to make him learn 
to call to his aid by- industries to occupy his time and 
supplement his income. The fact that the country was the 
centre of a vigorous and flourishing civilization warrants 
the conclusion that the creative instinct of the people 
must have expressed itself in craftsmanship embodied in the 
products of the handicrafts. 
To come now to the features of the Indian economic 
situation at the beginning of the 19th century. The unit 
of rural life in India was the village and absence of the 
means of communication made it self -sufficient, the needs 
of the village being supplied by the agriculturists and the 
village artisans. Another element in the economic life 
of the country was the urban industry. "The urban industry 
of India, at the beginning of the 19th century was mainly 
in the nature of handicrafts producing fine textiles or 
other luxury products for the aristocracy" (p. 32 D.R. 
Gadgil - Industrial Evolution of India). Of these handi- 
crafts the chief were the cotton, silk,and woollen 
textile products which commanded wide foreign markets, 
for of them it was said that before the 19th century 
India was chiefly famous "for exporting its elegant 
fabrics to the more civilized nations of the world" 
(Dr. Forbes Royle - Culture and Commerce of India - 
1851 p.20.) After these, in importance came the 
handicrafts/ 
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handicrafts working in brass, copper and bell -metal and 
besides these were the handicrafts such as enamelling and 
damascening. The number of such handicrafts in the 
cities of India was large. In the bigger cities each 
craft was organised into guilds which looked to the 
welfare of the members and the quality of the product. 
(D.R. Gadgil - The Industrial Evolution of India, p.33) . 
At the eve of the Industrial Revolution in England 
it may be said that India, industrially, was not behind 
the other countries of the world of the time. The 
extent of her trade in the products of her industries 
bears witness to the quality and appreciation of her 
industrial products. 
SECTION 2. THE BRITISH CONNECTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN INDIA. 
In attempting to take stock of the main features of 
Indian economic evolution in the 19th century note has 
to be taken of three very important landmarks. These 
are (1) the setting up of British Dominion over India. 
This movement occupied more than a century, and began 
in 1765 when Clive accepted the Diwani of Bengal, Behar 
and Orissa. By the beginning of the 19th century the 
East India Company, and through it the British power, 
had become the most important territorial power in India 
and/ 
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and one effect of it was the setting up then of its 
judicial and administrative system over the country. 
(2) In 1813 the East India Company's monopoly of 
British trade with India was ended and the trade was 
thrown open to British enterprise. This was brought 
about by many factors. One of these was that the 
Company's trade of importing into England the textile 
products of India and the competition engendered thereby 
and the feeling that the Company's trade was not help- 
ing British manufacturers to find new markets or supply- 
ing them with the much needed raw material led to a 
certain amount of discontent that became very vocal every 
time the Charter had to be renewed. When the time came 
for the Charter to be renewed in 1813 the country was 
in the throes of the Napoleonic War, and its trade was 
greatly hindered and adversely affected by the 
Napoleonic decrees. The position and the result are 
summed up by H.H. Wilson in his history of. India, Vol.1, 
p. 516 thus : - "The exigencies of the commerce of Great 
Britain probably weighed more with the Ministers than 
the arguments and assertions of either party. Excluded 
from the Continent by the decrees of Napoleon, the 
merchants and manufacturers were labouring under alarming 
difficulties; the country was menaced by severe distress 
unless some new vent for the issue of its industrial 
products could be discovered, some new hopes could be 
held/ 
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held out to animate the drooping energies of manufacture 
and trade. To this great necessity the interests of a 
single corporation was bound to yield ". Thus came to an 
end the East India Company's trade monopoly but it was 
still a very big factor in British trade with India. 
What the ending of this monopoly and the throwing open 
of the trade to British private enterprise meant was 
summed up by C.J. Hamilton in "Trade Relations Between 
England and India" thus "the Company had confined itself 
in the main to the old methods and the old branches of 
commerce but private traders brought a special commercial 
ability and a new enterprise to bear, with the result 
that they opened up markets in India for an increased 
variety of British commodities and at the same time began 
to export from India many articles which had never formed 
part of the company's trade" (p. 206). 
The third of the land marks was the Industrial 
Revolution in England and its effects on the English. 
economy. Bearing in mind the prevailing ideas of the 
time as to the economic relations of a country and its 
overseas possessions it can be inferred that the opening 
decades of the 19th century saw British commercial enter- 
prise getting ready to push British manufactured goods 
into Indian markets and export from India the raw material 
and foodstuffs needed by their country. In the nature 
of conditions in India at the time the start was a very 
slow one. The lack of internal means of communication 
stood/ 
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stood in the way of rural India feeling the impact of these 
new forces during the first half of the 19th century. It 
was very different with the urban industry of India. Right 
from the beginning of the 19th century Indian handicrafts 
began to feel themselves handicapped in various ways. 
Certainly they were seriously affected by the customs and 
inland duties set up in India under the orders of the 
court of directors of the East India Company. The salient 
features of the important despatch of the 29th July 1814 
were:- (1) to allow free entry to certain manufactures 
from Great Britain carried in British registered or Indian - 
built ships; (2) To reduce the import duty on other 
articles from Great Britain shipped in the same way; 
(3) Having paid the import duty at one port, the articles 
to be exempt from any further duty in their coastwise 
movements from port to port; (4) Double duty to be charged 
on foreign goods; (5) F7.211 refund of all duties to be 
allowed to Indigo, cotton, and hemp only if exported to 
the United Kingdom and on all other articles of export 
a draw back was to be allowed so as to have the duty not 
exceeding 2e; (6) The double duty principle applied 
with reference to shipping was to be continued; (7) 
Positive injuncti.onsto keep the inland duties regulations 
as they were in force; (8) No higher export or import 
duties to be levied at Bombay and Madras than those at 
Bengal. The Bengal rates to be considered maximum. 
They may have lower rates. (N.J. Shah - History of 
Indian Tariffs, p.49. ) According to these regulations, 
some/ 
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some favoured British manufactures could enter India duty 
free and others paid no more than 2-11. Products of 
foreign countries entering India if brought by British 
ships paid 5% and if by foreign ships 10%. As regards 
exports from India,those exports expressly needed by 
British Industries, such as cotton, hemp and indigo paid 
no export duty. All other exports to the United Kingdom 
paid 2 %. The mercantilist impress of the regulations as 
a whole is patent and reflects the prevailing vogue of 
thought as to the relations of a country and its oversea 
possessions. Indian industries, an integral factor in 
Indian economic life were ruinously handicapped by the 
inland duties. "A 5% duty was imposed upon raw cotton 
brought from one district to another. If after it had 
been manufactured into yarn it was then transported a 
further 2 was levied. When it was carried from the 
place where it was converted into cloth a further 2% 
became due. If the cloth was then dyed it would again 
pay another 2i% and thus the native manufacturer before 
placing the finished goods on the market might have had 
to pay a total of 17.5%. Similarly in the case of 
leather no better method could have been devised 
for stifling the natural growth of industries and 




Against the background of the import duties levied 
on British manufactures entering India and the inland duties 
on the products of Indian industries it is interesting to 
set the duties that at that time were levied on Indian manu- 
factures entering England. For example the duties levied 
in 1813 on Indian goods entering England were as follows : - 
Calicoes for every £100 value . £81. 2. 11. 
Cotton raw per 100 lbs. . £ 0.16. 11. 
Cotton manufactured . . £81. 2. 11. 
Hair or goats' wool manufactures £84. 6. 3. 
Flowered or stitched muslins or white calicoes 
£100 £32. 9. 2. 
Other manufactures of cotton not otherwise 
charged £32. 9. 2. 
(Digby - 'Prosperous British India' p. 90). 
H.H. Wilson in his history of India, Vol .II , p. 559, 
summed up the situation created thus "the customs had some- 
what declined but this arose from a measure adopted shortly 
after the renewal of the Charter by which, in consequence 
of orders from home, the duties were generally lowered and 
a variety of articles - the produce or manufactures of 
Great Britain - wholly exempted from any charge upon their 
being imported into India. As similar immunities were 
not granted to the manufactures or products of India in 
the ports of the United Kingdom, this was a piece of selfish 
legislation/ 
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legislation in which the interests of the dominant country 
were alone consulted and those of the subordinate dependency 
deliberately injured, the latter being not only deprived 
of a legitimate source of revenue but being exposed to an 
unequal competition under which native industry was rapidly 
decaying ". Indian industries seriously suffered from 
these measures aimed at them,and in 1823 the Court of 
Directors of the East India Company reduced the inland duty 
on piece goods from 7 to 2 equalising the duties on 
home manufactures and British imports and at this time 
Indian piece goods exports still paid an export duty 
varying from 2 to 7 according to British or foreign 
ships and destinations. (N.J. Shah - History of Indian 
Tariffs p. 119 - p. 120) 
By 1830 Indian industries were seriously on the decline 
and the industrial depression in India was severe. British 
manufactures had established themselves in Indian markets. 
"In the course of this short period of 20 years(1813 -1833) 
cotton piece goods which had been the great export staple 
of India from the earliest times had been almost entirely 
superseded in the market of the world by the produce of our 
own looms and now they seem to be on the point of sinking 
before the unequal competition even in the market of their 
history of Indian Tariffs 
own country ". (N.J. Shah 
n 
p.119). A new problem presented 
itself. The decline of the export of Indian manufactures 
has/ 
J 
has been explained. Exports of Indian raw produce also 
declined because of the discriminating duties set up in 
accordance with the Navigation Acts, goods to foreign ports 
and in foreign ships being charged higher rates. It is 
India's exports that pay for her imports and foreign 
obligations and the decline in exports contained the threat 
of diminishing British imports. The matter was immediately 
referred to a Select Committee in 1830 and their findings 
are interesting in that not a word was said in it about 
reviving or encouraging Indian industries. The Committee 
observed - "the chief manufactures of India having been 
supplanted to a great extent by the manufactures of 
England not only in the market of this country but in that 
of India itself, it has become an object of the deepest 
interest to improve the production of soil ". (P.P. 646 
H. of C. 1830 p.4) The outcome of their finding was 
(1) the grant to Europeans of the right, till then pro- 
hibited to them, to hold land in India. With the grant 
to Europeans of the right to hold land in India after 
1833 begins the period of plantations in India. Tea 
planting began about 1835 though the actual foundations 
of the present tea industry were laid between 1856 - 
1859; coffee planting began about 1840 and became a 
thriving business by 1860. The attempt to increase 
the agricultural produce of India found itself seriously 
handicapped by the lack of internal means of communica- 
tion and that brings us to the attempts to open up the 
country/ 
* P.P. = Parliamentary Papers. 
country by means of roads and railways. The opening up 
of the country began rapidly after 1850. Lord Dalhousie 
in his famous Minute of 1853 (W.W. Hunter - Marquis of 
Dalhousie pp.193-4) made clear the possibilities of 
railway development in increased trade whereby the markets 
for Britain's manufactures in India could be increased and 
British industries could get all the raw produce they needed. 
He referred also to the wide field that Indian railways 
would offer for the investment of British capital. The 
rising of 1857 impressed upon the rulers of. India the 
military necessity of railways and road ways and the 
Lancashire cotton famine that ensued in 1861 consequent on 
the outbreak of the American Civil War led to brisk 
activity on the part of Government in building roads to 
open up the cotton tracts and connect them with, the ports. 
The opening up of the country by railways and roads 
saw the beginning of the end of the economic isolation of 
the Indian village. This was revealed when following the 
outbreak of the American Civil War and the closing of the 
Ports of the south,the price of cotton in India began to 
rise. In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened for traffic. 
The shortening of the route to the west by about 4,000 
miles and the supersession of the sailing boat by the 
large steam ship led in time to a fall in freights and 
Indian raw produce came to have much easier access to 
the world markets and Indian agriculture came to be 
influenced by it. The latter half of. the 19th century 
was/ 
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was a period of expanding industrial activity in the 
west and the demand for raw produce for food and indus- 
tries began to show particular strength. Another im- 
portant factor was that a money economy was slowly but 
surely establishing itself in Indian economic life. 
To cater to the world's demand there came the new dis- 
coveries of the money metal in Australia and California. 
The combined effect was a rise in agricultural prices. 
The effects of this on Indian agriculture may be set 
down as making for (a) an extension of agriculture and 
(b) a specialization of crops. The old self- sufficing 
economy of the Indian village did not have the stimulus 
to bring under the plough all its available land or to 
put it economically to the best use. The link with world 
markets brought in a new demand reflected by rising 
prices and thus followed an extension of the area under 
agriculture. There also emerges the distinction of food 
crops and money crops. Food grains being a vital need 
of the country could never be ousted from agriculture 
and they maintained their position in the agriculture of 
the country but there was a definite increase in the 
cultivation of the agricultural non -food crops. The 
incentive of rising prices led to land being put to the 
crops they can grow best and thus there resulted a 
specialisation of crops as for example tea on the Uplands, 
jute in Bengal, and cotton in Berar. (p.8 Report of the 
Indian Industrial Commission Cmd 51 of 1919) 
35. 
It has been made clear so far that the outstanding 
factor dominating and determining the course of economic 
evolution in India in the 19th century was British 
dominion over India, which tended to express itself so 
far as the economic life of the country was concerned 
in terms of the attitude of mercantile imperialism to- 
wards colonies. The chief event that determined the 
shape and course of the economic policy pursued by 
Britain in India in the first half of the 19th century 
was the Industrial itevolution and its effect in making 
Great Britain in the main a country specialising in 
certain select manufactures. The movement that in the 
second half of the 19th century shaped British economic 
policy in India was the progress of the free trade 
movement in Great Britain. 
After the rising of 1857,British dominion in India 
which till then was administered by the East India 
Company passed over directly into the hands of the 
British Government and began to be ruled by a Governor 
General responsible through the Secretary of State 
for India to Parliament. 
36. 
THE INDUSTRIAL DEVFT,OPMENT OF INDIA. 
The industrial development in the country up to that time 
may here be taken account of as a good deal of the history 
of the latter half of the 19th century revolves round 
their rise and progress. The first cotton mill was started 
in Bombay in 1854. The progress of this infant industry 
was held up from 1861 by the high price of cotton ruling 
in the country in the years following the Lancashire cotton 
famine and the consequent huge export of cotton from India. 
Exports of cotton rose from 509,695 bales in 1859 to 
1 ,266 ,513 bales in 1865. After 1874 the industry de- 
veloped rapidly and the growth of the industry was en- 
tirely due to the advantages it had in raw material and 
labour and the big potential home market it had for its 
products. By the year 1879 there were 56 mills in India 
having 1,453,000 spindles and 13,000 looms and employing 
43,000 labourers. By 1894 these had grown to 144 mills 
with 3,711,669 spindles, 34,161 looms and employed 
139,578 labourers.(D.k.Gadgil :Industrial Evolution of India pp.5 
& 74) 
Till about 1830 the weaving of jute cloth was done 
by the Bengal hand -loom weaver. After this date the 
Dundee jute manufacturing industry began and the Indian 
hand loom industry declined. Jute mills were started 
in Bengal after 1854 and the industry developed very 
rapidly having the undoubted advantages of favourable 
situation and a monopoly of the supply of the raw 
material/ 
I. G. Watt - Dictionary of Economic products of India, Cotton. 
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material. By the year 1894 there were in India 29 jute 
mills employing 75,157 persons and the number of looms 
and spindles were respectively 10,048 and 201,217. (Ibid p. 77) 
The feature of interest in Indian economic history 
after 1860 was the financial situation of the Indian 
Government. The impoverishment of the country consequent 
on the upsetting of the balance of economic life follow- 
ing the decline of Indian handicrafts and the enormously 
swollen expenditure caused by the rising of 1857 led to 
a situation which became very difficult. James Wilson 
the first finance member of the Government of India re- 
viewing the financial situation of the Indian Government 
from 1854 summed it up in his financial statement by 
saying that "the normal state of Indian finances may be 
said to be deficiency of income and addition to debt" 
(p.p. 339 H.C. 1860, p.79 - First Financial Statement). 
In view of the growing foreign trade of the country he 
looked to a revision of the customs duties for add- 
itional revenue. Accordingly Act VII of 1859 was 
passed consisting of the following items: I. The 
abolition of the system of differential duties. This 
was a corollary to the abolition of the Navigation Acts 
which took place between 1854 -1859. II. A general 
import duty of 10% ad valorem cotton twist being sub- 
ject to 5% only as a concession rate to the hand loom 
weavers/ 
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weavers who were in a sorry plight at the time as a re- 
sult of the competition of imported cotton piece goods. 
III. Luxuries to be subjected to 20% ad valorem duty. 
IV. A general export duty of 3%. V. With the ex- 
the 
ception of grain, no increase in export duties. VI. A 
very limited number of articles of export and import 
constituted free lists. (P.P. 81, Session II H.0.1859,pp.17 -18) 
The tariff that Wilson set up in 1859 tried to do 
what had to be done and that was to combine the interests 
of British industries, commerce and shipping with his 
special responsibility of nursing Indian finances back 
to health. Yet an export duty is defensible only when 
the exporting country has a monopoly of the supply of 
the commodity and there is a strong world demand for it 
and no danger of substitutes being found for it elsewhere. 
Not all of India's exports fell within that class. With 
the rising tide of the import trade and India's position 
as a debtor country it was essential that the export 
trade should be encouraged to meet her foreign obliga- 
tions. The developments following Wilson's tariff of 1859 
are interesting. The European Chambers of Commerce in 
India did not like it. They felt that the new import 
duties would injuriously affect British imports and 
their import trade. They were also afraid that the 5% 
duty on yarn imports might encourage the hand -loom weaver 
to compete with the British piece goods imports. The 
needs/ 
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needs of Indian finances did not interest them. The 
memorial of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce closed with 
the following statement: "In conclusion your memorial- 
ists would venture respectfully to express a hope that 
the commercial policy of her Majesty's government in 
India will not be inaugurated by a departure from those 
principles of free trade which are now recognized in 
England as the basis of commercial prosperity ". 
(Parliamentary Papers 81, Session II. H.C. 1859, pp.10 
to 15). They were able to force the hands of the 
finance member who recognized their objections and in- 
corporated them in Act X of 1860. The features of this 
Act were the following. I. The import duty was brought 
down from 20% to 10%, and 10% became the general import 
duty. II. The duty on imported twist and yarn was 
raised from 5% to 10% and thus offset any advantage the 
handloom weaver might get from the lower tariff in com- 
petition with British piece goods imports. The general 
export duty was maintained at 3% but wool, hides, jute 
and tea were added to the free list. Indigo, salt -petre, 
lac, shellac and grain were the only important articles 
subject to special export duties. In 1861 the import 
duty on cotton twist and yarn was reduced from 10% to 5 %. 
(Financial Statement 1861 -62.) Cotton mills were rising 
in India and had the 10% duty been retained the Indian 
hand -loom weaver might have used Indian mill -spun yarn and 
thus/ 
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thus Indian mills would have been encouraged. In spite 
of a deficit of £6,000,000 in 1861 the import duty on 
yarn was reduced from 10% to 5% and the internal salt tax 
Financial Statement 1661 -2. 
was increased In 1862 the yarn import duty was further 
reduced from 5% to 3 and the import duty on cotton goods 
Financial Statement 1862 -3. 
was reduced from 10% to 5%. (Act XI of 1862) h In 1864 
the general import duty was reduced from 10% ad valorem 
to 7¡%. From this it seems clear that the free trade plea 
of the European Chambers of Commerce had come to be accepted 
by the Secretary of State of India and was being applied. 
Financial Statement 1864 -5. 
(Act XXIII of 1864)A In 1867 as a result of changes in 
the constitution of the tariff schedules forty articles 
were exempted from import and eighty -eight from export 
duties and tariff valuations were revised to meet the 
changes in prices since 1860. (Act XVII of 1867). 
Imports of merchandise increased from 14.2 million pounds 
in 1856 -7 to 32.60 million pounds in 1873 -4, and during 
the same period exports rose from 25.33 million pounds to 
54.96 million pounds. The revenue from customs however 
declined from 3.02 million pounds in 1860 to 2.40 million 
pounds in 1873 -74. (Moral and laaterial Progress Report 
1873 -74, pp. 48-49) . 
Import duties as they stood in India in 1874 were 
cotton 
7z% ad valorem general, 5% onivpiece goods, and 5i% on 
yarns and twists. Cotton manufactures were the main 
individual item of the import trade. In 1873 -4 merchan- 
dise/ 
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merchandise imports were valued at 31.63 million pounds 
and of these cotton goods were valued at 17.78 million 
pounds. (Annual Statement of the Trade of British India 
1873 -4). As these entered the country at the lower rate, 
the real level of the duties were rather misrepresented 
by the 7£% general rate. It was clear that the rate of 
duties was very low and that Indian financial considera- 
tions had been sacrificed to foster foreign trade and 
British industries, commerce and shipping. Strict ad- 
herence to free trade principles would demand the levy- 
ing of a countervailing excise in all cases where goods 
of the type imported were locally produced. That Indian 
cotton manufactures did not have an excise duty imposed 
on them is not to be regarded as a reflection on the free 
trade zeal of the government of India. Levying a counter- 
vailing excise duty,was a matter of great practical dif- 
ficulty,as the hand loom weavers who were scattered over 
the whole country would be difficult to rope in,and for 
that reason an excise duty on mill products only,would 
savour of discrimination. This seems the main reason why 
the industry was spared. 
The occasion of a general election in 1874 saw the 
launching of a Lancashire attack on the cotton duties 
for their abolition. In a Memorial to the Secretary of 
State for India the Manchester Chamber of Commerce stated amQn othhei 
thIn 
that a large number of new mills are now being projected". 
In is 
(Parliamentary Papers 56 H.C. 1876 p.38.) The attack 
carried/ 
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carried the implication that the existing cotton goods 
import duties were providing the protection for the 
Indian mills to rear themselves. Sensitive to such 
charges, the Government of India in November 1874 
appointed a tariff committee for revising the tariff 
rates and valuations and for examining the articles sub- 
ject to import and export duties. The members of the 
Committee unanimously rejected the demand of Manchester 
for the abolition of the cotton import duties. They 
however recommended to the Government the reduction of 
tariff valuation. Their finding was that India posses- 
ses natural advantages over Manchester for producing 
coarse cotton goods irrespective of the existence or 
otherwise of import duties; that the prospect of any 
enterprise to produce in India finer kinds of yarn and 
cloth with profit or success was notoriously remote; that 
there was no serious competition between Indian and 
English cotton industries and that the Manchester demand 
for the total and immediate repeal of the cotton duties 
in India when one - fortieth of the total import of 
British cotton goods was affected by a total competition 
P.P. 56 H.C. 1876 was unjustifiable and unreasonablert. Following up the 
findings of the Committee the Government of India passed 
P.P. 56 H.C. 1876 
Act XVI of 1875. The main features of the Act were 
(1) export duties except on indigo, rice and lac were 
abolished (2) the general import duty was reduced from 
7 to 5 %, (3) general tariff valuations were revised. 
While/ 
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While retaining the 5% import duty on cotton piece goods 
and the 511 duty on imported yarn they revised the tariff 
valuation for cotton goods to the extent of diminishing 
the amount derived from the duty by £88,000, (4) a 5% 
duty was imposed on the import of raw cotton, (5) special 
duties were imposed on spirits, wines, arms and ammunitions. 
(Act XVI of 1875.) The implications of this tariff act 
demand some attention. To begin with it meant a financial 
loss annually of £308,000. (Parliamentary Papers 56, 
pages 4,5 
1876.) Then there is the tendency to do away with export 
duties, which in the light of their history, was quite 
welcome. Export duties were levied, always leaving free 
those going to the United Kingdom. This made export duties 
financially far from being a success. Export duties in 
a period of brisk opening up of new areas in the world 
led to alternative supplies or substitutes. Such was 
the case of the Indian trade in salt -petre. Under the 
plea of a general export duty a duty of 3% had been levied 
on exports of Indian cotton goods. Surprise may be felt 
at such a state of. affairs (a) because of the normal 
attitude to manufactured exports in Europe which was one 
of encouragement as providing employment for the export- 
ing country (b) the Indian cotton goods manufacturing 
industry was an infant industry and as such if it was 
not to be encouraged at least could be expected to be 
freed from handicaps. This only draws attention to 
the / 
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the very different policy pursued in and for India by 
its conquerors. What made this export duty even more 
iniquitous was the fact that to a certain extent India's 
cotton goods exports were made from imported yarn which 
paid a 3 import duty and thus the total burden on the 
exported goods became in some cases not 3% but 62%. 
As against this British goods imported into India when 
re- exported to Asiatic or African markets received seven - 
eighth drawback of the imported duty paid and as a 
result the position of India cotton goods exports in 
competition with British goods in foreign markets was 
one of a very severe handicap. (Parliamentary Papers 56, 
1876, p. 20.) Similar in its effects on the finances 
of the country was the reduction on tariff valuations 
which eased the burden of the cotton,duty on imports to 
the extent of 288,000. The import duty of 5% on imports 
of raw cotton was an innovation. India being a grower 
and exporter of short staple cotton could only import 
the longer stapled American or Egyptian variety for 
the spinning of finer yarns. Free trade should have 
meant freedom even for India to do so as an economic 
proposition,if she could. But if she did,it would be 
a threat to Lancashire's cotton goods'export trade to 
India and the 5% import duty on imports of raw cotton 
was intended to discourage her from spinning finer yarns. 
In addition to passing this Act XVII of 1875 the 
Government/ 
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Government of India even offered to revise the import 
duty on imported yarn from to 5% if Manchester 
felt that the lower duty gave an incentive to Indian 
mills to weave finer cotton goods from 
The Government further stated "If in spite of such pre- 
cautions to Indian mill manufactures should assume more 
important dimensions than at present, then there appeared 
no doubt that the proper course would be not a repeal 
of the import duty with its concomitant resort to more 
objectionable taxation but the imposition of an excise 
duty. Home and imported goods would thus be put on 
an absolute equality and the revenue, unobjectionable, 
derived from clothing would be preserved ". (Parliamentary 
Papers 56 H.C. 1876 p.19) Manchester however had made 
up its mind that it would have nothing less than the 
repeal of the cotton duties and Lord Salisbury accepted 
the office of Secretary of State for India in 1g74 
pledged to achieve it. In 1877 a m sa AtAd' free trade 
triumvirate' - men known to be convinced free traders - 
Lord 
consisting ofiSalisbury the Secretary of State for 
Lord 
India,,Lytton the Governor -General and Sir John Strachey 
set itself to work for the repeal of the cotton duties 
in particular and all import duties in general. On the 
10th July 1877 a resolution was passed in the House 
of Commons for the immediate and total abolition of 
the cotton duties in India. (Hansard - vol.235, p.1126) 
The/ 
* The finance member of the Government of India. 
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The Government of India acted at once. In March 1878 
(a) the import duty on raw cotton was removed (b) a 
large number of articles which yielded insignificant 
revenues were transferred to the free list (c) coarse 
cotton goods were exempted from import duties.(Financial Statement 
1878 -9) 
Manchester complained that these measures did not go 
far enough and the Government of India appointed a 
tariff commission which exempted from duties all cotton 
cloth made of yarn up to 30's. As India at this 
time produced only yarn up to 20's and cloth from it, 
the exemption from duties of yarn up to 30's and cloth 
made from it was more than was necessary especially to 
a financially hard -pressed Government. The revenues of 
India suffered to the extent of Z200,000 by the exemption 
of coarse goods from import duty and this at a time when 
there was a budget deficit, an Afghan war on hand, an 
internal situation that necessitated the diversion of 
the ear - marked famine-insurance fund, a fall in exchange 
and the persistence of the effects of the terrible 
famine of 1877. (Parliamentary Papers 241, H.C. 1879 , 
p.36.) Gladstone expressed himself in the House of 
Commons over the remission of the cotton duty on coarse 
cloth in a debate on revenue accounts thus: - 
"With regard to the remission of import duties, there 
seems to me to be something distinctly repugnant in the 
way it has been done in the time of India's distress 
and difficulty by the Government of a party which has 
done/ 
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done all in its power to retain every protective duty 
in this country and which from year to year, as the 
occasion rises, advises the Crown to assent to Colonial 
Acts imposing fresh duties upon British manufactures. 
What an invidious, almost odious picture of inequality 
to exhibit to the millions of India. The free trade 
doctrines that we hold so dear,that we apply against 
the feeling of the Indian people in their utmost rigor, 
and without a grain of mercy, disappear in a moment 
when it is a question dealing with those interests and 
opinions we cannot lightly tamper with, namely the free 
colonists of the Empire. The Governor- General says 
that he cannot see that financial difficulty can in any 
way be pleaded against what he calls fiscal reform. 
If that be a true principle of government, it has been 
discovered for the first time by the present Viceroy. 
There has not been a free trade government in this or 
any other country which has not freely admitted that 
the state of the revenue is an essential element in the 
consideration of the application even of the best 
principles of free trade." (Hansard Vol.246 June 12, 
1879, PP. 1745-46.) 
In 1882 -83 on the basis of existing taxation a 
surplus of more than three million pounds were esti- 
mated and that gave an opportunity for another attempt 
for the total repeal of the cotton duties. Moreover, 
there/ 
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there arose administration difficulties in the levying of 
duties largely as a result of the exemption of coarse 
cloth woven out of yarn up to 30's. All these,combined 
to make Major Baring,the finance member decide to abolish 
all import duties. The bulk of the imports into India 
were cotton goods. If, therefore, the cotton duties were 
abolished the remaining import duties would be of com- 
paratively little financial value. Their abolition 
while it would entail some financial loss to government 
revenues would be very welcome to the vested interests 
of British industries and trade. Accordingly all 
import duties except the special duties on wines, 
spirits, arms and ammunition, salt and opium were 
abolished. (Financial Statement. 1882 -83. pages 46, 47) 
Thus from 1882 India entered on a free trade period 
in which free trade meant not merely a trade policy 
free from any tariff with a protective intention or 
effect but a trade free from any duty. The measure 
meant a net loss to the Indian treasury of Z1,108,000. 
The part played by the government of India in this is 
very unpleasant reading. It was convinced that the 
cotton duties were entirely revenue duties and had 
neither a protective intent, or effect and yet 
worked for their abolition. In a dispatch written 
on the 31st May 1894 the Secretary of State for India 
wrote saying "the increase of importations of piece 
goods/ 
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goods was much more rapid during the last ten years 
of the existence of the cotton duties (1873 -1883) 
than it was during the ten years after the duty was 
abolished (1883 -1893) . (Cmd 7602 of 1895, p.4). 
It is clear that in so far as the abolition of the 
import duties made for the free and abundant entry 
of manufactured goods the difficulty of Indian infant 
industries as a result of the severer competition 
became greater. 
The salient points of Indian tariff history from 
1883 -84 were the following. With dwindling income 
from customs duties and increasing expenditure income 
tax was reimposed 1886 deficit of the 
budget of 1885 -86. In 1888 there was another deficit 
and among the measures sought to provide for it were 
(1) an increase in the salt duty and (2) an import 
duty on petroleum. (F.S. 1888 -9). The consumer in 
India came in for a great deal of consideration when 
it was sought to abolish the cotton duties but his 
existence was forgotten when the salt duty was in- 
creased and it has to be borne in mind that the con- 
sumer could hold up his consumption of cloth in a 
way he could not do with salt. The imposition of the 
8% duty on petroleum was based plainly on the follow- 
ing considerations (1) the need of Revenues (2) 
imports/ 
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imports were foreign coming from the U.S.A. and Russia. 
Once again the consumer was ignored. Also ignored were 
free trade principles for a countervailing duty was not 
levied on petroleum produced in India ostensibly because 
it was an infant industry. (Financial Statement 1888 -9) 
aspitalxwmcxxsunangxitx There was another deficit, this 
time in the budget of 1894. The Government of India 
taking the cue from the recommendation of. the 1893 Royal 
Commission on Indian Currency (Parliamentary Papers 143 
H.L. 1894, Pt.1, p.11) doubled the duty on petroleum 
imports and proposed a general 5% import duty leaving 
out cotton goods imports. In 1893-4 imports of 
merchandise into India were to the value of 73.95 million 
L. and cotton manufacture imports amounted to 32,36 
"million £ of this sum. The reason for the exemp- 
tion of cotton goods imports was that "very powerful 
manufacturing interests in England are opposed to 
laying on even a 5% duty". (Parliamentary Papers 143 
H.L. 1894, Pt.1, p.57). The continued fall in the 
price of silver increased the financial embarrassments 
of the Government of India and forced them to consider 
the inclusion of cotton goods imports under the 5% 
general import duty. Its exclusion had led to a 
great deal of discontent in India. Sir James Westland, 
the then finance member, after conducting an inquiry 
into the competition between cotton. goods imports 
and/ 
51. 
and Indian cotton manufactures and being convinced that 
"of the manufactures of India 94% is absolutely outside 
the range of any competition with Manchester, being the 
coarser quality of goods (24's and under) which Manchester 
cannot pretend to supply so cheaply as India." (P.P. 
7602, 1895, p.11) recommended that import duties should 
be imposed at a rate of (a) 5% ad valorem on all cotton 
piece goods, (b) 3l.% ad valorem on all cotton yarns 
of counts above 24, (c) that an excise duty of 33% 
ad valorem should be levied on all machine made cotton 
yarns produced at mills in British India of counts 
above 24" (P. 14) The Secretary of State for India 
modified the proposal by raising the duty on yarns to 
5% and leviable on yarns above 20's instead of 24 -, 
and it was put on the Indian Statute 
book as Act XVII of 1894. In response to the 
agitation of Lancashire the cotton tariff was changed 
in 1896 and by the change (1) only woven goods both 
imported and manufactured in Indiarteo be taxed at a 
uniform rate of 3' instead of 5%. (2) All yarns 
imported or manufactured in India were to be free of duty. 
(C. 8078 of 1896, p.25 -32) . If according to Sir James 
Westland 94% of Indian cotton manufactures were out- 
side the range of competition with imported cotton piece - 
goods,the imposition of an excise on all of it 
reflects the fear that the Indian commodity might be 
substituted/ 
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substituted for the imported if the duty was not also 
levied on it to the same amount. 
This brings to an end the survey of the economic 
policy developed during the 19th century in India. 
As it has been necessary to go into the details of 
the economic policy pursued by Britain in India during 
the 19th century, the chapter might be brought to a 
close with a brief resume of the main facts described 
in it. It has been noted that British dominion over 
India became effective when the Industrial revolution 
began to bear its fruits in Great Britain. What was 
needed by Great Britain was large markets to take her 
manufactured goods and in return provide her with raw 
materials and foodstuffs. To achieve that end with 
success meant making India entirely or mainly a pro- 
ducer of raw material and thus bring her into a scheme 
of a division of labour with Great Britain mainly 
which would,by the necessity for exchange,increase 
trade. The treatment meted out to Indian industries 
in the early part of the 19th century has been noted. 
Then the country was opened up and that led to the 
extension of the one industry that was to be encouraged 
Agriculture and trade began to grow. 
The next stage was the progress of the Free Trade 
movement and its extension to India. It will be 
noted/ 
53. 
noted that some of the zeal with which it was sought to 
make India a free trade country was partly accountable 
to the world of Europe and the United States of America 
and the self- governing dominions becoming protectionist. 
India was a worthy substitute for all of them put to- 
gether because with her heavy population her market as 
history later proved, could be a very valuable one. 
Thus it has been seen that the finances of the country 
were sacrificed to provide a good market for B ritisr. 
manufactures and India became a free trade country in 
the eighties. 
Now if the people of every country have to live in 
their country and earn their livelihood there, it follows 
unquestionably that they should be free to embark on 
all the lines of economic activity that their own ability 
and the natural resources of their country offers them. 
This is a position dictated by natural laws and it is 
not in any way altered or weakened by the fact of a 
country being self -governing or not. To do anything 
else is to give an unnatural twist to economic life and 
it must be borne in mind that an unnatural twist needs 
a lot of pressure to maintain. Inevitably the pressure 
is bound to weaken and the recovery follows as a reaction. 
It can be fairly justly claimed that the trend of the 
post -war history of trade is evidence of that. 
The/ 
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The Indian issue of the period that is being con- 
sidered is bigger than the Free Trade Vs. Protection 
issue. To say that it was not so is considerably to 
detract from the interest and importance of it. 
Free trade alone cannot prevent a country from develop- 
ing industrially and rearing industries provided she has 
natural resources and the market for it, home or foreign. 
All the protection in the world cannot help a country 
to rear industries for which she has not the advantages. 
From the economic point of view,the Free Trade Vs. 
Protection issue comes nearest, being a real issue in 
the case of a country with advantages for rearing in- 
dustries but actually industrially undeveloped, having 
to face competition in her markets from industrially 
adult countries. Free traders, as for example the 
Committee of Economists presided over by Sir William 
Beveridge in their book "Tariffs: the case examined ", 
make out that it is best for infant industries to 
grow under Free Trade conditions and that their growth 
under Free Trade will in fact be sounder than under 
the shelter of tariff walls. While theoretically 
their arguments seem sound, the weakness of their 
position is the fact that history provides no serious 
example in the post -industrial revolution period of 
a country rearing its industries under a regime of 
Free Trade. 
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outstanding Free Trade country, built up her industries 
under a system of strict and stringent protection and 
emerged a Free Trade country when her industrial supremacy 
and leadership were unchallenged. The reason it seems 
why history does not provide us with serious examples of 
undeveloped countries rearing themselves industrially 
under a regime of Free Trade,which theoretically has been 
proved to be quite possible,is that when a country embarks 
on industrialisatien,the impatient democracies of 
National States want spectacular, early, and tangible 
results. They are egged on in this by the vested interests 
of these industries and a democratic system lends itself 
to pandering to the populace. This is a digression 
but it is necessary. 
The Indian issue of the period it may be repeated 
was not the Free Trade Vs. Protection issue. Indian 
industries could have reared themselves under a regime 
of Free Trade if the State could have given them what 
every other state did for the industries of its people. 
Just that and no more. The necessity for this was greater 
in India because of the transfer of economic initiative 
into its hands,as a result of its big place in the life 
of the country and its centralised control of the arteries 
of economic life. Great Britain chose to specialise 
in Industries and one reason among others for this was 
that/ 
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that "however cheap manufactured goods became during 
the 19th century they never became relatively so cheap 
as agricultural produce. It paid therefore to be a 
manufacturing country ". In India on the other hand her 
economic policy frowned on industrial development. Once 
again Great Britain reared her industries under a severe 
regime or protection and emerged into Free Trade when her 
industrial leadership and supremacy were almost un- 
challenged. In her undeveloped industrial state India 
on the other hand,was theoretically to develop herself 
under a regime or ±ree Trade in which the competition 
fair and unfair could be far more severe. The Free Trade 
policy for India was being implemented exactly at the 
time when Great Britain was granting the self -governing 
dominions fiscal autonomy and the right to rear tariffs. 
If the need for industrial development was necessary for 
these newly occupied countries with no industries and small 
populations,it was infinitely more necessary for India 
but the difference of treatment is striking. The truth 
is that mercantilist imperialism baulked of action in 
the self - governing dominions found an infinitely better 
alternative place to extend its sway over,in India 
and the result was the Economic policy pursued in India 
by Britain. in the 19th century., Adam Smith's passion 
for human well-being and his prophetic insight are 
realised when writing at the close of the 18th century 
he/ 
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he said in his 'Wealth of Nations' "To prohibit a great 
people however from making all that they can of every 
part of their produce or from employing their stock and 
industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to 
themselves is a manifest violation of the most sacred 
P.91 
rights of mankind" (Bk. IV, Ch. VII) And again "here- 
after perhaps the natives of these countries may grow 
stronger or those of Europe may grow weaker and the 
inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world 
may arrive at that equality of courage and force which 
by inspiring mutual fear can alone overawe the injustice 
of independent nations into some sort of respect for 
the rights of one another" (Bk. IV, Ch. VII) p.159 
58. 
CHAPTER IV. 
TRADE EXPANSION 1900-1914 
AND THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO IT. 
A. GENERAL. 
Evidence of the fact of a world -wide expansion of trade during 
1900 -14 is provided by the following table. 
Foreign trade per head of population. 
Population 
in Millions 
1900 1905. 1910 1913 
Z. s. d. L. s. d. L. s. d. Z. s. d. 
India 315 0: 8: 4 0:11: 4 0:14: 3 0:17: 7 
Russia 164 1: 1: 4 1: 4: 6 1:12: 7 1:12:10 
United 
Kingdom 45 18: 5: 0 19: 0: 2 22: 7: 6 25:14:10 
France 40 9: 1: 2 9:16: 6 13:10: 0 15: 9: 7 
Germany 65 9: 1: 0 10: 8: 6 12: 8: 6 15: 7: 7 
Italy 35 3:15: 2 4:11: 0 6: 2: 7 7: 1: 9 
U.S,A. 92 6: 0: 6 6: 7:10 7: 7: 5 9: 1: 7 
Japan 50 1: 3: 3 1:15: 5 1:18: 0 2:12: 7 
China 400(?) 0: 2:10 0: 5: 1 0: 5: 8 0: 7: 4 
(Source: Review of the trade of India 1914-15, 13.39) 
The foundations of this rising structure of trade were laid 
during the 19th century and economic development during 1900 -1914 
merely built on the foundation laid then. Foreign trade is exchange 
and/ 
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and exchange flourishes and grows in value and volume 
under the following conditions. 
I. An increase in the production of wealth along the 
lines of a geographical division of labour. It has 
been seen that Europe and the United States of America 
came to specialise in the production of manufactured 
goods and in the main the rest of the world,in the pro- 
! 
duction of Raw materials of industry and foodstuffs. 
That was a geographical division of labour along the 
lines of specialisation. The increase in the produc- 
tion of wealth was brought about (a) in the industrial 
world by power production and the adoption of large 
scale production (b) by the extension of primary pro- 
duction in the rest of the world. This was brought 
about by imperialist expansion. The extent of the 
increase of the area of the British Empire during the 
last 30 years of the 19th century has been given 
earlier in this study. During the same period prac- 
tically the whole of the African Continent was par- 
titioned among the great powers, the French espec- 
ially building up a great African empire and Germany 
doing her best, to acquire territories wherever the 
countries earlier in the field would allow them to 
get a footing. Spheres of influence were vigorously 
sought in countries such as China which could not 
be/ 
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be annexed. Another index to the increase in the pro- 
duction of wealth was the growth of population. "The 
rapid growth of population is in itself a stimulus to 
economic development. Among the bourgeoise large 
families militate against the leisured class. Among 
the proletariat they supply the human material neces- 
sary for the working of the industrial system". 
(Source:- Stephen Viljoen : Economic tendencies of 
today, p.7) The total world population as estimated 
by Professor Walter F. Wilcox rose from 813,000,000 in 
1800 to 1495,000,000 in 1900 and 1746,000,000 in 1925. 
(Recent Economic Changes, p.843) and that of Europe 
rose from 190,000,000 in 1800 to 450,000,000 in 1914. 
"One century produced one and a half times as many 
human beings as all previous centuries of European 
life combined ". (Stephen Viijoen :- Economic tend- 
encies of today, p.6). 
II. Development of the institutions that facilitate 
exchange and commerce. (a) Development of the means 
of transport. The latter half of the 19th century 
and the first fourteen years of the twentieth were 
periods of a rapid extension of railways and rail- 
way mileage. The rate of the expansion is real- 
ised from the following figures of average annual 
increase of hallway Mileage. 
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Lengths of Railways in Kilometres. 
Europe. Period. World. Europe. Outside 
1841 -50 3000 2000 1000 
1860 -70 10000 5300 4700 
1891 -1900 17000 6000 11000 
1900 -1913 24000 5000 19000 
(Source: - der Moderna Kapitalismus III, pp.288 -7 
quoted by Viljoen in Economic Tendencies of today 
p. 98 ) 
Complementary to the development of internal trans- 
port was the growth in the tonnage of ocean transport. 
This was estimated at 23 million tons in 1900 (A.W. 
Kirkcaldy - British shipping : its history, organ- 
ization and importance.) and rose to 45 million 
tons in 1913 (C. Ernest Fayle - The World "s shipping 
industry, p.297). The effect of the development is 
reflected in the following index numbers of freights. 
The downward tendency may be regarded as a factor con- 
tributing to trade expansion. 
62. 
Mean Yearly Freights - 1900 taken as Standard 
Year. 
Homeward. Outward. 
1900 100 100 
1901 74 71 
1902 64 61 
1903 70.5 53 
1904 71 47 
1905 69.5 55 
1906 69 67.5 
1907 69.8 67.5 
1908 57 63 
1909 63 67.5 
1910 64.4 68.2 
1911 75 82 
1912 105 107.8 
1913 89 91 
(Source: - A.W. Kirkcaldy - British Shipping: its history, 
organization and importance Appendix XVI, p.641). 
III. MONETARY DEVELOPMENT. 
Account must also be taken of the contribution of 
this great institution of economic life to the trade ex- 
pansion of the period. As an institution of economic 
life money so established itself that a failure of the 
quantity of money to expand in response to the increased 
demand for it might have held up or weakened the trade 
expansion/ 
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expansion of the period. The contribution of money to 
the trade expansion lay in the fact that an increased 
supply was able to cope with the increase in demand and 
more than that. A survey of the index number of whole- 
sale prices in the leading trading countries shows an 
unmistakeable tendency in the latter part of the period - 
1910 -1913 - to a rise in prices, liamk a rise in prices, 
big enough to provide the stimulus to production and 
trade, but not to imply a threat to the value of money, 
acts as a lubricant for the wheels of the mechanism of 
production and exchange. In this way money did make 
its contribution to the trade expansion of the period. 
It took nearly the whole of the 19th century for the 
International gold standard to rear itself. The cent- 
ury began with England adopting the gold standard in 
1816 and closed with India coming into the gold group 
in 1899 and between that period all the leading coun- 
tries of the world had adopted it and in 1900 the only 
big country outside the gold group was China which was 
more or less on the silver standard. The adoption of 
the gold standard by countries that had not adopted it 
was hastened towards the end of the 19th century by 
the fall in the price of silver. The world then being 
divided into lending and borrowing countries, lending 
countries were reluctant to lend with the insecurity 
of the falling price of silver and hence silver stand- 
ard/ 
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standard borrowing countries were made to adopt the gold 
standard. It was so in the case of India. The contribu- 
tion of the international gold standard to international 
trade has been summed up by saying that in it "inter- 
national trade and finance the two great limbs of the 
world's economic order had found the monetary vehicle 
which most closely corresponded to their necessities ". 
The reference is to the stability of the exchanges 
secured by the international gold standard during the 
pre War period and 1900 -1914 may be regarded as the 
most successful period of the pre-war international 
gold standard. The emergence of gold as the inter- 
national standard was possible because during the 
period there was an increased gold supply to meet the 
increasing gold demand. The following figures of 
gold production are taken from W.T. Layton's Study 
of Prices, p.160. 

















The increased gold supply enabled the central 
banks to 
strengthen and increase their gold reserves 
and in- 
crease the quantity of credit and guarantee 
converti- 
bility. But it is only right to say that 
while the 
increased supply of gold enabled the strengthening 
of 
the gold basis of credit and the capacity to increase 
it, it was not the cause of the credit expansion of 
the period which expressed itself in a rise in prices. 
This was mainly the result of the opening up of profit- 
able investments which made the supply of capital un- 
equal to the demand and caused a rise in the value of 
stocks and shares of development loans and made them 
the basis of greater borrowing. "The group of years 
with the highest rate of discount is the group 1906 -11 
when the output of gold was at its highest ". (J.A. 
Hobson - Gold and prices, p.141.) 
B. INDIA. 
This section is given to the survey of the forces 
that made for India's response to the general trade ex- 
pansion of the period 1900-14. These are considered on 
the same lines as in the earlier section. 
In Chapter III of this study the economic history of 
India during the 19th century has been surveyed. It was 
seen/ 
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seen there that the policy pursued by Great Britain in 
India was generally to bring India into a scheme of a 
geographical division of labour with her, as a producer 
and exporter of raw material and importer of manufac- 
tures. The implementing of that policy>took the form 
in the early years of the 19th century, in getting out 
of the way of British Manufactured imports the com- 
petition of Indian industrial products. In the latter 
part of the century, it expressed itself in opening up 
the country by means of railways and by a reduction 
of import tariffs, designed to make the capture of the 
Indian market easy for foreign manufactured imports 
which were mainly British industrial products. During 
the period 1900 -1914 there was no change of policy on 
the part of the Government. The import tariffs in 
the main remained the same as they were when they were 
fixed in 1896 and were in the words of Sir Edward Law 
"the lowest in the world ". Government intervened to 
change tariffs only when British imports into India 
were threatened in any way or to provide a gain to a 
powerful British- financed industry in India. 
In justification of the criticism made above the 
following instances may be cited. At the close of the 
19th century the central European powers stimulated 
beet sugar exports by means of bounties. Considering 
the inveterate British habit of sporting the consumer 
this/ 
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this should have been welcomed as the bounties made sugar 
cheap for the consumer in the United Kingdom and in India. 
The colonial office persuaded the Indian government to 
levy an extra import duty on beet sugar not so much be- 
cause it was bounty aided as that as a result of it 
British West Indies sugar planters were in a bad way. 
chiefly 
"We are in this business of the sugarconventionb ecause of 
the West Indies". (Economist P.1844 Nov. 29, 1902.) 
The Indian duty on beet sugar imports was further raised 
in 1903 when it was found that the duty of 1899 was not 
effective. So far as India was concerned the effect of 
the duty was to shut out Central European beet sugar in 
of sugar. was in accordance 
the then recently born idea of Imperial preference. 
Now, when later on in this study the sugar trade is 
studied as an item of the import trade1it will be real - 
isedIthat as a result of the free trade policy pursued 
in India coupled with the laissez faire attitude of 
in regard to Indian industrial development 
Government the Indian sugar industry was generally in 
a poor and stagnant condition. In March 1911 a resolu- 
tion was moved in the Indian legislative council "that 
the duty on imported sugar be so raised as to make it 
possible for the indigenous sugar industry to survive 
the competition to which it is at present exposed ". 
An amendment was moved asking for an inquiry by a com- 
mittee of experts into the means the State could take 
to/ 
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to save the industry from threatened ruins Both the 
resolution and amendment were defeated by the official 
majority. (Source : - Proceedings Vol.XLIX, pp. 415 
431) Now XI= sugar cane growing is an integral part 
of Indian agriculture. The Indian tariff board sugar 
inquiry report of 1931 recognised this and recognised 
it as an industry of national importance. It is also 
seen that British policy was to encourage agriculture 
and discourage industrial development. In the light 
of the attitude to the sugar industry cited above,is 
it wrong to infer that British policy was to encourage 
agriculture so as to increase the export trade in raw 
produce but not to encourage agriculture if it was 
going to affect the import trade in manufactured 
articles. In this case the British. interests affected 
would be mainly,the shipping interests,as at this time 
the bulk of the sugar was from a non-British source - 
Java. Again. in 1910 the duty on kerosene oil imports 
was raised,but the necessity,in strict adherence to 
free trade principles,of a countervailing excise which 
bulked so large in the case of Lancashire cotton manu- 
facture imports into India,was waived in the case of 
the Indian oil industry on the score that it was an 
infant industry: Thus while during the period 1900- 
1914 the tariffs were very low and very few changes 
were made. These examples serve to show under what 
circumstances/ 
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circumstances Government was disposed to intervene and 
raise tariffs. 
Another aspect of the economic policy relevant to 
the matter in hand is the attitude of the Government to 
Industrial development. That attitude has been seen 
to be one of encouragement to agriculture, to increase 
the volume of the export trade and discouragement to 
industrial development. This policy was referred to 
as a policy of laissez faire though it seems incorrect 
to sum up so positive a policy with a title that im- 
plies negation. The thought content of the term 
laissez faire, is, that things are left alone) because 
the industrial initiative of the people being quite 
live,could be trusted to help itself and that would 
be the best for all concerned. When, on the other 
hand industrial initiative has been almost destroyed 
by economic policy, laissez faire under these circum- 
stances comes to have a different content of implica- 
tions. 
Now the situation that brought to the fore the 
unsuitability for the wellbeing of the people, of the 
so called policy of laissez faire supposed to be 
pursued by the Government in India7was the difficult 
economic situation which was that "In India there 
were five famines between 1800 and 1825, two between 
1825 -50, six between 1851 -75 and 18 between 1876- 
1900"/ 
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1900" (Report cf the Indien Industrial Commission, note 
by the Hon. M.M. Malavaiya, p.257) . The Famine Com- 
mission of 1880 in its report said "we have elsewhere 
expressed the opinion that at the root of much of the 
poverty of the people of India and the risks to which 
they are exposed in seasons of scarcity lies the un- 
fortunate circumstance,that agriculture forms almost 
the sole occupation of the mass of the population and 
that no remedy for the present evils can be complete 
which does not include the introduction of a diversity 
of occupations through which the surplus population 
may be drawn from agricultural pursuits and led to 
find means of subsistence in manufactures or some 
such employment". (Report Vol.', p.175). This was 
in 1880. The increasing gravity of the situation 
in the years that followed,made one provincial govern- 
ment in India take some initiative in the matter of 
industrial encouragement and education. What success 
attended that attempt is seen in the chapter in the 
Indian Industrial Commission's Report headed "Govern- 
ment industrial policy in recent years ". On page 70 
of that report occurs the following "From the memo- 
randum it will be seen that step by step the Madras 
Government committed themselves to an increasingly 
active policy for the promotion of industries .... 
These numerous activities aroused the opposition of 
the/ 
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the local European community. The Madras Government 
appointed a special officer under the title of Director 
of Industries to control pioneer enterprises and pract- 
ical industrial education and to establish a bureau of 
industrial information. But when the scheme was 
laid before the Secretary of State for India,the essen- 
tial feature of experiment and demonstration by govern- 
ment agency on a commercial scale,entirely failed to 
secure his approval ". This means that the Secretary 
of State was all out for a laissez faire policy. Now 
whether the economic policy of a government to its 
people should be laissez faire or state help is a 
only 
question that has a meaning,,when considered in rela- 
tion to the capacity of the people to help themselves 
or not. The Secretary of State apparently decided 
this issue on the reasoning that what was good for 
Great Britain must be ipso facto good for India even 
when conditions were so intensely different. More 
need not be said in this connection. 
Another factor which had an effect and influenced 
the trade of the country is the development of the 
means of transport. There was during the period a 
definite increase in the mileage of Railways and 
Roads. Railway mileage in India increased from 
24752 in 1900 -01 to 34656 miles in 1913 -14. One motive 
behind railway development in India is made clear from 
the/ 
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the Dalhousie Minute of 1853 to which reference has 
already been made. Agriculture definitely gained from 
the development of transport in the country as it led 
to a specialisation of crop. (p.8. Industrial Commis- 
sion's Report). Reference has already been made to 
this. It was different when it comes to consider 
the effect of Railways on Indian industrial develop- 
ment. Here Railway policy during this period rather 
clearly bears the marks of the motives that according 
to the Dalhousie Minute of 1853 led to its inaugura- 
tion and development. Surveying Railway policy and 
its effects the Indian Industrial Commission in its 
report said "before the war the major portion of 
Indian Railway traffic flowed in two streams - raw 
products moving towards the ports and imported manu- 
factured articles moving up country from the ports.... 
the policy of the railways has been based on this 
position and has followed and tended to stimulate 
these movements In consequence many in- 
equalities have arisen between goodsfor export or 
imported articles on the one hand and goods for in- 
ternal use or locally manufactured articles on the 
other in areas where Railways compete with one 
another or with water transport and speaking gener- 
ally favourable rates for raw produce moving to the 
ports have resulted (p. 171) The Review of the trade 
of/ 
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of India for 1901 -2 has on page 5 the following "im- 
ported sugar can be laid down more cheaply from Karachi 
than Indian sugar brought into the Punjab from other 
provinces, the railway finding it expedient to concede 
favourable terms for sugar from the ports" . Summing 
up the position that resulted from the economic policy 
as a whole,pursued, Sir Alfred Chatterton in his book 
The Industrial Evolution of India says "The external 
trade of the country has grown at the expense of the 
internal, resulting in an unhealthy and one -sided 
development of the country's resources. Roads, Rail- 
ways, telegraphs, the construction of the Suez Canal 
and every improvement in the means of transport both 
by sea and land have contributed to the difficulties 
and in many cases to the ultimate discomfiture of 
the Indian artisan. The attention of Government 
has been entirely directed to the opening up of the 
land, to the provision of irrigation, assistance has 
in more than one case been given directly to the 
effects of English manufacturers to export to Indian 
markets whilst the industrious artisan has been left 
severely alone to combat as best he can the growing 
difficulties of his position "(p. 20) . 
During the period the area under agriculture 
increased. It was a net area of 197 millions in 
1900 -1 and rose to 219 million acres in 1913-14. 
Of/ 
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Of the total area under crops the area under food grains 
increased from 177 millions in 1900 -01 to 191.5 million 
acres in 1913 -14 and the area under other crops increased 
from 20 to 28 million acres. The area under irrigation 
also increased during the period rising from 30 million . 
acres in 1900 -1 to 46 million acres in 1913 -14. The ex- 
tension of irrigation was an attempt to reduce in so far 
as it was reducible the element of instability inherent 
in the Indian agricultural economy by its dependence on 
the Monsoon for the water supply for agriculture occupa- 
tions. There was some progress industrially in the well 
established cotton and jute manufacturing industries; 
this will be seen more in detail in the part of this 
study referring to the trade in these commodities. 
Another factor contributing to India's response 
to the trade expansion of the period was the exchange 
stability of the period. Trade thrives with stable 
exchange and unlike the period 1870 to 1899 or even 
1919 -1925 the period 1900 -1914 was one of stable ex- 
change and except for one short lapse in November 1907 
the exchange rate during the period kept within the 
gold points of the is 4d rate. While during the per- 
iod then the International gold standard saw to the 
stability of the exchanges within the gold group the 
value of silver fluctuated during the period in terms 
of gold and thus there was an element of instability 
which/ 
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which may theoretically 
be expected to have an effect on 
India's trade with China. 
The fluctuations in the gold 
value of silver during the period 
is seen from the follow- 
ing table of the average 
annual price of silver in London. 
Year. Price of Silver 
per 




1902 24- ) 
1903 241 ) 





1906 30$ ) 
1907 30íg 
r 
1908 24g ) - 716 
1909 23ió ) 
1910 24; ) + 4 
1911 2832 ) 
1912 2796 ) - 2g d . 
1913 255 ) 
16 
These are the annual average prices of silver. An insight 
into the fluctuation of the value of silver in terms of 
gold in the course of a year can be gained from the follow- 
ing table quoted from H.B. Morse - International Relations 












price of silver per oz. 
28.75 d. 
32.25 rise of 12% in 2 months 
31.25 fall of 3% in 1 month 
32.25 rise of 13% in 3 months 
32.0 fall of 10% in 3 months 
37.0 rise of 16% in 2 months 
32.0 fall of 14% in 2 months 
35 d rise of 9% in 3 months - 
34.5 fall of 2% in 3 months 
37.25 rise of 8% in 2 months 
If exchange is a major factor in determining trade then 
the foreign trade of China ought to reflect these varia- 
tions in the gold value of silver and alternate between 
increasing volume of exports and declining imports when 
silver fell in value and vice versa when silver rose in 
value. Again if the fluctuations in the value of silver 
was anything for short periods like what the table for 
1903 -04 makes it out,one 
uncertainty of the value 
the trade of the 
t ions a contract 
country 
of sale 
a basis of calculation. 
should expect the tremendous 
of silver generally to depress 
seeing that with such fluctua- 
or purchase cannot be made on 
A fluctuation within limits may 
be safeguarded against,by the banks providing cover or 
by every import or export transaction being covered by 
an/ 
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an export or import transaction. But even bank cover has 
to be paid for and the banks would not lose the occasion 
for a squeeze and it is not always possible to cover ex- 
port transactions with import ores or vice versa. if 
then exchange was a substantial factor in influencing 
trade the fall of the trade of China ought to reflect 
all this suitably. The following are the figures of 






Imports into China Exports from China. 
39.7 million L. 
40.9 ' " 
43.1 It " 
49.3 ' " 
67.2 " It 
25.1 million £. 
27.8 " It 
28.2 '" " 
34.3 It ti 
34.2 " " 
1906 67.5 " " 38.9 It 
1907 67.6 It It 42.9 " " 
1908 52.6 " " 36.8 " "" 
1909 54.3 It " 44.05 " if 
1910 62.3 It " 51.2 " It 
1911 63.3 " N 50.7 " It 
1912 72.1 It It 47.07 " " 
It will be seen that China's foreign trade reflects the 
swing of general trade conditions in the world during 
the period,rather than the fluctuations of exchange. 
China' s/ 
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China's trade with India during the 
period showed the 
same features as her trade as a whole. 
1901 
1902 
Indian imports into China 
in ai wan Taela . 
28.9 million H.T . 
46.6 
Annual Average 
for 1901 -06 32.5 




Exports from China 







(Figures of China's trade quoted from the article "Our trade 
with China ", economist. May 28, 1921, p.1167) 
In countries living in close and active competition with 
each other the rate of exchange is so closely related to 
the price level that variations of exchange tend to cor- 
rect disparities and bring about a parity of purchasing 
power between the internal and world price level. In 
the case of China the whole economic structure of the 
country operated against its being in such a relation 
with the other trading countries and its price level 
was not thus aligned to the world price level. The 
disparity of purchasing power it may be argued still 
left., a margin of gain in spite of the vagaries of ex- 
change.Hence trade was unaffected by the fluctuations 
of the gold price of silver. The position was accent- 
uated by the fact that for China it was a developmental 
period and in the world at large there was a growing 
demand for the exports of China. 
79. 
Of the influence of the fluctuations of the gold value of 
silver on the trade of China C.F. Remer in his book on 
the foreign investments of China writes thus (p.47) "the 
effect of the remarkable and fairly continuous fall in 
the gold price of silver after 1870 is not so easily dis- 
covered either in the field of trade or investment. In 
general, I believe that less importance is to be attached 
to silver than is commonly supposed. For China the silver 
problem is the currency problem. A currency different 
from that of the great trading nations is not so signifi- 
cant as in the days before the world war when the west 
may be said to have been on an automatic gold standard. 
The monetary standard of a particular country is more a 
matter of national policy. Under such circumstances the 
important consideration may be the effect of silver on 
domestic prices and business conditions within China 
rather than its effects in the field of international 
economic relations ". 
China's chief imports from India during the period 
were cotton yarn and opium. The following are the fig- 
ures of the rate of exchange and the average price of 





Rate of exchange 
in Hongkong 





1894-5 1316 188 
1895-6 1390 191 
1896 -97 1288 181 
1897-98 1087 155 
1898-09 1061 143 
1899-1900 1218 146 
1900 -21 1356 150 
1901 -02 1299 143 
Reviewing this table The Review of the trade of India 
for 1901 -2 has on p.25 the following "here we find a 
price of Rs 1299 in one year and Rs 1061 in another 
year, the exchange in both years being at the same 
rate and an almost equally low price (Rs 1081). When 
exchange was much higher,Prices seem to have borne 
little or no relation in the period in the table which 
begins just before the closure of the mints, to the 
variations in exchange. They are dependent on supply 
and demand, not on the varying rates of the media of 
exchange, though a particular transaction may be 
affected by the variation of exchange and it is some - 
times supposed that such a temporary bargain illus- 
trates the operation of a general law ".(Review of the Trade of 
India 1901-2 p.25) 
Another/ 
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Another factor making for the expansion 
of Indian 
trade during the period 1900 -1914 was foreign 
borrowing 
on the part of India. Borrowing influences trade 
in 
the sense that while the loan is contracted and given, 
part of the loan at least may be transferred to the 
borrowing country in the shape of goods bought in the 
lending country. In fact very often loans were granted 
on the condition that part at least of it was spent in 
the purchase of goods in the lending country. That 
India was at present spending no less than 95% of her 
London Loans in direct purchases in the United Kingdom 
was the view expressed by Earl Winterton in 1923 
(Economist p.95 July 21, 1923). Once the loan has 
been made, payment of interest is effected by acquir- 
ing credits abroad through increasing exports. Thus 
normally the grant of a loan makes for increased im- 
ports while the transaction is being effected and makes 
also for increased exports from the debtor country by 
way of payment of interest. 
It is not possible to get the figures of import 
of capital on private account for the period. Im- 
ports coming into the country on public account,do not 
affect the import figures of private merchandise,though 
the payment of interest for them affect the exports of 
private merchandise. This concludes the survey of the 
factors that influenced the trade expansion during 
1900 -1914 on the Indian side. 
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CHAPTER V. 
THE COURSE OF INDIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN MERCHANDISE 1900-14. 
The start for a consideration of this may be made with 
the figures of the values of imports and exports of private 
merchandise during the period. 1 crore = .6 million pounds. 
Year. 
Export values in Import values. 
Crores of Rupees. 
of Rupees. Crores of Rupees. Crores 
1898-9 109.35 68.38 
1899-1900 105.68 70.71 
1900-01 104.2 76.27 
1901-1902 121.2 81.5 
1902-1903 125.9 78.8 
1903-1904 149.6 84.8 
1904-1905 154.1 96.7 
1905-1906 158.2 103.1 
1906-1907 173.1 108.3 
1907-1908 173.4 129.9 
1908-1909 149.8 121.3 
1909-10 184.3 117.1 
1910-11 204.9 129.4 
1911-12 221.7 138.6 
1912.13 241.4 161.0 
1913-14 249.0 191.3 
(Source:- Review of the trade of India 1900 -1 to 1913 -14) 
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The broad note of the trade of the country during 
the period 1900 -1914 was one of expansion, the average 
annual rate of increase of merchandise exports being 
11 crores and for merchandise imports g crores. On 
the trade in private merchandise,India had a healthy 
favourable balance indicated by the figures given 
below. These figures have been arrived at by deduct- 
ing the value of re- exports of merchandise imports 
from the total value of merchandise imports on private 
account and deducting the derived figure from the value 
















Excess of Exports over Imports (Merchandise 
private) 















Although the raison d'etre of international trade 
to a country may be merchandise imports, the key posi- 
tion in the whole foreign trade of a country is its 
export trade in merchandiseand the character of it is 
determined by the nature of the commodities she ex- 
ports and the world demand for them and its influence 
on their price. Thus the importance to the foreign 
trade of a country,of her export trade in merchandise, 
lies in the fact,that it is these,that provide her 
with the foreign credits with which to command the 
exports of other countries for herself,which are her 
imports. Thus it is the export trade in merchandise 
of which the upper limit to the quan- 
tity in value of her imports. A country may tempor- 
arily be a borrower and import more than she exports. 
This however cannot be a long period or a permanent 
position. If a country is a debtor, the discharging 
of her debt obligations is done with her exports,and 
these,further narrow her foreign credits that can be 
devoted to import merchandise into the country. 
Lastly a country's merchandise exports constitute 
her economic personality. The explanation then of 
the large excess throughout the period of the value 
of merchandise exports over her imports lies in the 
fact (a) that India is a debtor country and part of 
the total credits of her exports has to be devoted 
to/ 
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to a discharging of her annual debt and other obligations. 
(2) India is an importer of precious metals and these have 
to be paid for. The former then is a more definite charge. 
The latter depends on the state of prosperity in the 
country and the price at which the precious metals gold 
and silver could be procured. 
Table Number 37 entitled The Balance of Trade of 
India p.81 - Review of the trade of India 1913 -14 gives 
as an item "Net imports of gold and silver". 




pounds 6.3 million million ending 1903.4 
1904 -5 12.07 " 9 4.5 " 9 
1905-6 6.3 If If 3.3 9 " 
1906 -7 9.8 If If 4.4 " " 
1907 -8 11.5 n " 6.6 " " 
1908 -9 3.1 If " 7.9 " If 
1909-10 14.4 If If 6.2 It " 
1910-11 15.9 If " 5.7 " n 
1911 -12 25.17 If If 3.5 " n 
1912-13 25.05: " n 4.3 n ,t 
1913-14 15.5 " " 4.6 " 
If the key position in understanding the foreign trade 
of India is her export trade it would help to look into the 
factors that helped to maintain her export trade in merchan- 
dise in such a healthy condition that she had a large excess 
of/ 
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of Merchandise Exports over Imports. These may be set 
down as the following:- 
I. That from the point of view of the production of 
wealth India had been shaped to fit into a scheme of 
a world division of labour as a producer of Raw M at- 
erial - a position which made trade and exchange a 
vital necessity. This has been referred to in the 
previous chapter and does not need to be enlarged upon. 
U. That during this period the demand for Raw Mat- 
erials both for purposes of industry and food was 
very strong as a result of increasing industrialis- 
ation in Europe and the United States of America and 
the growth of population in the world in general and 
Europe and the U.S.A. in particular. India was dur- 
ing the period an exporter of Raw Materials mainly 
and an importer of manufactured goods. The position 
during the period made the terms of exchange favour- 
able to Raw Material producing and exporting count- 
ries. The following table of index numbers of 
Indian exports and imports bears this out:- 
87. 
Prices in India expressed as index numbers. 





1900 124 96 
1901 116 96 
1902 113 86 
1903 103 88 
1904 104 93 
1905 116 105 
1906 139 116 
1907 145 106 
1908 151 99 
1909 133 109 
1910 127 113 
1911 136 117 
1912 145 117 
1913 154 117 
1914 160 114 
(Source : - Table 4 p.447 G.F. Shirras Indian Finance & Banking) 
According to this table while imported articles rose by 
18 points between 1900 and 1914,exported articles rose 
by 36 points - double. 
III. India is a producer and exporter of a wide variety 
of raw materials. In a few of them such as jute, lac 
and certain oil seeds she had during the period the 
monopoly/ 
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monopoly of the supply. In others she stood in varying 
degrees of strength as a supplier. This meant a strong 
position, such, that the fading away of the world demand 
for an export commodity like indigo or a weakening of 
the world demand for another like coffee that took place 
during the period,had no chance to show itself in the 
figures of her exports as a whole. A world of change 
which caused these also caused new commodities like 
manganese to come into the export trade and thus off- 
set the influence of the fading out of the demand for 
Indian indigo. 
Iv. The distribution of the Indian export trade was 
so wide that thereby it was insured against serious 
fluctuations of the demand for her exports which it 
might be expected to be liable to if the outlets for 
her export was a narrower field. The features re- 
vealed by a scrutiny of the appended table showing 
the shares of the different countries to which Indian 
exports go may be set down as follows: - 
(a) The scheme of a geographical division of labour 
into which India had been brought is very clear from 
the fact that in 1900 -1 Europe and the United States 
of America together took roughly 60% of her exports 
and this percentage share rose to 70% in 1913-14 
(b) The main argument for saying that the export 
trade/ 
Shares of the different Countries in the export trade 
1900 -1 1901 -s2 1902.3 1903-4 1904-5 
U.K. 30.1 25.1 25.2 27.1 27.5 
China 11.3 14.5 12.6 11.9 12.6 
Germany 8.8 8.4 8 9.9 9.2 
U.S.A. 8.9 6.9 6.7 6 6.3 
Japan 2 5.7 4.6 5.6 6.3 
France 5.7 7.3 7.2 6.6 6.2 
Belgium. 3.4 3.9 3.9 5.1 5.4 
Straits 
Settlements 6.6 5.2 6 4.8 4.]. 
Ceylon 4.6 3.7 3.5 3 3.2 
Austria 
Hungary 2.6 2 2.5 3.2 3 
Italy 2.9 2.4 2.7 3.3 2.7 
Egypt 4.3 4.4 6.1 .9 .8 















of India in Merchandise. Percentages. 
1906 -7 1907 --8 1908 -9 1909 -10 1910 -11 1911 -12 1912 -13 1913 -14 
27.1 25.9 24 26.3 24.9 26 25.1 23.7 
10.9 8.6 12 9.9 9.3 8.2 8.4 2.3 
11.0 11.7 10 9.5 9 9.8 10.1 10.3 
9.0 7.8 8.8 7.6 6.5 7.0 7.8 8.9 
4.1 4.8 6.4 6.7 6.3 7.5 7.7 9.2 
6.4 6.6 4.8 6.3 7.6 6.2 6.5 7.1 
4.1 4 4 5.4 5.3 6 5.4 4.9 
3.8 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.7 3.9 3.7 2.8 
3.7 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.7 
3.3 3.1 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.3 2.9 3.9 
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 
2.4 1.1 2.4 1 2.8 1.6 
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trade was widely distributed,is the fact that the United 
Kingdom'ssshare in the Indian export trade was less than 
half of her share in the import trade of India generally 
and in 1913 -14 came to be only slightly more than one - 
third of her percentaga share in the import trade in that 
year. The reasons for this disparity between the United 
Kingdom's shares in the Indian export and import trade 
is that India's exports are largely bulky raw material 
and take some carrying. If there were alternative nearer 
supplies of any of these available the United Kingdom 
may reasonably be expected to plump for them, especi- 
ally so in the case of any raw material import,used by 
her for the manufacture of goods for a competitive ex- 
port market. Thus for example during the period Great 
Britain began taking more linseed from the Argentine 
and coffee from Brazil than from India. Besides Great 
Britain was increasingly investing capital in the 
opening up of the nearer countries which stood for 
nearer alternative supplies. 
The greater share of the United Kingdom in this 
trade may be accounted for as the combined result of 
a number of factors. It was the product of the early 
start she had in trading into India and the monopoly 
that she had of it in these days. It was also the 
product of British dominion over India and of the 
import/ 
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import and export trade of India at this time being 
largely 
in British hands. Another factor was her Industrial supremacy 
and leadership even though it was very seriously challenged 
during the period. Free trade may also be argued as a factor 
making for the United Kingdom's greater share in the Indian 
export trade. In realising this, it has to be borne in mind, 
that although her percentage share declined during the period, 
she still at the end of the period had a percentage share which 
was double that of the next biggest importer of Indian goods 
and absolutely the United Kingdom's share rose from a value 
of 32 crores in 1900 -01 to round about 60 crores in 1913 -14. 
In spite of this absolute increase in her takings of Indian 
exports, the United Kingdom's percentage share of the Indian 
Export trade in Merchandise declined from 30 in 1900 -01 to 
23 in 1913 -14. This merely proves that her share being big at 
the start had not the scope of an expansion such as could maintain 
her percentage share of it of 30%. At the rate of the expansion 
of Indian exports it would have needed a very big expansion of 
the United Kingdom's takings to maintain her percentage of 30%. 
This she was not able to do. Hence in spite of the absolute 
increase in her takings her percentage share of it declined. 
Countries whose takings were small at the start like Germany 
were able to register a big percentage advance. This change 
was an expression of the increasing industrialism in these 
countries and a measure of the extent to which British Industrial 
leadership and supremacy were being challenged. This is all 
that need be said here anent the distribution of the Indian 
export trade and its character. 
V./ 
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V. To continue the consideration of the factors that 
made for the health of the export trade. There was 
another factor which operated to contribute to the 
health of the Indian export trade. It is theoretic- 
ally arguable that a monsoon country depending for 
the success of her agricultural season on the rainfall 
may be expected to have inherent in her economy an 
element making for instability which would affect its 
production and exports. That in actual fact ,the in- 
herent element of instability got considerably re- 
duced may be proved in the following way. The total 
area of India is 1,773,168 square miles. The country 
is in the main an agricultural country. It belongs 
to the monsoon region and depends for the success of 
its agriculture on the sufficiency and timeliness of 
the rainfall. From this, two deductions may reason- 
ably be expected to follow. These are (1) Consider- 
ing the size of the country there cannot be a whole- 
sale failure of rainfall all over the country. 
(2) In view of its size again a failure of rainfall 
in some part of the country may be considered a 
normal event. Allowing for the fact that there are 
gradations of good and bad rainfall, it is arguable 
that these two points are elements that work for a 
rather 
comparative stabilityAthan instability of agricul- 
tural/ 
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agricultural production. Annther factor that tends to 
make for the comparative stability of agricultural pro- 
duction in India is the distribution of rainfall in the 
country. The country from the point of view of rain- 
fall falls into divisions of assured and abundant rain- 
fall andÇracts subject to drought. According to the 
Famine Commission of 1880 the parts of the country which 
from the abundance and certainty of their rainfall or 
from other conditions of climate or their geographical 
features are exempt from the risk of drought consisted 
of the eastern districts of Bengal and Assam, Burma, 
the narrow strip of country lying between the western 
Ghats and the sea, and the tracts immediately eastward 
of the summits of that range, the upper valley of the 
Nerbada, and Sind where owing to the very small rain- 
fall agriculture almost wholly depends on artificial 
irrigation from the Indus the supply of water from which . 
never so far fails as to cause a general loss of crop. 
The tracts which are most subject to drought includes 
(1) the western and southern parts of the North Western 
provinces and that portion of the Punjab country which 
lies east of the Sutlej. (2) The western and northern 
states of hajputana and of the central plateau which 
border on the north western provinces. (3; The dis- 
tricts of Bombay above the western Ghats and the dis- 
tricts/ 
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districts of Madras above the eastern Ghats together with 
the southern and western region of Hyderabad and all My- 
sore except the strip lying close along the western Ghats. 
(4) The districts along the east coast and at the ex- 
tremity of the peninsula. Now in the regions where there 
is a risk of drought the progress of irrigation has served 
to some extent to diminish that risk. The effect of this 
position on agricultural production has to be seen to feel 
how much the inherent element of uncertainty and inst ab - 
thereby 
ility has,been reduced. Jute, which is a front line pro- 
duct of the export trade , is grown entirely in. the Bengal 
and Behar,regions of abundant rainfall. As such the pro- 
duction of it from the point of view of rainfall may be 
expected to be subject to no serious interruption though 
there are gradations of good seasons with corresponding 
effects on output. Then again Tea which is important for 
the export trade is almost wholly grown in Bengal and 
Assam, 444,000 out of the total area of 533,000 acres 
during the period under it, in British India, being in 
that region of certain and abundant rainfall. As 
against commodities grown exclusively in areas of cert- 
ain rainfall,there are a number of important commodities 
like rice, cotton and wheat the production of which. in 
varying degrees is widely distributed Itix between areas 
of certain and uncertain rainfall. The result is that 
the/ 
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the failure of the crop in one region,is made up by good 
crops in the other and on the whole the production may 
vary but is less liable to very wide variations. Thus 
the specialisation of crops in regions of certain rain- 
fall on the one hand and the wide distribution of pro- 
duction of other crops as between regions of certain and 
uncertain rainfall tends and has tended on the whole to 
reduce the instability that as a monsoon country is 
associated with an agricultural country like India. 
Another factor tending during the period to main- 
tain and increase the agricultural production of the 
country was that agriculture was the occupation in- 
creasingly of the people, "for the proportion to the 
total population of those depending on agriculture rose 
from 61% in 1891 to 66% in 1901; to 71% in 1911 and to 
73% in 1921" (p.58 Economic conditions in India -P.P. 
Pillai). To conclude. Speaking generally then, so 
far as the agricultural production in its effects on 
trade is concerned,the conditions of the Indian agri- 
cultural economy tended more and more to weaken the 
forces making for instability of output. 
On this background the course of the Export and 
Import of trade of the period may now be considered. 
To start with the export trade, the figures make out 
that/ 
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that in the opening year of the period the export 
trade 
showed a certain weakness. The following figures 
bear 
this out. 
Exports of Merchandise. 
1898 -99 
109.35 crores 
1899 -1900 1900 -01 
105.68 104.20 
On the other hand the import trade in merchandise during 
that period showed strength being in value 68.38, 70.71 
and 76.27 crores respectively for the three years. This 
merely shows the time lag involved in adverse economic 
conditions in the country and a reduction of purchasing 
power of the people expressing itself in a reduction of 
imports. All the same the figures of the number and ton- 
nage of steamers and sailing vessels which entered from 
and cleared to foreign countries reflected the weakness 
of the export trade. 
Year Number of Vessels Total tonnage. 
1898 -99 9686 9 ,115 ,646 
1899 -1900 8528 8 ,627 ,486 
1900 -1901 8302 8 ,269 ,430 
(Review of the Trade of India 1900 -1) 
It seems safe to infer from this that as India is an 
exporter of bulky raw materials which take more carry- 
ing/ 
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carrying and fill more cargo space than finished articles 
which are mainly her imports and as the value of her ex- 
ports are greater than her imports,the total tonnage of 
steamers and sailing vessels with cargoes and in ballast 
which enter from and clear to foreign countries is more 
influenced by the export trade. 
The weakness of the export trade in 1900-01 was the 
result of a number of factors the chief of which was 
famine. This famine,which. Loveday in his book on the 
history and Economics of Indian famines characterises 
as "the greatest famine which history records" broke 
out in. 1899 and continued into the first half of the 
opening year of the period. "The area seriously affec- 
ted in British India was 175,000 square miles with a 
population of 25 millions" "one million ex- 
cess deaths occurred among British. subjects" (Moral 
and Material Progress and Condition of India 1900-1 
p.30). In addition there was an epidemic of plague. 
"It will be observed that drought and famine were the 
cause of a proportion of the restricted trade, at least 
5 crores of the decline being set against grain and 
pulse and oil-seed" ( "Review of the Trade of India, 
1900 -01, p.16) 
Exports of Grain and Pulse and Oilseeds. 
1898 -99 1899-1900 1900 -01 
Grain & pulse 27.19 crores 18.09 crores 
Seeds 11.84 " 10.09 




The difficulties arising out of famine were not the only 
ones with which the country was confronted. Some of the 
major export industries and the trade in them had their 
own special troubles. "All manufacturing industry was 
affected by the rise in the price of coal ". This was 
the effect of the South African war that broke out in 
1900. It resulted in the holding up of South African 
coal and the diversion to the Cape of supplies that 
would have gone elsewhere . The effect on coal prices 
is clear from the following figures of average annual 
prices. 
1899 1900 1901 
7/7d per ton 10/94d 9/414d 
(Source : - Economist Oct.25th 1902, p.1638) 
The cotton industry in Western India was going through 
a depression,as the result,among other things,of the 
rise in the price of coal and raw cotton and the de- 
pressed price of yarn as the result of the trade with 
China - its major export market - being held up by 
the Boxer rising and the intervention of the Foreign 
Powers in China. The average price of Middling Ameri- 
raw 
can cotton during 1899, 1900 and 1901 was respect - 
9 
ively 316 d, 532 d and 41d per lb. respectively. 
(Economist, Jan.5th 1901, page 7) . The depression 
in the Indian cotton manufacturing industry is clear 
from/ 
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from the following Index Numbers of the prices 
of Raw 
Cotton and Yarn in India. 
1899 1900 1901 
Raw Cotton 59 84 88 
Cotton Yarn No.20s 52 61 69 
(Source:- Review of. the Trade of India 1900 -01, p.17) 
Yet another line of production,thetrade in which 
was in a depressed condition in this year was that of 
Tea. Tea is grown in India mainly for export. As in 
the case of cotton yarn exports, the export trades in 
these two commodities had the weakness of concentrating 
on one market. The Tea industry concentrated on the 
United Kingdom market which was at this time glutted 
with imports mainly from India. The following table 
gives the figures of imports, consumption and excess 
in that market. 
Imports and consumption of Tea in the U.K. in million lbs. 
Year Imports. Consumption Excess 
1895 233.8 million lbs 227.8 6.02 million lbs. 
1896 253.1 246 6.5 
1897 268.8 261.8 7.0 
1898 276.4 279.03 2.59 
1899 302.5 288.69 13.89 
1900 334.07 314.23 19.84 
(Source: - Circular of Gow, Wilson and Stanton quoted 
by the Review of the Trade of India 1900 -01, p.20) 
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Increased tea output resulted from increased planting 
for with the five years ending 1900, "107,000 acres 
were added to the area under Tea in India" (h.T. 
1900 -01, p.19). Tea planters attempted to make up 
for the fall in price with increased plucking and this 
increased the supply but also lowered the quality and 
hardened the fall in price. The consumption of Indian 
Tea in markets outside the United Kingdom expanded from 
19 million lbs. in 1896 to 33.5 million lbs. in 1900 
but this was hardly enough to stop the fall in. prices. 
An expansion of supply unrelated to the demand brought 
about therefore a fall of the price of tea. 
Price of Tea. 
1898 -99 1899 -1900 1900 -01 
8id per lb. 84d. 7*d. 
(average annual price of tea per lb. quoted from the 
Economist commercial and financial review of 1900. 
Feb. 16th 1901) . 
Yet another export commodity the trade in which 
was an element of weakness for the Indian export trade 
was Indigo. The export values of the trade in this 
commodity was as follows: - 
1898 -9 1899-1900 1900-01 
2.97 crores 2.69 2.13 crores 
Once a prosperous dye material export, the decline in 
the/ 
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the export and production in it was brought about by 
the competition of the German synthetic dye which was 
put on the market for the first time in 1897. After 
As i at i cus 
that because of its relative cheapness`, the record of n in 
Economic 
Journal 
June 1912 natural indigo in the Indian export 
trade was one of 
steady decline,so much so,that Indigo ceased shortly 
after to be an export commodity of any importance. 
Another source of weakness to the Indian export 
trade was coffee. The export trade in this commodity 
declined from 1.74 crores in 1898 -99 to 1.48 in 1899- 
1900 and 1.22 in 1900 -01. The average price of coffee 
in 1899 was 65/2 *d and fell to 47 shillings per cwt. 
in 1900. The competition of Brazilian coffee was so 
severe that no compensation in increased price could 
be looked for from a diminution in quantity. The 
growing taste for tea during the period completely 
overshadowed coffee and this coupled with the strength 
of the Brazilian coffee supply,gave no chance for 
any recovery of Indian coffee in the export trade. 






point of detailing all these items of embar- 
of the Indian export trade is to show that 
of famine, plague, depression in the cotton 
industry, the temporary loss of the China 
101. 
yarn market and the decline in the 
price of tea, indigo 
and coffee the total decline in the 
value of the Indian 
expor=t trade in merchandise between 1899-1900 
and 1900- 
01 was only 1.48 crores out of a total export 
trade in 
the former year of 106 crores,and between 1898 to 1901, 
that is for the whole of the famine period, the decline 
was only of 5.15 crores out of a total of 109.35 crores. 
This is a proof of all that has been said earlier in 
this chapter on the factors that make for reducing what 
may be called,the theoretically inherent element making 
for instability in production and therefore in the ex- 
port trade of the country. If some commodities declined 
in quantity or value others rose and that helped to a 
great extent to even out the decline. As the Review of 
the trade of India put it on page 2 for 1.900 -01 "there 
was some compensation on the credit side of the account 
in opium, jute and the manufacture of jute and also 
in hides and skins ". In this connection another signi- 
ficant point to note is that the real effect of the 
forces at work during this year was not so much a de- 
cline in the total export trade as a change in the pro- 
vincial distribution of the export trade. The Review 
of the trade of India for 1900 -01 has on page 3 the 
following "the influence of the drought and famine 
upon the trade of the year is strongly indicated by 
the/ 
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the provincial distribution of the export trade. From 
Bombay the exports of Indian merchandise declined in 
value by almost 11% Exports from Karachi also 
which are largely dependent on the harvests of the 
Punjab were only half their value in the preceding 
year. In Burma,there was a small decline which arose 
out of the transfer to the consumer in the famine 
stricken districts of Western India of rice which in 
an ordinary year would have found its market in Europe. 
The export trade of Madras was hardly affected at all 
and that of Bengal largely increased ". 
The untoward economic conditions of the opening 
of the period 1900 -1914 and their influence on 
Indian production and trade have been dwelt on at 
length. This has been done on purpose to show (1) 
how it came about that the period had an inauspicious 
start and (2) to use it to exemplify some of the 
economic features on which the trade of India rested. 
To continue now the survey of the Indian export 
trade after 1900 -1. In the case of the simple agri- 
cultural economy that X= obtained in India, recovery 
from a set -back may be expected to come almost at 
one stride with a good monsoon. That it was so can 
be realised from the following figures of the export 
trade from 1901 -2 right up to 1907-8 when there occur- 
red a failure of the monsoon in a large part of the 
country. 
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1901 -2 + 17 crores of Rupees 1901 = 116 
1902 -3 + 4.7 " 1902 = 113 
1903 -4 + 23.7 " 1903 = 103 
1904 -5 + 4.5 " 1904 = 116 
1905 -6 + 4.1 It 1905 = 116 
1906 -7 + 14.9 It 1906 = 139 
1907 -8 + 0.3 it 1907 = 145 
3efore taking up the consideration of the export trade 
during the bad Monsoon year 1907 -8, it would be well to 
turn to the fortunes of merchandise up 
to that period. It has been seen that while during the 
opening year of the period the export trade showed signs 
of weakness, the import trade showed signs of considerable 
strength. The explanation of this difference has been made 
earlier. As however the export trade is the key position 
in determining the broad course of trade in general it 
could not be that the import trade in merchandise could 
fail to reflect the weakness of the export trade. It may 
be delayed but it had to show itself even if there was a 
time lag making for a delay. That showed itself in 1902-3 
when the export trade was on an upward move. The following 
figures show the trend of the values of the import trade 
in Merchandise. 
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Orores of Rupees. 
1898-9 1899-1900 1900 -1 1901 -2 1902 -3 1903 -4 
68.38 70.71 76.27 81.5 78.8 84.8 
According to the Review of the trade of India for the 
year 1902 -3, the decline of imports of merchandise in 
that year was mainly under the heads of cotton goods, 
sugar and petroleum. As these are articles of general 
consumption the reduction in their imports points to a 
reduction in the purchasing power of the people as a 
result among other things of the famine of 1899-1901. 
The weakness of the import trade in 1902 -3 was also 
due "to plague in many of the great distributing 
centres and marts which had been inimical to large 
business" and "to the practical exclusion during nearly 
three quarters of the year of Austrian and German beet 
sugar through additional countervailing duties ". 
(Review of the Trade of India 1902 -3) . 
With 1903 it can be presumed that the depression 
which began with the new century and was caused by 
famine and plague in India and by the South African 
war and the Boxer rising outside,lif ted,The Index 
Number of wholesale prices in India and the United 
Kingdom point to that :- 
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India. United Kingdom. 
Index Number of 
wholesale prices. 
B.O. Trade 
Index general prices. 
1900 116 100 
1901 110 97 
1902 106 96 
1903 99 97 
1904 101 98 
Thereafter it was a period of rising prices and particu- 
larly in India. That the rise in India was due to the 
increase in the volume of currency is the view of J.M. 
Keynes expressed in an article entitled Recent Economic 
events in India (Economic Journal March 1909). 
"We may conclude" he writes "that between April 1903 and 
the end of 1907 the net increase in the circulation of 
coins and notes amounted in value to not less than 49 
millions sterling or 735 million rupees ". That the 
rise of prices was influenced by the increase in cur- 
rency is proved by the close correspondence revealed 
by the following table cited by him, of the general in- 
dex number of prices and estimated total volume of 
currency. 
General Index Number 
of prices. 
Estimated total volume 
of currency on 1st April 
of each year. 
1903 100 100 
1904 102 110 
1905 112 115 
1906 131 127 
1st April 136 ) 
1907 140 31st Dec. 143 ) 
(p.57) 
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That there was during the period a rise of prices and 
that this rise was greater than the rise of prices in 
the United Kingdom is proved by the following table 
quoted from page 52 of the article. 
Index Numbers of Prices. 
Imported Exports and Prin- Food Prices in 
articles cipal articles grains the United 
consumed. Kingdom. 
1903 100 100 100 100 
1904 106 101 93 102 
1905 109 114 117 105 
1906 119 137 142 111 
1907 132 144 143 116 
In the normal course of trade the rise of internal price 
should be expected to work for an increase of the 
import trade and a checking of the export trade. The 
monopoly element in many of India's raw material exports 
served to maintain and increase the value of the export 
trade. This is borne out by the following table of the 
chief exports of India and the percentage increase or 
decrease of exports of 1906 -7 over those of 1902 -3. 
(Source : - Ibid p.59. 
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The chief exports of India and the percentage increase or 
decrease of exports of 1906 -7 over those of 1902 -3. 
Commodity. 
Percentage increase or decrease of 
exports of 1906 -7 over those of 1902 -3. 
Quantity. Value. 
Grain and pulse - 7% + g% 
Seeds - 11 - 13 
Cotton + 22 + 49 
Jute + 23 + 141 
Cotton twist and yarn - 2 + 22 
Hides and skins raw 
and tanned + 65 + 82 
Opium - 1 + 16 
Tea + 29 + 34 
Gunny bags + 14 + 58 
Gunny cloth + 41 + 91 
Lac + 13 + 90 
Of the failure of the monsoon in 1907 and its effects the 
Review of the Trade of India for 1907 -8 has the following 
on p.l. "The spring harvest of 1907 had been generally 
inlifferent particularly in Northern India and when the 
failure of the south west monsoon occurred famine con- 
ditions declared themselves over a large area .... the 
distress extending over 133,000 square miles bearing a 
population of 49 millions. 
The/ 
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The effects of this on Indian agricultural produc- 
tion is revealed by a comparison of the area and out - 
turn of crops in 1907 -8 with that of 1906 -7. 
Increase ( +) decrease ( -) in %. 
Commodity. Area. Out-turn. 
p.4) 
Rice + 0.9% 
Cotton - 3.1 
Wheat - 21.9 
Jute + 14.1 
Rape and Mustard - 18.6 
Linseed - 43.9 








Although the decrease in agricultural production was thus 
serious the export trade in merchandise just maintained 
itself, rising by 2% from 173.08 crores to 173.42 crores. 
The exports of raw materials and unmanufactured articles 
declined in value by 6.5% (R.T.I. 1907 -8 p.4) . 
In the autumn of 1907 occurred the financial crisis in the 
United States of America. Its immediate effect was to 
cause a drain of gold from London and create a stringency 
there. The position created by this stringency and the 
failure of the crops was to make the balance of trade 
unfavourable to India and produce a weakness of exchange 
as a result of which exchange went for a very short time 
below the gold point. The position is well brought out 
by the following table showing the exports of merchandise 
and treasure from India during 1906 -7 and 1907-8. 
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1906 -7 1907.8 
Increase ( +) 
or 
decrease ( -) 
1st quarter. 
Exports of 
merchandise. 40.99 crores 49.5 crores + 20.8% 
Exports of 
Treasure. 2.19 crores. .7 crores - 64.5 
2nd quarter. 
It 46.27 + 27.4 
ft Merchandise 36.33 
Treasure " 1.49 1.8 " + 20.6 
First 6 months Merchandise = + 23.9% 
Treasure = - 30% 
3rd quarter. 
Merchandise 46.44 crores 39.62 " - 14.7 
Treasure 1.27 " 1.73 " + 36.2 
4th quarter. 
Merchandise 52.79 crores 41.77 " - 20.9 
Treasure .75 " 1.13 " + 50.2 
Last 6 months Merchandise = - 18% 
Treasure = + 41.4% 
(Review of the Trade of India p.31 1907 -8) 
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As some of India's agricultural products of one year 
enter into the trade of the next the agricultural weak- 
ness of 1907 -8 may have been expected to show itself in 
the trade of 1908-9. The Monsoon of 1908-9 was itself 
not a very satisfactory one and what was worse,the shock 
to credit as the result of the American crises settled 
down as a general depression during 1908 and reflected 
itself in a general decline of the trade of the leading 
trading countries. (Review of the Trade of India 1908 -9 
p.3). In India the export trade declined from 173.3 
crores in. 1907 -8 to 149.82 crores. This marks the 
break in the demand for Indian exports which had, in 
spite of rising prices maintained, the export trade 
up to this time. 
To turn now to the import trade during the period. 
The following are the figures of the import trade and 
the index number of import prices. 
Value of imports 
Index Number of 
Import prices. 
1903-4 84.8 crores 1903 88 
1904 -5 96.7 " 1904 93 
1905-6 103.1 " 1905 105 
19 06 -7 108.3 " 1906 116 
1907-3 129.9 " 1907 106 
1908 -9 121.3 " 1908 99 
1909-10 117.1 
11 1909 109 
The influence of the large rise in the price of 
imported articles in India in 1906 will be seen in 
the large increase in imports of 1907 -8 a year when 
the export trade was just able to maintain itself. 
1908-10 were years when the import trade declined. 
This may be regarded as the result of the reduction 
in the purchasing power of the people from a failure 
of the crops and the rise in the price of food grains. 
The Review of the Trade of India for 1908-9 states 
"a calculation based on the average monthly prices 
of the seven principal food grains of India during 
1908 and the previous five years shows that the price 
in 1908 was 57.3 %more than average of the five years 
period (p.4) . Thus the index number of food grain 
prices average monthly in India from 1906 -1910 was 
as given below: - 
1906 = 118 
1907 = 122 
1908 = 154 
1909 = 126 
1910 = 108 
(Source:- Review of the Trade of India 1910 -11 p.2) 
This may be assumed to contribute to the weakness of the 
import trade which is shown by the values of the import 
trade between 1908-1910. 
1909 was a year of recovery and in 1910, as will be 
seen/ 
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seen, the prices of food grains declined appreciably and 
from then began the revival of trade which continued un- 
checked till 1913. This section of the survey of the 
import and export trade - 1900 -1914 - might be brought 
to a close with a survey of the figures of the import 
and export respective prices. 
Value of imports Index Number of 
import prices. 
Value of exports Index number of 
export prices. 
1909-10 117.1 crores 1909 99 1909-10 184.3 1909 133 
1910-11 129.4 1910 109 1910-11 204.9 1910 127 
1911-12 138.6 1911 113 1911-12 221.7 1911 136 
1912-13 161.0 1912 117 1912-13 241.4 1912 145 
1913-14 191.3 1913 117 1913-14 249 1913 154 
1914 114 1914 160 
(Source:- Review of the Trade of India 1909-10 to 1913-14). 
To conclude this survey, the features of Indian 
foreign trade of the period 1900 -1914 revealed by the 
survey may be set down as consisting of the following. 
(1) That as an exporter of raw produce India at this 
time stood in a position of advantage as the terms of 
exchange were in favour of raw material exporting 
countries. (2) The monopoly element that India had in 
some of her export commodities and her strength as a 
supplier in the case of other commodities contributed 
inf 
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in no small measure to the prosperity of her export trade. 
(3) This prosperity of her export trade increasing the 
purchasing power of the people contributed to the strength 
of the import trade. 
(4) The inordinate rise in the price of food grains re- 
duced this purchasing power between 1908 and 1910 and the 
import trade recovered definitely with the fall in the 
price of food grains and with the good cotton crops in 
the United States of America in the closing years of the 
period. 
This chapter might be brought to a close with a brief 
survey of the distribution of the import trade of India 
among the trading countries. Appended is a table of the 
percentage share of the different countries. Having 
given the distribution of the export trade of India, the 
distribution of the import trade may also be given in 
this chapter. 
The features disclosed by the table may be briefly 
set down. 
(1) The reality of the geographical division of labour 
in world production is patent from the fact that during 
the period 70 to 80% of the imports into India came 
from Europe and the United States of America. 
(2) The lion's share of the import trade was that of 
Great/ 
Distribution of the Indian import trade among the 
Country 1900 -1 1901 -2 1902 -3 1903 -4 1904 -s5 1005 -6 
United Kingdom 63.8% 64.5 66.3 64.9 65.2 66.7 
Belgium 3.2 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.6 4.3 
Germany 3.4 3.7 2.7 3.4 3.9 4.2 
Mauritius 3.2 2.4 2.5 3.1 2.1 2.0 
Russia 3.7 3.9 3.4 2.9 1.7 0.3 
Straits 
Settlements 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 2.5 
Austria Hungary 4.1 4.8 3.2 2.6 4.1 4.0 
China 3.3 2.2 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 
France 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 
U.S.A. 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.1 2.2 
Japan 1.1 .87 1.0 1.5 1.2" 1.2 
Java , - 0.7 1.4 2.1 1.8 
Italy - - - - 1.3 1.1 
trading 
1906 -7 
countries 1900 - 1914. 
1910 -11 1911 -12 1912 -13 1913 -14 1907 -8 1908 -9 1909 -10 
66.8 66.7 62.6 62.6 61.1 62.4 63 64.1 
4.0 4.1 4.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.3 
5.3 4 4.1 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.9 
2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.3 1.4 2.0 1.4 
0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
2.6 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.9 
2.8 2.0 3.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.3 
1.4 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 .9 
1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.5 
2.3 2.5 2.7 3.1 2.7 3.8 3.2 
1.5 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 
2.7 4.5 5.1 6.8 7.0 6.8 5.8 5.8 
1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 - 1.2 
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Great Britain and amounted to double the percentage of 
all the shares of all other countries in the import trade 
of India. That need not be a surprise seeing that trade 
was the main motive that led to the setting up of British 
Dominion over India . Here is an avowal of it. "The 
empire is commerce .... It was created by commerce, it 
is founded on commerce and it could not exist a day 
without commerce for these reasons among others 
I would never lose the hold which we now have over our 
great Indian dependency - by far the greatest and most 
valuable of all the customers we have or ever shall have 
in this country ". 
(Joseph Chamberlain. Foreign and Colonial Speeches 1897, 
pp. 101 -2 and 131 -33. 
Great Britain maintained her share of the import 
trade with India very well during the period. The U.S.A. 
and Germany although as industrialised as the United 
Kingdom did not seriously enter the lists as competitors 
for trade in India because the U.S.A. then had a large 
home market and nearer export markets and Germany not 
having the start of Great Britain in India had shortly 
to build it up and found it not easy work. 
(3) Java took over the major part of the sugar import 
trade with India and that accounts for the decline of 
the share of Mauritius and the striking increase of 
that of Java. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
THE INDIAN EXPORT TRADE 1900-1914. 
Section 1. Taanufactured goods. 
The start for a study of the Indian export trade in 
merchandise i3 with an account of the commodities that 
.figure in it. A complete list of all the commodities 
would be very wearying and it is therefore proposed in 
this study to take account only of these commodities in 
the trade that rise to an importance in terms of value 
of one crore of Rupees (.6 million pounds sterling). 
Indian Export commodities that satisfy this condition 
are the following in order of importance. Two lists are 
given one for the opening and the other for the closirg 
year of the period 1900 -1 to 1913 -14. 
There is an advantage in giving two such lists. 
It helps to realise the chanes that took place in the 
Indian export trade. It has to be borne in mind that 
the year 1900 -01 was a very bad famine year while 1913- 
14 was a year of trade boom conditions though a little 
subdued compared to the years immediately before it. 
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Value in Millions of .e sterling 4 Rs 15 = £1 sterling. 
1900-1 Indian Exports. 1913-14. 
Grain & pulse 9.35 Grain pulse 6. flour 30.1 
Jute haw 7.24 Cotton Raw 27.4 
Cotton Raw 6.75 Jute Raw 20.6 
Tea 6.36 Jute Manufactures 18.8 
Opium 6.30 Seeds 17.1 
Seeds 6.009 Tea 9.98 
Jute 14anufactures 5.24 Cotton Manufactures 8.08 
Hides & Skins taw 4.65 Hides and skins haw 7.8 
Hides & Skins tanned 2.996 Opium 2.28 
Indigo 1.42 Wool Raw and Manufactured 1.8 
Cotton i4ianufactures 1.02 Lao 1.3 
Coffee .818 Hides and skins tanned 1.05 
Lac .699 Coffee 1.02 
Wood and timber .868 Oiloake .9 
Wool Raw .601 Manganese ore .8 
Wood and timber .7 
Dyeing and Tanning substance .7 




(Fi¡ures ta.,-en from Tables relaAng to the Trade of British India 
1900-1 to 1904-5 No.10 1909-10 to 1913-14 No.10) 
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A study of the two lists shows certain small dif- 
ferences which may be noted in passing. (1) At the end 
of the list for 1913-14 are certain items which do not 
appear in the list for 1900-01. These items are oilcake, 
kanganese ore, dyeing and tanning substances, raw hemp 
and oils. Since 1900-01 the trade in these items had 
expanded to a value to entitle them to a place on the 
list. (2) There is one item on the 1900-01 list which 
finds no place in that of 1913-14 and that is Indigo. 
This has been referred to in the previous chapter. 
(3) Another feature to be taken note of in a survey of 
the two lists is that while with the exception of 
Indigo all the items of the 1900-01 list have their 
place in that of 1913-14 and while their values in all 
cases have advanced in the 1913-14 list, Opium holds 
the distinction of being the one commodity whose export 
value in 1913-14 was considerably less than in 1900-01. 
This decline was the result of the decision made at 
the International Opium Conference held at Shanghai 
midway through the period 1900-1914. The Indian govern- 
ment which was a party to that conference accepted the 
decision to abolish the trade eventually. 1913-14 
was the first year when the decision became effective 
in so far as the export of Indian opium was concerned. 
The decline of that year was very marked. 
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Section 2. Indian Exports of. Manufactures. 
An outstanding feature, revealed by the items of 
the Indian export trade is, that India is almost en- 
tirely an exporter of haw Material. The main items 
of Manufactured goods on the list of Export articles 
are (1) Jute Manufactures (2) Cotton Manufactures 
and (3) Tanned hides and skins. What relation of 
value in the export trade these together bore to the 
tttal value of India's export trade in merchanlise 
can be realised from the following table. 
Year 
Value in Crores of Rupees. 
% o f (2) to 
(1) 






1900 -1 104.2 crores 21 crores 20% 
1901 -2 121.2 " 25 " 20% 
1902 -3 125.8 " 25.81 19 
1903 -4 149.6 " 27.64 19 
1904 -5 154.1 " 29.32 21 
1905-6 158.1 " 35.65 22.5 
1906-7 173.07 " 37.85 22 
1907-8 173.4 " 39.29 22.5 
1908 -9 149.8 " 36.65 24 
1909 -10 184.3 " 38,06 20.5 
1910-11 204.8 " 36.97 18 
1911 -12 221.7 " 35.25 16 
1912-13 241.3 " 57.33 23.5 
1913-14 249.04 " 54.6 22 
(1) 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India 1900 to 1914) . 
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It will be seen that India's manufactured exports have 
maintained themselves at more or less a fifth of the 
total export trade in merchandise. In thus maintaining 
themselves at this percentage their value has risen 
from 21 crores in 1900 -01 to 54.6 crores in 1913 -14. 
chile the volume of these exports has increased, has 
there been any broadening of the stream of India's 
manufactured exports? The Review of the Trade of 
India for 1913 -14 has on page 63 the following items 
of the export trade under Section 3 of articles wholly 
and mainly manufactured. Their values 
fabrics. 
are also given: - 
of Rupees 
" 





Wool .25 " " 
Silk .05 
Other Materials .02 
Hides & Skins tanned or 
dressed 4.25 " 
Chemicals Drugs & Medicines 3.95 " 
Dyes and Colours 1.04 " 
w 
Metals Iron & Steel and 
manufactures of .44 " 
Metals other than Iron and 
Steel & manufacturers .19 " 
If 
Apparel .18 " 
Cutlery, hardware etc. .07 " 
Furniture/ 
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Furniture 6. cabinet ware .06 
Railway plant and Rolling stock .01 
Glassware and earthen ware .02 
Paper, pasteboard & stationery .0075 
Carriages, carts including cycles 
and iiiotor cars .003 
ilachinery of all kinds .0015 
Miscellaneous 383 
From this list of India's manufactured exports it 
will be seen that the most important from the point of 
value are (1) Jute Loods, (2) Cotton Loads and (3) 
Tanned hides and skins, and in the year 1913 -14, these 
three accounted for 44.5 out of the total of 54 crores 
of exports of articles wholly and mainly manufactured. 
The percentage of these three items in the export trade 
in manufactured goods during the period 1900-1914 will 
be seen from the following table. 
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Indian Exports of Manufactures. 
Value in crores of hupees. 
(1) (2) 
Total Value of Exports Value of Jute, Cotton 
Years. of articles manufactured goods and Tanned 
Hides and skins. 
% of 2 to 1. 
1900 -1 21 crores 18.05 86% 
1901 -2 25 22.22 89% 
1902 -3 25.81 21.90 85% 
1903 -4 27.84 23.02 83% 
1904 -5 29.32 24.42 83% 
1905 -6 35.65 30.51 85% 
1906-7 37.85 32.32 85% 
1907-8 39.25 32.94 84% 
19 08 -9 36.65 31.38 85% 
1909-10 38.06 32.96 86% 
1910-11 36.97 32.09 89% 
1911 -12 35.25 30.25 86% 
1912-15 57.33 39.6 74 
1913-14 54.6 44.64 819 
(heview of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) 
The position revealed by this table is,that thile the value 
of India's manufactured exports, had during the period increased 
from 21 to 54 crores of hupees, Exports of Jute goods and Cotton 
goods and Tanned hides and skins maintained themselves throughout 
the period at between 80 to 85% of the total exports of manu- 
factured goods. In other words the stream of India's exports of 
manufactured goods while it increased in volume, did not broaden 
out its channels. 
Generally/ 
122. 
Generall it, is unwarranted to infer from the non- 
appearance of new manufactured exports that there has 
been no industrial development. If a country has a large 
home market, effective industrial developments in that 
country may not express themselves in the export of such 
goods if they are all consumed internally. In the case 
of Ilia however it is quite right to infer from the 
non appearance of new manufactured goods in her export 
trade that there was during the period no new industrial 
development. Reference has already been made to the 
economic factors working to that result. These were 
(1) the internal economic policy (2) The one sided free 
trade policy of the period whereby while India could be 
flooded by the manufactured goods of all countries Indian 
manufactures were prevented from gaining entry into the 
Continental countries of Europe and the United. States of 
America by the heavy tariffs levied to preclude such 
entry. (3) Another handicap was referred to by Sir 
Edward Law in his minute on Imperial Preference. To 
quote the Minute "An important question affecting Indian 
trade in a very special manner is that of freights .... 
To illustrate the disadvantages of the present 
situation,I may point out that if an oil presser in 
India desires to ship his oils to Europe, the abundance 
of raw produce generally awaiting shipment and which can 
be easily and with great a,dvantage, shipped in bulk, 
naturally/ 
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naturally leads ship -owners to charge something. like 
fancy rates on such goods as oil in casks. I think 
it well to draw attention to this question because I 
believe that existing conditions as regards freights 
are very prejudicial to nascent Indian industries and 
must be considered as a factor tending to delay their 
development ". (p.24 and 25 Views of the Government 
of India on the question of Imperial Preference (cmd 
1931 of 10 04) ) 
Another problem that has to be looked into in 
connection with the Indian export of manufactured 
goods during this period is this. The question 
arises "In what measure did each of these three 
chief items of manufactured goods contribute to the 
total increase of the exports of manufactured goods. 
That can be realised from the following table of 






Tanned Hides & Skins 
Exports. 
1900-1 7.86 crores 5.70 crores 4.49 crorss 
1901-2 8.71 10.86 2.65 
1902-3 9.01 10.00 2.89 
1903-4 9.46 10.47 3.09 
1904-5 9.93 11.64 2.85 
1905-6 12.44 14.42 3.65 
1906-7 15.71 12.16 4.45 
1907-8 18.29 10.76 3.89 
1908-9 15.73 11.53 4.12 
1909-10 17.09 11.91 3.96 
1910-11 16.99 11.01 4.0 
1911-12 16.00 9.77 4.4 
1912-13 22.8 12.20 4.6 
1913-14 28.27 12.12 4.25 
(Figures taken from the heview of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) 
In attempting to assess the advance of the export trade in each 
of these three items, during the period, it has to be borne in 
mind that it is very unsafe to compare the figures of 1900 -1 
with that of 1913 -14. 1900 -1 was a famine year and the 
mortality in cattle was so abnormally large that the export 
trade in hides and skins suddenly grew very large. That is 
clear from a comparison of the figures given for 1900 -1 and 
1901 -2. Similarly the wide variation between the export fig- 
ures/ 
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figures of cotton goods for the years 1900 -1 and 1901 -2 
suggests that 1900 -1 was not a normal year. The bulk 
of India's exports of cotton manufactures is yarn, which 
during the period went to China. These exports were 
held up by the outbreak of the Boxer rising in 1900 -01. 
If then an assessment of the advance of the export values 
of each commodity is to be made it would eliminate error 
to a greater extent to compare the figures of 1901 -2 with 
these of 1913 -14. 
Looking at the figures given already it will be real- 
ised that between 1901 -2 and 1913 -14 India's total manu- 
factured exports increased by 118.8°%-. Individually ex- 
ports of jute goods increased during the period by 224.5 %, 
of cotton goods by 11.5; and those of tanned hides and 
skins by 60%. In 1901 -2 Jute goods accounted for a little 
more than one -third of India's total manufactured exports, 
cotton goods a little more than two fifths and tanned hides 
and skins a little more than one - tenth. In 1913 -14 jute 
goods approximated to a little more than half, cotton 
goods less than one - quarter and tanned hides and skins to 
about one -thirteenth of the total exports of manufactured 
goods. Thus it seems clear that while these three major 
items of India's export trade in manufactured goods 
accounted for about 85% of the total export trade in 
manufactured goods throughout the period, in the course 
of the period the relative importance of these three 
became/ 
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became very unequal, Jute accounting for most of the 
advance while Tanned hides and Foods registered very 
much less and Cotton goods more or less just maintained 
themselves in the export trade the advance registered 
by them/being 11.5%, That is to say, during 1900-1914 
while the volume of the exports of manufactured goods 
increased, the ohannel of the stream far from getting 
broadened became narrower. The explanation of this 
lies in the following facts. Exports of Indian cotton 
manufactured goods registered a very poor advance dur- 
ing the period. It has been said that the bulk of 
India's exports under this head was that of cotton 
yarn to Chinas The first step in the industrial career 
for any country is with the light industries and of 
these the spinning of yarn is the easiest,. Japan 
having entered on a career of industrialisation started 
the spinning industry and had a geographical advantage 
with regard to the China market, as her spinnings were 
coarse yarn which was what India exported to China. 
Japan was able to out into and take over India's trade 
with China and that accounted for the decline of 
India's exports of yarn to China during, the period. 
What advance Indian cotton goods exports were able 
to register was therefore in the line of woven goods. 
But the advance in this line could not be large be- 
cause Great Britain and the countries of the Continent 
of/ 
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of Europe which had an older cotton weaving industry 
established direct connections with some of India's 
export markets such as Persia and Ceylon and when it 
came to competition with these India for very many 
reasons was in a much weaker position. This is suf- 
ficient to explain the poor advance registered by 
India's cotton goods in her export trade. It is 
of course not to be inferred that because her ex- 
port trade in cotton goods registered a poor ad- 
vance that therefore the cotton manufacturing 
industry in India was in a stagnant condition. That 
was not so. The industry made very real progress 
during the period as will be seen later. Having a 
large home market and finding her foreign markets 
very unstable propositions the Indian cotton manu- 
facturing industry gave more attention to the home 
market. 
Section 3. The Export of Tanned Hides and Skins. 
From the point of view of value the export 
trade in Tanned hides and skins is the smallest of 
the three main items of the export trade of India 
in manufactured goods that are being considered 
here. These however registered an advance of 60% 
during the period. The smallness of the advance 
is to be accounted for by the following features. 
The/ 
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The main markets for India's hides and skins during 
the period were Europe and the United States of 
America. All countries,with the sole exception of 
the United Kingdom,were protectionist and levied 
import duties on manufactured goods while allowing 
in free, or at a lower rate, raw material. The 
United States of America and Germany had built up 
a tanning industry. The former was the biggest 
importer of Indian raw skins and the latter the 
biggest importer of raw hides. The result is re- 
fleoted in the progress during the period of the 
export trade, in rawts different from,tanned hides 
and skins of India. The former commodity made 
bigger strides than the latter. Hence although 
India was in a strong position in the world's 
supply of hides and skins her export trade in 
tanned hides and skins reflected very poorly that 
position of strength. 
strikingly different from that of cotton goods 
and tanned hides and skins was the advance during 
the period of the Indian export trade in Jute goods. 
The figures of these will be surveyed in detail 
a little later. This striking advance is to be 
accounted for by the facts that (1) India had a 
monopoly of the world supply of jute (2) that 
jute goods consisting of bags and cloth were uni- 
versally/ 
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universally needed to move all sorta of raw material 
entering. trade. 
It would help to a fuller understanding of the 
Indian export trade in the major items of manufac- 
tured goods to make a brief study of the details of 
the trade in each of the three commodities. 
I. The export trade in Jute t`anufactures . 
This commodity accounted in 1913 -14 for 12% of 
the total export trade in merchandise of the country. 
(review of the trade of India 1913 -14 p.22). This 
item of the trade falls into the two main divisions 
of exports of Jute bags and of Jute cloth. The 
following table gives the figures of the quantities 
and values of the export trade in each of these items 





Cloth Million yds. Value in crores 
of Rupees. 
1900 -1 202.9 4.43 365.2 3.35 
1901 -2 230.1 4.72 418.6 3.89 
1902-3 225.1 4.64 492.8 4.37 
1903-4 206.2 4.56 552.3 4.84 
1904 -5 201.4 4.75 575.5 5.11 
1905-6 233.3 6.07 658.6 6.3 
1906.7 257.6 7.34 696.06 8.25 
1907 -8 293.02 8.47 789.8 9.69 








Value in crores 
of Rupees 
1909-10 364.3 8.6 940.1 8.43 
1910-11 360.8 8.56 955.3 8.35 
1911-12 289.7 7.57 871.4 8.34 
1912-13 311.7 9.6 1021 13.0 
1913-14 368.7 12.5 1061.1 15.6 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India 1900 to 1914) 
houLhly exports of Jute Bags have during the period 1900-1914 
risen by 80% in quantity and their value has increased by 184%. 
On the other hand exports of Jute cloth increased by 190% in 
quantity and 368% in value. The greater increase in value of 
the exports as compared with the increase in the quantity of 
the exports can be accounted for by the general rise in prices 
reinforced in the case of these commodities by the element 
of monopoly in them. The disparity in the increase in the 
quantity of exports of Jute bags and Jute cloth is a very 
noticeable feature. The explanation of this has already 
been suggested. The tendency among the importing countries 
was generally to import raw material where as a result there 
would be profitable employment for home labour. Thus by a 
system of duties on the manufactured poods,while letting in 
the raw material free, they were able to shut out jute manu- 
factures and import the raw material. Thus according to the 
Review of the Trade of India 1913-14 (p.22) while Indian 
exports of Jute manufactures accounted for 12% of India's 
total/ 
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total exports of Merchandise raw jute accounted for 13% 
and right through the period exports of raw jute were 
larger in value than those of jute manufactures. On 
the other hand a comparison of production costs local- 
ly for coarse jute manufactures with those of Indian 
mills made it more profitable for countries like the 
United states of America to import the cloth and work 
it up into bags rather than import the raw material 
and spin and weave it. Under these conditions such 
countries levied heavy duties on bags and let in the 
cloth at a lighter rate. The Review of the Trade of 
India for 1907 -8 refers to "the heavy import duty on 
Jute bags in the United States of America ". (p.57) 
Again in countries like Australia where labour was 
comparatively scarce and industrialism in its infancy 
and labour costs comparatively high it was found more 
profitable to import jute bags rather than either the 
raw material or the cloth and work them up locally. 
Accordingly the U.S.A. became the largest importer of 
jute cloth and Australia the largest importer of 
jute bags. In general the prevailing, spirit of 
economic nationalism with its rooted prejudice 
against imports of manufactured goods and the fact 
that most of the countries of the world were old 
countries with heavy populations unlike Australia 
accounts for the greater increase of the export of 
jute/ 
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jute cloth rather than of bags. Thus with the world 
demand for jute cloth being wider and larger than 
that for jute bags the jute cloth export trade was 
steadier and expanded without interruption in a way 
which was not true of the export trade in jute bags. 
The figures of the export trade in jute cloth shows 
that the trade expanded steadily from year to year 
except for a slight decline in the depression year 
1908 -9 and that in 1911 -12 which was due to a rise 
in price. On the other hand the export trade in 
jute bags declined in quantity from 1902 -3 to 1904 -5, 
the factors contributing to this decline in order 
of importance were (1) the drought in Australia 
which was the largest buyer of jute bags (2) the 
rise in the price of jute bags as evidenced by the 
figures (3) the fact that the opening years of 
the period was one of depression of trade. In the 
depression year - 1908 -+9 - the trade was saved from 
a fall in the quantity of exports by the large fall 
in price. The fall in export quantities in 1911 -12 
was accounted for by the rise of price and thereafter 
even with a rise of price boom conditions helped 
the export trade in jute bags to large increases. 
The large increase in the export of bags in 1913 -14 
may be accounted for by general boom conditions and 
to the fact that "on October 3rd 1913 the United 
States/ 
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States of America reduced the duty on bags, and bag- 
gings were allowed to enter free" (Review of the Trade 
of India 1913 -14 p.23) . Thus the greater liability 
of the export trade in jute bags to interruption is 
to be explained by (1) the large dependence on Austr- 
aliaf a country liable to drought as a buyer and (2) 
to the greater liability of the export trade in bags 
to be hit at by tariffs by the importing countries. 
II. The Indian Export trade in Cotton Manufactures. 1900 -1914. 
The figures of the total value of exports of 
Indian cotton manufactures have been given already and 
need not be repeated here. These exports fall under the 
two divisions of exports of yarn and of cloth and dur- 
ing the period exports of the former were the more im- 
portant from the point of view of. value. The figures 
of quantities and values of these exports are given 
below. 
Year. 






Exports of Yarn in 
Million lbs. 
Value in crores 
of Rupee:.,. 
1900 -1 118.08 4.17 69.3 `7743 
1901 -2 272.4 9.31 72.6 1.42 
1902 -3 248.5 8.54 69.5 1.32 
1903-4 252.4 8.84 75.8 1.48 
1904 -5 247.8 9.81 87.4 1.65 
1905-6 297.6 12.38 91.9 1.86 
1906 -7 243.5 10.39 76.69 1.65 
134. 
Year. 
Exports of Yarn 
in trillion lbs. 







1907 -8 215.5 8.97 74.12 1.63 
1908-9 235.46 9.68 77.9 1.70 
1909-10 227.3 9.7 94.13 2.04 
1910 -11 183.4 8.62 99.79 2.20 
1911 -12 151.4 7.59 81.4 1.96 
1912 -13 203.9 9.91 86.5 2.09 
1913.14 198 9.85 89.2 2.13 
(Figures from the kteview of the Trade of India.) 1900..1914). 
This table makes it olear that quantitatively the export trade in 
cotton yarn declined during the period. The rise in prices helped 
to maintain the value of the trade from serious impairment. 
On the other hand the export trade in cotton cloth increased 
quantitatively by about 25% and also in value. Turning from 
the figures of export, to those of production in the country it 
will be seen that quantitatively the production of both yarn and 
cloth inoreased,,though the latter showed a far greater rate of 
increase than the former The following are the figures of 
the production of cotton yarn and cloth in mills in India. 
135 . 
roduction of cotton Yarn and Cloth b Mills in India. 
Year. 
Production of Yarn 
in Million 1bs. 
Production of cloth 
in Million lbs. 
1900-1 353 98.7 
1901-2 573 119,6 
1902-3 576.2 122.7 
1903-4 578.7 138.04 
1904..5 578.3 158.7 
1905-6 680.9 163.8 
19067 653.7 165.7 
1907.8 638.29 189.05 
19 08 -9 657.5 192.36 
1909-10 627.3 228.7 
1910-11 609.9 244.8 
1911-12 625.03 266.6 
1912-13 688.4 285.4 
1913-14 683 274 
(Figures from the iteview of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) 
It is clear from these figures that the lack of strength of 
the export trade in cotton manufactures was in no way an 
index to any languishing of the Indian cotton mill industry, 
the vantity of whose output shows a definite advance. If 
the average of the production of yarn and cloth for the 
period 1896 -7 to 1900 -1 of the Indian cotton mill industry 
be taken as 100 for each, the index number of production 
for 1913 -14 was 151 for yarn and 291 for cloth. The dif- 
ferences/ 
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differences in the rate of the growth of looms and spindles 
in the Indian cotton mill industry explains the differences 
in the rate of growth of production of yarn anti cloth. 
1900-1 1904-6 1907 -6 1913-14 
No. of Mills 194 206 227 214 
No. of Looms 40,542 47,305 66,718 96,668 
Ito. of Spindles 4,942,290 5,196,432 5,763,710 6,620,576 
(Fl unes from the Statistical Abstract for British India 
for the period.) 
The increase of interest of the Indian cotton mill in- 
dustry in the production of cloth as against yarn can be 
explained by (1) the growing weakness of the China market 
for Indian yarn. How important the China market was for 
the Indian mill industry, and the lack of strength of that 
market in this respect can be seen from the following fig- 
ures of total Indian yarn exports and exports to China 
during the period. 
Year. 
Exports of Yarn. 
Exports of Indian Cotton 
Yarn to China in Million lbs. 
Total Indian Cotton. 
Yarn exports in Million lbs, 
1900 -1 118.08 108 
1901 -2 272.4 260 
1902-3 248.5 231 
1903-4 252.4 235 
19 04 -5 247.8 229.1 
137. 
Year. Total Indian Cotton 
Yarn exports in Allion lbs . 
Exports of Indian Cotton 
Yarn to China in Million lbs. 
1905 -8 297.6 282 
1908 -7 243.5 223 
1907-8 215.5 160 
19O8- 235.4 208 
1909-10 27.3 200.3 
1910-11 183.4 158.9 
1911 -12 151.4 129.2 
1912-13 203.9 183.3 
1915-14 198 177.9 
(Figures from the keview of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) 
From this table it is obvious that (1) Indian exports of 
yarn were almost entirely determined by what China would 
take from year to year (2) the quantity of Indian yarn 
that China took from year to year varied very much as 
the result of famines, plagues and political disturb- 
ances. (3) In spite of wide variations in China's 
takings of Indian yarn it is clear that the quantity 
of it showed an unmistakeable tendency to decline. 
This was due as has been said to the increasing: cap- 
ture of the China yarn market by Japan and the growth 
of China's own spinnings of yarn. Writing in the 
Economist of the 4th January 1908 (p.9) on Japan's 
Commercial Expansion' Mr Masuda ,the writer says 
"Our exports of cotton yarn to China have groom from 
6 million taels in 1897 to 20 million taels in 1903" 
and/ 
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and he says further "Japan has ;3,500,000 invested in spin- 
ning factories". 
Another factor to be taken into reckoning in accounting 
for the change of interest of the Indian mill industry from 
yarn to cloth lay in the fact that the early years of the 
20th century were characterised by a furious speculation 
in cotton particularly in the United States of America which 
at the time produced 60% of the world supply of it. Now 
cotton yarn being more closely related to raw cotton than 
cloth, was more liable to reflect the fluctuations of the 
price of the raw material than cloth which was more re- 
moved. Besides there was growing in India a movement for 
the preference of indigenous manufacture. deference as 
early as the year 1906-7 is made to the fact of this move- 
ment by the ¡teview of the Trade of India. The Indian 
mill industry met the situation recounted here by (1) an 
increasing production of cotton cloth than yarn and (2) 
the higher counts 
by spinning yarn of -Paz ---yam to meet the internal 
needs of the Indian handloom weaver in place of the coarse 
spinnings for the China market. The net result was an 
increasing interest of the Indian cotton manufacturing 
industry in the home market. Evidence of this is found 
in the following percentages of the internal production 
of yarn and cloth retained for consumption in India. 
139. 
$ of yarn production % of cloth production 
Retained for home Eetained for home 
22umalm. consumption. 
1900 53% 78.9% 
1901 88.8 79.7 
1902 52.8 82+3 
1903 56.9 82.9 
1904 56.4 83.5 
1905 67.1 84.2 
1906 56.3 83.7 
1907 82.8 89.2 
1908 66.3 90.9 
1909 84.5 90.8 
1910 83.8 90.3 
1911 69.8 90.4 
1912 75.8 98.4 
(quoted from the Economist 14arch 22, 1913, P.898) 
The increasing quantities of the home production 
retained for home consumption should be expected 
to have reactions on the important import trade in 
cotton manufactures. This may be borne in mind 
while studying the import trade of India in cotton 
manufactures. 
The Export in Tanned hides and .3kins. 
What measure of strength the export trade in 
Tanned hides and skins imparted to the export trade 
in merchandise of India in Cenerai and to the export 
trade/ 
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trade of India in manufactured goods in particular can 
be realised from the following figures of Exports of 
Haw and Tanned hides and skins. These figures are taker 
from the Imperial Institute Indian Trade Enquiry Report 
on Hides and Skins, pages 84 and 85. 
and Skins 
Export of Hides /from India. 
Average Annual Exports in Cwts. 
1895 -6 - 1899 -1900 1900 -1 - 1904 -5 1905 -6 - 1909 -10 1910 -11 - 1913 
haw H. 786,544 802,698 863,449 1030,445 
Tanned 144,724 144,580 180,769 1830745 
Raw 120,139 266,723 480,649 551,240 
Tanned . 194,693 159 ,545 142,787 139 ,18 1 
These figures show that in the case of raw hides, ex- 
ports at the beginning, of the period were five times 
as much in weight as that of tanned hides and during 
the period while exports of raw hides increased by 
240,000 owt. those of tanned hides increased by barely 
40,000 cwt. In the case of raw skins, exports,starting 
with 120,000 cwt. grew during the period to fully four 
times that quantity whereas tanned skins exports start- 
ing with 195,000 owt. declined by the end of the period 
to 139,000 cwt. The values of Raw and Tanned hides 




Values of Exports of Raw and Tanned Hides and Skins. 
Raw hides and skins 
in crores of Rupees 
Tanned hides and skins 
in crams of Rupees. 
1900-1 6.98 crores 4.5 
1901-2 5.57 2.6 
1902-3 5.53 2.88 
1903-4 5.83 3.09 
1904-5 7.65 2.84 
1905-6 10.11 3.6 
1906-7 10.89 4.4 
1907-8 7.05 3.8 
1908-9 8.33 4.1 
1909-10 9.65 3.96 
1910-11 8.99 4.08 
1911-12 9.44 348 
1912-13 11.73 4.6 
1913-14 11.68 4.22 
(Figures voted from the Review of the Trade of India 1900-1914) 
The opening year of the period was one of a heavy mortality 
of cattle and export of both raw and tanned hides and skins 
was large. Export values fell away in the years immediately 
following. Up to 1903-4 exports of raw hides and skins were 
twice the value of tanned hides and skins. After this period 
appeared the duties in the importing countries on tanned 
hides and skins. The trade was also stimulated by the Russo- 
Japanese/ 
142. 
husso-Japanese war and as a combined result the velues 
of exports of raw hides and skins rose very well while 
those of tanned hides and skins rose much less. As 
against the duties on tanned goods levied by the United 
States of America and Germany the home marked for tan- 
ned leather was at that time limited. In this con- 
nection the following evidence tendered by the Honble. 
Mr L.P. Watson before the Indian Industrial Commission 
is very instructive. The question was put to him 
"You say that the capacity of output of the tanneries 
in Bombay and Madras is far greater than the demand in 
normal times under existing fiscal condition. Do you 
mean that the trade is killed by foreign competition?" 
Answer: "It is killed by foreign duties. England is 
practically the only buyer of Madras and. Bombay tanned 
cow-hides for the sinple reason that other countries 
have imposed such heavy import duties on these that an 
export trade is rendered impossible". 
Question: "The home market is a limited one and more 
than supplied". 
Answer: "Yes", 
(p.681 Minutes of Evidence - Indian Industrial 
Commission.) 
This brings to a close the survey of the main 
items of manufactured goods in the Indian export trade. 
143. 
Section II. The Indian Export Trade in itaw Materials. 
It has been seen that 80% of India's export trade 
in merchandise consists of exports of raw materials. 
This section deals with this trade in general and with 
the most important items of the trade in particular. 
In enclosure No.1 appended to the Minute on the 
views of the Government of India on the question of 
Preferential Tariffs, (Cmd 1931 of 1904) Sir Edward 
Law referring to opium, indigo, myrabolanus, Mowra, 
jute, jute manufactures, teakwood, lac and til from 
among India's export commodities said (p.13) "In the 
production of most of the articles above scheduled 
India enjoys a practical if not an absolute monopoly 
and if foreign countries require them they must im- 
port them from India ". Developments during 1900 -1914, 
after Sir Edward Law wrote the trAnute in 1904, made the 
Indian monopoly of indigo of very little value to the 
export trade. The changes that came over the export 
trade in indigo and opium may first be noted briefly, 
before pasaing on to a consideration of the commod- 
ities which showed outstanding strength for the ex- 
port trade. 
During 1906-7 the Chinese government came forward 
with proposals for the abolition of the opium trade. 
As a result,the International Opium Conference met at 
Shanghai/ 
6hanghai during 1908-9 and in May 1911 an agreement was 
arrived at to end the trade in less than seven years 
"if clear proof was given of the complete absence of 
production of native opium in China". Although as a 
result of this development the quantity of opium ex- 
ported began to decline, the value on the other hand 
showed strength till the last year of the period when 
it gave way as the result of a steep decline in the 
quantity of exports. Thus for most of the period, 
1900-1914,0pium,in spite of the agreement,continued 
to be a source of strength for the export trade. The 
figures of the trade show that the knowledge that ex- 
ports of opium from India were due to stop and the 
grkleartor speculation engendered thereby, caused the 
price of Indian opium to rise. 
Exports of Opium. 
(1) 
Cheats of Opium 
1000 chests. 
(2) 
Value in crores 
of Rupees. 
1900-1 70 9.45 
1901-2 66 8.5 
1902-3 67 8.01 
1903-4 74 10.4 
1904-5 67 10.6 
1905-6 63 9.4 
1906-7 66 9.3 
1907-8 64 8.6 
1908-9 67 9.34 
chests of Mpium 
1000 chests. 
Value in crores 
of Rupees. 
1909-10 56 9.31 ) 
1910-11 44 12.71 ) 
1911-12 38 13.08 ) 
1912-13 31 11.22 ) 
) 
1913-14 12 3.42 ) 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India 1900 to 1914) 
Another commodity which ceased to be of any strength 
to the Indian export trade was Indigo. Reference has al- 
ready been made as to how the discovery of a cheaper syn- 
thetic dye (.Asiaticus,Economic Journa), June 1912) knocked 
the bottom out of India's export trade in the natural dye. 
The following figures of the trade show how complete was 
the blow dealt by the synthetic dye to the Indian trade 
in Indigo. 
Exports. 
1895-6 187,337 cwt. 
1900-01 102,491 " 





(Figures quoted from the Review of the Trade of India 
for the years). 
The chief of the items of Indian raw material ex 
which 
port oommoditiesr,auring this period were sources of real 
strength to the Indian Export trade were Raw Jute and 
Raw Cotton, Food grain, Tea, Oilseeds and Raw hides and 
skins/ 
skins. To a survey of the special features and details 
of the trade in these commodities the rest of the chapter 
on the Indian Export traded devoted. 
A. Raw Jute. 
The commercial production of Jute is confined 
to India, the areas concerned being Bengal, Behar and 
Orissa, Assam, Gooch ; Behar and 1'tepal and this is due,as 
the Imperial economic Institutes Jute Enquiry Report 
states "to the fact that no country i3 so situated in 
regard to soil, climate, water and labour as to be ever 
able to compete with India in the raising of Jute ". 
(Page d) Thus, India has the monopoly of Jute supply 
and this monopoly is due to the failure on the part of 
many countries that have attempted it to discover suit - 
able ,tom= 's={.4_ substitutes at satisfactory prices. Thus 
Jute is not an absolute monopoly but a conditional mono- 
poly the chief condition being price. Jute is a fibre 
in universal demand. Its principal use is in the manu- 
facture of that vast quantity of coarse cloth, (the 
gunnies and hessians of commerce) which is made up into 
bags and sacking necessary for the transport of the 
world's agriculturel produce. It also has other uses 
no less universal if of secondary importance. Jute 
fabrics of various qualities are employed in manufact- 
uring carpets, rugs, matting, blankets and even for 
cheap/ 
cheap shirtings and table cloths formerly male from flax. 
Jute is also used in making twine, thread and cordage and 
in admixture with other fibres in making a large number 
of coarse fabrics, while jute waste is used in the manu- 
facture of brown paper. Such uses imply a constant demand 
from every part of the civilized world for the material 
in its raw state,as well as for its manufactured products. 
From the principal uses to which the fibre is put, jute 
affords a rough barometer of the world's harvests and 
is therefore immediately sensitive to seasonal fluctua- 
tions from droughts or other material causes and in 
general to any circumstances whatsoever likely to lessen 
the production of foodstuffs or raw materials or to im- 
pede their unfettered transportation from one country 
to another. The period under review being singularly 
free from such disturbances on a big scale, saw the trade 
in raw and manufactured jute enter on a career of pro- 
sperity as indicated by the figures Oxen below of total 
out -turn, export and value of export. 
Indian Production and Export of Jute. 
Year Out-turn in Exports in Value of Exports. 
Million Bales Million Bales in Millions of £. 
1900 -1 6.5 3.4 7.2 
1901 -2 7.4 4.1 7.8 
1902 -3 6.5 3.8 7.4 
1903 -4 7.2 3.3 7.8 
1904 -5 7.4 3.6 7.9 
1905 -6 8.08 4.05 11.4 
1906 -7 9.12 4.5 17.8 
1907,8 9.8 3.97 11,9 
1908-9 6.39 4.6 13.2 
1909 -10 7.2 4.04 10.05 
1910 ..11 7.9 305 10.3 
1911-12 8.2 4.6 15.03 
1912-13 9.8 4.9 18.03 
1913-14 8.7 4.3 20.55 
(Source:- Review of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) . 
That the Jute trade was well provided with the stimulus 
of a rise in price is seen in the following figures 
of the annual average price of Jute first marks per 
bale of 400 lbs. at Calcutta. (Source:- Review of 
the Trade of India 1913 -14, p.21) . 
Price of Jute 1900-1913. (Average Annual) 
/ear. Price per bale of 400 lbs. 
1900 Z2: 5: 1 
1904 2: 3: 7 
1905 2:17: 8 
1906 3:16: 8 
1907 3: 7: 8 (source:- p. 21, "Review 
of the Trade of India" 
1908 2:12: 1 1913-14). 
1909 2: 3: 5 
1910 2: 8:11 
1911 2:14: 2 
1912 3:12: 4 
1913 4:14: 8 
The increase in the exports of raw jute would during 
the period have been greater had it not been for the 
development of the Indian jute industry and the conse- 
quent increase in internal consumption* It is esti- 
mated that the Indian consumption of raw jute in 1900-1 
was 2.5 million bales and 4.4 million bales in 1913-14. 
Apart from the trend during the period, of a general 
rise of prices, part of the rise in the price of jute 
had to be accounted for by an increase in the demand 
for the raw material, The Review of the Trade of 
India made the following estimates of the world demand 
of raw jute. 
1904-5 7.5 million bales. 
1906.7 8 million bales, 
1911-12 8.5 to 9 million bales. 
1913-14 10 million bales, 
(Source:- Review of the Trade of India for the res- 
pective years under Jute). 
Thus with Indian monopoly of the supply and an increase 
in world demand that was threatening to out-run the sup- 
ply the increase in the volume and value of exports of 
raw jute are easily understood and the commodity was a 
source of great strength to the export trade during the 
period. 
The Indian Export Trade in Raw Cotton. 
The place and importance of raw cotton in the ex- 
port trade of India can be realised from the following 
table of export quantities and values during the period. 
They are set down in bales of 400 lbs each and crores 
of Rupees. 




Value in crores 
of Rupees. 
Percentage of Total 
Exports of Merchandise. 
1900 -1 1.02 10.12 9.7% 
1901-2 1.62 14.42 11.5 
1902 -3 1.72 14.75 11.5 
1903-4 2.26 24.37 16% 
1904 -5 1.58 17.43 11.2% 
1905 -6 2.071 21.34 13.5 
1906 -7 2.072 21.97 12.75 
1907-8 2.397 25.70 14.5 
1908 -9 1.903 19.76 13.1 




Value in crores 
of Rupees. 
Percentage of Total 
Exports of Merchandise. 
1910 -11 2.432 35.10 12.2 
1911 -12 2.052 29.4 13% 
1912 -13 2.066 28.3 11.6 
1913-14 2.975 40.9 16% 
(source- "Review of the Trade of India" 1900 -14) . 
The features disclosed by this table of Raw Cotton trade 
development during the period 1900 -1914 are worth noting. 
Roughly between 1900 -1 and 1913 -14 the quantity of Indian 
raw cotton exports have nearly trebled themselves while 
their export values has quadrupled, The difference bet- 
ween the two is explained by the rise of cotton prices. 
The rise in the price of raw cotton is to be accounted 
for partly by the general rise of prices which has been 
enquired into earlier in this study, and partly by changes 
in the relative demand for and supply of raw cotton. The 
index to the change in demand lies (1) in the growth of 
world spindleage during the period. That was estimated 
at 105,574,135 in 1900 and rose to 143,332,000 in 1913. 
"Since 1909 the world's consumption of raw cotton has in- 
creased at the rate of almost a million bales per annum ". 
(Economist July 4th 1914, p.11.) and the world's cotton 
production has grown from a supply of 17,300,000 bales in 
1902 -3 to 25,968,000 bales in 1913 -14 (J.A. Todd - The 
Cotton World p.3). Ever so the position during the 
period was one in which "the world's consumption of cot- 
ton is continually tending to exceed the supply" 
(Review of the Trade of India 1913 -14, p.14) . 
The world's supply of cotton is made up of (a) the 
American supply which accounts for approximately 60-7. 
(b) the Indian which is about 20%, (o) the Egyptian 
which contributes about 6%, (d) the rest. From the 
point of view of length of staple and fineness the 
order of importance is Egyptian, American and Indian. 
On the whole this order represents the true position 
though some American cotton is supposed to be as fine 
and as long in staple as the best Egyptian. 
The fact that raw cotton can be carried over long 
at very low cost 
distances /has tended to the creation of a unified and 
very sensitive world cotton market. Largely as a mat- 
ter of economy of production every cotton manufacturing 
industry turns to its nearest supply for its cotton. 
Thus Continental Europe and the United Kingdom which 
produce no cotton look to the American and Egyptian 
supply mainly, the U.S.A. to its own,and Japan to 
India and India and Egypt mainly to their own supplies. 
Now if every cotton industry in each country had spin- 
dles specialised to one kind of cotton only the world's 
cotton market might have been expected to divide it- 
self into water -tight divisions each affected by the 
forces of its own demand and supply and uninfluenced 
by the others. In that case the prices of the differ- 
ent kinds of cotton should have gone their own way and 
shown no common movements. The fact that the cotton 
supply/ 
supply of each prominent producer of cotton has supplies 
of the different lengths of the fibre long, middling and 
short and the fact also of a shortage of the American 
supply for export has increasingly led cotton industries 
to substitute one kind of cotton for another on a price 
basis and even to mix their cotton has tended to prevent 
the appearance of these water-tight divisions of the 
cotton market and has helped to unify the cotton market 
into a very sensitive whole. The outstanding example 
of a country that substitutes and mixes its cotton in 
manufacture is Japan. In his book "Uotton goes to 
market" -A,a4. Garside writes thus (p.127) "here to 
an extent not approached in any other part of the world 
American competition meets the test of competition with 
other growths, especially Indian on both a price and 
quality basis. This competition grows out of the facts 
that Japan lies midway between the U.S.A. and India, 
it makes largely a class of goods in which American and 
Indian Gotten can be mixed in varying proportions and 
its machinery is adapted to the use of either of them 
The 
or mixtures of them". /Factors influencing the price 
of cotton are many. The crop is the basic supply factor. 
kill consumption is the basic demand factor. The crop 
is subject to greater fluctuations than consumption and 
the size of the crop is determined chiefly by growing 
conditions that develop within a few months in the 
middle/ 
middle of the growing season. Hence crop developments 
are usually the chief price affecting influences in 
the crop growing period while consumption developments 
are usually of most importance during the rest of the 
year, At all times monetary or general trade develop- 
ments may be of vital importance for they may reflect 
changes in the commodity value of money and in general 
buying power. 
Pt ow if the demand for and supply of each kind of 
cotton equated,the differences in the resulting prices 
of the different kinds of cotton should measure the 
difference of their quality only and no more. 
In a world of change and flux and with the varia- 
tion of output of cotton such a situation is too much 
to ask and actually the percentage of the price of 
Indian cotton on American which dominates the cotton 
market either is more than or less than the percentage 
warranted by the difference of quality. What it at 
any time will be depends on the relation in India of 
internal supply and demand 44 2.n relation to the rest 
of the world's supply and demand. The resulting posi 
tion can be inferred from the following table of the 
annual average prices of Middling American and Indian 
No.l fine oomrah and the percentage of the price of 
the latter on the former. 
Prices of Cotton per lb. in d. at Liverpool 
Indi a 
Middling 140.1 Fine Percentage of the 
American. Oomrah. price of the second 
on the first. .
1900 -01 5.16 4.37 85% 
1901 -02 4.78 4.19 88/ 
1902 -03 5.48 4.47 92 
1903 -4 8.94 5.56 80 
1904 -e 4.91 4.82 94 
1905 -6 5.95 5.00 84 
1906 -7 6.38 4.87 76 
1907 -8 6.19 5.03 81 
1908-9 5.50 4.94 90 
1909-10 7.86 6.31 80 
1910 -11 7.84 7.03 90 
1911 -12 6.09 5.63 93 
1912 -13 8.76 6.16 91 
1913-14 7.26 5.88 81 
(Source:- J.A. Todd 'the Cotton World' p.29) 
It will be seen that the percentage of average annual price 
of Indian over American cotton has during the period varied 
between 94 and 76 a difference of 18 points. The low per- 
centage of 78 in 1906-7 is accounted for thus by the Review 
of the Trade of India for that year (p.47). "In England 
the consumption of raw cotton in 1906 exceeded that in 1905 by 
some 370,000 cwt. or 2.2%. in India there was a considerable 
decline of activity more particularly in the later months. 
The/ 
The bill consumption fell by nearly 285,000 cwt. from 
7,234,800 to 6 ,948 ,000 cwt.... The decline in Japan's 
purchases is one of 22% but her total imports of raw 
cotton declined by some 28%." 
The position then may be summed up thus. If the 
Indian demand is weak in its relation to the supply 
the price of cotton in India tends to be low and the 
resultant price of Indian cotton would represent a 
comparatively low percentage of the price of American 
cotton if the demand for the latter in relation to its 
supply be strong. If that be so,external consumers of 
cotton substituting Indian cotton for other because 
of the advantage of price, would create a demand for 
Indian cotton which would result in increased exports 
and raise the price of Indian cotton and weaken the 
demand for American and thus the percentage that the 
Indian price would bear to the price of American cotton 
would tend to rise. On the other hand if as the re- 
sult of a strong demand in India for cotton in relation 
to the home supply the price of Indian cotton bears 
a high percentage to the price of American, the Indian 
Mill Manager might find it to his advantage to import 
American rather than buy Indian cotton especially if 
he wants to spin finer yarns. For example imports of 
raw cotton into India rose in 1912-13 to the highest 
figure of the period namely 548,071 cwt. If the Review 
of the Trade of India for that year says "that it is 
symptomatic of the trend of the Indian industry towards 
finer/ 
finer products. It has of course been stimulated by the 
relatively high prices current for good Indian cottons" 
(p.25) The relative prices of American and 
Indian cot- 
ton for the year were the following. 
American in Liverpool Broach in Bombay. 
Opening 6.23d 5.85 
Highest 7.44 7.02 
Lowest 6.09 5.51 
Closing 6.99 6.78 
Average 6.75 6.27 
"the approximation of the Broach price to that for Amer- 
ican is closer than ever. There is usually a close re- 
lation between home prices for American cotton and those 
in Bombay for Indian cotton. In both cases the price 
ruled strong till August then dropped for a time and be- 
gan a fresh advance in november which has been more or 
less maintained. But whereas in American cotton the 
highest level was reached in December, the renewed ad- 
vance in Indian cotton continued almost up to the end 
of the financial year". (.p.48. 
Looking at the list of cotton prices and parities 
it will be seen that the price of American and Indian 
move in the same direction generally which is an index 
to the world cotton market being a unified and sensitive 
whole, The American price is higher than Indian be- 
cause American cotton is superior and long in staple 
and/ 
and Indian is short. It is only in the year 1906-7 that 
while the American price rose the Indian fell and this 
unusual movement in different directions has been ex- 
plained. Lastly it has been seen that in the latter 
part of the 1900 -1914 period the percentage borne by 
the price of Indian cotton to American has been high. 
That bespeaks changing relative position as between the 
demand for and supply of Indian cotton and that for 
American. The index to that is provided by the follow- 
ing table of index numbers of looms in India, Japan, 
Italy, U.S.A. and Great Britain. 
Estimated i umber of Looms in India, Japan, Italy, U.S.A. 
and Groat Britain during 1909-1913. 1913 = 100 






1909 82 57 87 1X3 92 
1910 88 73 91 - 92 
1911 91 84 92 - 94 
1912 95 90 101 - 98 
1913 100 100 100 100 100 
(Source:- Daniels & Jewkes - The Post War depression 
in the Lancashire Cotton Industry. Table IX p.165 
Part II J.it.S.S. 1928) . 
The greater activity and therefore demand of India 
and Japan who use mainly Indian cotton compared to 
the advance in the U.S.A. and Great Britain is clear 
here. 
C. The Indian Export Trade in Food Grains. 
The export trade under this item falls in order of 
importance into the divisions of (a) the export trade in 
Rice (b) the export trade in Wheat and (c) the export 
trade in other food grains. On this study it is pro- 
posed to deal with only the first two divisions, that 
is the export trade in rice and wheat. 
For a country of the population of India the pro- 
duction of food grains is very important. Food grains 
take up the largest portion of the acreage under culti- 
vation.. This of course is a permanent feature of the 
Indian economy. According to the Report of the Progress 
and Condition of India for 1913 -14 (page 45) out of 
a total cultivated area of 212.5 million acres which 
inc} -udes the area cropped more than once,fully 163 
million acres were devoted to the cultivation of food 
grains. 
Of these trice is out and away the most important 
item. India during the period stood in the position 
of being the biggest producer, consumer and exporter 
of Rice. The Review of the Trade of India for 1913 -14 
on page 16 says "India's share of the world's pro- 
duction was no less than 40. The Imperial Institute's 
Trade Inquiry Report on Rice (p.38) gives the world's 
exported surplus of Rice as approximately 5.1 million 
tons in 1913 -14 and India accounted for 2.6 million 
tons of them. The area under rice in India accord- 
ing/ 
according to the 3tatistical Abstract for i ritish India 
was 89 million acres in 1900 -01 and rose to 77 million 
sores in 1913 -14. The production of rice during the 
period rose from 20.7 million tons in 1900 -1 to 30 mil 
lion tone in 1911-12 and 28 million tons in 1913 -14. 
In the light of these figures it is interesting to con- 
sider the figures of the quantities and values of India's 
itioe exports. According to the Review of the Trade of 
India for 1913 -14 *exports of rice were nearly 9% of 
the total estimated production". 
Year. 
Exports of ïtiiae. 
Value in orores of Rupees. Exporta in Million tone. 
1900-1 1.5 13.1.4 
1901 -2 1.887 13.84 
1902 -3 2.35 18.78 
1903 -4 2.22 18.95 
1904-6 2.44 19.46 
1905 -6 2.15 18.63 
1906 -7 1.93 18.52 
1907-3 1.915 20.33 
1908.0 1.5 15.88 
1909-10 1.96 18.24 
1910 -11 2.4 23.23 
1911 -12 2.62 29.05 
1912-13 2.76 32.55 
1913-14 2.45 26.63 
(Review of the Trabe of India 1900 -1 to 191344). 
Remembering that 1900 -1 was a famine year and in 
the caso of rice the teniency to replenish stocks would 
affect the export trade of the years immediately fol- 
lowing, it would be preferable for purposes of the study 
of the trend of the Rice trade to choose 1903 -4 as the 
normal year in the light of which to study the movements 
of the trade. The features revealed by the figures may 
be set down as follows:- (1) Quantitatively the export 
trade has not shown any serious advance. In fact it has 
just maintained itself. (2) From the point of export 
value the trade has shown much better advance which is 
explained by the general rise in prices and the rise of 
Rice prices in particular. For e.g. in 1904.5 the 
quantity exported was 2.44 million tons and was valued 
at 19.45 crores. In 1910 -11 exports amounted to 2.4 
million tone but value soared to 23.23 crores and in 
1913 -14 exports were about the same, being 2.45 million 
tons but export values rose to 26.63 crores of Rupees. 
(3) Quantitatively the export trade has been erratic. 
. 4 { 
For e.g. from 1905 -6 right up to 1909 -10 was a period 
when the export trade in rice export quantities showed 
weakness. That weakness was in the earlier part of 
the period due to a rise in the price of food grains 
internally which narrowed the margin between the in- 
ternal and the export price and thus reduced the in- 
ducement to export. It was due to a period of good 
crops, growing prosperity and increased consumption. 
1907/ 
1907 was one of failure of crops and the year following 
the crop was not very good, a depression settled on the 
world and these conditions reinforced the forces making 
for a weakness of the export trade. Recovery began in 
1910-11 with good export prices and with a fall in the 
internal price of food grains, The following index 
numbers of internal retail prices of food grains explains 
the weakness of the export trade. 
Index Numbers of Prices. 
(a) 
Of articles consumed 
or exported. 
(b) 
Index Number for food grains 
(Retail prices) 
1873 100 100 
1902 115 141 
1903 103 128 
1904 104 117 
1905 116 147 
1906 139 129 
1907 145 180 
1908 151 231 
1909 133 195 
1910 127 168 
1911 136 161 
1912 145 189 
1913 154 199 
(p. 118 Progress and Condition of India 1913-14) 
Most/ 
Most of India's exports of Lice are from Burma. Burma's 
share of the export trade of India in Rice was luring 
the period as follows:- 
Percentage of share of Surma in the Indian Export Trade in Rice. 
1905-6 73.3% 
1906 -7 73.4 
1907 -8 76.4 




i212 -13 74.5 
1013.14 75.5 
(Review of the Trade of India 1905 -6 to 1913 -14) . 
This is so because although "Burma is far from being the 
largest producer of rice, as its production is on an aver- 
age not more than one. -sixth of the production of Bengal 
and little if anything greater than Madras, she retains 
for home consumption less than one fifth of her crop 
and exports the remainder to India and foreign countries, 
the amount of the exports to foreign countries being 
directly dependent on the state of the Indian demand ". 
(Review of the Trade of India 1903, -4, p.20) . The 
weakness of the Indian export trade in Rice can be 
understood in the light of the following figures of 
the export of Burma hice to India. 
The Export of Burma hiGe to India. 
1903-4 195,000 tons 
1904 -6 301,000 " 
1905 -6 460,000 " 
1906 -7 813,000 " 
1907-8 979,000 " 
1908-9 1,157,000 " 
1909 -10 1,038,000 " 
1910 -11 611,550 " 
1911 -12 245,000 " 
1912 -13 266,000 " 
1913 -14 899,000 " 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India for the period) 
According to the Imperial Institute's Indian Trade 
Inquiry Report on Rice, the rice trade of the world 
falls into two great branches "the Far Eastern requiring 
a cheap rice for feeding the native population and the 
Western branch requiring large quantities of medium 
quality rice and much smaller quantities of high quality 
rice ". Rice is chiefly employed the world over as food 
but a certain amount is used for industrial purposes 
either merely ground for use as a size in the textile 
industry or converted into starch. Considerable quant- 
ities are also used in brewing beer especially in 
Germany and Austria. The three major rice exporting 
countries are India, Siam and Indo China and these three 
countries in 1913 accounted for 94% of the world's ex- 
ported/ 
exported surplus and India accounted for 53% of this. 
Indian rice is exported to every part of the globe 
and during the period under review the export trade 
was more affected by conditions in India than by 
external demand since India was the biggest consumer 
of Rice. The factors affecting the export trade 
during the period may be set down as follows. 
A diminishing of India's exports of rice may be 
caused by (a) a short crop. A shortage in any 
province of India usually leads to a diversion of 
Burma's surplus to India. The figures bearing this 
out have been given already. 
(b) a shortage of other food crops for which rice may 
be substituted. The chief crop in this connection was 
the wheat crop. 
(c) excertional prosperity and enhanced consuming and 
holding power among cultivations of crops other than 
food grains as for e.g. among cultivators of Jute in 
Bengal. "If we accept the lowest estimate of average 
consumption of Rice per head (i.e. i ser = 1.03 lb) 
and assume that the increased consumption or reserva- 
tion by the 50,722,000 of population in Bengal alone 
amounts to only one - hundredth part of such average 
consumption, the total withdrawal from visible supply 
on account of the one provincealone would amount to 
about 84,500 tons" . (Review of the Trade of India 1906 
-7, p.35) . 
(d)/ 
(d) a disposition of cultivators to substitute specially 
profitable crops for rice. "The chief feature of the 
Indian rice trade in the year was the continued shortage 
of crops in Bengal (a province responsible in a season of 
good rainfall for more than a third of the total out turn) 
chiefly due to an adverse season but also in part to a 
contraction of acreage in consequence of the temptation 
offered by the high price of Jute in the sowing season 
to grow that crop in preference". (heview of. the Trade 
of India 1907 -8, p.33) . 
To sum up then, as the chief supplier of hice to 
the world market India was in a strong position in the 
rice trade. The world demand for rice was strong during 
this period and Indian rice was widely distributed all 
over the globe by the export trade. As India is herself 
the largest consumer of trice in the world the export trade 
in rice did not advance strikingly in quantity but it did 
in value and on the whole rice was a source of increasing 
strength to the export trade during the period. 
Indian Export Trade in Wheat. 
During the period, with the increasing population of 
the great industrial states of Europe and the increasing 
expenditure of their working classes, the problem of the 
world's wheat supply became an increasingly important 
one. During the last quarter of. the 19th century the 
U.S.A./ 
U.S.A. was the main exporter of wheat and during these 
years wheat prices mainly depended upon the conditions 
of the American wheat crop. At the close of the 19th 
century however the increased demand in the U.S.A. and 
the competition there of other crops such as the sugar 
beet which was artificially fostered by the tariff, 
made the large surplus crops of the seventies and 
eighties almost impossible. Besides attempted corners 
in wheat at the close of the century the U.S.A. sent 
wheat prices soaring. The shortage and the attempted 
corners combined, broke the ascendancy of the U.S.A. 
in the European market by stimulating the production 
of other sources of supply the chief of which came 
to be Russia, Argentine, and 
India. 
1heat is an uncertain crop generally and exports 
from each of the new sources were liable to wide 
fluctuations from various causes and therefore not 
readily to be depended upon. For e.g. the figures 
of wheat exports to Great Britain from Australia as 
affected by the drought of 1900 -2 make this clear. 
British Imports from Australia (Wheat). 
1902 - 2,072,766 cwt. 
1903 - 30 cwt. 






Similarly the Argentine crop was subject to locust in- 
vasion and the Canadian crop to exceedingly erratic 
weather. In spite of this the sources of wheat exports 
during this period were so many that sowing took place 
in every month of the year and a shortage in European 
harvests was apparent early enough to influence the 
acreage put under wheat elsewhere. The effect of this 
on wheat pricey was that whereas prior to 1898 they 
showed big fluctuations, since that date they have been 
remarkably steady though with an upward trend. 
It is on this background that the Indian wheat ex- 
port trade during the period has to be considered. The 
world's wheat supply and average gazette price of wheat 
during the period were as follows. 
Average Gazette price 
World's Wheat supply. of Wheat per quarter London. 




























(Dornbusch's list compiled from the Economist 1900 -1914). 
From the figures in this list, it 13 clear that while 
the world's supply of wheat steadily grew during, the period 
the price of wheat also showed an upward trend which is 
an index partly to the general rise of prices and partly to 
the growth of the demand for wheat. 
Until the Suez Canal was opened and the export duty 
was abolished little wheat was exported from India, the 
mean of the five years ending 1872 -1873 being; only 16,000 
tons. Between 1900 -1914 the area under wheat rose from 
roughly 24 million acres in 1900 to 30 million acres in 
1914. The following figures indicate the wheat production 
and exports of India. 
Production and Exports. 
Year Wheat production Exports Value in crores. 
1900-1 7.09 million tons 2,500 tons .38 
1901 -2 6.06 " " 366,091 3.62 
1902 -3 7.97 " " 514,607 4.98 
1903 -4 9.6 " " 1,295,565 11.08 
1904 -5 7.58 " " 2,150,025 17.9 
1905 -6 8.57 " " 937,523 8.5 
1908-7 8.49 " " 801,445 7.2 
1907 -8 6.10 " " 880,459 8.58 
1908 -9 7.59 " " 110,000 1.34 
1909 -10 9.63 " " 1,050,574 12.7 
1910 -11 10.06: " " 1,266,000 12.95 
1911 -12 9.9 " " 1,361,000 13.34 
1912 -13 9.8 " " 1,660,000 17.7 
1913 -14 8.4 " " 1,202,000 13.22 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India - 1900 -1 to 1913 -14. 
The features of the wheat trade contained in this 
table of figures are well worth giving a little atten- 
tion. Wheat production in the country during the period 
varied in quantity between 6 million tons, the lowest 
quantity produced which was in the year 1901 -2 and 10 
million tons, the highest, in 1910 -11. Wheat exports 
on the other hand varied between much wider limits the 
lowest quantity of exports being 2500 tons in 1900 -01 
and the highest 2.1 million tons in 1904 -5. Yet the 
difference in the quantity of wheat production between 
these two years was no more than half a million tons: 
In view of this it is worth while to consider the 
factors influencing the export trade in wheat. The 
wheat exports of a statistical year are drawn from the 
production of the year before it and therefore have to 
be referred to it and not to the production of the same 
year. AS a matter of ZA44 Trade exports of wheat depend 
on the difference between ti.e internal and the external 
price of wheat. Europe is the biggest market for wheat 
and as most of India's exports of wheat go to the 
United Kingdom a good export trade in wheat for India 
depends on the margin between Indian and United Kingdom 
price of wheat. This margin must cover the cost of 
transport to the port from up country and the freight 
overseas and leave a profit and the larger the profit 
the greater will be the quantity exported. For a large 
export trade in wheat from India,the Indian and the 
United/ 
United Kingdom price of wheat have to work in opposite 
directions, the former being low and the latter high. 
The conditions so far as India is concerned of a low 
price of wheat ruling may be set down as consistin{T 
of (1) a good crop of wheat in the previous year, 
(2) good crops of other food grains, (3) good crops 
of both for a number of years previously. A good 
crop of wheat in the previous year does not guarantee 
good exports. If the crop of other food grains has 
not been good the rise in their price would cause the 
price of wheat in the country to rise also and narrow 
the margin. Once again a good crop of wheat in the 
previous year cannot guarantee good exports if in the 
past have been short crops of wheat, 
for then the replenishing of exhausted stores in add- 
ition to actual consumption would tend to keep in- 
ternal wheat prices up. Thus a good export trade in 
wheat in a year depends on a good crop of wheat and 
of other food grains at the time, and good crops of 
wheat for two or three years before that: this is 
essential for keeping wheat prices down. 
If now attention is given to the table of fig- 
ures of exports and production an attempt may be made 
to see how far that table bears out the argument of 
the factors stated above as conditioning the export 
trade in wheat. As a further help the index numbers 
of the annual average price of wheat in India and 
in the United Kingdom are set down. 
Index Numbers of Annual Average Wheat Prices. 
India United Kingdom. 
Official 1673 = 100 Statist. ).866.67 = 100. 
Delhi. No.1 Pessy per cwt. American per quarter. 





1905 82 1905 61 
1906 100 1906 58 
1907 87 1907 64 
1908 127 1908 67 
1909 106 1909 74 
1910 110 1910 65 
1911 95 1911 63 
1912 103 1912 68 
1913 107 1913 65 
1914 114 1914 72 
(Statistical Abstract for British India) J.R.S.S. p.640 July 1920. 
To look now at the figures of production and Trade. 1899-1900 
was a year of failure of crops and famine and exports of wheat 
in 1900 -01 got reduced to 2500 tons valued at .38 crores. 
The index number of wheat prices was as high as 115 in 1900. 
Thereafter there was a steady increase of wheat exports from 
the low figure of 1900 -01 till the highest export quantity of 
the/ 
the period 1900 -1914 was reached in 1904 -5 of 2.1 million 
tons valued at 17.9 crores of Rupees. The crop from 
which the exports of 1905 -6 were drawn was that of the 
year 1904 -5 and it was short of the one previous to it 
by 2 million tons and hence a fall in the quantity ex- 
ported. In any case a concatenation of very favourable 
circumstances should have been necessary to exceed the 
2.1 million tons level of wheat exports. With the 1904 -5 
wheat crop being short by 2 million tons a falling off 
in the quantity of exports in 1905 -6 was very natural. 
The crops of the years 1905-6 and 1906-7 improved by 
a million tons and its effect is seen in the improve- 
ment in the exports of 1907-8 over that of 1906 -7. What 
made the improvement in the export trade comparatively 
small was the rise in price for the Indian index number 
of the price of wheat shot up from 82 in 1905 to 100 
in 1906 whereas the United Kingdom index number of wheat 
prices fell by 3 points. 1907 was a year of failure of 
crops. The wheat crop declined from 8.5 million tons 
in 1906-7 to 6.1 million tons in 1907 -8. The wheat 
index number shot up between 1907 and 1908 from 87 to 
127, a rise of 40 points and exports fell to as low as 
110,000 tons. Thereafter with good crops and prices 
falling off from the high level of 1908 the export trade 
steadily recovered but did not recover to get anywhere 
near the exports of 2.1 million tons of 1904 -5. 
In 1910 India was estimated to have one ninth of 
the/ 
the world's acreage under wheat and her crop was esti- 
mated at one eleventh of the world's total (Economist 
May 14th 1910 p.1065). The Review of the Trade of 
India for 1913 -14 (page 18) says "India produces 10% 
of the world's wheat. Although India's position in 
the world's wheat market is not one of very great 
strength :she has one advantage which is that the 
Indian wheat crop comes to the market in the inter- 
val between the antipodean harvests of South America 
and Australia and those of northern latitudes ". That 
is a time when the United Kingdom market is nearly 
bare and Indian wheat arriving on a bare market is 
able to command good prices. The following table 
of monthly exports of wheat from India and wheat 
prices in Karachi and London show the state of the 
United Kingdom market during the summer months of 
1909 -10 and the Indian export trade then. 
Indian Wheat Prices per quarter Price per quarter 
Month Exports. Karachi. London. 
April 20,063 tons 36/9 36/5 
May 93,808 " 58/- 42 5 
June 232,691 " 35/9 43/1 
July 277,404 " 37 - 42/9 
August 174,104 " 36/- 44/9 
September 22,026 " 34/6 38/5 
October 37,280 " 33/8 32/2 
November 35,968 " 33/3 32/2 
December 31,940 " 34/- 32/5 
January 55,720 " 34/9 33/3 
February 17,057 " 34/9 33/6 
March 52,517 " 32/9 32/7 
(quoted from the Review of the Trade of India 1909 -10 p.44) . 
:CV. Indian Export Trade in Tea. 1900 -1914. 
Tea was during the period under review decidedly 
a source of strength to the Indian export trade and the 
figures of values bear this out very well. 
Average price per lb. 
Year Value Public Auction Calcutta. 
1900 -1 9.55 crores 7/11 
1901 -2 8.14 - 
1902 -3 7.36 - 
1903 -4 8.55 5/10 
1904-5 8.46 5/4 
1905 -6 8.84 5/4 
19 06 -7 9.85 5/5 
1907 -8 10.30 6/11 
1908-9 10.39 6/- 
1909-10 11.70 6/10 
1910-11 12.41 7 /0e 
1911 -12 12.94 7/7 
1912 -13 13.29 7/1 
1913-14 14.97 7/9 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India) . 
Tea imports into the United Kingdom were during the 
latter part of the 19th century drawn from China, 





1875 86% 13% 0% 
1885 66% 30% 2% 
1895 16f 46% 32% 
1902 6% 54% 36% 
(quoted. from Progress and Condition of India 1903 -4 p.112). 
Difficulties having arisen with China in the course of 
the 19th century the British government interested the 
East India Company in an effort to produce Tea in India. 
(Cotton -Handbook of Commercial Information for India 
p.203). Experimental plantations were started by govern- 
ment at its own cost and in due course,when the industry 
was established they were sold to private companies. 
British Companies with sterling capital were induced to 
take up work and special concessions were granted to 
tea planters. In 1903 a tea Gass of pice per lb of 
tea exported was levied at the request of the planters 
and the sum was given to the Tea Coss Committee for re- 
search towards improving the quality of Indian tea and 
opening up of new markets. 
The area under Tea in India rose from 522,000 acres 
in 1900 to 610,000 acres in 1913 -14. (Material and Moral 
Progress and Condition of India 1913 -14: p.47). 
The bulk of this acreage was in Bengal and Assam 
Tea was produced in India entirely for export. The 
following table gives the figures of production and 
export in million lbs. 
Year Production Exports 
1900 -1 197.2 million lb. 190.3 
1901 -2 191.3 179.68 
1802 -3 188.58 181.4 
1903-4 209.4 207.15 
1904 -5 222.2 211.88 
1905 -6 222.38 214.2 
1906 -7 241.4 233.6 
1907-8 248.02 227.02 
1908 -9 247.47 233.96 
1909-10 258.3 249.4 
1910-11 263.6 254.3 
1911-12 268.8 260.77 
1912-13 296.3 278.5 
1913-14 305 289.47 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) . 
At the commencement of the period the Tea trade was 
in a depressed condition. The imposition of an addit- 
ional 2d per lb. of duty on tea in 1900 in the United 
Kingdom was not calculated to improve the position. 
There was besides the competition of Ceylon, Java and 
China tea. It was clear that the way out of the depres- 
sed state of the Tndian tea trade lay in the direction 
of improving; its quality ana rinding new markets for it 
and making Tea production more scientific and economic. 
An Indian market expansion commission was set up which 
concluded! 
concluded its labours in 1904. By all these efforts 
it was sought to improve Indian Tea exports to foreign 
and colonial markets and increase the consumption of 
Tea in India. Between 1896 and 1900 the annual average 
of Tea exports to foreign and colonial markets was 14 
million lbs. In 1903-4 it rose to 37 million lbs. and 
to 44 million lbs. in the next year, In /906 there was 
a reduction of the import duty in the United Kingdom by 
id: with 1906 the period of falling prices came to an 
end. The period from that year was one of increasing 
world consumption of tea. Promising export markets had 
been created in Australia, Canada, the Continent of 
Europe and Russia in addition to the main market - the 
United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom the consumption 
of tea was greatly stimulated from after 1909 by Old 
Age Pensions, the Temperance Movement and the increased 
duty on intoxicants. Thus there resulted a situation 
from 1910 which was stated thus: "the consumption of 
Tea has increased enormously of late years while pro- 
duction though it has increased has not grown to any- 
thing like the same extent" (Economist p.946 Nov. 4th 
1911). The period closed with a season which was 
described by Messrs Thomas & Co. as one of the best 
ever known from the producer's point of view The 
out-turn was a record one and the average price the 
highest for about 20 years, Moreover consumption 
out-stripped even the record crop. The increased 
consumption was world wide". (quoted from the Review 
of the Trade of India 1913-14). 
Export Trade in Seeds 1900 -1914. 
Another major item of the export trade in raw material and 
one that was a source of strength to the export trade during 
the period was seeds. The following figures of export quanti- 




Value in Crores 
of Rupees. 
Index Numbers of Oilseed 
Wholesale Manchester and 
Lmndon, prices 1901 -5 == 100 
1900 -1 10.99 9.01 1901 116 
1901 -2 22.98 16.77 1902 106 
1902-3 22.19 14.88 1903 92 
1903 -4 24.68 14.51 1904 77 
1904 -5 26.87 14.41 1905 67 
1905-6 17.57 10.61 1906 82 
1906 -7 19.73 13.01 1907 97 
1907 -8 23.18 16.81 1908 103 
1908 -9 16.24 11.67 1909 98 
1909-10 27.68 18.72 1910 111 
1910-11 31.43 25.12 1911 130 
1911 -12 30.01 26.94 1912 137 
1912 -13 24.53 22.75 1913 106 
1913-14 31.65 25.2 1914 105 
(Figures of Export quantities and Values quoted from the heview 
of the Trade of India. 1900 -1914. Index Number of Oilseeds 
Wholesale prices quoted from the Roonomist Feb. 15th 1918, p.183) 
The figures given above are the total of all seed 
exports whioh includes a very small quantity of non- 
oil seeds. Setting this aside the oil-seeds trade 
which is the overwhelming bulk under this head may be 
oonaidered here. The importance of the trade in oil- 
seeds lay in the increasing use to which they came to 
be put. A great part of the oil seeds of commerce is 
used for the extraction of oil or fat which is re- 
fined for use in the edible-fat industry and the pro- 
portion so used tended steadily to increase during the 
period. No less important is the use of oils and fats 
in the manufacture of soap in the course of which 
glycerine is obtained as a by-product. Drying oils 
such as those of linseed and poppy seed are largely 
used in the varnish and paint industries. Oiloake 
and meals left after the extraction of oils constitute 
an asset of increasing importance as food for feeding 
cattle and are therefore indirectly of great importance 
as food for human beings. 
The most important Indian oil-seeds are copra and 
mowra seed yielding solid fats; cotton, sesame, castor, 
rape and ground nuts yielding liquid non-drying oils 
and linseed, poppy and niger yielding liquid drying 
oils. The Imperial Institute's Indian Trade Enquiry 
Report on Oilseeds made the following estimate of the 
strength of India as a supplier for the world market 
in oilseeds. 
World's Estimated India's Percentage of 









38 ,000 7% 
Mowra seed 1/1 33,000 100% 
Cotton seed 900,000 284,000 31% 
Sesame seed 264,000 112,000 42% 
Castor seed 137,000 135,000 98% 
Rape seed 385,000 249,000 55% 
Ground nuts 780,000 383,000 4,5% 
Linseed 2,150 ,000 414,000 20% 
Niger seed 4,000 100% 
(Quoted from page 4.) 
It will be seen from this that India had the monopoly of 
the exports of Mowra, Castor seed and Niger seed. That 
these seeds were not the most important from the point of 
value of the Indian export trade in oilseeds may be real- 








































£364,000 others =5.9 
£311,000 
the Trade of India 1913 -14 p.26) . 
It is clear from this that it is not the oil seeds in 
which India had more or less the monopoly of exports 
during the period but those in which Indian exports 
were but a part and a part only of world total exports 
that were really of importance from the point of value 
to the export trade. 
During the period under review there was a brisk 
demand for oil seeds and most of India's exports went 
to Europe. Under the circumstances demand hardly 
affected the dimensions of the trade. The trade how- 
ever was affected by the nature and success of the 
season in India. The oil -seed crop depends on very 
uncertain conditions of rainfall for the necessary 
moisture in the soil at sowing time and for the 
principal varieties on showers during growth. Conse- 
quently the oil --seed trade, like that of wheat, is 
subject to wide fluctuations from year to year. 
Then again India exports a large variety of oil- 
seeds. Some of these like linseed, during; the 
period, were produced entirely for export. For 
e.g. the production of 1910 -11 from which the ex- 
ports of 1911 -12 were drawn amounted to 563,600 
tons and the exports of 1911 -12 ran up to 522,000 
tons. (1 eview of the Trade of India 1911 -12) . Thus 
only 0 of the linseed crop is retained in the 
country. Linseed exports may thus be expected and 
did in fact during the period show wide fluctua- 
tions/ 
fluctuations. On the other hand Rape seed, Sesame, 
around nuts and Cotton seed are mostly consumed in 
the country. The percentage of exports to produc- 
tion in 1911 -12 of nape seed was 20, of Sesamine 
23 and Cotton seed 17% and the fluctuations in the 
export of these was smaller because of this and be- 
cause of the fact that the production in many but 
not all was much smaller than that of Linseed. 
The general run of the export trade in oil- 
seeds may here be briefly examined before consider- 
ing the individual items of the trade. The opening 
year of the period bears unmistakeably the marks 
of the crop failure. Export values however were 
partly redeemed by high prices as the index number 
discloses. Thereafter the crops being good export 
quantities recovered but export values receded be- 
cause it was a period of falling prices. In 2905 -6 
there was a big decline in the oil -seed export due 
mainly to the partial failure of the linseed crop 
and low prices. Thereafter the trade recovered 
except for the general depression of 1908-9. The 
closing years of the period was one of advancing 
quantities though it must be said that prices in 
the case of oil -seeds did not show the resilience 
that other raw material prices tended to show during 
the period. 
To make a brief inquiry into the individual 
items/ 
items of the oil-seeds export trade. The export trade 
in ground nuts was one that during the period grew 
un- 
mistakeably in volume and gathered great strength. The 
following table of export quantities and values bears 
this out . 
Exports of Ground Nuts. 




1900 -1 232 109 
1901 -2 1085 524 
1902-3 1036 477 
1903-4 1922 757 
1904 -5 1674 645 
1905-6 1374 579 
1906-7 1725 836 
19 07 -8 1524 785 
1908 -9 1782 900 
1909-10 3243 1646 
1910 -11 3690 2036 
1911-12 3822 2120 
1912-13 4867 2694 
1913-14 5558 3254 
(Review of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) . 
It will be seen that starting weakly in the bad year 
1900 -1 the trade grew steadily. In 1909 -10 exports 
doubled themselves and in 1913 -14 reached the export 
quantity of 5.6 million cwt. The steadiness and pro- 
gressive character of the ground nut export trade are 
features entirely of the 20th century. At the end of 
the/ 
the 19th century the trade had fallen very low. Its 
recovery during the period under review was due on the 
demand side to the discovery of a new process for de- 
odorising the oil expressed from the seed which made it, 
till then suitable only for soap making, an important 
article of food in southern Europe where vegetable oils 
take the place of butter. It also derived a demand 
from its increasing use as a substitute for olive oil. 
On the supply side the introduction of disease resisting 
varieties enabled the supply to respond to the demand. 
During the period France was the principal customer 
taking 80% of the Indian exports. The Review of the 
Trade of India for 1913 -14 states that the figures of 
the export of ground nuts from India given are not com- 
plete in that exports from the French Indian port of 
Pondicherry whence a good quantity usually is exported 
is not included in it. 
The following are the figures of the quantities 
and values of the export trade in castor seed during 
the period. 
Year 





19 00 -1 878 437 
1901-2 1324 452 
1902-3 1752 613 
1903-4 1567 461 
1904-5 1461 481 
19 05 -8 1279 524 
1908-7 1505 761 
1907-8 1994 1011 
1908-9 1650 705 
1909 -10 1900 840 
1910-11 2148 1099 
1911-12 2403 1178 
1912-13 2212 1092 
1913-14 2897 1336 
The trade in castor seed is on a smaller scale than 
that of ground nuts. In its own way the trade has 
shown steadiness and progress. What with the Indian 
monopoly of exports and the steadiness of world demand 
the trade has been a source of strength to the export 
trade in oil seeds. The United Kingdom was during the 
period the outstanding importer of Indian castor seed, 
France, the United States of America, Belgium, Italy 
and Germany taking much smaller quantities. 
The/ 
The Export Trade in Linseed. 
The following are the figures of export quantities 
and values of Linseed. 
Year Quantity in Value in 
1000 cwt. £1000. 
1900-1 5,060 2970 
1901.2 7,328 4509 
1902 -3 6,328 3793 
1903 -4 8,816 3829 
1904 -5 11,182 4219 
1905-8 5,789 2743 
1906-7 4,379 2173 
1907 -8 6,198 3191 
1908 -9 3,210 1703 
1909-10 4,677 2616 
1910 -11 7,411 5593 
1911 -12 10,440 8643 
1912-13 7,089 5318 
1913-14 8,277 4457 
Linseed Exports. 
It has been seen already that India exported the 
bulk of her production of Linseed retaining only 6% in 
the country during the period. In 1913 Indian exports 
of Linseed accounted for but 20% of the world exports. 
Largely as a resultant of (a) variations in the Indian 
production/ 
production (b) that the bulk of it i3 for export and 
(c) the fact that Indian export of Linseed is a minor 
percentage of world exports ani that the world supply 
is provided by the Argentine, Uruguay, Russia, Canada, 
the U.S.A. and China, the Indian export trade in Lin- 
seed during the period showed very great fluctuations. 
An extraordinary rise in the price of Linseed in 1900 
which continued during the two following years in- 
duced a great increase of its cultivation throughout 
the world and particularly in the Argentine. Many of 
these countries were nearer Europe and offered the 
United Kingdom in particular a nearer alternative 
supply. Surveying the figures of the trade it is 
seen that the trade was very elastic up to 1904 -5 
but after that lost a certain amount of that elast- 
icity. The explanation of this seems to lie in the 
fact that it reflects the trend of world trade in 
the commodity. For e.g. the average total imports 
of Linseed into the United Kingdom is seen from the 
following figures. 













Exports from British India into the United Kingdom. 
Annual Average 1901 -1906 = 788.5 (1000 quarters) 
1907-1912 = 656.2 ( " " ) 
(Figures taken from the Economist article "Sources of 
our supply of oilseeds" p. 1089 June 14th 1919) 
It seems then that the stagnation or lack of elas- 
ticity of the Indian export trade in Linseed may be 
attributed to the fact that the European Linseed market 
was dominated by the Argentine which is the biggest 
producer and exporter of the commodity. The huge out- 
put of Linseed by the Argentine during; the period de- 
pressed the market for Indian Linseed and led in India 
to the substituting for Linseed a more valuable crop 
as for e.g. ground nuts. The figures of imports of 
Linseed into the United Kingdom which was during the 
period one of the chief importers of the commodity 
suggest a reduction of the demand for Linseed. The 
steadiness and increase of the exports of ground nuts 
and the stagnation of Linseed export give weight to 
the conclusion that the former was supplanting the 
latter in use because of its richer oil content. 
The oil content of the former is estimated at be- 
tween 46 to 70% and that of Linseed at 13 to 40% by 
the Imperial Institute's Economic Inquiry Report on 
Oilseeds (p.3). 
The figures of the export trade in Rape seed 
are as follows:- 




1900-1 - 1727 823 
1901 -2 6925 2970 
1902 -3 3927 1647 
1903-4 4343 1689 
1904 -5 5155 1822 
1905 -6 1994 811 
1908-7 3729 1644 
1907-8 5543 2883 
1908-9 2786 1579 
1909-10 6629 3122 
1910.11 6593 3104 
1911 -12 4709 2341 
1912-13 4556 2403 
1913-14 4980 2851 
According to the Indian Oilseeds Trade Enquiry Report 
of the Imperial Institute, of Rapeseed there is on an 
average a total annual out-turn of 1,200,000 tons and 
in normal years the proportion of exports to total pro- 
duction is about 20% (p.105). The same report makes out 
that Indian exports accounted in 1913 for 65% of the world's 
exported surplus. The bulk of the production then is con- 
sumed in the country. Looking at the figures of the ex- 
port trade it is seen that if the erratic opening years 
and the disastrous year 1905 -6 and the slump year 1908 -9 
are left out the trade has been just maintaining itself 
into an upward trend in 1909 and shows a decline in 1911 -12 
at which quantity it settle itself till the envi of the 
period/ 
period. The absence of any striking development of 
exports is to be explained by increased consumption in 
India on the one hand and to the fact that the rapeseed 
belongs to the group of oilseeds with poor oil content 
and in its case there is also the difficulty experienced 
in refining it and making it odourless. It can be said 
that the growth of the popularity of Ground nut has been 
at the expense of seeds like Rapeseed. The largest 
buyers of Indian Rapeseed during this period were Belgium, 
Germany and France, the United Kingdom and Italy taking 
much smaller quantities. 
The figures of the export trade of India in Sesamum 






1900-1 1844 1037 
1901-2 2447 1429 
1902-3 3733 1939 
1903-4 3513 1619 
1904-5 2517 1158 
1905-6 1685 979 
1906..7 2741 1697 
1907-8 1533 1127 
1908-9 1657 1084 
1909-10 2983 1772 
1910-11 3246 2135 
1911-12 1896 1350 
1912-13 1557 1215 
1913-14 2244 1796 
The figures show that the export trade has made very 
little advance. That can be understood in the light 
of the facts (1) that the major portion of the world 
exports of Sesamum came from China and the better 
quality of the Chinese seed narrowed the vent for 
Indian Sesamum. (2) Sesamum being largely consumed 
in the country it would be substituted for other 
oilseeds in which there was a shortage. Hence the 
trade has fluctuated though within comparatively 
narrow limits. 
Sesame seed belongs to the group of seeds with 
richer oil content and in Europe is utilised in the 
manufacture of soap. The average quantity of this 
seed exported annually from India between 1885 and 
1890 was 100,000 tons of which France took 70,000 
tons. Between 1910 -11 and 1914 -15 with the same 
average exported quantity from Indiá, Franca took 
only 32,700 tons on an average annually. 
According to the Imperial Institute's Trade Report 
other European countries imported the sesame seed 
and this was brought about by the fact that "the 
addition of this oil to Margarine was made obli- 
gatory in Germany, Austria, Belgium and Denmark ". 
Indian Export Trade in Cotton Seed. 1900 -1914. 
Last but not least in importance in Cotton 
Seed. 
The following are the figures of exported quantities 
and values. 
Year Export quantities 
in 1000 cwt. 
Export Values 
in £1000. 
1900 -1 225 37 
1901-2 2036 309 
1902 -3 3974 613 
1903-4 2677 445 
1904 -5 2529 410 
1905-6 389]. 681 
1906-7 4388 866 
1907-8 4250 877 
1908-9 3883 875 
1909-10 5649 1354 
1910-11 5980 1530 
1911 -12 4073 1012 
1912-13 2611 685 
1913-14 5686 1416 
India's export trade in Cotton seed developed 
phenomenally and with dramatic suddenness. The value 
of this trade in 1900 -1 was only £37,000 and in 1913 -14 
it amounted to £1,416,000. During that period it rose 
in quantity from 228,000 cwt. to 5,686,000 cwt. The dis- 
tinctive feature of cotton seed among oil seeds is that 
it/ 
it is a by- product and not grown by itself or for its 
own sake. While the trade in cotton dates far back 
into the 19th century, that in the seed did not begin 
till the close of the 19th century and this is to be 
explained by the fact that it was only by the end of 
the 19th century that the mechanical processes by 
which solid edible fats could be got from the seed 
came into use. Exports of Indian cotton seed during 
the opening years of the 20th century are striking. 
Years Quantity 
1899 -1900 43,485 cwt. 
1900 -01 225,000 cwt. 
1901 -2 2,036,000 cwt. 
Accounting for this development the Review of the trade 
of India 1901 -2 has the following on page 28 "the reason 
for the sudden activity of the demand is not quite clear; 
it has been assigned to the necessity of finding a sub - 
stitute for olive oil which was scarce in the market, 
also to the scarcity of sesame oil; to the demand for 
lard and margarine for which materials were lacking; to 
the discovery of a new process for hulling the seed 
cheaply and efficiently; to the high price of seed re- 
sulting from an American demand for all that could be 
got on the American Continent ". The export trade in 
cotton seed needed only a start. With the increasing 
acreage under cotton during the period under review 
and/ 
and the increasing demand for use as both cattle feed 
and for edible fat the seed consolidated the position 
in the trade given it by the phenonional start. 
"The world's production of cotton seed in 1913-14 may 
be taken to be about 11,000,000 tons. Of the cotton 
seed produced much is either used locally or is ex- 
ported in the form of manufactured products as in the 
case of the U.S.A. India and Egypt and especially the 
latter are the chief sources of supply of cotton seed 
to those countries which produce none. Thus only 
900,000 tons entered foreign trade in 1913-14, that 
is only 8% of the output". (Imperial Institute Report 
p.84, 83). 
so far as India is concerned that Report estimated 
the production for 1913-14 at 2,110,000 tons and ex, 
port was 284,000 tons. Thus one seventh of the output 
was exported, six sevenths being retained in the 
country. It will be realised from the figures of 
the trade that the Indian export trade in cotton seed 
showed strength. The bulk of India's cotton seed ex- 
ports went to the United Kingdom. 
In bringing this survey of the export t ade af-- 
cam-44i 
India in oilseeds to a close it will help to be able) 
to see it in its true perspective if the export trade 
in oilseeds in their quantities and values are set 














1900 -1 10.99 9.01 3.6 .52 
1901 --2 22.96 16.77 3.5 
.53 
1902 -3 22.19 14.88 4.8 
.67 
1903 -4 24.68 14.51 6.1 .83 
1904 -5 26.87 14.41 4.8 .62 
1905 -6 11.57 10.66 3.8 .53 
1906 -7 19.73 13.01 2.99 .46 
1907 -8 23.18 16.81 3.2 .50 
1908 -9 16.24 11.67 4.4 .63 
1909-10 27.68 18.72 4.4 .65 
1910 -11 31.43 25.12 4.2 .70 
1911 -12 30.01 26.94 4.6 .81 
1912 -13 24.53 22.75 2.8 .50 
1913 -14 31.65 25.2 3.2 .57 
(Figures quoted from the Review of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) . 
From the figures given it is clear that while the export of 
oilseeds in quantity and value between the opening and closing 
years of the period has increased by approximately 200%. 
India's export of the oil expressed from the seeds has in the 
same years declined by one ninth in quantity and increased by 
.05 crores in value. Anent this a very useful reference as 
to some of the factors working to effect this trend of de- 
velopments in the oil seed export and oil manufacturing in- 
dustries and trade in India, is the evidence tendered by 
Mr H.L. Sutaria, Director of the Indian Cotton Oil Company 
Limited/ 
Limited, to the Indian Industrial Commission (Cmd. 237 
of 1919 Vol .IV , p287 ) . Paragraph 48 of this evidence 
runs as follows: "It goes without saying that the pre- 
sent Railway rates have been based with a view to en- 
courage exports of raw produce. The rates for instance 
to a port such as Bombay or Karachi from any interior 
point are comparatively cheaper than the rates, caeteris 
paribus, between two interior points. The rates on raw 
produce again are cheaper than those on manufactured 
articles. Add to these the various restrictions as to 
long or short lead, wagon loads, carrying capacity, risk 
notes etc. etc., and it will be easily seen how hot 
things are made by the railways for the development of 
indigenous industries. In India the railways exist, 
not for her own industries but for those in countries 
far far away ". The rates cited by him are worth quoting. 
From Miles To Bombay(Port) Miles To Naysari (Interior) 
Ankleshwar 198 Rs 0- 2 - 1 ps. 49 0 - 2 - 2 
Broach 204 0- 1- 9 55 0- 2- 3 
Chamargam 211 0- 2 -11 82 0- 2- 6 
Paley 219 0- 2 -11 70 0 - 2 - 8 
Miagam 229 0- 3- 4 80 0 2- 8 
Boroda 248 0 -3 -8 99 0 -3 -3 
Dabhoi 249 0- 3 -10 90 0 - 3 - 5 
Bodeli 2 74 0 -3 -8 115 0 -4 -0 
(For Cotton Seed per Maund p. 294). 
"Distance for distance the rate per ;sauna per mile for 
Naysari works out at 4i times the rate for Bombay. 
Indigenous industries alas have to atone for the sin of 
sea competition" (ibid. That is for oilseed. 
In paragraph 56 there is the following statement. 
"The rate on oil from 24aysari via Dadai is 0 - 4 - 2 pies. 
That from Bombay to Madras is 0 - 11 3 ps. The total 
rate from Nansari to Madras under these circumstances 
should be the total of the above rates viz. 0 - 15 - 5. 
Instead our consignments from Nansari to Madras have been 
charged at Rs. 1 - 10 - 4 ps. The matter was brought to 
the notice of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway who 
said the Bombay to Madras rate was a port to port rate 
and could not be applicable to traffic originating at 
interior points ". The natural result of the state of 
affairs set forth by the witness is given in paragraph 
65. 
"here is a list of the world's Cotton 
operating in 1914. 
Number of Mills. 
Seed Oil Mills 
United States of America 885 
England . 50 
Russia . 32 
Germany 9 
France . 5 
Austria 1 
China e 9 
India 1 
JgYPt g 









India's production of Cotton Seed annually 1,500,000 tonst 
The handicap in the matter of shipping freights for 
the export of a commodity like oil has been referred to 
already. 
The survey of the important items of the export trade 
made herein accounts for approximately 80% of India's 
export trade in merchandise during the period 1900 -1914. 
CHAPTER VII. 
THE IMPORT TRADE OF INDIA IN MERCHANDISE 1900 -1914. 
Seotion 1. 
This chapter is devoted to the study of the 
import trade of India in merchandise during the period 
1900 -1914. The following is a table of the figurea of 
the value of that trade. 
Value in cross 10,000,000 Rs. = .6 million Z 
Year of Rupees. 
1900-1 76.27 
1901 -2 81.47 






1908 -9 121.26 
1909-10 117.05 
1910-11 129.35 
1911 -12 138.57 
1912-13 161.01 
1913 -14 183.24 (Figures from the Review 
of the Trade of India 
1900-1914) 
If the figure for 1900 -1 is taken as 100, that for 
1913-14, the closing year of the period works out at 
240/ 
240 and thus it is seen that the import trade in merchan- 
dise has increased by 140f between the opening and the 
closing year of the period. It may be mentioned that the 
export trade in merchandise registered almost the same 
percentage increase. 
The heview of the Trade of India classifies Indian 
foreign trade into the following four divisions:- 
I. Food, drink and tobacco. 
U. haw materials and produce and articles mainly 
unmanuf ac turgid . 
III. Articles wholly and mainly manufactured. 
IV. idiscellaneous and unclassified. 
According to this classification imports under Glass III - 
articles wholly and mainly manufactured - form the major 
item of the import trade in merchandise. In the year 
1900 -1 they accounted for 42.5 crores out of a total 
import of merchandise of 76.27 crores and represented 
55% of total merchandise imports. In the closing year 
of the period - 1913 -14 - these imports amounted to 
145.5 crores out of a total import of merchandise of 
183.24 crores representing 79%. Thus while the import 
trade in merchandise as a whole increased between the 
opening and closing years of the period by 140%, accord- 
ing to the classification referred to above manufactured 
imports rose from 100 to 344 and registered an increase 
of 244%. 
For/ 
For the purpose of understanding the real strength 
of manufactured goods in the Indian import trade 
in 
merchandise the classification referred to above is 
imperfect. The classification was devised mainly for 
administrative convenience. It could not serve that 
end 
and at the same time be a perfect classification of im- 
ported commodities into manufactured goods and those that 
were not. This classification does not tell the whole 
story of the strength of manufactured goods in the Indian 
import trade in merchandise. For example, item one,of the 
classification is entitled articles of fool and drink 
and tobacco and under it are grouped the following items, 
sugar, provisions and oilman's stores, liquors, spices, 
fruits and vegetables, other food and drink, tobacco, 
fish (excluding canned fish), grain, pulse and flour, 
Tea. how of these items sugar, provisions, liquors, 
other food and drink and tobacco are obviously manu- 
factured products and as will be seen, the most important 
from the point of value, of the items under this head. 
The chief raw material items under this head are fruit 
and vegetables, fish, grain, pulse and flour, tea, and 
India, as a big exporter in two of these, namely grain 
and tea could not be a big importer as well. Thus the 
major part of the value under this head, should go 
into the total of the value of manufactured imports 
into India. For e.g. in the normal year 1910 -11 
articles/ 
articles of food, drink and tobacco accounted for 16% 
of the total imports and according to the Review of 
the Trade of India for that year 83.06% of the imports 
under this head were sugar imports. (p.10). In view 
of this, and if the aim is to get at the real strength 
of manufactured goods in the import trade, results 
more nearly approaching the actual state of affairs 
could be got at by deducting from the total of merch- 
andise imports, actual imports of raw material. The 
resultant would represent manufactured imports into 
India. There would, in this case, still be a little 
discrepancy but it would be nothing like what results 
from estimating manufactured imports by merely accept- 
ing group 3 of the official classification. Applying 
this method the following results are arrived at :- 
Indian Imports. 
Year. Total Merchandise Total Raw Material Total Manufacture 
imports. imports. imports. 
1900 -1 76.27 crores 9 crores 67 crores 
1913 -14 183.24 14.25 169 
Thus the percentage of manufactured imports to 
total merchandise imports works out roughly at 90% 
for 1900 -1 and 92% for 1913 -14. This roughly re- 
presents the actual strength of manufactured imports 
in the Indian import trade in merchandise. 
Section II. The Chief Items of the Import 
Trade in Merchandise. 
Below are riven lists for 1900 -1 and 1913 -14 
of the commodities 
that attained to a value of a crore of Rupees 
or more in the import 
trade, in order of their value. 
1900-1 Value. 1913-14 
Value. 
Name. Name. 
(1) Cotton Manufactures £18,230,752 (ï) Cotton Manufacture £44,199,000 
(2) Sugar 
(3) Iron & Steel 
manufactures. 
(4) Mineral oil 
(5) ; achinery and 
Millwork 
£ 3,770,144 (2) Iron and steel 
Z 3,048,421 (3) Sugar 
£ 2,305,235 
£ 1,505,039 
(6) Woollen manufacture £ 1,408,384 
(7) Provisions 
(8) hardware and 
Cutlery 
(9) Silk manufactures 
(10) Liquors 
(11)Apparel 
(12) hallway plant and 
Rolling stock 








(4) hallway plant and 
haling stock 
(5) Machinery and 
Millwork 
(6) Copper 
(7) Mineral oil 
(8) Hardware and 
Cutlery 
(9) oollen Manufacture £2,567,000 
£10,663,000 
£ 9,971,000 
Z 6 ,690 ,000 
£ 5 ,172 ,000 
Z 2 ,745 ,000 
£ 2 ,744,000 
Z 2,632,000 
(10) Silk Manufacture 
(11) Provisions 
(12) Liquors 
(13) Glass & Glassware 
(14) Instruments, appar- 
atus & appliances 
(15) Spices 
(16) Haberdashery and 
Millinery 









(18) Motor cars á cycles £1,022,000 
(19) Dyes £943,000 
(20) Silk raw £839,000 
(21) Drugs and I`edicines. £780,000 
(22) Fruits & vegetables £754,000 
(23) Precious stones £715,000 
(24) Coal, Coke and £711,000 
(25) Building and engineering 
material £707,000 
(26) Chemicals ;677,000 
In the light of these two lists ,certain observations seem 
permissible. It has been seen that between 1900 -1 and 
1913 -14 the import trade in merchandise increased by 140%. 
The lists given reveal that between these years the number 
of commodities of over i crore value in the trade doubled 
itself. That is to say not only dici the volume of the 
import trade increase but the channel of that stream broad- 
ened itself,in striking contrast in this respect,to the 
export trade in merchandise,in which the number of the 
commodities increased only by half their total number. 
The explanation of this difference in development lies 
in many factors. First the varieties of manufactured 
commodities, can in the nature of the case be larger in 
number than those of raw material. Economically the 
country was being opened up during the period. It was 
a/ 
a developmental period and it was a period when the 
middle class in the country was goinr strong, large, 
and beginning to use and consume a variety of com- 
modities. As such the effect on trade would be, in 
the first instance, to make a big impression on the 
import trade in increasing the volume and the variety 
of the imports. 
Section III. 
In this section it is proposed to make a 
study of the import trade in a few of the items of it. 
The reasons for restricting the study to a few of the 
items of the import trade are (1) that the number of 
items in the import trade coming under notice are so 
large that it would be an exhausting business to go 
through them all. (2) It has to be borne in mind that 
the overwhelming number of these are manufactured goods 
many of which India either does not produce at all 
or produces on so small a scale that the imported goods 
do not meet .0 y competition. For e.g. among the major 
items of the import trade are commodities like iron 
and steel manufactures, machinery and millwork, hallway 
plant and rolling stock, provisions, liquors, hardware 
and cutlery and a number of other items in which there 
being no home industry at all or one of any serious 
importance a study of them must just resolve itself 
into/ 
into taking account of the value of the imports and no 
more. Under the circumstances it is proposed here to 
make a brief study of imports of (1) Cotton manufactures, 
(2) Sugar, (3) Mineral oil . Apart from the large value 
of these imports, there is an additional interest in the 
trade in these because these are (1) articles of general 
consumption and therefore affect the well being- of the 
large mass of the people of the country. (2) In all of 
these there was during the period home industries pro - 
ducing all these commodities though sugar lagged behind 
the other two commodities. (3) There was an imperial 
interest in the trade in all the three commodities. 
Alt these reasons constitute the justification for 
selecting these three for a study. 
A. The Import Trade in Cotton Manufactures. 1900-1914. 
The importance of these imports in the total im- 
port trade in merchandise into India can be realised 
from the following table of the percentage of cotton 
manufacture import values of the total value of 
private merchandise import. 
Indian Imports of Cotton Manufactures. 
Year. -~--- 
Percentage of value of Cotton 
. anufaacture impo.Lte to total value 
of merchandise imports. 
1900-1 39% 
1901 -2 40% 
1902 -3 39% 
1903-4 37% 
1904-5 39% 
1905 -8 41% 
1906 -7 38% 




1911 -12 38% 
1912-13 38% 
1913 -14 36% 
(Figures from the rteview of the Trade of India 
1900 -1 to 1913 -14) 
It has been seen that between 1900 -1 and 1913 -14 the 
import trade in merchandise increased by 140 %. That 
of the import trade in cotton manufactures was 120% 
and in spite of increasing values of the import trade 
in merchandise cotton manufacture imports were able to 
maintain themselves at an average of 37% of the total 
imports of merchandise varying between 41% in the 
prosperous year 1905-6 and 31% in the year of. depression 
1908-9. 
The/ 
The overwhelming bulk of cotton manufacture imports 
into India came from Lancashire during the period. India 
was during the period the biggest individual importer of 
Lancashire Cotton manufactures. Thee circumstances 
help to simplify the understanding of the course of the 
Indian import trade in cotton manufactures. Imports of 
cotton manufactures into India fall into the major item 
of cotton piece goods imports, a much smaller item of 
cotton yarn imports and an even smaller iter: of miscel- 
laneous cotton goods. The position is made clear by the 
following table. 
Values of Imports of Cotton Manufactures. 
Year 








29.83 crores 26.25 crores 2.48 crores 
1901-2 32.89 » 30.2 2.64 
1902-3 30.4 vo 28.1 2.29 
1903-4 31.01 28.8 2.1 
1904-5 38.04 35.5 2.48 
1905-6 42.84 39.01 3.42 
1906-7 40.91 37.69 3.2 
1907-8 48.04 44.34 3.69 
1908-9 38.01 34.36 3.64 
1909-10 39.37 36.05 3.31 
1910-11 44.87 41.70 3.13 
1911-12 49.56 45.7 3.79 
1912.13 60.82 56.38 4.44 
1913-14 66.00 57.6 4.16 
(Table compiled from the heview of the Trade of India 1900 -1914 
It is clear from this table that cotton piece goods forì 
the overwhelming portion of cotton manufacture imports 
into India. With most of these imports into India coming 
from the United Kingdam,the course of the Indian import 
trade in cotton manufactures when it was adversely affected 
must have been affected by adverse conditions in the export- 
ing or importing countries or both. The following table 
sets down the cotton piece goods exports of the United 
Kingdom and the imports of India. 
British Exports of Cotton Piece Goods. Imports of British Piece Goods. 
Year Cotton piece goods. Year. Cotton piece goods. 
Exports of the United Kingdom Imports into India from the United 
inMillion yards. Kingdom in Million yards. 
1900 5034.25 1900-1 1972 
1901 5364.60 1901 -2 2154 
1902 5330.7 1902-3 2071 
1903 5157.2 1903-4 1997 
1904 5591.9 1904 -5 2251 
1905 6198.19 1905 -6 2415 
1906 6261.29 1906-7 2276 
1907 6298.04 1907..8 2487 
1908 5532.4 1908-9 1947 
1909 5722.3 1909-10 2141 
1910 6018.45 1910-11 2252 
1911 6653.6 1911 -12 2379 
1912 6912.6 1912-13 2942 
1913 7075.5 1913-14 3104 
(Figures for the United Kingdom compiled from the Economist history ana review of each year and those for India from the Review of the Trade of India for the period) . 
Looking at these figures, it will be 
seen that the weakness 
of the Indian import trade in piece goods during 
1902 -3 
and 1903 -4 merely reflects the weakness of British 
Exports 
of piece goods. Of the British cotton industry in 
1902 
the Economist article on it says "Speaking broadly the 
year 
1902 was a most discouraging 12 months to production 
of 
cotton yarn and cloth. It was distinctly unremunerative 
as compared with the two previous years ". p.60, January 
10th, 1903. The commercial history and heview of 1903 
(p. 340, Feb.20, 1904 - Economist) says "Our great cotton 
industry suffered in 1903 a partial paralysis consequent 
on the gambling operations of American speculators in 
the raw material". So far as imports of piece goods for 
the year 1903 -4 into India are concerned, :here was a de- 
cline of 74 million yards but a rise of price made the 
value of these imports higher than that of 1902 -3 by 
.7 crores of Rupees. For the next two years Indian 
piece goods imports reflect the prosperity of the Lanca- 
shire industry as a result of good harvests in India 
greatly increased production of the raw material in the 
United States of America and a return of prices to more 
advantageous terms. In 1906 the Lancashire industry 
judging by the quantity exported seemed to continue on 
its career of prosperity but the import trade in piece 
goods got a set back and declined. The cause of this 
lay in India. The Review of the Trade of India for 
1906/ 
1908 -7 attributes this to "the high level of cotton goods 
prices, the dearness of food grains and the consequent 
contraction of the people's purchasing power and the move- 
ment for the preference of indigenous products in the 
country. The monthly average prices of the seven principal 
food grains in India was 31.2% higher in 1908 than the 
average of the previous 5 years". This is the first refer- 
ence to a movement for the preference of indigenous pro- 
ducts in the country. On the import trade at this time it 
left very little serious influence, nothing at all that 
can be compared to the effects of the movement in an 
intensified fors: chat showed itself in the post -.ar period. 
After the set back in 1908 which was experienced by both 
the piece goods exporting trade of the United Kingdom and 
the piece goods importing trade of India, both entered 
from 1909 on a career of boom and prosperity which came 
to a great climax in 1912 and 1913 as a result of good 
cotton crops and easier prices. "Owing to the abundance 
and relative cheapness of supplies of American and 
Egyptian cotton, imports of piece goods rose sharply from 
2438 million yards in 1911 -12 to 3023 million yards in 
1912 -13 and 3192 million yards in 1915 -14e 
(Report of the Tariff Board on the Cotton Textile in- 
dustry 1926.) So far for a survey of the factors in- 
fluencing the import trade of Indian cotton piece goods 





and British piece goods imports into India move together 
generally shows the importance of the Indian piece goo-is 
import trade to the British industry. Individually the 
largest consumer and buyer, India took 40% approximately 
of Lancashire's piece goods exports. For example the 
relation of imports of British piece goods into India 
to total exports of cotton piece goods of the United 
Kingdom in 1913 was as is shown by the following table. 









India 1483 782 
All 
countries 2358 2045 
Percentage 
dxported to 










470 286 36 3057 15.9 9.0 
1231 1151 290 7075 27.4 27.1 
38% 25% 12% 43% 58% 33% 
5.9 3.7 0.6 35.0 
18.7 21.8 4.8 97.8 
35% 17% 12% 36% 
In 1913 India took 43% of the quantity and 36% of the value 
of the United Kingdom's Exports of Cotton piece goods. 
(:source: Burnett -durst - Lancashire and the Indian :arket. 
Journal of the hoyal Statistical Society Pt. III, 1932, 
p. 399). 
The United Kingdom's share in the Indian piece goods 
import trade is seen from the following, figures of total 
piece goods imports and imports of British piece goods 
Imports of Cotton Piece Goods into India. 
1900 -1 
Total Cotton piece goods 
importa in million yards. 
Imports from the United Kingdom 
into India in million yards. 
2003 million yards 1972 million yards. 
1901 -2 2190 2154 
1902 -3 2107 2071 
1903 -4 2033 1997 
1904 -5 2288 2251 
1905 -6 2463 2415 
1906 -7 2318 2276 
1907 -8 2532 2487 
1908. -9 1993 1947 
1909-10 2193 2141 
1910-11 2 308 2252 
1911 -12 2438 2379 
1912-13 3023 2942 
1913-14 3 197 3104 
(Figures taken from the Review of the Trade of India 1900- 1914) . 
The import trade in piece goods falls into the divisions of imports 
of Grey goods, of white bleached goods, and of coloured goods con- 
sisting of printed, dyed, or woven goods. The British share of 
the import trade in each of these classes of goods was during the 
period as given below:- 
British Share of Indian Cotton Cloth Imports. 
Grey Goods. White Bleached. Coloured, printed or dyed. 
1900 -1 99.2% 98.7% 95.3 
1901 -2 99.3 99 95.8 
1902 -3 99.2 98 95.9 
1903 -4 9903 98.3 95.5 
1904 -5 99.6 98.3 95.32 
1905 -6 99.2 98.09 95.4 
1906-7 99.3 98.25 95 
1907 -8 99.5 98.4 93.5 
1908 -9 99 97.6 93.5 
1909-10 99 i 
191041 99 98 94.2 
1911 -12 99 98.2 94 
1912 -13 99 98.0 94 
1913 -14 99 98.0 94 
(Source - Review of the Trade of India 1901- 1914). 
Thus no less than 97% of Indians piece goods imports came during 
the period from the United Kingdom. i,ancashire supplied 99% of 
the imports of grey goods, the remaining 1% of grey goods imports 
consisting of American Drills and Jeans. In bleached goods also 
the United Kingdom stood in a similar strong position the remainder 
of the imports consisting of white shirtings coming from the 
Netherlands. In the trade in coloured roods the United Kingdom 
accounted for only 92% of the imports the balance being largely 
special types of coloured foods from Italy and the Netherlands. 
In/ 
In the following table are set down the figures of the imports 
of piece goods in million yards under each of the heads of Grey, 
White and Coloured goods. This is done to see the course of the 
trade in each of them and how far they moved together or differently. 







1900-1 1192.7 467.48 343.16 59% 
1901 -2 1188.76 580.09 422.86 54% 
1902 -5 1283.68 389.98 , 433.66 61` 
1903-4 1085.11 468.34 481.27 53% 
1904 -5 1210.16 584.3 493.9 53% 
1905 -6 1348.84 572.75 541.65 54.8% 
1906 -7 1298.48 494.97 524.48 56% 
1907.8 1253.8 733.53 544.41 49.5% 
1908-9 1042.29 477.75 472.83 53% 
1909-10 1236.83 493.04 462.83 56% 
1910 -r11 1130.08 586.52 591.53 49% 
1911 -12 1218.85 629.6 589.4 50% 
1912 -13 1535.13 768.76 682.2 50.7% 
1913-14 1534 793 832 49% 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India 1900, -1914) 
Between 1900 -1 and 1913 -14 imports of cotton piece roods increased 
from roughly 2000 million yards to 3200 million yards which approxi- 
mates to an increase of 60%. Individually imports of grey roods 
increased by about 25 - 28 %, white goods by 75% and coloured goods 
by about 130%. This wide difference in the percentage of increase 
in/ 
in the imports of tt.. different kinds of piece Foods is 
to be explained by the amount and quantity of the output 
of cloth by the Indian cotton mill industry. The follow- 
ing table gives the figures of Indian cotton cloth pro- 
duction by the mills and the percentage exported. 




in Million yards 
Percentage of output 
exported. 
1899 *1900 329.4 21% 
1900 -01 341.2 20.3 
1901 -2 409.7 17.7 
1902.3 406.3 17.1 
1903 -4 460.5 16.5 
1904-5 549.5 15.8 
1905-8 566.0 16.3 
1906-7 708.0 10.8 
1907-8 808.4 9.1 
1908-9 824.5 9.4 
1909-10 963 9.7 
1910-11 1042.7 '9.6 
1911-12 1136.2 3.6 
(Figures quoted from the Economist p.697, 698 March 22nd 1913) 
1912-13 1220 3% 
1913 -14 1164 7% 
(Review of the Trade of India 1913 -14) 
Indian mill production has steadily increased while 
the percentage exported has steadily declined leaving an 
increasing/ 
increasing percentage of the home mill production for 
hone consumption. Thus the averre annual production of 
cloth by Indian Mills for the five years 1909 -10 to 
1913-14 was 1105.5 million yards of which 854.1 million 
yards are grouped as grey and bleached but really 
mostly grey goods and 251.4 million yards of 
coloured goods. It stands to reason that with this 
large production of grey goods in the country imports 
of grey goods which were half more than the quantity 
of both bleached and coloured goodsnshould be far more 
sensitive to the internal production than coloured goods 
in which the internal production was much smaller than 
grey goods and in which the imports themselves were also 
smaller. This development accounts for the comparative 
inelasticity of grey goods imports as compared with im- 
ports of white bleached or colourel goods. The Review 
of the Trade of India for 1916-17 days on page 18: 
"Indian piece goods compete with imported goods mainly 
in regard to grey goods .... the competition lies only 
in a small number of qualities of grey goods which are 
on the border line of the lower counts ". 
Any further inquiry into the details of the com- 
petition offered by Indian mill cloth to imported 
piece goods is rendered impossible by the inadequacy 
of the statistics of Indian mill production. As late 
as 1932 the Indian Tariff Board Enquiry Report on 
Cotton/ 
Cotton Textile Industry remarked that "the chief defects 
in the statistics of production are that grey and bleached 
goods are not shown separately and that all coloured goods 
are included under one general head". 
Besides the tables relating to the trade of British 
India constantly during the period 1900..1914 shuffled 
the items under the different heads of imports of cotton 
piece goods that they are not of much use in attempting 
with safety to trace the trends of the trade in any of 
these heads individually. As it was a period of increas- 
ing consumption of cloth in the country both the quantity 
of the imports and of home production were on the increase 
during the period and that being so it is not possible to 
note changes where as the result in the increase of the 
latter heads of imports declined. The main thing that 
can with certainty be stated is that the smaller percent- 
age of increase of grey goods imports is to be accounted 
for by the increase in the internal production and to a 
lesser degree by the change in fashion from grey to 
bleached and coloured goods. 
The next thing of importance in the import trade in 
cotton manufactures into India is that in cotton yarn. 
The 20th century it seems was not to be one of a great 
trade in cotton yarns as it was in certain other corn- 
moditiessuch as food grains or cotton cloth. Here for 
example are figures of the export trade of the United 
Kingdom and India in cotton yarn. 
British and Indian Exports of Cotton Yarn. 
Years. 
British Cotton Yarn exports 
in million lbs. Years. 
Indian Yarn Exports 
in million lbs. 
1900 158.29 19 00 -1 118.08 
1901 169.7 1901 -2 272.4 
1902 167.48 1902 -3 248.5 
1903 150.76 1903-4 252.4 
1904 163.89 1904 -5 247.8 
1905 205.6 1905-6 297.6 
1906 207.37 19 06 -7 243.5 
1907 241.11 1907 -8 215.5 
1908 214.87 1908-9 235.46 
1909 215.2 1909-10 223.3 
1910 191.69 1910 -11 183.4 
1911 223.8 1911 -12 151.4 
1912 243.9 1912-13 203.9 
1913 210.17 1913 --14 198 
(British figures quoted from the Economist - Commercial History 
and Review of each year). 
(Indian figures quoted from the Review of the Trade of India) 
During the period under review the United Kingdom and India were 
the big exporters of yarn. If the figures of the bad year 1900 -1 
are ignored, the trend of the figures for the period show a de- 
cline in the yarn export trade of India and a 25% increase in that 
of the United Kingdom. The reason why the period under review 
was not one of great trade in cotton yarn may be stated thus. 
The spinnin`. of cotton yarn is an old industry which in the 
centuries/ 
centuries before the Industrial Revolution was widely 
known and practised. Then came the Industrial Revolu- 
tion to the West and the development of the means of 
transport and communication. Contact was established 
with the Far East and it was opened up and became with 
its large population a good export market for yarn. 
This contact led to the movement of the Industrial 
Revolution spreading to these countries. Then began 
the career of industrialization. The first steps in 
a career of industrialism is with light manufactures 
of which cotton spinning is an ideally popular one. 
Thud the period saw the cotton yarn spinning industry 
establish itself in India, Japan and China. 
To the extent that these countries spin yarn for them- 
selves to that extent the trade in cotton yarn with 
them was bound to be limited. This is one reason why 
this period was not one of any striking trade in yarn. 
Another reason why the export trade in cotton yarn of 
the older exporting countries did not show much strength 
lay in the fact that the period being one of increasing 
demand for cotton was also a period of great speculation, 
especially in the United States of America. Now cotton 
yarn being closely related to the raw material tended 
to reflect the fluctuations of price of the raw material 
and this made the business more risky for spinners of 
yarn. (Pre -war fluctuations of profits in the Cotton 
Spinning industry in Great Britain by H. Campions 
p.626 J.1.S.S. 1934) 
Index Number of Spinning Profits. 
Year Profits Margins 
1900 165 107 
1901 145 64 
1902 - 1 81 
1903 - 20 82 
1904 14 94 
1905 297 120 
1906 305 106 
1907 546 165 
1908 277 109 
1909 -120 90 
1910 -156 89 
1911 12 102 
1912 229 126 
1913 268 118 
The margins are between the prices of American Middling 
cotton and 32's twist yarns for 1902 -03. 
Cloth being more removed from the raw material was in 
this respect safer and there was a greater tendency to 
follow the safer line of production. For e.p. reviewing 
the Indian cotton mill industry during, the period 1899- 
1914 the Tariff Hoard Inquiry Committee of 1926 says 
in its opening rages At the outset of the period the 
Indian Cotton ì;:i11 Industry was essentially a spinning 
industry and nearly half the yarn produced was exported. 
At/ 
At the end of it while the number of spindles had increased 
by 395 the number of looms had increased by no less than 
1425 ". For all these reasons the period under review was 
not one of an expanding trade in yarn for the yarn ex- 
porting countries. From the figures of cotton yarn ex - 
porte of the United Kingdom and India given already it has 
been seen that, wile the trend Df Indian exports was one 
of decline, those yarn exports of the United Kingdom re- 
corded a 255 increase. This lifference in the fortunes 
of the two exporting countries is to be accounted for by 
the fact that India was an exporter of coarse yarn of the 
lower counts which would be precisely tistat on which .a new 
spinning industry would concentrate. Tith China and 
Japan spinning; yarn of these counts, India lost a great 
deal of her export trade. The yarn exports of the United 
Kingdom were those of the higher counts for the production 
of which the country was well suited as a result of the 
peculiar climate of Lancashire and the aptitude of her 
people. Thus the United Kingdom lost her trade in the 
yarn of lower counts but retained that in the higher. 
The truth of this is borne out by a consideration of the 
figures of the Indian import trade in cotton yarn. 
The following table gives the figures of the internal 
production of yarn by the Indian mill industry, and the 
percentage of the production retained in the country 
and the quantity of yarn imported into the country in 
millions of lbs. 
Year. 
Indian Production and Imports of Yarn. 
Imports of yarn 
in Million lbs. 
Indian dill pro- 
duction of yarn 
in i illion lbs. 
Percentage of it 
retained for home 
consumption. 
1900 -1 353 53% 34.8 million lbs. 
1901 -2 573 66.6% 38.3 
1902 -3 576 52.6 33.7 
1903-4 578.7 56.9 28 
1904 -5 578.3 56.4 30.61 
1905 -6 680.9 87% 45.75 
1906-7 653.7 58.3 37.63 
1907 -8 638.29 62.8 37.31 
1908 -9 657.5 66.3 41.52 
1909-10 627.5 64.3 40.29 
1910-11 609.9 63.8 32.50 
1911 -12 625.03 69.8 41.91 
1912 -13 688.4 75.8 50.04 
1913-14 683.0 71% 44 
(Figures compiled from the Review of the Trade of. India 
1900 -01 to 1913 -14) . 
Taking the figures of the import quantities as a whole it is 
seen that imports of cotton yarn reflected very poorly the 
general expansion of the import trade in Merchandise. To 
what extent and in what lines the increase in the Indian 
mill production of yarn and the decline of the export trade 
in yarn affected the import trade and set limits to it will 
be realised from a study of the figures of imports and in- 
ternal mill production under the different counts of yarn. 
Figures of the Imports and Horne Production of Yarn of the different 
Counts in Million. lbs. 
Year. Yarn Counts 1 -30. 31-40 Above 40. 
Imports Home pro- 
duction. 
Imports Home pro- Imports Home pro - 
duction. duction. 
1900-1 8.02 339.2 20.2 11.06 4.3 2.7 
1901 -2 7.4 559.41 23.86 12.61 4.4 .91 
1902-3 7.25 563.04 19.81 12.51 4.2 .67 
1903-4 6.47 561.29 14.98 16.51 4.8 .94 
Counts 1 - 25 26 - 40 
1904 -5 2.5 531.4 19.9 45.6 5.04 1.27 
1905-6 3.4 634.65 33.69 45.09 5.8 1.13 
1906 -7 2.5 603.89 25.6 49.11 6.4 1.4 
1907-8 2.3 579.3 23.9 56.05 7.4 2.7 
19013.4 4.09 597.6 25.66 55.23 8.5 4.69 
1909 -10 2.4 574.7 26.2 48.98 7.6 3.59 
1910.11 1.6 552.49 19.67 53.57 6.6 1.8 
1911 -12 1.5 565.19 28.3 58.9 7.1 2.19 
1912 -13 4.1 623 31.39 60.98 8.76 2.93 
1913-14 2 617 27 63 8.0 3.0 
Thus the development of. the Indian cotton spinning industry 
during the period led to a position at the close of the period 
in which imports of yarn of counts between 1 -25 was almost re- 
duced to nothing. There was progress in the spinning of counts 
between 31-40. In counts of yarn between 26 and 40 imports 
increased by 7 million lbs. while the home production which was 
more than double the quantity of imports in 1904 -5 rose by 
17 million lbs. In the yarn of counts above 40 while imports 
during/ 
during the period had almost doubled themselves pro'uc- 
tion seems to have made very little headway. As the 
bulk of the yarn that India produces and deals in are 
coarse yarns of the lower counts the acquisition of the 
production of the whole of this has narrowed the pro- 
vince of the possible expansion of imports to those of 
the higher counts which India uses to a much smaller 
degree; even in these the progress of Indian produc- 
tion has set limits to the import trade. Thus the 
supremacy of imports is in the section of yarn of counts 
above 40 but the quantities dealt in are comparatively 
so small that the influence of this on the total figures 
of the import trade in cotton yarn is comparatively 
small. 
In the course of this survey of cotton manufacture 
imports the figures of the internal production of cloth 
and yarn have been given. The survey of these figures 
makes it clear that the cotton industry made very def- 
inite progress during the period. As the period was 
one of free trade the conclusion is warranted that free 
trade and free imports did not during the period prevent 
the Indian cotton mill industry from developing. In 
the industrial development of a yet undeveloped country 
the vital issue seems to be not so much free trade or 
protection but whether for a particular line of indus- 
trial advance the undeveloped country has the advantages 
making/ 
making for such developments, such as raw material, labour, 
capital and a home market or a foreign market. In all 
these respects the Indian cotton manufacturing industry 
in India was well placed, hence its advance. India stood 
in the same position of advantage with regard to the turn- 
ing of many of her other raw materials into manufactured 
goods. If then industrial developments in them was negli- 
gible the conclusion seems warranted that it was not Niue 
to free trade but to an internal economic policy pursued 
by the rulers of the country whose interest lay in making 
things easy for the increasing entry of British manufac - 
helping 
tures into India rather than in /the development and 
advance of Indian industries. 
B. Import Trade in Su ár. 1900 -1914. 
The import trade in sugar has been selected for a 
study here because it has many points of interest not 
shared in by most of India's import commodities. Among 
these are that sugar is an article of general consumption 
and as such the trade is of wide general interest for the 
country. Again. India has all through history been a grower 
of the sugar cane and a producer of sugar and a consumer of 
it on a large scale. In the 19th century she was also an 
exporter of sugar, "The English East India Company ex- 
ported/ 
exported large quantities of sugar from British India 
as well as crystals)" p.12 World's Cane Sugar 
Industry Past and Present - H.C. Prinsen Geerligs. 
At the commencement of the 20th century there was in 
addition an imperial interest involved in the sugar 
import trade of India, All these points of interest 
make a study of the import trade in sugar interesting. 
The trade was one which in value and volume was one 
of importance and the progress it made during the 
period was quite striking. 
The following table gives the quantity and value 
of the imports of sugar during the period. 
Year. 
Indian Imports of Sugar. 
Quantities in tons. Value in crores of Rupees 
1900 -1 263,835 5.65 
1901 -2 300,668 5.90 
1902-3 273,110 4.95 
1903 -4 316,692 5.95 
1304 -5 346,840 6.90 
1905 -6 463,556 7.77 
1906 -7 555,202 8.73 
1307 -8 558,988 9.22 
1008-g 603,911 10.90 
1909-10 630,473 11.52 
1910-11 739,102 13.16 
1911 -12 612,092 11.93 
1912-15 772,153 14.30 
19 13 -14 896,869 14.95 
(Figures from the review of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) . 
The table shows that between the openings and closing years 
of the period sugar imports increased by more than 200% 
quantitatively and by a little more than 150¡' in value. 
This points to the fact of a tendency to a fall in the 
prices of sugar during the period. The following index 
numbers of sugar prices during the period bear this out. 
1867-77 = 100 U.K. Statist. 































(quoted from the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 
p. 566 1914) 
There were during the period many factors contributing to 
the striking expansion of the import trade in sugar. 
Among/ 
Among these were the increase in the production and supply 
of sugar to such an extent that even in a period generally 
of rising prices they tended towards a fall in the price 
of sugar. Part of the tendency to the falling price of 
sugar during the period was to be accounted for by the 
increasing competition among producers. As a result 
efforts were made to make the production of sugar more 
scientific and economic. The following table gives the 
figures of the world's crop of sugar during the 
World Production of SucT. 
















(Figures compiled from The Economist - History and Review 
of each year-sugar). 
The world consumption of sugar expanded luring the period 
according to The Economist from an estimate of 8.5 million 
tons at the beginning of the period to nearly 15 million 
tons during 1912-13. "The average annual increase in the 
world consumption of sugar for several decades before the 
War was at the rate of 3%". (The Imperial sugar Cane 
Research Conference Report of 1931). Thus in terms of 
world supply and demand and the progress of the industry 
the tendency towards a little fall in sugar prices during 
the period is perfectly intelligible. Another factor 
contributing to the striking import trade of India in 
sugar is the nature of the commodity itself. Sugar is 
an article of general consumption. Individual consump- 
tion was small in quantity and value and there was scope 
with a fall in price for an increase in total consumption. 
The Review of the Trade of India for 1904 -5 has on page 6 
the following "Well informed opinion has put the annual 
production (in India) at 3 million tons which is about 
one third as much again as appears in the commercial 
estimates of the crop. Taking the higher estimate as the 
outside limit and adding the imports of 1904 -5 which re- 
present one ninth of the home production the quantity of 
home consumption provides only 25 lbs per head of the 
population a rate - .. only 28% of the esti- 
mated per capita consumption of the United Kingdom in 
that year. A considerable advance on the present rate 
of consumption is therefore possible". Then again 
imported/ 
imported sugar was at an advantage in competition with 
home -grown sugar, The increasingly scientific and economic 
production of it as compared with Indian sugar has been 
referred to already. "Recent experience has confirmed Mr 
iloel Paton's estimate that the out turn of raw sugar per 
acre under cane in India did not exceed 1.25 tons as com- 
pared with 2 tons in Cuba, 3.44 tons in Java and 4.02 
tons in fawaii "(p.12 Review of the Trade of India 1907 -8) 
Imported sugar also seems to have had an advantage in the 
shape of cheaper transport in the country. The Review 
of the Trade of India for 1901 -2 states on page 5 
"Imported sugar can be laid down more cheaply from 
Karachi than Indian sugar brought into the Punjab from 
other provinces, the railway finding it expedient to con.. 
cede favourable terms for sugar from the port". For all 
these reasons and mainly because imported sugar was re- 
fined sugar and cheaper, its consumption became popular 
in certain parts of the country and it was substituted 
n 
for home grown to a certain extent. In 1900 -01 imported 
sugar formed only 5.9% of the Indian sugar supply but 
in 191011 it formed 20%. Average imports in the three 
years ending 1899 -1900 represented only 1.96 lbs and 
annas 2.82 per head of the population. In 1910 -11 
imports represented 6. 79 lbs and annas 8.64 per head 
of the population. (Review of the Trade of. India 1910- 
11, pp.12 and 13) . The effect of the growing import 
trade on Indian sugar production is borne out by the 
following/ 
following figures of the acreage under suEar cari the out 
turn in tons of raw sugars (The figures are quoted from 
the 6tatistical Abstract of aritish India for the period). 
ax in 8rttih India. 
Xear Area in acrea Out-turn in tons. 
1900-01 2)6,51,3,371 2,278,748 
1901-02 2,$96,592 2,022,476 
1002-03 2,491,172 1,906,764 
1903-4 2,416,909 1,871,986 
1904.4 2,569,020 2,189,000 
1905.6 2.414,860 1,725,500 
1906.17 2,623,873 2,205,300 
1907-8 2,876,965 2,046,900 
1908-9 2,408,212 1,841,800 
1909-10 2,4420033 2,127,100 
191C-11 2,540,541 2,217,800 
1911,12 2,563,770 2,451,100 
191245 2,712,085 2,583,600 
1913.14 2,707373 2,291,500 
Thus in a period when the net, area sown with crops in- 
creased from 197 million acres in 1900-1 to 219 million 
acres in 1913-14 the area under sugar cane has been 
practically stationary. The reason for this as stated 
by the leview of the Trade of India 1910-11 is that 
"price recorda show that in 18 years the prices of food 
stuffs in India have risen by 321. The price of Indian 
crude/ 
crude sugar has risen only 28%. In other words sugar 
has not fully shared in the appreciation of other food 
stuffs and it is difficult to dissociate this fact from 
the circumstance that the world's price of say Java 
sugar has declined in the same period by 28%". (Review 
of the Trade of India 1910 -11, p.13). The import trade 
would have increased in a more striking way and the 
effect of it on Indian sugar production would have been 
more serious if it had not been for the fact that limits 
were set to the competition of imported sugar by the wide 
preference in the country for the home made crude sugar - 
gur. "There is a class of consumer who for sentimental 
reasons will prefer gur to sugar at whatever level prices 
may stand". (13.87. Indian Tariff World Report on Sugar 
1931). The substitution of the refined imported sugar 
for the country made crude sugar was mainly in the towns 
and especially in the toes on the coasts. 
The sugar import trade has during the period gone on 
increasing from year to year with very few interruptions» 
In the period under review the annual increase of imports 
was held up only on two occasions, once during 1902-3 
and again during 1911 -r12. The explanation of the 1902 -3 
decline of sugar imports was the result of administrative 
action. The Review of the Trade of India for the year 
states on page 3 As the effect of special additional 
duties imposed on the 8th of June 1902 on sugar produced 
in Austria -Hungary and Germany and from 1st March 1903 
on/ 
on sugar produced in certain other countries the import- 
ation of beet sugar fell last year to just below half the 
abnormally large imports of 1901 -2; but in partial com- 
pensation of this decline the imports of cane sugar in- 
creased by 41.09. Thus this decline is the result of 
extraneous administrative action and not the result of 
a decline of consumption in the country. On the other 
hand the decline of sugar imports during 1911 -12 was 
the result of the decline of the world's supply of sugar 
consequent 
for the year and the /rise of prices. The beet sugar crop 
of 1910 was estimated at 8 million tons and that for 1911 
was only 6,250,000 tons. The Cuban cane sugar also suf- 
fered a decline. Thus but for these two interruptions 
the trade was a very prosperous one. 
It now remains to consider the changes during the 
period in the character of India's import trade in sugar. 
This can be done by considering the sugar imports as 
failing into the two divisions of imports of Cane and 
Beet sugar. 
Imports of Cane and Beet Sugar into India - In Cwts. 
Year Cane Sugar Beet sugar. 
1897-98 2 ,029 ,330 2 ,206 ,064 
1898-99 2,238,620 1, 526 , 29 0 
1899-1900 2 ,063 ,477 872,515 
1900 -1901 3,024,074 1,817 ,590 
1901 -1902 2,491,907 2,936,196 
1902 -1903 3,529 ,334 1,457,517 
1903-1904 5 ,300 ,682 529,885 
Year. Oane sugar. Beet Sugar. 
1904-5 4,833,309 1,716,488 
1905.6 4,262,929 3,433,262 
1906.7 5,926,848 3,803,834 
1907.8 9,250,841 794,060 
19084 8,719,259 1,944,024 
1909.10 10,276,897 859,187 
1910.11 11,814,187 724,958 
1911-12 9,887,693 254,159 
1912.13 12,355,463 1,144,869 
1913-14 14,556,000 1,504,000 
(Figures from the ueviev, of the Trade of India 1900-1914). 
In 1897-98 imports of cane and beet sugar into India were 
almost equal in quantity. Since that time the fortunes 
of the two commodities in the import trade have been very 
different. In 1913-14 imports of cane sugar amounted 
to 14.5 million cwt. and imports of beet sugar to 1.5 
million cwt. In other words the forces in operation in 
the import trade in sugar have made cane sugar the over- 
whelmingly preponderant portion of the sugar imports 
into India. Another feature that the table shows is 
that while imports of cane sugar have been comparatively 
steady and strong, imports of beet sugar have been very 
erratic along with a decided tendency to weakness. 
Beet sugar imports durinî: the period came from 
Austria Hungary and. Germany. During the opening years 
of/ 
of the period the main exporter of cane sugar to India 
was kauritius. Beet sugar first appeared in India in 
1893-4. The laet filceen year of the 19th century was 
a period when the beet sugar industry in Central Europe, 
with the help of bounties and other privileges, increased 
its production and exports. Consequently these were years 
when the cane sugar industry suffered badly and beet sugar 
imports into India increased rapidly. About that time 
the British Sugar planters of the West Indies found them- 
selves shut out of the American market by the United 
States of America raising the duties against imported 
sugar with a view to encouraging, their own sugar industry. 
The West Indian planters felt that they would have got 
better terms if they had belonged to the United States of 
America. Noting this attitude Joseph Chamberlain who was 
at the Colonial Office felt that something ought to be 
done to satisfy them and started his campaign for imperial 
preference in general and against bounty fed sugar in 
partioular. To the United Kingdom which was itself not 
a producer of sugar but a large consumer the continental 
sugar bounties were advantageous because sugar was cheap. 
In so far as England joined the campaign against sugar 
bounties it was to help the British sugar planting 
colonies, and partly because of the fear of their threat 
of secession from the Empire. "The course of debate 
confirmed common knowledge that we are in this business 
of the Convention chiefly because of the Test Indies". 
(The Sugar Debate" p.1844 Economist Nov.29th 1902) 
The Brussels Conference of 1898 was convened to abolish 
the bounty system but failed to achieve its object. 
The European commercial interests in India connected with 
the trade in Mauritius sugar and the British Planters of 
sugar in Mauritius however were able to persuade the 
Uolonial Office and the Indian Government to levy duties 
against bounty fed sugar imports. Bounty fed sugar would 
mean cheap sugar for the time being and the consumer would 
.tTofit by it while the producer in India would suffer as 
the result of the low prices. Hence in this case it was 
good to sppport the producer and a great deal was said 
in the course of the discussion of the bill to impose 
countervailing duties, of the detrimental effect to the 
Indian producer from the imports of bounty fed sugar 
(C. 9287 of 1899). Over and abovethe import duty of 
5% a countervailing duty was levied on bounty fed sugar 
after 1899. The figures however of the import of beet 
sugar from Austria Hungary and Germany from 1900-1 to 
1902-.3 showed clearly that this countervailing duty was 
not effective enough to stop the imports and additional 
duties were levied which served to check the imports of 
Beet sugar into India. The ending of the sugar bounties 
served to restore beet sugar from an artificial to 
a more natural value and in doing that enabled the culti- 
vation of cane sugar to come into its own and since that 
time the cultivation of cane sugar made steady progress 
during the period. The following is the percentage of 
cane/ 
cane sugar in the world's total sugar supply during the 
period. 
1900-1 38% 1907-8 40.5 
1901-2 37.5 1908-9 45.8 
1902-3 44.4 1909-10 48.3 
1903-4 42% 1910-11 41.2 
1904-5 49.5 1911.12 49, 
1905-6 40.9 (Quoted from 11.0. Prensen Garling's 
"The World's Cane Sugar Industry" 
1906-7 42.4 p. 39. ) 
Even after the bounty question was settled beet sugar 
imports during the period continued to be both weak and 
erratic. That was because of the increase of consumption 
of sugar in Europe, which was geographically the market for 
European beet sugar. That explains the weakening of beet 
imports into India. The erratic character of the imports 
was due to the variation of beet crops as a result of the 
season. Variations of consumption in Europe whioh wa 1- 
influenced by factors like the taxation of the commodity 
or the success of the fruit.crop. A good fruit crop 
would give a fillip to the jam making industry and in- 
crease the consumption of sugar. 
Attention may now be devoted to the change in the 
character of cane sugar imports into India: during the 
opening years of the period the chief exporter of cane 
sugar into India was Aauritius. Imports from Java were 
small at the beginning of the period but gained ground 
steadily till in 1904-5 Java became the chief source of 
cane/ 
cane sugar imports into India. That position was con- 
solidated by Java and maintained during the rest of the 
period* This development was the product of the Recipro- 
city Convention of 1904 between the United States and 
Cuba. The preference given in the U.S.A. market to Cuban 
sugars deprived Java sugar of its assured position in the 
American market and Java turned its attention to the 
Indian market to whioh it was very near. 
In concluding this study of the import trade of 
India in sugar, certain remarks seem appropriate in the 
light of developments detailed in the foregoing pages. 
The world's sugar supply during the period consistei of 
the supply of the central European states, the U.S.A, 
Cuba, Hawaii, the West Indies, Mauritius and Java. 
It was a competition that was severe but it was a com- 
petition among units all more or less strong and the 
result of it was that the trade in sugar in a way ration- 
alised itself, every producing region concentrating on 
its nearest and therefore its natural market. The ex- 
igencies of competition and price backed by the natural 
strength of the contestants brought this about. 
As Europe was the biggest consumer of sugar and was mainly 
catered for by the beet sugar crop the price of sugar was 
largely influenced by that of beet sugar, cane sugar 
merely following it. The following table shows beet 
and cane sugar prices in. Calcutta from 1903 to 1910. 
Year 
Beet sugar prices 
Calcutta per cwt. 
Cane sugar prices 
Calcutta per cwt. 
s. d. d. d. 
1903 13 11 13 7 
1904 13 10 13 2 
1905 15 7 15 5 
1906 11 10 11 11 
1907 12 6 12 2 
1908 13 10 13 7 
1909 13 11 13 10 
1910 14 10 14 9 
(Taken from Notes on Sugar in India by Noel Paton and 
quoted by the Indian Tariff Board Report on Sugar 
1931, p.89) . 
The index numbers given earlier in this study of Beet 
and Cane sugar prices also bears this out. 
The attitude of the Government to the increase of 
sugar imports and its effect on the area and production 
of sugar cane in India have already been considered and 
need not be repeated here. 
C. The Indian Import Trade in Yineral Oils 1900 -1914. 
Almost the same arguments that led to a study 
of the Indian import trade in sugar hold good in the 
case of Mineral oil imports into India. Kerosene oil 
item 
being overwhelmingly the most important /in the import 
trade/ 
trade in Mineral oils this short study is devoted mainly 
to a consideration of that item of the Mineral oil import 
trade. The interest of the trade lies in the fact that 
Kerosene oil is an article of general use and general use 
has a special significance in a market with the heavy 
population of India. It is a commodity in which there 
was a local industry producing it. 
The start for the study is with the values of 
Lineral oil imports into India. The importance of kero- 
sene in the oil imports is seen from the following table 
Indian Imports of hineral Oils and Kerosene, 
Imports of Mineral Oils 
in crores of Rupees. 
Imports of Kerosene oil 
in crores of Rupees. 
1900-1 3.76 3.10 
1901-2 3.83 3.51 
1902-3 3.46 3.14 
1903-4 3.38 3.07 
1904.5 3.27 2.97 
1905-6 2.23 1.78 
1906-? 2.42 1.96 
1907-8 3.15 2.48 
1908-9 3.90 3.33 
1909-10 3.14 2.51 
1910-11 3.38 2.38 
1911-12 4.24 3.25 
1912-13 3.75 2.56 
1913-14 4.11 2.85 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India 1900-1914) 
The items tif the Mineral oil import trade are first and 
and 
foremost Kerosene and then fuel oils/ lubricating. oils. 
From the table given it is clear that 
while imports of Kerosene oil into India have declined, 
the total imports of Mineral oil have shown a slight in- 
crease which is accounted for by the fact that items of 
imports other than Kerosene have between the opening and 
the closing year of the period risen from .66 crores to 
1.26 crores, that is have doubled themselves. That is 
an index to the degree of industrial development that 
took place in the country during the period. 
The decline in the value of Kerosene imports points 
to the increasing availability in the country of home 
supplies of Kerosene. During the period Kerosene was 
the main commodity for the supply of lighting and had 
no other serious competitor in the field to reduce the 
demand for it. The following figures of the quantities 
of foreign Kerosene imports and of coast wise imports 
of Kerosene supplies from Burma, explain the decline 
of the value of Kerosene imports into India during the 
period. 
Indian Imports of Kerosene. 
In Million gallons. 
coastwise imports 
from Burma. 
Foreign imports of 
of Kerosene oil. 
1900 -1 72.6 8.2 
1901 -2 91.4 13.4 
1902 -3 81.4 17.4 
1903 -4 71.5 35.2 
1904.5 76.1 42.7 
1905 -6 50.9 47.1 
1908.7 53.03 61.8 
1907.8 65.4 63.8 
1908.9 83.5 82.7 
1909 -10 64.05 81.2 
191011 56.59 91.8 
1911 -12 79.4 87.7 
1912 -13 65.6 100.5 
1913 -14 68.8 109.0 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India 1900 -1914) 
Indian consumption of Kerosene increased during the period 
from 80.8 million gallons in 1900 -1 to 177.8 million gal- 
lons in 1913 -14. While internal supplies accounted for 
only one -tenth of the country's consumption in 1900 -1, 
in 1913 -14 internal supplies accounted for 60% of the con - 
sumption. The period so far as the Kerosene oil trade was 
concerned was generally one of an increase of world pro - 
duction and consumption. In the trade very severe com- 
petition/ 
competition was engendered in the attempt to find and hold 
markets. That being so the capture of the Indian market 
by the British Indian Oil Companies merits attention. 
The Indian market for Kerosene is a price market in 
the sense that the poverty of the masses of the people 
makes price, not quality, influence the demand for it. 
This played a large part in determining during the period 
the trend of the import trade in Kerosene oil. For ex- 
ample up to 1895-6 American case-oil predominated over 
Russian oil in the import trade. Thereafter Russian oil 
being cheaper got the bettor of American case oil. Anent 
this the Review of the Trade of India for 1900-01 states 
"The transference of the trade from the United States to 
Russia means merely a question of relative price. As 
long as Kerosene oil was almost exclusively used in India 
by the European population and by the wealthier classes 
of natives in the towns American oil had the preference 
since it wa ,. of better quality and the difference in 
price was not to the consumer so material a considera- 
tion as the difference in quality. When Kerosene oil 
reached the native consumer of the lower classes the 
case was different for he was content with an inferior 
quality at a lower price" (p.11). Imported Russian 
oil was further cheapened by being imported in bulk and 
this put American oil at a still greater handicap. 
That position is indicated by the following figures of 
the import of American and Russian oil. 
Indian Imports of Oil from the U.S.A. and Russia. 
Year 
In kil l ion gallons. 
Imports of American oil. Imports of Russian oil. 
1896-7 45.48 18.2 
1897-8 50.63 23.9 
1898-9 50.8 21 
1899-1900 57.68 12.7 
1900-01 67.3 5.1 
1901-02 84.47 5.7 
1902-5 71.12 9.22 
19 03 -4 57.3 6.7 
1904-5 40.3 7.47 
In 1902-3 American oil entered the market as bulk oil and 
combined with the rising prices of Russian oil, saw a 
decline of Russian oil and an increase of American. 
Imports however of American and Russian oil slowed up 
thereafter as the result of (1) the development of the 
Burma oil industry as indicated by the figures of coast- 
wise imports with India. (2) Competitors nearer home 
entering the field as the result of the revival of the 
oil industry in Sumatra and Borneo by a coalition of 
the Royal Dutch and Shell Companies. The advent of 
this interest into the import trade did not influence 
or improve the figures of the import trade as the 
figures of Kerosene oil imports make plain. Imports 
from Sumatra cut into the Russian share of the trade 
as a result of being nearer the Indian market than 
Russia/ 
xtussia and internal disturbances in Russia. Burma oil 
was able steadily to acquire the predominant share of 
the supply of Kerosene oil to the Indian market, in 
spite of the competition of powerful interests like the 
American and the Royal Dutch and Shell groups. The first 
factor working to bring this about was that Burma oil 
being inferior as a luminant was cheaper than American., 
Russian or Sumatra oil. Gil of the same quality as the 
Burma oil was produced in the Dutch East Indies, and 
besides the producing industries had formed a coalition 
to place their oil on the Indian market. In this effort 
that body had the initial handicap of being further away 
from the Indian market than the Burma oil company. The 
handicap was increased when foreign oil had to pay the 
8 duty imposed on it in 1896. In 1910 the duty was 
raised from 1 arena per imperial gallon to i anna 6 
The Burma Oil Company's production of oil accounted for 
only 4% of the world's supply. The company was not 
able to meet the whole of the needs of India and foreign 
oil traversing a longer distance and paying a fairly 
heavy duty was able to enter the country, and the con- 
sumer if he needed it had to pay the total cOet of land- 
ing it in India. Kerosene oil prices were set in 
India by foreign oil and Burma oil whose landed cost in 
India should have been cheaper by the shorter distance 
and the absence of a duty was able to follow the prices 
of foreign oil with just a difference to make the con- 
sumer/ 
consumer prefer it. The result was that the consumer 
paid his price but what should have gone into the coffers 
of the State as excise duty went into the pockets of the 
Burma Oil Company. 
The following table gives the prices during the 
period of Burma oil and foreign oil of the same quality. 
1903 -4 
Prices of Oil in India. 
Borneo Oil. Burma Oil. 
Victoria Brand per 2 tins. Per 2 tins. 
3 - 1 - 4 3- 3- 8 
1904 -5 2 - 12 - 5 2 - 14 - 3 
1905 -6 2 - 11 - 5 2 - 11 - 11 
1906 -7 3- 3- 6 3- 5- 4 
1907 -8 3 - 7 - 10 3 - 8 - 11 
1908 -9 3 - 8 - 0 3- 10 - 5 
1909-10 2 - 8 - 11 2 - 10 - 0 
1910 -11 3 - 4 - 9 3- 6- 3 
1911 -12 3 - 3 - 6 3- 4- 5 
(Figures from the Review of the Trade of India.) 
Although a price market the Indian market for oil 
was one of the biggest markets in the world and cert- 
ainly the biggest in the East; producers, not without 
reasons, were keen to get into the market. The steady 
way in which the Burma Oil Company was increasingly 
consolidating itself in the Indian market as a result 
of the advantage of being nearer and being exempt from 
duty/ 
duty was the envy of other oil producing concerns such as 
the Dutch Shell group in the Far East and the Oil Corpora- 
tion of the U.S.A., the Standard Oil Company. The result 
was that the period 1900-1914 was marked by periodical 
incursions of these companies into the Indian market to 
break the growing monopoly of the Burma Oil Company. 
The effect of this is seen in the figures of the import 
trade and in the rate war that broke out periodically. 
For e.g. in 1904-5 the producing interests in the Far 
East the Royal Dutch and. Shell having formed a coalition 
proceeded to try to get a share of the Indian trade. 
The effect was increased imports and as the Review of 
the Trade of India for that year puts it "the effect 
of this competition on prices is apparent in their 
constant fluctuation. The average value per 10 gallons 
of oil in bulk was lower than in 1903-4 by 10 annas 
8 pies. During 1909-10 the duty on imported Kerosen 
was raised from 1 anna to j per imperial gallon under 
Act VIII of 1910. 1910-11 and 1911-12 were years of 
a rate war between the standard and shell interests and 
according to the Review of the Trade of India "the 
aggregate reduction of rates from the 15th August to 
the end of larch 1911 ranged approximately from 9 to 
19%. 
The position then in the import trade in Kerosene 
oil in the latter part of the 1900-14 period was as is 
indicated by the following table. 
Imports in Millions of gallons. 
Average of five years 1909-10 
to 1913 -14. 
United States of America 42.5 
Borneo 12.5 
Straits settlement 3.1 
Persia .7 
Russia 5.0 
Other countries 3.1 
Total all countries 88.9 
Coastwise imports from Burma 93,1 
(Source:- Review of the Trade of India 1916 -17 p.8) . 
This study of the import trade of India may be brought 
to an end with a brief survey of two important items of 
the import trade namely that in Iron and Steel and in 
Machinery and Mill work. During the period India mainly 
relied on imports to provide for her needs of these com- 
modities and a survey of these items provides a clue to 
the industrial and general development in India during 
the period. Between the period 1909 1913 -14 imports 
of Iron and Steel, and of Machinery and Mill work accoun- 
ted on an average for 7% and 4% of the imports. 





in crores of Rupees. 
Iron and Steel Machinery and Millwork 








1904 -5 6.15 4.02 
1905 -6 6.64 4.91 
19067 7.55 5.79 
1907 -8 9.75 6.58 
1908-9 9.04 6.61 
1909-10 8.84 5.07 
1910-11 9.44 4.73 
1911 -12 10.07 4.25 
1912 -13 11.50 5.88 (including Belting) 
1913-14 15.99 8.26 
Imports of Iron and Steel for the five years from 1909 -10 
to 1913 -14 amounted to an annual average of 735,300 tons 
and the United Kingdom supplied 60% of the imports the 
remainder of the imports coming in order of importance 
from Germany and Belgium and then the United States of 
America. Up to the outbreak of the War the United Kingdom 
supplied almost 90% of the Machinery imported into India 
largely on account of her heavy shipments of textile 
machinery/ 
machinery, electrical plant, prime movers and boilers, 
tea machinery and plant for every industrial purpose. 
A survey of the figures of the import values in 
both these commodities reveals the fact that the in- 
crease of imports in. each case during the period was 
approximately to the same extent. There is a similarity 
of movement of both imports the only difference being 
that the time lag involved in variations of prosperity 
in the country affecting the import trade is as is to 
be expected longer in the case of imports of Machinery 
which takes longer to manufacture. 
Thus ends the survey of the import trade of India. 
(q60 -Ig14 
CHAPTER VIII. 
REVIEW OF THE POST WAR PERIOD 1919 -1931. 
A General. 
In this study of the trade of India the period of 
the Great War is omitted and attention is focussed upon the 
main developments of the post -war period. Trade with Europe 
is a very important part of India's foreign trade. For ex- 
ample in 1915 -14 as regards private trade in merchandise 
only, no less than 80), of the import trade of India and 57 
of her export trade were from and to European countries." 
( "Review of the Trade of India" 1913 -14 p. 8) . The Great 
War was fought in the heart of industrialism and brought the 
trade of the central European belligerent powers to an end 
and the restrictions, prohibitions, controls, and other 
interference with trade not only reduced the quantum of 
trade but gave it a very serious twiste Oence it is not 
proposed in this study to consider the trade of India 
during the war period separately; references to develop- 
ments during the war period influencing the trade of'the 
country during the Post -war period will, of course, not 
be neglected. 
1919 was the first full year of peace and marked the 
beginning of the endeavour to return to normalcy. That 
beginning was made possible by the end of fighting, the con- 
clusion of peace, and the easing, but not the ending, of 
war -time restrictions and control. The features of the 1919 
post -war/ 
post -war situation have been set down as follows: - 
"(a) Grave shortages of food and raw materials. 
(b) The breakdown in communications by land and sea. 
(c) The loss by death of many millions of workers in 
their prime. 
(d) The disorganization of currencies and public 
finance. 
(e) The staggering load of debts. 
(f) The dislocation of the channels of trade and the 
mechanism of industry. 
(g) Profound changes in the habits and desires of man. 
(h) Revolution and actual starvation in several 
countries and grave impoverishment in many 
others. 
( i) The inflamed passions and new political grievances 
which threatened new wars as soon as there was 
again the energy and the resources to wage them". 
(Salter, "Recovery" p. 15) . 
The post-war period began with a trade boom which was 
short -lived and was followed immediately by a depression. 
The boom may be described as a psychological reaction of a 
money flooded world to the weakening of the restrictions on 
trade. Normally a trade boom may be regarded as a product, 
of the factors of expanding wealth production, increasing 
efficiency of production and a hopeful outlook. In the 
1919 situation none of these factors existed. On the other 
hand there was serious monetary inflation to an unparalleled 
degree. "In Britain between 1913 and 1920 the price level 
rose more than 3 -fold; in France more than 54 -fold; in 
Italy more than 6i -fold; in Austria between 1914 and 1922 
more/ 
more than 17,000 -fold which in 1925 became more than 21,000; 
in Russia by 1922 over 4,000,000 -fold and this in 1923 be- 
came more than 6 billion -fold; in Germany for 1920 the rise 
was only 15 -fold but at the peak of inflation in 1923 it went 
far above the astronomical figure of a trillion- fold ". 
( "Booms and depression ", Irving Fisher, pp. 154 -155). In 
the light of this it is not difficult to see that "in 1920 
the Budget of only one European state was balanced. No 
single European currency, save that of Albania, was on a gold 
basis; the European exchanges for seven years danced and 
jumped with spasmodic and tireless energy ". (Loveday, 
"Britain and World Trade ", p. 31). The boom was followed 
speedily by a depression and, in order to combat it, the 
Brussels and Genoa Conferences set before Europe the two 
definite objectives of a balanced budget and a return to 
the gold standard respectively. In attempting to return 
to the gold standard, countries according to the peculiarities 
of their position accepted one or other of the routes of 
devaluation, deflation, or repudiation. Clearly it was a 
period of falling price levels. This is seen from the 
following table of index numbers of wholesale prices:- 
WHOT,F,SALE PRICES. 
U.K. U.S.A. Japan. India. Italy. 
Bureau of Bank of 
Economist. Labour. Japan. Official, Bachi. 
1913 100 100 100 100 100 
1918 224.9 194 195.8 180 409.1 
1919 235 206 236 196 - 
1920 283 226 259 204 624.4 
1921 181 147 200 181 577.5 
1922 160 149 196 180 562.3 
1923 162 154 199 176 574.6 
(quoted from the Economist Monthly Supplement, 
August 23, 1924, p. 12) 
"The recovery of Europe was indeed remarkable. By 1925, 
that is seven years after the cessation of war, world production 
was 18% more than in 1913 and Europe had regained the Pre -war 
11 
standard and indeed output was greater than in 1913. (p. 7, 
Loveday, "Britain and World Trade "). This progress would have 
been greater for Europe and the world if it had not been hindered 
by hampering circumstances such as the slump in trade in 1920 
and 1921, inflation in Germany, Austria and Poland in 1922, the 
occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, the stabilization crises of 1924 
in Germany and Poland, the slump of the French and Belgian 
currencies, the deflation difficulties in the United Kingdom. 
in 1925, and the British coal strike in 1926. While world pro- 
duction of wealth was in 1925 18% greater than in 1913 world 
trade was after elimination of price changes about 81 greater 
than in 1913 and for Europe the index number of trade was 89 
in 1924/ 
in 1924 and 91 in 1925 (1913 = 100). The conclusion pointed 
to by a survey of world and European production and trade is 
that "in trade as in production there has been a shift in the 
centre of gravity from Europe and the Atlantic to America, 
Asia, Oceania and the Pacific Ocean ". (Loveday, "Britain and 
\Vorld Trade" p. 28) . The truth was that, emerging from the 
debauch of a war, Europe was left with the heavy work of re- 
construction, a staggering load of debt, high taxation which 
constituted a burden on industry, currency instability and 
soaring tariff walls. It was a situation which considerably 
reduced Europe's capacity to lend and export capital by which 
means a certain amount of her trade had been financed during 
the pre -war period. European trade was also reduced by the 
growth during the war period of industries in her export 
markets, especially the cotton textile industry in Japan and 
India. 
The period 1925 to 1929 was one of progress. The in- 
crease in the world production of wealth is indicated by the 
following figures: - 
1913 _ 100 
Raw material 
All products & colonial Foodstuffs 
products. 
1925 1928 1925 1928 1925 1928 
World 118 129 130 148 111 117 
The increasing stabilization of currencies helped in 
lending and borrowing of capital and the construction and 
restoration of industrial plant. The indices of indus- 
trial/ 
trial production bear witness to the extent of the recovery:- 
INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1926 -9. 
1926 1927 1928 1929 
United Kingdom 100 107 106 112 
Germany 100 146 145 147 
France 100 107 118 129 
Poland (1925) 100 122 138 138 
Sweden 100 110 106 130 
Canada 100 134 149 166 
U.S.A. 100 112 117 124 
The advance in trade during the period is indicated by 
the figures given below. 
QUANTUM OF TRADE. 
Imports Exports Total 
1928 as 0 1928 as 1928 as 
of 1913. of 1913. of 1913. 
Europe 111 102 107 
North America 161 160 160 
South America 124 129 126 
Africa 140 125 132 
Oceania 135 138 137 
Asia 144 154 149 
World 124 122 123 
(quoted from Loveday, "Britain and World Trade" p. 71) 
A feature of the period which is worthy of note was the 
fall in general prices. The following table of the index 
number/ 
number of wholesale prices shows that. 
INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES. 






Japan. Official. Official. 
1924 166 141 207 137 173 
1925 159 148 202 142 159 
1926 148 143 179 134 148 
1927 142 137 170 138 148 
1928 140 140 171 140 145 
1929 137 139 166 137 141 
Considering that during this period there was an increase 
of world production and trade the fall in price levels may be 
regarded as the product of the combined action, varying with 
different countries, of the twin forces making for stabilization 
of currencies and the rationalisation of production with its 
effect on the efficiency of production and production costs. 
The period 1929 to 1931 was one of a severe depression 
and its effects on production, trade and prices are unmistak- 
able. 
INDEX NUMBER OF WHOLESALE PRICES. 
India U.K. U.S.A. Japan France 
Calcutta on 1913 =100 1926 =100 1900 100 1913 =100 
July 1914=100 
Sept. 1929 143 135.8 96.1 217.5 608 
March, 1930 125 124.5 90.2 195.9 558 
March, 1931 100 105.9 76.0 158.3 539 
( "Review of the Trade of India, 1932 -3" p. 3) . 
The effect on the production of wealth is seen from the 
table given below. 
The following are indices of production of producer's 
and consumers goods 1925 -1929 = 100. 
Producer's Goods. Consumer's Goods. 
Germany U.K. U.S.A. Germany U.K. U.S.A. 
1927 108 102 92 111 101 102 
1928 107 100 104 109 100 100 
1929 112 107 113 104 100 104 
1930 95 96 83 101 90 88 
1931 70 78 54 94 88 89 
(compiled from the League of Nations' "World 
production and prices, 1925 -32" Table V. p. 56). 
The effect of the depression on world trade is seen from 
the following figures- 
TO TAL, VALUE OF WORLD TRADE. 
1929 -1932 
in Millions of Dollars. 
Year Imports Exports Total 
1929 35606 33035 68641 
1930 29083 26492 55575 
1931 20847 18922 39769 
1932 13885 12726 26611 
It will be seen that the period of study, 1919 -1931, ends 
with the world as a whole in the grip of a severe economic de- 
pression. It is not the object here to discuss the causes of 
the world depression. This survey of the course of world 
production/ 
production and trade in general and of Europe in particular 
has been intended as the background on which to study the 
course of Indian trade during the post -war period. 
REVIEW OF THE POST WAR PERIOD 1919 -1931. 
B The Indian Economic Background. 
This section is devoted to a brief survey of the main 
features of the Indian economic background in the post -war 
period relevant to the study of Indian foreign trade. As 
the general economic features of the Indian situation have 
been dealt with at the start of this study, this section is 
devoted to an account of such changes as took place during 
this period which may be regarded as influencing her foreign 
trade. 
I. Free trade and laissez -faire have been seen to be 
the main features of the Indian economic policy up to the 
outbreak of the war. In the post -war period both of these 
are abandoned and a policy of protectionism and of state -aid 
is inaugurated. With Britain ruling India and being securely 
in power, and having a very large interest in trade which was 
vital to the well -being of herself, with India being her best 
Market, it could not be expected that either protectionism 
or state help would be adopted or applied by her with any 
thoroughness in regard to industrial development. Even so 
the change from the one to the other was a big step and of 
profound significance for the course of the country's trade. 
The change from the laissez -faire policy to state -aid 
centres round the Indian Industrial Commission and its report. 
During the war period the helplessness of India once imports 
from Europe began to dwindle came to be realised. This made 
her/ 
her turn to countries outside the Empire like Japan and the 
U.S.A. for such commodities as she needed and was not able 
to produce then. This, and the poverty and low standard of 
life of the masses in the country and consequent restlessness 
of the people, revealed the unsoundness of the Indian economic 
position and forced the hands of the rulers of the country 
to consider the position afresh. The government of Lord 
Hardinge, the then Viceroy of India, in its dispatch of the 
26th November, 1915, stated, "It is becoming increasingly 
clear that a definite and self -conscious policy of improving 
the industrial capabilities of India will have to be pursued 
after the war unless she is to become more and more a dumping 
ground for the manufactures of foreign nations who will be 
competing the more keenly for markets the more it becomes 
apparent that the political future of the larger nations de- 
pends on their economic position. After the war India will 
consider herself entitled to demand the utmost help which her 
government can afford to enable her to take her place, so far 
as circumstances permit, as a manufacturing country ". (quoted 
from "India Analysed ", Vol. II, p. 88). The Indian Industrial 
Commission was shortly after appointed and was "instructed to 
examine and report upon the possibilities of further industrial 
development in India ". 
The difficulty of obtaining stores for war and the urgent 
necessity to produce in India whatever could be produced for 
war purposes led in 1917 to the formation of the Indian 
Munitions Board. Its purpose was "to control and develop 
Indian/ 
Indian resources with special reference to the needs created 
by the war, to limit and co- ordinate demands for articles 
not manufactured or produced in India and to apply the manu- 
facturing resources of India to war purposes with the special 
object of reducing demands on shipping ". The Indian Munitions 
Board began to function while the Industrial Commission was 
sitting and its successful working helped the Commission to 
adopt two fundamental proposals in its Report, namely - 
"(1) That in future Government must play an active part in 
the industrial development of the country with the aim of 
making India more self- contained in respect of men and ma- 
terial, (2) that it is impossible for government to under- 
take that part unless provided with adequate administrative 
equipment and reliable scientific and technical advice ". 
(p. 208 "Progress and Condition of India, 1917-18 "). Thus 
the laissez -faire policy of the Government of India came to 
an end and even if only as a statement it is an important 
landmark. 
The developments which brought the free trade period 
to an end in India may now be considered. The Joint Select 
Committee on the Government of India Bill presented its re- 
port on the 17th November, 1919, and made the following ob- 
servation regarding fiscal Autonomy for India. "Nothing is 
more likely to endanger the good relations between India and 
Great Britain than a belief that India's fiscal policy is 
dictated from Whitehall in the interests of the trade of 
Great Britain/ 
Great Britain. That such a belief exists at the moment there 
can be no doubt. That there ought to be no room for it in 
the future is equally clear. India's position in the Imperial 
Conference opened the door to negotiation between India and 
the rest of the Empire but negotiation without power to legis- 
late is likely to remain ineffective. A satisfactory solution 
of the question can only be guaranteed by the grant of liberty 
to the Government of India to devise the tariff arrangement 
which seems best fitted to Indian needs as an integral portion 
of the British Empire ". Developments following this declara- 
tion led to the appointment of the Indian Fiscal Commission 
and the finding of the Commission was, to quote its words, 
"our conclusions, in the interests of 
the consumers generally and particularly of the masses of the 
people, in the interests of agriculture, in the interests of 
steady industrial progress, and for the maintenance of a 
favourable balance of trade, the policy of protection which 
we recommended should be applied with discrimination so as 
to make the inevitable burden on the community as light as 
is consistent with the due development of industries and to 
avoid abrupt disturbances of industrial and commercial con- 
ditions". (Para. 93, page 51, "Indian Fiscal Commission's 
Report, Cmd. 1764 of 1922 "). From all these developments 
it is clear that the Government of India was in the post -war 
period freer in the matter of regulating its revenue and pro- 
tection tariffs. The change in this position is very clearly 
reflected/ 
reflected by the fact that while the pre-war period, 1900 -14, 
was one of almost no tariff change, the post -war period was 
one of repeated and almost annual changes. From 1916 to 
1924 the changes, which were all in an upward direction, in 
Indian tariff rates were solely for Revenue purposes though 
a protective effect they inevitably must have had. After. 
1924 protection duties came also to be levied, and these came 
thick and fast. Partly this was due to the peculiar circum- 
stances of the times when competition became very severe and 
depreciation of currencies created the danger of exchange - 
dumping. The fact that a tariff board carefully sifted the 
evidence in every case of a claim for protection and that the 
Fiscal Commission laid down very careful principles on which 
alone the grant of protection to an industry should be given 
acted against the danger of a protectionist ramp. 
A protective duty is assumed to be successful the less 
revenue it brings into the coffers of the State. In the 
nature of the case Indian protective duties were planned to 
equalise the prices of indigenous and imported goods rather 
than to shut them out. For example "the rates of duty im- 
posed were intended to equalise the prices of imported steel 
and of similar Indian products ". (p. 9 "Review of the Trade 
of India, 1924 -25 "). The result of all these tariff changes 
is seen in the effect upon the customs revenue. The following 
table gives figures of retained imports, their value, and the 
Customs Revenue from them - 

















1913 -14 183 183 100 9.22 
1919 -20 190 101 206 14.6 
1920 -21 329 142 237 22.41 
1921 -22 266 124 214 26.91 
1922 -23 231 138 169 32.58 
1923 -24 224 120 190 30.97 
1924 -25 239 137 180 36.86 
1925 -26 225 147 158 38.40 
1926 -27 232 156 148 39.41 
1927 -28 252 181 136 39.86 
1928 -29 255 190 133 40.37 
1929 -30 242 189 128 40.33 
1930 -31 167 157 105 36.72 
(Figures compiled from the "Review of the Trade 
India ", 1913 -14 to 1930 -31). 
of 
In the table column 1 gives the actual declared value of 
retained imports in crores of Rupees, and column 2 gives the 
value in crores of Rupees of imports from 1919 -20 to 1930 -31 
in terms of the prices of 1913 -14. A conception is thus 
attained of the volume of the import trade. Column 3 gives 
the index numbers of the prices of imports and column 4 gives 
the customs 
the customs revenue from the import trade. The figures in 
column 2 show that the volume of the trade attained the 1913 -14 
level only in the three years from 1927 to 1930. As the 
duties levied were repeatedly raised and they were ad valorem 
duties it is easy to understand the rise of customs revenue, 
especially in the earlier years of the period. In the later 
years while the volume of trade increased prices tended to 
fall - a factor which should have tended to make the revenues 
from customs duties maintain themselves rather than increase. 
The actual increase in the customs duties during this period 
points to the facts of a widening of the range of dutiable 
goods, the grant of protection to new industries and the 
raising of the duties, and the change, which was a popular 
vogue them of converting ad valorem duties into specific ones. 
For example, in 1927 -8 with a volume of imports slightly less 
than that of 1913 -14 and import prices 365 more than in 1913 -14 
the customs revenue was 3255 greater than in 1913-14. The 
practical value of this survey lies in the fact that, if im- 
port goods had to bear this additional charge, it may be expected 
to have very definite effects on their consumption in the country 
and the volume of imports, and this fact has to be borne in 
mind when studying the course of the import trade. The actual 
tariff regulations will be considered in the course of the 
study of the main items of the import trade and need not be 
referred to here. 
II. Another economic feature of the post -War period 
in India of importance to the study of her trade was the rate 
of Exchange. It has been seen that under the international 
gold standard Rupee -exchange in the pre -war period, 1900 -14, 
was stable at 16d. and kept within the gold points throughout 
the Whole period except for a very brief lapse in November, 
1907. It was too much to expect that from the general upset 
of the War the Rupee exchange should come through unscathed. 
The ls. 4d. Ratio for the Rupee was decided upon under the 
shadow of the falling price of silver in 1892. In giving 
the Rupee the legal value of 16d. which was well above the 
value of the silver in it at the close of the 19th century, 
the Rupee was made safe against fall in of silver. 
During the War period silver rose in value. From a price of 
23d. per ounce in September, 1915, it rose steadily to 43d. 
per ounce in September, 1917. At 43d. per ounce the legal 
and the intrinsic value of the rupee coincided and the rupee 
could be said to become what is called good money. The ex- 
change value of the Rupee had to be raised to 17d. to protect 
the circulation. From 43d. per ounce in August, 1917, the 
price of silver rose to 58d. in May, 1919, and 78d. per ounce 
about the middle of December, 1919. At this period Indian 
currency practically approximated to the silver standard and 
with the rise in the value of silver the exchange value of 
the Rupee rose also. The rate of exchange in demand bills 
was 1/42d. in April, 1919, 1/84d. in May, 1/10 d. in 
August/ 
August, 2/011- -16d.. in September, 2/41d. in December. During 
the War period the dollar sterling exchange was pegged at 
4.7610%. When this control was ended in March, 1919, the 
depreciation of sterling in terms of the dollar was seen to 
be about 30 per cent. This depreciation came to be reflected 
in the rupee sterling exchange and what with the high price 
of silver, the Rupee exchange rate soared still higher. The 
exchange rate during the latter half of 1919 reflected (a) the 
rising price of silver, (b) the depreciation of sterling, (c) 
the favourable balance of trade of India, (d) the boom con- 
ditions prevailing then. The confusion prevailing was patent. 
The Secretary of State for India, however, appointed a Royal 
to examine the exchange conditions. 
The Committee commenced its sittings in May, 1919, and drew 
its report by the end of the year. Its two recommendations, 
published in February, 1920, and accepted by the Government 
of India, were (1) the linking of the Rupee to gold, not 
sterling, and (2) the Ratio of 2 Shillings gold for the Rupee. 
While this Committee was drafting its report, the British 
Government was accepting the policy of deflation laid down 
by the Cunliffe Committee. In February, 1920, the price of 
silver rose to 892 -d. and the rupee exchange could not but re- 
flect its legal value of 2 Shillings gold and the high price 
of silver and the depreciation of sterling in terms of gold. 
Thus exchange rose to as high as 2s. 10d. in February, 1920. 
Silver thereafter began to fall in value. It fell to 727d.. 
on the/ 
on the 1st April, 1920, 52d. in July, 1920 and 33., on the 
31st March, 1921. There appeared then the following features 
(1) a fall in the price of silver, (2) a general fall of prices, 
(3) the boom turned into a slump and the demand for Indian ex- 
ports fell off and the balance of trade became unfavourable 
to India. The 2/- gold rates for the Rupee having been accepted 
by Government had to be maintained. The demand for sterling 
consequent on the over -valuation of the Rupee in terms of it 
and the unfavourable balance of trade led to a large sale of 
reverse councils at the 2/_ gold rate. That Rate failing to 
be effective the Secretary of State changed it to 2/- sterling 
as from 24th June, 1920, the market value having fallen below 
this rate. It was continued until the 28th,December, 1920, 
and then the attempt to maintain the exchange rate was given 
up. Under the circumstances of falling prices an endeavour 
to make the 2/- gold or sterling rate effective would have 
necessitated a large contraction of currency which would have 
had disastrous repercussions on trade in India. Hence the 
contraction of currency had to be much less than the actual 
Rupee value of the reverse councils sold and this was also 
a fact which insured the defeat of the 2/- Ratio. Left to 
take its own course exchange fell to 1 /2sd.. sterling which 
was equivalent to under 1/- gold. in March, 1921. Below is 









































































































(Figures from the "Review of the Trade of India ") . 
(Average rate figures from the "Statistical Abstract from 
British Trade" 1921 -22 to 1930 -31, pp. 332 & 333). 
The years following the slump year, 1920, were years of 
good agriculture seasons. As a combined result of good Monsoons, 
favourable export trade, increased external demand for rupees, 
and contraction of currency, the exchange rate steadily rose 
to 1/4 gold in October, 1924. The extent to which contraction 
of currency was brought into operation to put up the exchange 
rate may be realised from the following figures. In 1920 -21 
the amount of contraction of currency was 3158 lakh, in 1921 -22 
it was/ 
it was 111 lakh and in 1922 -23 it was 569 lakh. All this had 
the effect of raising the exchange rate of the Rupee to 1/6 
sterling and 1/4 gold. When, in 1925, Great Britain returned 
to the gold standard 1/6 sterling became equivalent to 1/6 gold. 
It is strange that when most of the countries of the world had 
devaluated their currencies, some had repudiated it, and Great 
Britain returned to the pre -war parity, India alone of all 
countries in the world should appreciate the value of her money. 
It may be interesting, and perhaps relevant, in this connection 
to set down the following statement from page 21 of the Report 
on the conditions and prospects of British trade in India at 
the close of the war by His Majesty's Senior Trade Commissioner 
in India and Ceylon (Cmd. 442 of 1919) ". "The effect of the 
rise in exchange from 1/4 to 1/8 is automatically to reduce 
the local price of overseas imported goods expressed in rupees 
by 2070. This has been a great stimulus to the import trade 
particularly in the case of cotton piece goods where the dis- 
crepancy between Calcutta offers in rupees and Manchester 
quotations in sterling was frequently bridged by the exchange, 
and many orders -rere placed this spring which otherwise would 
not have gone through. High exchange also places the British 
maker in a more favourable position vis -a -vis his competitor 
in India. On the whole, therefore, his material interests 
would appear to be best served by the fixation of exchange at 
as high a rate as may be possible in the circumstances". The 
explanation given by the Finance member was that at the 1/6 
ratio/ 
ratio prices in India had adjusted themselves to world prices. 
It is not proposed here to enter into the controversy, which 
at that time was a bitter and acrimonious one, whether prices 
had adjusted themselves to that rate of exchange or not. The 
fact that a large contraction of currency at the expense of 
a high bank rate had to be gone through to put up the rate to 
1/6 in 1924, and a large contraction of currency subsequently 
had to be resorted to to correct the tendency to weakness in 
the exchange rate, points plainly to the fact that whatever 
the degree of adjustment attained when it was decided to make 
1/6 the rate of exchange it was not complete and needed a net 
contraction of note issue to the extent of 102.5 crores to 
correct the weakness of exchange during the period 1926 -7 to 
1930 -31. (Report of the Controller of Currency for 1930 -31, 
p. 14). The gold exchange standard is less automatic and 
fool -proof than a straight forward gold specie standard. 
This, combined with the fact that the currency authority in 
India then was the Government, makes it very difficult to 
differentiate between what is manipulation of currency and 
exchange and what legitimate intervention in discharge of its 
responsibility to maintain the integrity of the monetary unit 
set up by law. Under the circumstances it would be of more 
practical value to see how far the trade of India during the 
period was affected by and showed the influence in it of the 
variations in the rate of exchange. 
REVIEW OF THE POST- WAR PERIOD 1919 -1931. 
Course of Indian Trade 1919 -1931. 
Bearing in mind the features of the Post -war period of 
importance for trade, a study of the course of Indian foreign 
trade is now appropriate. The following table gives (1) 
figures of the actual value of imports and exports, and (2) 
the value of these calculated in terms of prices in 1913 -14. 
INDIAN IMPORTS. 
Year 
Value of Imports 
in crores of Rupees 
Value of imports 
in terms of 
1913 -14 prices 
Index Number of 
prices of Imports 
Volume of Imports 
1913 -14 183 183 100 
1919 -20 190 101 206 
1920 -21 317 142 237 
1921 -22 252 124 214 
1922 -23 217 138 169 
1923 -24 214 120 190 
1924 -25 233 137 180 
1925 -26 216 143 158 
1926 -27 223 156 148 
1927 -28 240 181 136 
1928 -29 246 190 133 
1929 -30 234 189 128 
1930 -31 160 157 105 
INDIAN EXPORTS. 
Year 
Value of Exports 
in crores of Rupees 
Volume of Exports Index Number of 
prices of Exports 
1913 -14 244 244 
100 
1919 -20 309 198 
158 
1920 -21 238 172 
140 
1921 -22 231 182 127 
1922 -23 299 214 140 
1923 -24 348 240 145 
1924 -25 384 250 154 
1925 -26 374 246 152 
1926 -27 301 228 132 
1927 -28 319 248 130 
1928 -29 330 260 127 
1929 -30 310 263 118 
1930 -31 220 235 94 
( "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 to 1931) . 
The features of the import and export trade revealed 
by these figures may be noted. The export trade shows earlier 
recovery and better health through the period than the import 
trade. The pre -war vale of exports was attained as early 
as 1922 -23 and exceeded in the years following, except for the 
years 1926 -7 and 1930 -31. The decline of actual value in 
1926 -7 was to the extent of 74 crores of which Raw Cotton and 
Manufactures accounted for 35 crores, falling by 24; in quantity 
and 38,,x/ 
and 38;.> in value. ( "Review of the Trade of 
India ") . Oil- 
seeds declined by 101 crores and Rice by 7 crores. 
It was, 
as will be seen from a glance at the index number of 
export 
prices, a year marked by a 20 point fall of the index number 
of export prices. The 1930 -31 decline in volume of the ex- 
port trade was also due to the fall of prices which in this 
case was far more spread out over the articles of the export 
trade. Except for these two years then the export trade 
showed quicker powers of recovery and greater strength. This 
was due to the influence of the following factors:- 
I. India was not injured by the War in the way in which 
the production economy of the belligerent states was. In 
the VJar brought a certain measure of prosperity to India 
though the production and export of some commodities, like 
Jute, was reduced. Hence recovery was beset with fewer 
difficulties in the case of India. The main produce and 
exports of India during the period were raw materials. The 
figures reveal that, during the post -war period and even in 
1913 -14, Indian exports of raw material in value were double 
India's exports of manufactured products. A set -back to 
her production of Raw material usually resulted from a failure 
of the rains. During the period under review serious failure 
of the Monsoon was very rare. There was a failure of the 
Monsoon in 1918 and a partial failure in 1920 and a Monsoon 
slightly below normal in 1928. On the whole the Post-war 
period was a remarkable run of successful agricultural seasons. 
So that/ 
So that on the production side the absence of interruption 
made conditions secure for a steadily expanding export trade, 
should the demand for them and the price to call out exports 
of them be ready to play their part. 
II. Other factors that made for an early recovery and 
strength of the Indian export trade were the following. The 
main exports were Raw Materials and in many of them, such as 
Jute, Lac, Rice, Sour Oilseeds, Tea, and Hides and Skins, 
India was in a strong position as a source of supply to the 
world market. The post -war period was one of increasing in- 
dustrialism. Industrial states were becoming more industrial, 
and new states were also turning to industrial production. 
This was a factor making for a strengthening of the demand 
for Indian Raw Material. The trade in Raw Material was less 
hampered by tariffs than the trade in Manufactured Goods, and 
that can definitely be regarded as a factor making for freer 
and fuller trade in them. The Indian export trade, moreover, 
was more widely and evenly distributed over the world than 
her import trade in which Europe had the overwhelming part 
and the United Kingdom had the lion's share of that, even if 
that share was a dwindling one. During the pre -war period 
the terms of exchange as between producers of Raw Material 
and Manufactured Goods was in favour of the former. In the 
post-war period the index number of prices of imports which 
are mainly Manufactured Goods and of exports which are mainly 
Raw Materials shows that the terms of exchange was in favour 
of the/ 
of the producers of Manufactured Goods. So far as the 
demand 
for Indian Raw Material was concerned this meant a strengthening 
of demand. On the supply side a lower price might have been 
expected to reduce the supply. But 70 of the huge population 
of India were tied to agriculture with no chance of an alter- 
native occupation. A position like that could not be expected 
to reduce the output of Raw T,laterial produce even if prices 
fell. There may be a shift of agricultural production, as, 
for example, from the production of a commodity particularly 
depressed in price to one not so depressed. This happened 
during the period in the case of oilseeds when groundnuts were 
increasingly sown and the area under the cultivation of linseed 
or sesamum was stagnant or declined. On the whole the total 
net area sown with crops in British India increased from 223 
million acres in 1921 -22 to 229 million acres in 1930 -31. 
(Statistical Abstract for British India, pp. 430 & 431,for the 
period). It has to be remembered that 1930 -31 was a depression 
year. These are briefly the factors that made for an early 
recovery and general strength of the export trade. 
To take up now a brief survey of the course of the Indian 
export trade. 1919 -20 was the first year after the end of 
the War. It was a boom year, prices were rising. The easing 
of war -time prohibitions and controls led to a high export 
trade. Indian exports increased monthly from 221 crores in 
April, 1919, to the record figure of 311 crores in March, 1920. 
Thus "trade boomed in spite of Railway and Cable congestion 
and of/ 
and of the inevitable reaction of high prices, 
labour diffi- 
culties, fluctuating rates of exchange and continuance 
of 
Government control over the trade in such important foodstuffs 
as wheat and rice ". ( "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20, 
p. 1). The rate of the Rupee exchange during the year rose 
from 1/61. in April, 1919, by steps to 2 /10Ád. on the 11th 
February, 1920, and fell to 2/3$d.. at the end of March". 
( "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20, p. 35). The steady 
increase of the quantity of the export trade month by month 
during the year makes it clear that the strong demand for 
Indian exports in world markets, expressing itself in rising 
prices, was able to override any weakness that the rising rate 
of exchange might otherwise have caused in the export trade. 
Thus even the abnormal rise in the rate of sterling did not 
leave any impression on the export trade which, theoretically, 
it might be expected to have done. According to the "Review 
of the Trade of India" for the year, the volume of exports 
increased by 224 and their prices by over the previous year. 
1920 -21 revealed that there was no stability in the pre- 
vailing boom. Deflation and falling prices were the rule 
right from the beginning of the year. The following index 
numbers of the general prices of the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., 
and Japan show that clearly. 
U.K. U.S.A. Japan 
Statist Bradstreet Oriental 
Economist 
1st April, 1920 261.8 20.87 
If 317.5 
1st March, 1921 183 11.86 219.4 
1st Dec. 
1920, 
( "Review of the Trade of India" 1920 -21, p. 1) . 
The exchange rate fell, according to the chart of the 
"Review of the Trade of India" for 1920- 21.(p. 39), from 2/3d. 
in April, 1920, to 1 /4d. in March, 1921. The weakness of 
the export trade became early apparent. The export trade 
which had touched the record figure of 31ti crores in March, 
1920, fell to 28" crores in April snd steadily declined till 
it was 18 crores in March, 1921. The features in the situ- 
ation contributing to this decline were (1) that prices and 
exchange were falling and in a falling market no one would 
like to buy except for in ediate needs. The large exports 
of the previous year had stocked foreign markets well with 
Indian goods and they could afford to wait. (2) Taxation 
was everywhere high, financial stringency prevailed, foreign 
exchanges were capricious and unrest was beginning seriously 
to affect the world's industries. (3) Russia and Central 
Europe were still out of the market and India had lost in 
them some of her principal customers. (4) It was a year 
of poor harvests in India and the embargo on the export of 
food grains had to be continued. The net result was that 
the balance of trade in the year was unfavourable to India 
to the/ 
to the extent of 79 crores. In the previous year exports 
exceeded imports by 126 crores. 
1921 -22 was a year of unrelieved depression. Two factors 
which seemingly hampered business throughout the year were the 
falling tendency of prices and the instability of exchange. 
Thus exports of merchandise fell from 238 crores in the pre- 
vious year to 231 in 1921 -22. With 1922 -23 began the revival 
of the Indian export trade. The value of exports jumped up 
from 231 crores in 1921 -22 to 299 crores in 1922 -23. This 
was the result of good harvests in India and the fact that 
most European countries showed notable improvement in practi- 
cally all branches of industrial and commercial activity'. 
The removal of the embargo on the export of food grains con- 
tributed effectively to the increase of the export trade. 
The recovery in the export trade inaugurated in the previous 
year was continued in 1923 -24 with good harvests in India 
and a steady advance towards stable economic conditions in 
Europe. The export trade advanced from 299 crores during 
1922 -23 to 348 crores during 1923 -24. Progress towards 
stabilization was the keynote of the Economic history of 1924- 
25 in Europe. The following table shows the effect of in- 
creasing stabilization of currencies and exchange in Europe 
on its trade:- 
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 
Foreign trade 
index 100 105.5 123.8 129.5 130.2 144.8 
Currency 
fluctuations index 13.2 10.7 2.6 1.4 1.6 0.9 
(quoted from Monetary Stability Supplement Economist, 
p. 2, November 10, 1928). 
With a good Monsoon the export trade of India grew from 348 
crores in 1923 -24 to 384 crores in 1924 -25 and this with. the 
Rupee exchange steadily rising from near 1 /4a-d. in April, 1924 
to 1/6 in March, 1925. If the rate of exchange was a major 
factor determining trade it would be expected that the export 
trade would show some weakness this year. It is clear, however, 
that what influence towards weakness of the export trade the 
rising exchange rate may be expected to impart, the effect is 
not perceptible because of the influences of strength of demand 
and the security given by stable price levels. Of course, in 
the light of the violent fluctuations of exchange in the immediate 
past, the fluctuation of this year was certainly mild. The 
trend of 1925 -26 was that of a slight tendency to falling prices. 
The following index numbers bear that out: - 
U.K. Japan U.S.A. India 
Statist Bank of Bradstreet Calcutta 
Japan 
April, 1925 137.5 266.9 13.3 164 
March, 1926 126.1 243.9 13.1 151 
In spite then of good harvests and strength of demand 
the value/ 
the value of the exports of merchandise in 1925 -26 
fell by 10 
crores from 384 to 374 crores. The trend of falling 
general 
prices continued in operation during 1926 -27. 
U.K. Japan U.S.A. India 
Statist Bank of Bradstreet Calcutta 
Japan 
April 1926 125.5 238.9 12.9 149 
March 1927 123.6 226.6 12.5 146 
The coal strike in the United Kingdom caused a rise in 
the freight rates during the year. The economist index 
number of Whole Cargo Charter Rates was 122 in March, 1927. 
The fall in prices which was general during this year was 
the result of the return to gold. If returning to the pre- 
war parity, as in the case of the United Kingdom, necessitated 
deflation, then the return to a rate higher than pre -war in 
the case of India necessitated deflation even more so and the 
weakness of exchange in this year pointed the necessity of 
deflation to keep it up. Thus during 1927-28 the export 
trade increased by 18 crores and freight rates showed a dis- 
tinct tendency to fall. This year, 1928 -29, was one of 
prosperity, though, with increasing stabilization of currencies, 
there was a tendency to a downward movement of prices. In 
India the Calcutta index number of wholesale prices was 146 
in April, 1928, and fell to 143 in March, 1929. The export 
trade, however, advanced from 319 to 330 crores during this 
year./ 
year. It was a year in India of labour strikes and unrest. 
During 1929 -30 the export trade declined by 20 crores of 
Rupees. The fall in prices began from October, 1929, and 
the decline of the prices of India's staple exports was 
pronounced. Between September, 1929, and April, 1931, the 
fall of prices in these was very serious amounting to 37 in 
the case of India's exported commodities. Thus between 1928- 
29 and 1930 -31 the value of the export trade declined by a 
third. 
Looking at the values, the volume and the index number 
of prices of imports, certain factors stand out quite clearly. 
Unlike the export trade the import trade has been slower in 
recovery and has shown less strength. It was only in 1927 -8 
that it regained the volume of 1913 -14. The explanation of 
this disparity between the trends of the import and export 
trades lay in the higher prices of imports compared to what 
India got for her exports. The following table shows the 
extent to which prices of imports were higher than that of 
exports during the period. 
INDEX NUYBERS OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS. 
1913 -14 
1919 -20 







1920 -21 237 140 97 
1921 -22 214 127 87 
1922 -23 169 140 29 
(Continued) 
INDEX NUMBERS OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (Cont.). 
Imports Exports Difference 
1923 -24 190 145 45 
1924 -25 180 154 26 
1925 -26 158 152 6 
1926 -27 148 132 16 
1927 -28 136 130 6 
1928 -29 133 127 6 
1929 -30 128 118 10 
1930 -31 105 94 11 
It was only in the latter part of the period when the 
index number of prices of imports came down and considerably 
bridged the gulf between them and the index number of export 
prices that the volume of the import trade got back to its 
pre -war level. The general lack of resistance and elasticity 
shown by the import trade is to be attributed to the effect 
of rising Revenue and Protective tariffs that was a feature, 
the former of the whole period and the latter after 1924. 
Looking at the course of the import trade it will be seen 
that it took time to gather strength compared withthe export 
trade. Industry had to get back to some sort of peace -time 
basis to be able to execute orders. In spite then of the 
boom in trade the import trade did not in 1919 -20 show the 
advance of the export trade. The time lag between the placing 
of an order by an importer and the execution of it and its 
arrival in India has been referred to thus by the "Review of 
the Trade/ 
the Trade of India" 1920 -21. - "Trade 
return of imports are 
invariably out of date as a record 
of business transactions, 
for, even in normal years, they 
indicate values on arrival 
in fulfilment of orders placed three, six, 
or even (in the 
case of IIachinery)twelve months earlier." Thus 
with soaring 
exchange and prices and a boom which expressed itself in an 
inordinate amount of company flotation - 906 companies with 
an aggregate authorised capital of 275 crores were registered 
in British India and Mysore as against 290 companies with a 
capital of 21 crores in the preceding year - the import trade 
had to wait till the next year to show the effects of it when 
it rose to the value of 317 crores. This abnormal importation 
was partly due to the fact that India during the war period 
was starved of the Manufactured goods that she needed, especially 
producers' goods. The boom and the high rate of exchange 
materially assisted to swell the import trade. The high prices 
of these goods would normally have acted as a check to the 
import trade if it was not for the fact that the high exchange 
value of the Rupee and the sale of reverse councils helped 
importers to get sterling very cheap. 
Another factor that tended to stimulate the import trade 
during 1920 is referred to thus - "A special feature of the 
later years of the war and of subsequent years also was the 
insistence of Exchange Banks in India on the production of 
cover, at first as a condition of financing export trade, 
later to financing imports. The insistence on cover for 
export/ 
export bills during 1917 and 1918 is a point of special importance 
to the present survey for it encouraged export firms to take up 
import business in order that they might be able to provide the 
necessary cover themselves and thus avoid the premium demanded 
for cover in the open market. This development undoubtedly 
stimulated the demand for foreign goods and the import business, 
once engaged in, was retained by many firms and must have helped 
to swell the volume of orders for foreign goods during 1920 ". 
("Review of the Trade of India" 1920 -21, p. 39) . The slump 
setting in during the year, imports steadily declined for the 
next three years and it was only in 1924 -25 that the import 
trade began to recover. This recovery was the combined result 
of the rise in the exchange rate in that year, the rise of the 
prices of exported goods and the progress of stabilization in 
Europe and increasing production and trade. The import trade 
again had a set -back as the result of the coal strike but it 
recovered thereafter and had a period of a mild prosperity 
till it got completely enveloped in the depression subsequent 
to 1929. In 1930 -31 the value of imports declined to 160 
crore s . 
REVIEW OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD 1919 -1931. 
D Distribution of India's import and export trade. 
The distribution of the import and export trade of India 
may now be considered. The following table gives the shares 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The outstanding feature of this table is the steady de- 
cline of the share of the United Kingdom in the Indian import 
trade. This is quite contrary to what happened in the pre- 
War period when with expanding import trade the United Kingdom 
was able to maintain her share of the import trade at 64% of 
total imports. The decline in the British share of the Indian 
import trade is broadly a reflection of the weakness shown 
during this period of the British export trade as a whole. 
The following figures bear evidence to that fact. 
Values of 
Total British Export trade 
as of 1924 = 100 
Values of 
British Export of articles 
wholly or mainly 
manufactured. 
1924 100 100 
1925 97.3 98.2 
1926 91.7 92.8 
1927 86.5 87.3 
1928 86.3 86.7 
1929 84.1 84.8 
1930 80.3 81.2 
1931 71.8 72.3 
(quoted from Macrosty - "The Overseas Trade of the 
United Kingdom 1924 -31" p. 610 J.R.SS Part IV. 1932). 
This decline in British Export trade is to a great extent 
accounted for by the following Figures of average values of 
Raw Materials and Manufactures 1924 -31. 
cLt,r_ 
R,, antije, z 4 s I 
--- --- --_ - 
C 
osxó * !. r-. - : . - ::.ñs0i' -vLSLt1. tiC -{í ï--ü1' v .a- as-' 
1924 = 100 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 
Retained imports of 
Raw Materials 96.8 81.9 76.2 81.8 78.1 64.9 48.1 
Retained imports of 
Manufactures 96.5 91.1 86.7 84.6 84.5 78.5 66.6 
British Exports of 
Manufactures 98.2 92.8 87.3 86.7 84.5 81.2 72.3 
gd (p. 615) . 
"Thus the fall in food prices has greatly reduced the 
cost of living from 75 over 1914 in 1924, to 64ïß in 1929, 
and to 48ó at the end of 1931 The average level 
of the Rates of wages in 1926 and up to 1930 was from 70 to 
75ó above that of July, 1913 ". (Macrosty, p. 616). Ibid. 
The conditions suggested by these figures is that a lack 
of adjustment of wages to prices was a serious cause of dis- 
equalization and weakness in the export trade. "Our wages 
whilst comparing unfavourably with those in the U.S.A 
were much higher than those paid by any of our chief European 
competitors". (Macmillan Committee report p. 53) . This 
was serious because the years after 1925 representing the 
second phase of recovery from war dislocation were marked 
by the growth of production, trade and general material well- 
being in the U.S.A., Germany, and Japan in particular and in 
certain other countries, and by rapid technological advance 
in agriculture and in some few manufacturing industries such 
as wireless/ 
as wireless apparatus, electrical goods, automobiles, and 
artificial silk. In the U.S.A. "industry has been highly 
rationalized and the use of power and labour- saving machinery 
has made possible a large increase in production with a smaller 
number of workers in employment. For example, between 1919 
and 1929 production rose by 42,' whereas the number of wage - 
earners was reduced by 6jß ". (Joliffe "The U.S.A. as a Finan- 
cial Centre" 1919 -1933 p. 1). "In Japan between 1929 and 1930 
the proportion of the Japanese population engaged in industry 
actually declined from 19.1 to 18.4 The general index of 
of industrial production rose between 1920 and 1930 by 39;x'.' 
(p. 168 "Eastern industrialism and its effects on the West 
with special reference to Great Britain and Japan" by G.F. 
Hubbard). Similarly in the case of Germany (see "Britain 
and World Trade" Loveday, p. 95). Great Britain was handi- 
capped in many ways from sharing similar development. The 
return to the gold standard and the general strike of 1926, 
and the rigidity of wages all were handicaps in a world more 
strongly and severely competitive than the pre-war period. 
"Had the pound been stabilized in 1925 at a lower figure it 
would have removed one initial handicap ". (p. 42 "The Gold 
Standard and its Future" T.E. Gregory). As against the 
industrial and other progress of the U.S.A., Germany, and 
Japan, that of the United Kingdom was comparatively small. 
The table below gives the index numbers of industrial pro- 
duction in the United Kingdom. 
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION. 
Board of Trade 1924 = 100. 
1924 = 100 
1927 = 107 
1928 = 106 
1929 = 112 
1930 = 103 
(quoted from G.D.H. Cole "British Trade and Industry 
Past and Future" p. 202). 
In the latter part of the post -war period then the com- 
petition_ engendered was severe and Britain' s competitors in 
the Indian market were able to help themselves to some of her 
share of the import trade. "It seems generally agreed that 
an increased choice of all classes of goods has become open 
to the overseas purchasers and that the field of effective 
competition has broadened in most classes of goods so that 
traditional business connections of a semi -monopolistic kind 
have lost much of their. value. The offer of alternative 
choices affected Britain more than most other countries. 
The British Economic Missions have found in most of the 
markets they examined that high price is the chief difficulty 
facing British Expansion ". (p. 526 "Britain's Access to 
Overseas Markets "Economic Journal" December, 1932, R.B. 
Forrester). 
The advance of the shares of the U.S.A., Japan and Germany, 
and Belgium, in the import trade of India has been mainly at 
the expense/ 
the expense of the United Kingdom. Another point to notice 
in this connection is that Great Britain stood in one respect 
in a very vulnerable position with regard to her share in the 
import trade. That was, that, while India exports more to 
all other countries individually than she imports from them, 
it is only in the case of the United Kingdom that she imports 
more than she exports. 
To conclude, the general trend of Great Britain's export 
trade during the post -war period up to the period considered 
here - 1931 - was one of stagnation if not decline. The 
proportion of the decline over the various areas is given in 
the following table. 
PROPORTION OF TOTAL II PORTS OBTAINED FROM TLE UNITED KINGDOM. 
1913 1925 1927 1928 
0 70 
Europe 8.4 9.2 8.1 7.7 
North America 16.8 11.2 10.3 10.1 
South America 27.9 21.2 18.7 18.8 
Africa 36.7 34.6 32.9 31.3 
Asia 31.5 19.9 18.6 18.9 
Oceania 53.4 46 43.2 44.4 
World 14.5 13.3 12.1 11.7 
(Loved.ay "Britain and World Trade" p. 150) . 
"The figures render it abundantly clear that our loss of 
status has been greatest in the American Continent and Asia 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































So far as the export trade of India was concerned the Dis- 
tribution of that trade more or less approximated to the pre -war 
position. Great Britain maintained her share of the trade ex- 
cept for abnormal years. This was partly due to a conscious 
desire to maintain the trade and prevent it from dwindling in 
view of her much greater share of the import trade of India. 
The tables showing the distribution of India's Export and Import 
trade exemplify very well the fact that in the matter of trade 
like repels like and unlike attracts unlike. 
The industrialised states together account for 65 to 70 
of India's exports just as they account for a like percentage 
of her imports. 
CHAPTER IX. 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CHIEF ITEMS OF THE EXPORT AND IMPORT 
TRADE IN MERCHANDISE, 1919 -1931. 
In the survey of the items of the Export and Import 
trade during the Pre -war period, 1900 -1914, "a standard of 
value" of one crore of rupees was set up as entitling an ex- 
port or import commodity to notice as an individual item of 
trade. If that is adhered to for the Post -war period, 1919- 
1931, then the chief items of the Export and Import trade are 
the following : - 
MERCHA NDISE EXPORTS. 
1. Cotton Raw. 
2. Cotton Manufactures. 
3. Raw Jute. 
4. Jute Manufactures. 
5. Seeds. 
6. Raw Hides & Skins. 
7. Tanned Hides & Skins. 
8. Tea. 
9. Grain, pulse & flour. 
10. Lac. 




14. Paraffin wax. 
15. Coffee. 
MERCHANDISE IMPORTS. 
1. Cotton Manufactures. 
2. Sugar. 




7. Machinery & Millwork. 
8. Silk Manufactures. 
9. Hardware. 
10. Motor cars & cycles, etc. 
11. Liquors. 
12. Provisions & Oil man 
stores. 
13. Paper & pasteboard. 
14. Spices. 
15. Instruments, apparatus, 
& appliances. 
16. Manures. 16. Salt. 
17. Fodder, bran & Pollards. 17. Tobacco. 
18. Wool Raw. 18. Fruits and vegetables. 
19. Dyes. 
20. Drugs and medicines. 
21. Woollen Manufactures. 
22. Rubber Raw & Manufactured. 
23. Chemicals. 
24. Apparel. 
25. Paints & Painting Materials. 
26. Building & engineering 
materials. 
27. Soap. 
28. Glass & Glassware. 
It will be seen from a survey of the items of the Merchandise 
import and export trade, that in character it is the same as 
the Pre -war trade. That need cause no surprise. Economic 
developments move slowly and take time to show themselves out. 
Industrial development in a comparatively accentuated form 
there undoubtedly was in India from the war period. What, 
however, prevented it from showing itself in the export trade, 
or in the import trade by stanching the stream of imports of 
certain kinds, is the size of the country and the big market 
for goods that it represents. The home market normally would 
be the chief objective of the industrial producer in India. 
At the start, the industrial producer would perhaps be able 
to cater to it only partially and consequently no spectacular 
change/ 
change would be made in the export or in the import trade. 
One condition laid down by the fiscal commission about the 
grant of protection to any industry in India wa.s that it had 
a large home market. Again, the fact, that, during the Post,. 
war period such protection as was given to Indian industries 
was intended to equalise prices and not to shut out imports, 
points to the fact that Indian industrial production, while 
certainly developing, was not expected to supply all the needs 
of the home market. The fact of India having a large home 
market and Japan not having one is one element, among other 
things, of the differentia which worked for Japan making a 
spectacular entry into the export trade in certain goods while 
India. did not. 
While then there was no change in the character of the 
Indian import and export trade in merchandise between the 
pre -war, 1900 -1914, and post -war, 1919 -1931, periods, there 
are certain differences which may be noted. It will be seen 
that, compared to the pre -war period, there are in the post- 
war more items both in the import and export trade. Part of 
the explanation of this, perhaps the chief one, is the rise 
in prices during the war and post -war periods. On the other 
hand the standard of one crore of rupees has been continued 
even during the post -war period as the qualification entitling 
an item of trade to recognition in this study. The result 
has been that 33 commodities in the export trade and 42 in the 
import trade touched the one crore value. On the other hand 
all of them/ 
all of them were not able to maintain themselves at the velue 
of one crore in the trade. The fell in prices during the 
post -war period weeded out some, and thus commodities that, 
even with the fall in prices, were able to maintain themselves 
at a value of one crore number 17 in the export trade and 28 
in the import trade and this more or less approximates to the 
trade position as it was in 1913 -14. 
THE CHIEF ITEMS OF THE EXPORT TRADE IN MERCHANDISE, 1919 -31. 
I Raw Cotton. 
In the consideration of the main items of the Export 
trade in merchandise the start may be made with Raw Cotton. 
The following table gives the figures of the value in crores 
of rupees of Raw Cotton Exports and the 5 of these values in 
the total Export trade in Merchandise. That should help to 
an understanding of the importance of Raw Cotton in the Indian 
Export trade in merchandise. In the production of the `lorldls 
supply of this commodity India approximately accounted for 20 
The U.S.A. by its supply of about 60 dominated the Cotton 
market. 
Value of Cotton Exports 
in crores of Rupees. 
of these Values 
to the total 
Exports of Merchandise. 
1913 -14 41 crores 17% 
1919 -20 59 19 
1920 -21 41.62 17 
1921 -22 53.96 23 
1922 -23 71 27 
1923 -24 98 28 
1924 -25 91 24 
1925 -26 95 25 
1926 -27 58.60 19.62 
1927-28 47.72 15.09 
1928 -29 66.25 20.2 
1929 -30 65.08 21.1 
1930 -31 46.33 21.19 
Pre -war average 33.27 
Post-war average ) 
1918 -19 to 1930 -31) 64.73 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" for the period). 
A glance at the table shows that Raw Cotton has been a 
source of strength to the Export trade in merchandise in as much 
as the value of the average annual post -war exports of it has 
been almost double that of the pre -war average. This striking 
increase of value has been, it will be seen, contributed to by 
higher prices and larger exports. Cotton prices throughout the 
post -war period were higher than those of the pre -war year, 1913 -14, 
and generally export quantities have also been larger. The 
following table gives the figures of (1) the seasonts average 
spot prices of Indian cotton No. 1 Fine Oomrah - pence per lb. 
(2) the quantities in Bales of cotton exports. 
36 y 
Season's average 
spot prices in Liverpool 
of Indian Cotton 
No. 1 Fine Oomrah. 
in pence per lb. 
Exports of Raw Cotton 
in 
Bales of 400 lbs. 
1913 -11 5.88 2,975,000 
1919 -20 19.23 2,398,600 
1920 -21 9.20 2,074,000 
1921 -22 9.60 2,989,000 
1922 -23 11.14 3,362,000 
1923 -24 13.35 3,764,000 
1924 -25 11.95 3,326,000 
1925 -26 8.97 4,173,000 
1926 -27 7.18 3,188,000 
1927 -28 9.21 2,686,000 
1928 -29 8.03 3,712,000 
1929 -30 6.39 4,070,000 
1930 -31 4.02 3,926,000 
(source:- page 235, "The (source:- "Review of 
Marketing of Cotton" the Trade of India" 
J.A. Todd). 1919 -1931). 
The factors determining the export trade of India in 
Raw Cotton have been dealt with already in considering the 
Indian cotton exports of t }e Pre -war period. It was stated 
there that the Indian export trade in Raw Cotton is a product 
of the relation of the positions of Indian cotton supply to 
Indian demand and world supply to world demand. Generally it 
may be said that, other things remaining the same, the lower 
the percentage that the price of Indian cotton bore to middling 
American the greater would be the tendency to substitute Indian 
cotton/ 
cotton for American and vice- versa. 
How this principle worked itself out during the period 
may be seen from particular instances. The "Review of the 
Trade of India" for 1929 -30 has the following on page 76 - 
"the home demand for the cotton crop of 1928 -9 was very mode- 
rate owing to the severe slump in the cotton mill industry. 
This depressed the price of Indian cotton and the parity 
throughout the year was turning more and more in favour of 
Indian cotton as against American cotton. This naturally 
led to an increase in the exports of Raw cotton in the year 
under review as compared with the preceding two years. Ex- 
ports in 1929 -30 amounted to 4,070,000 Bales as compared with 
3,712,000 Bales in 1928 -29 and 2,686,000 Bales in 1927 -28, an 
increase of 358,000 Bales over 1928 -29 and of 1,384,000 Bales 
over 1927 -28 ". As an example of a position very different, 
the export trade of 1924 -25 may be considered. The Indian 
cotton crop of that year was bigger than that of the previous 
year by little more than 400,000 Bales. The "Review of the 
Trade of India" for 1924 -25 says "Indian prices fell in sym- 
pathy with American, as usual, but the Bombay market neither 
followed the American market in its rapid fluctuations nor 
did Indian cotton fall proportionately so much as American. 
This lessening of the margin between American and Indian cotton 
combined with the heavy fall in the former led to a much re- 
duced demand from the Continent for Indian cotton ". p. 21. 
The following table helps to make concrete the position 
in the cases cited. 
INDIAN - AMERICAN PRICE RATIOS. 
Monthly Average Prices of Indian Oomrah Cotton in % of 
American Middling Cotton at Liverpool. 
1924 -25. 1929 -30. 
April 75.5 74.8 
May 74.3 74 .3 
June 7 6.2 75.1 
July 75.3 75.3 
August 77.3 74 .7 
September 82.3 75.1 
October 88.8 74.7 
November 94.6 73.9 
December 95.1 74.5 
January 91.2 72.7 
February 89.2 69.6 
March 88.3 67.5 
(source:- "Cotton goes to Market" 
A.L. Garside, p. 398) . 
The following table gives the figures of the Indian 
cotton crop and the quantity of cotton exports and the 






Season's Average Price 
in pence per lb. 
of cotton in Liverpool. 
Indian. American. 
1919 -20 5,845,000 2,398,600 19.23 25.31 
1920 -21 3,600,000 2,074,000 9.20 11.89 
1921 -22 4,485,000 2,989,000 9.60 11.37 
1922 -23 5,073,000 3,362,000 11.14 14.92 
1923 -24 5,161,000 3,764,000 13.3.5 17.66 
1924 -25 6,072,000 3,326,000 11.5 13.76 
1925.26 6,250,000 4,173,000 8.97 10.77 
1926 -27 5,024,000 3,188,000 7.18 8.15 
1927 -28 5,963,000 2,686,000 9.21 11.17 
1928 -29 5,782,000 3,7 12,000 8.03 10.52 
1929 -30 5,260,000 4,070,000 6,39 9.09 
1930 -31 4,822,000 3,926,000 4.62 5.71 
(source:- "Review of the Trade 
of India "). 
(source:- J.A. Todd, 
"The Marketing of Cotton" 
p. 235). 
This table points to certain features that may be taken stock 
of. One of these is the relation of Raw Cotton Exports to 
production. While generally exports vary directly with pro- 
duction, there are enough exceptions in the table to make 
definite that the quantity of the production is not the sole 
factor determining export. Hence it also shows that even . 
when production and export very directly they do not do so to 
the same degree. The cotton market is a unified and a very 
sensitive market largely as the result of (1) the wide demand 
for cotton/ 
for cotton, (2) the ease with which - meaning the low cost at 
which - it can be transported across long distances, (3) the 
fact of the growth of spindleage, not specialised to working 
solely in any particular variety of cotton. That being so 
generally prices of American and Indian cotton move in the 
same direction if not to the same degree. The table of prices 
set down makes that abundantly clear. The table reveals one 
year, 1921 -22, when while the season's average price of Middling 
American fell that of Indian rose. The explanation of this 
lies in the fact that the year was a slump year so far as the 
United. Kingdom and the U.S.A. were concerned. It was not as 
much of a slump year in Japan and China, the main consumers 
of Indian cotton. It was also a year of short cotton crops. 
The "Review of the Trade of India" for 1921 -22 says "Japan 
is always the principal consumer of Indian cotton and in the 
year under review 1,760,000 bales went to that destination 
compared with 939,000 in 1920 -21 ". Again "1921 -22 was a bad 
season for the Chinese cotton crop owing to adverse climatic 
condition consequently China increased her purchases 
of Indian cotton from 192,000 bales in 1920 -21 to 435,000 bales 
in 1921-22". (p. 15) . 
Speaking generally of the cotton position in the post -war 
period,it may be said that the period 1919 to 1923 was one of 
shortage of supply. The following index numbers of world 











source:- "Economist", p. 
September 15, 1923. 
390, 
If the demand during this period had been normal the price 
of cotton should have risen, but general slump conditions led 
to a fall of cotton prices. The decline in exports of Indian 
cotton in 1920 -21 was the combined result of a short crop and 
the crisis in Japan. The recovery from the slump began from 
1922 -23. Indian cotton export values for the period 1922 -23 
and 1925 -26 are a significant index to it. The annual export 
values for the years were 71 crores, 98 crores, 91 crores End 
95 crores. Right up to 1924 the U.S.A. had a run of short crops 
but after that date she began turning out large crops and the 
relative world production and consumption position in cotton was 
as follows:- 
Average price of 
World production. World consumption. Middle American. 
Million bales of Million bales of New York cents. 
500 lbs. 500 lbs. 
1924 20.3 20.4 31.1 
1925 25.6 23.3 24.8 
1926 28.7 24.7 20.6 
1927 29.2 26.1 15.2 
1928 24.8 25.5 20.4 
1929 27.2 25.8 19.7 
1930 27.1 25.2 16.6 
1931 26.2 22.4 10.4 
(source : - "Economist" p. 771, October 29, 1932). 
The average annual rate of increase in cotton production 
for the period. 1923 -28 is given as being 0.8 and the rate of 
increase in production of 1929 over 1928 as 8.2. (p. 2, 
"Review of the Trade of India" 1930 -31). Hence with the de- 
pression setting in in 1929 cotton prices fell heavily. Be- 
tween September, 1929, and March, 1931, the price of cotton 
in India fell by 36g. (p. 7, "Review of the Trade of India" 
1930 -31). 
Indian cotton exports went, during the period, mainly to 
Japan and to a lesser extent to almost every country of Europe. 
The Japanese demand was a steady and consistent one throughout 
the period except for a decline in 1920 -21 and in 1927 -28 on 
account of an internal crisis. 
II The Export Trade in Cotton Manufactures. 
The figures of the values of exports of cotton 
manufactures and the wholesale price index number of cotton 
manufactures in India during the period are given below to 
show the strength of the trade in this commodity:- 
Pre -war 
Total Value of 
Cotton Manufactured 
Exports. 
Index Number of 
Cotton Manufactures 
prices wholesale in 
India. 
average 11.4 crores 
War 
average 11.72 1914 (end of 100 
July) . 
1919-20 27.4 1919 295 
1920 -21 18.27 1920 325 
1921 -22 15.65 1921 280 
1922 -23 13.06 1922 239 
1923 -24 10.95 1923 221 
1924 -25 11.27 1924 229 
1925 -26 9.65 1925 210 
1926 -27 10.75 1926 173 
1927 -28 8.67 1927 159 
1928 -29 7.80 1928 159 
1929 -30 7.19 1929 160 
1930 -31 5.22 1930 125 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
The table makes it clear that right through the period 
the export trade in cotton manufactures steadily declined. 
Part of this decline was due to the steady fall of prices 
during the period. How much of the decline was due to a 
diminishing of the volume of the exports ramains to be seen. 
To take up just the export trade in cotton yarn. The 
following table gives the figures of (a) the total production 
of cotton yarn by Indian mills, (b) the quantity exported, and 
(c) the value of these exports : - 
Indian Mill production 
of cotton yarn 
in Million lbs. 
Exports Value of exports 
of cotton yarn of cotton yarn, 
in Million lbs. crores of Rupees. 
1913-14 683 198 pre-war 
average 
9.13 
1919-20 636 152 18.25 
1920-21 660 83 10.17 
1921-22 692 81 7.71 
1922-23 706 57 5.47 
1923-24 617 38,;- 3.66 
1924-25 719 361 3.70 
1925-26 687 32 2.93 
1926-27 807 411, 3.08 
1927-28 809 23ç 1.88 
1928-29 648 24 1.96 
1929-30 834 24.6 1.90 
1930-31 867 23.5 1.58 
The export trade in cotton yarn has, during the period, 
steadily declined from 200 Million lbs. in 1913 -14 to 23.5 
Million lbs., that is one- eighth of that of the last pre -war 
year. This decline was due to the steady decline of exports 
to China, and the following table gives the figures in Millions 
of lbs. of yarn exports to China and Hong Kong. 
Pre -war average 170 Million lbs. 
1919 -20 126 
1920 -21 63 
1921 -22 62 
1922 -23 41 
1923 -24 20 
1924 -25 
1925 -26 




1928 -29 1.8 
1929 -30 .8 
1930 -31 .9 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 
Table exports of twists and yarn, 
1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
This steady decline of China's takings of Indian yarn 
was the result of the advance during the period of yarn 
spinning in China and the fact of China increasingly supply- 
ing her own needs in the matter of the low counts of yarn 
that she used to import from India. Imports of Indian yarn 
into China were all of the low counts, between 1 & 20. 
The following figures of imports of yarn into China and 
China's production of yarn explain the decline of the Indian 
cotton yarn export trade to China. 
Imports of yarn _into China. China's production of yarn. 
1913 360 Million lbs. 225 Million lbs. 
1924 77 590 
1929 31 1000 
(source : - G.E. Hubbard, "Eastern industrialisation and 
its effects on the West" p. 190). 
The spinning of yarn being the first step in the process 
of development of industries and China having advantages of 
very much/ 
very much the sane kind as India for this particular industry 
it is not surprising that India lost the whole of her yarn 
export trade with China. A material consideration contributing 
to this development is set down in the two tables given below. 
Table one gives the Index Number, during the period, of the 
price of silver, and table two gives the declared value per 
lb. of Indian yarn exports. 
1. 2. 
Index Number 
of the price 
of silver. 
Declared Value 
of Indian yarn 
exports per lb. 
R's aneas pies 
Pre -war 
Average 1919 85.3 average 0 7 11 
" 1920 76.1 1919 -20 1 3 3 
" 1921 48.1 1920 -21 1 3 9 
" 1922 51.6 1921 -22 0 15 3 
" 1923 49.4 1922 -23 0 15 5 
" 1924 50.7 1923 -21 0 15 3 
" 1925 52.5 1924 -25 1 0 3 
" 1926 47.1 1925 -26 0 14 9 
" 1927 42.8 1926 -27 0 11 11 
'r 1928 44 1927 -28 0 12 2 
" 1929 40.2 1928 -29 0 12 10 
" 1930 29.0 1929 -30 0 12 5 
" 1931 20.4 1930 -31 0 10 9 
(1) The base of these Index Numbers is 
1 gold = 151 silver = 100. 
(source : - p. 328 'Journal of the Royal Statistical Society" 
Part II, 1934). 
(2) (source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
The decline in the purchasing power of silver and the 
fact that during the whole of the period the price of Indian 
yarn was well above the pre-war average may be considered as 
largely contributing to the decline of yarn exports to China. 
The influence of the price of silver on China's power to pur- 
chase imports is clearly seen from the fact that during 1919- 
20 imports of yarn into China from India rose from 48 Million 
lbs. in 1918 -19 to 126 Million lbs. "The large increase in 
the exports of yarn from 73 Million lbs . in 1918 -19 to 160 
Million lbs. in 1919 -20 was due in the main to increased ex- 
ports to China owing to a rise in the price of silver ". (p. 10, 
"Tariff Board inquiry into the Indian Cotton Mill industry" 
1926.) After that the steady fall in the price of silver 
weakened China's power to buy and made it difficult for Indian 
yarn to compete with Chinese yarn in the Chinese market. 
Of the exports of cotton yarn of India the bulk was yarn 
of low counts. There was also a decline in India's small 
export trade in yarns of the higher counts during the period. 
The only redeeming feature in her yarn export trade was that 
in the post -war period she developed a small trade in grey 
two -folds double which rose in quantity to 15 Million lbs. in 
1921 -22 and declined to 7 Million lbs. in 1930 -31. The de- 
cline in exports of the higher counts reduced them, towards 
the end of the period, to a few thousand pounds. 
India's other customers in the yarn export trade were 
Persia, Egypt, and Siam, but their taking all told was a 
very small/ 
very small quantity. 
Although India's yarn exports declined very much during 
the period, the production of yarn by Indian mills, far from 
declining, increased. As it was a disturbed period internally 
and there were plenty of labour troubles, the production rose 
with interruptions from 683 lbs. in 1913 -14 to 867 Million lbs. 
in 1930 -31. This makes it clear that the loss of the export 
trade did not seriously injure the industry. It can be 
argued that the fact that she had a large home market for a 
variety of goods made her let go her export market without 
the feeling of any serious apprehension. 
The following table gives the figures of India's Export 
trade in cotton piece goods. 
Exports of cotton piece 
good's in Million yards. 
Value of piece goods 
Exports in crores of Rupees. 
1913 -14 89 2.13 
1919 -20 196 8.6 
1920 -21 146.4 7.3 
1921 -22 161.0 7.4 
1922 -23 157.0 6.9 
1923 -24 165.3 6.63 
1924-25 181.5 6.86 
1925 -26 164.8 6.15 
1926.27 197.4 7.32 
1927-28 168.6 6.18 
1928 -29 149.2 5.37 
1929 -30 133 4.67 
1930 -31 97.7 3.32 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
This trade falls into the two divisions of exports, grey 
goods - unbleached - and coloured, printed and dyed goods. 
The quantities of these exports are given in the following 
table: - 
EXPORTS OF INDIAN GREY AND COLOURED, PRINTED AND DYED GOODS, 
in Million yards. 
Pre -war average 
War average 





1919 -20 74.89 119.59 
1920 -21 48.4 96.1 
1921 -22 24.2 135.7 
1922 -23 31.1 124.7 
1923 -24 33.8 129.9 
1924 -25 44.1 136.1 
1925 -26 37.3 126.5 
1926 -27 19.9 175.9 
1927-28 17.98 149.28 
1928 -29 16.3 131.45 
1929 -30 15.04 117.18 
1930 -31 9.8 87.5 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
It is clear that the export trade in piece goods unlike 
that in cotton yarn, has, throughout the period, kept well 
above the export values of 1913 -14 and this even in the de- 
pression year, 1930 -31. The contribution of Grey goods and 
coloured/ 
coloured goods to this condition has, however, been very different. 
'7hile there has been, during the period, a steady decline in 
the quantity of exports of Grey goods, coloured goods consoli- 
dated the advance made during the war period and left it behind 
in the post -war period so that, even in the depression year, 
193o -31, exports of coloured goods were double the quantity of 
the pre -war average of exports. Mill production of Grey and 
Bleached goods in India during the period rose from 872 Million 
yards in 1913 -14 to 2003 Million yards in 193o -31, while the 
production of coloured goods rose from 291 to 557.6 Million 
yards. In the light of these figures of production one should 
have expected grey goods to make a bigger impression on the 
export trade than the other. An explanation has to be found 
for this unexpected development of the Indian export trade in 
piece goods. That explanation seems to be found in the price 
of exported grey goods. The following table gives the declar- 
ed values per yard of exported and imported grey goods. 
DECLARED VALUE OF IMPORTED AND EXPORTED GREY GOODS IN INDIA. 
Prices per yard in annas and pies. 
Grey (imported). 
R's annas pies 
Grey (exported). 
R's annas pies 
1913 -14 0 2 8 0 2 7 
1919 -20 0 6 9 0 6 4 
1920 -21 0 7 4 0 7 4 
1921 -22 0 5 8 0 6 6 
1922 -23 0 5 3 0 5 4 
1923 -24 0 5 3 0 5 3 
Grey (imported). Grey (exported). 
Rts annas pies. 
1924 -25 0 5 5 
1925 -26 0 4 11 
1926 -27 0 4 2 
1927-28 0 3 11 
1928 -29 0 3 10 
1929 -30 0 3 7 
1930 -31 0 3 0 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 
R's annas pies. 
0 4 10 
0 4 5 
0 4 10 
0 4 9 
0 4 10 
0 4 8 
0 4 4 
-20 to 1930 -31). 
If this table is studied along with the table of the 
figures of exports of grey goods from India, the influence 
of price on the export trade in this commodity is seen to be 
very telling. As a combined result of boom conditions and 
a price lower than imported like goods the export trade was 
able to improve slightly on the position achieved by it during 
the war. In 1920 -21 prices were about the same, and the re- 
cession of exports may be attributed to the depression. The 
decline from the depression figure in the next two years was 
due to Indian grey goods being higher in price than imports 
which, just as they came to India, might be expected to have 
poured into India's export markets. During 1924 -25 and 
1925 -26 the Indian price was lower than the import price and 
the export trade shows an unmistakable revival. Thereafter 
export prices being well above import prices Indian export 
trade in grey goods steadily declined till swallowed up in 
the depression/ 
the depression, exports stood at the low figure of 9.8 
illion yards. This decline is an index to the progress of 
the Japanese weaving industry and of the rationalization_ 
moverent in it which helped Japan to capture India's export 
marl :ets in this commodity. 
The influence of the price element seems also clear in 
the Indian export trade in coloured goods. Below are the 
figures of declared values per yard of exports and imports 
of coloured goods. 




in annas and pies. 
1913 -14 0 3 5 0 5 0 
1919-20 0 9 10 0 7 7 
1920 -21 0 11 4 0 8 7 
1921 -22 0 8 9 0 7 7 
1922 -23 0 8 3 0 7 6 
1923-24 0 S 2 0 6 8 
1924 -25 0 7 10 0 6 5 
1925 -26 0 6 11 0 6 5 
1926-27 0 6 2 0 6 1 
1927-28 0 5 7 0 6 0 
1928 -29 0 5 6 0 5 11 
1929 -30 0 5 6 0 5 9 
1930 -31 0 4 5 0 5 7 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
Roughly down to 1926 -7, prices of Indian coloured goods 
being lower, the export trade every year improved on the 
average of the war period exports till in 1926 -7 it was more 
than double that figure. Thereafter import prices were 
lower than export prices and the export trade declined, but 
even in its decline in the depression year, 1930 -31, it was 
able to maintain a quantity figure above the figure of the 
quantity of exports average for the war period. This nay 
be taken to mean that the competition that Indian coloured 
goods exports met in her export markets was much less severe 
than in the case of Indian exports of grey goods. This 
seems to have sustained the export trade in the former com- 
modity. The following table gives the figures of Indian 
exports of both goods to her export markets. 
EXPORTS FROM INDIA IN 1,000 YARDS. 
To 
Average for the War period. 1930 -31. 
Grey Coloured Grey Coloured 
Persia. 9826 21421 143 13271 
Iraq 9537 12188 131 8757 
Straits Settlements 1608 16319 158 10806 
Aden & dependencies 21828 3147 1709 1463 
Kenya, Zanzibar & 
Pemba 8926 2803 1600 6535 
Ceylon 533 9618 79 17481 
Portugese Nast Africa 5266 618 2205 4377 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India ", Table of Exports of 
Cotton Piece Goods, 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
Year 
III Export Trade in Raw and Manufactured Jute. 
The importance of exports of Raw and Manufactured 
Jute in the Indien export trade in merchandise is clear from 
the following table of the Percentage of these to the total 
exports of Indian merchandise. The table also gives the 
values of Raw and Manufactured Jute exports separately to 
indicate the importance of each in that trade. 
Percentage of 
Raw & Manufactured Jute 
in the Export trade 
in Merchandise 
Value of Value of 
Raw Jute Exports Manufactured Jute 
in crores of Rupees. in crores of Rupees. 
1913 -14 24 30.83 28.27 
1919 -20 24 24.70 50.01 
1920 -21 29 16.36 53 
1921 -22 16 14 30 
1922 -23 21 22.5 40.49 
1923 -24 18 20 42.28 
1924-25 21 29 51.77 
1925 -26 26 38 58.83 
1926 -27 26.5 26.78 53.18 
1927-28 26.39 30.66 53.56 
1928 -29 27.64 33.34 56.90 
1929 -30 25.45 27 52.90 
1930 -31 20.3 13 31.90 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
It is seen that in the post -war period exports of Manu- 
factures of Jute came to be of greater importance to the ex- 
port trade/ 
port trade than exports of Raw Jute. The index of this is 
seen in the progress of the Jute Manufacturing industry in 
India during the period. 
THE JUTE INDUSTRY. 
1914 -15 1918 -19 1923 -24 1929 -30 
No. of dills 70 76 89 98 
No. of Spindles 795,528 839,919 1,043,417 1,140,435 
No. of Looms 38,379 40,043 49,038 53,900 
No. of Persons 
employed... 238,274 275,500 330,408 343,257 
(figures from the Statistical Abstract for British India 
for the period). 
As jute production in India is limited to the provinces of 
Bengal and Behar mainly and is not capable of a wide distribution 
the effect of the progress of the Manufacturing industry on the 
exports of Raw Jute is realised from the following percentages 
of exports of Raw Jute to the production of Raw Jute. 
RAW JUT'E . 
Percentage of Exports to Production. 
Pre-war 
average 51 
1919 -20 38 
1920 -21 44 
1921 -22 66 
1922 -23 47 
1923 -24 43 
1924 -25 48 
1925 -26 46 
1926 -27 37 
(cont.) 
1927 -28 49 
1928 -29 51 
1929-30 44 
1930 -31 31 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 
1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
In the nature of the conditions of production of Raw Jute 
a maintenance of the Percentage of exports of Raw Jute was 
definitely incompatible with the striking increase in the Per- 
centage production and exports of manufactured jute that took 
place during the period. Hence is seen the indication of a 
decline of the Percentage of exports of Raw Jute to production. 
The following table gives the distribution of the export 
trade in Raw Jute in Thousands of Bales. 
Countries. Pre -war average. Post -war average. 
United Kingdom 1,691 952 
Other parts of the 
British Empire.... 4 5 
Total British Empire 1,695 957 
U A 535 483 
France 428 357 
Italy 213 180 
Brazil 15 79 
Japan 17 60 
Belgium. - 174 
Spain 122 132 
Germany 920 586 
Austria Hungary 250 
Other countries 
Total 
Pre -war average. Post-war average. 
86 92 
4,281 3,102 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1931-32, 
Table No. 28, p. 217). 
In contrast to the trends of the Export trade in Raw Jute, 
the export trade in Jute Bags and Cloth may now be considered. 
The following table gives the quantities of Exports separately. 
BAGS. 
Numbers in Lakhs. 1 lai h = 100,000. 
Pre -war average. Post -war average. 
United Kingdom 305 418 
Europe excepting the 
United Kingdom 206 299 
South Africa (includ- 
ing Rhodesia) 119 177 
East Africa (includ- 
ing 1auritius) 99 112 
Australia & New 
Zealand 628 720 
Java 130 205 
Japan 35 186 
Far East (excluding 
Java & Japan 393 584 
South America 431 335 
Central America & 
West Indies 130 298 
Other countries 796 607 
Total 3,391 4.043 
EXPORT TRADE IN CLOTH. 
Jute in 100,000 yards. 
Pre -::gar average. Post -war average. 
United Kingdom 423 741 
Canada 333 508 
Australia. 209 175 
U.S.A 6,639 8,938 
Argentine republic 1,727 1,813 
Other countries 369 528 
Total 9,700 12,703 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 
p. 219, 1932 -33). 
It is clear then that, while in the case of exports of 
Raw Jute the post -war average shows a decline over the pre- 
war, in the case of Bags and Cloth it shows an increase which 
is larger in the case of Jute Cloth than of Bags. As in the 
pre-war period the United Kingdom is the largest importer of 
Raw Jute, the U.S.A. the largest importer of Jute cloth and 
Australia and New Zealand together the largest importer of 
Jute Bags. 
The followin_, table gives the figures through the period 
of quantities of exports of Raw Jute, Jute Bags and Jute Cloth, 
the Index number prices of Raw and Manufactured Jute to Demon- 
strate the course of trade in these commodities during the 
period. 
Raw Jute 
in ?Million Bales. 
Jute Bags Jute Cloth 
in Millions. in Million yards. 
1919 -20 3.4 343 1275 
1920 -21 2.3 534 1353 
1921-22 3.0 386 1120 
1922 -23 2.9 344 1254 
1923 -24 3.8 414 1349 
1924 -25 3.9 425 1456 
1925 -26 3.6 425 1461 
1926 -27 4.5 449 1503 
1927 -28 4.9 463 1553 
1928 -29 4.7 498 1568 
1929 -30 4.5 522 1651 
1930 -31 3.4 434 1271 
From these figures it is fairly clear that the export 
trade in Raw Jute and Jute Manufactures has steadily advanced. 
The one serious interruption to the advance occurred in the 
slump year 1920 -21. Thereafter the career of the export 
trade has been a very steady advance. The high exchange rate 
of 1919 does not seen to have affected the rate for them, if 
the rate was high the demand under boom conditions was strong 
enough to bear the high rate. The exchange rate, it has been 
seen, rose from 1922 to 1924 but the export trade in this case 
does not show any shrinkage of exports. Of course, the trade 
in a monopoly commodity of India like Jute cannot be expected 
to be very sensitive to variations of exchange. During the 
1922/ 
1922 to 1924 period exports far from descending showed a steady 
advance. The export trade enters on a note of strength from 
1923 -24. Thus the trade seems more influenced by generally 
stable economic conditions than by variations of exchange. 
The following are the declared values of Raw Jute (per 








R's anuas pies annas annas pies 
1913 -14 401 2 5 0 5 5 0 2 4 
1919 -20 417 5 8 0 8 8 0 3 11 
1920 -21 346 5 0 0 7 2 0 3 4 
1921 -22 300 6 4 0 5 9 0 2 3 
1922 -23 389 12 7 0 7 5 0 3 1 
1923 -24 303 0 11 0 7 1 0 2 9 
1924 -25 418 0 1 0 8 9 0 3 1 
1925 -26 586 0 0 0 10 1 0 3 6 
1926 -27 378 5 11 0 8 8 0 3 0 
1927 -28 343 12 7 0 8 0 0 3 2 
1928 -29 360 4 8 0 8 0 0 3 2 
1929 -30 336 12 5 0 6 9 0 2 11 
1930 -31 207 14 8 0 5 5 0 2 1 
From this table it is clear that although the prices of 
Manufactured and Raw Jute move, and have perforce to move, in 
the same direction the prices of Manufactured goods have, 
right through the period, kept well above the pre -war price 
of 1913 -14/ 
of 1913 -14 and have, generally speaking, had a firmer tone. 
That is an illustration of the post -war tendency of the price 
of manufactured commodities to be more rigid than that of 
Raw Material. In the case of Jute Manufactures in India 
this was the result of co- operative action taken in the case 
of the manufactures. Such action did not exist in the case 
of the production of the Raw Material. The Jute Mill- owners' 
Association, for example, agreed in 1921, in view of the 
large increase of looms and spindles, to work short time, that 
is for 54 hours a week. This agreement lasted. till 1929. 
:411-1-e The high price of jute led to an increase in the area 
under jute in 1930 -31 from 3,415,000 acres to 3,531,000 acres 
which increased the yield by a million bales more than in 
1929 and thus contributed to depress the price of jute. 
During the depression, the manufacturing side of the jute 
industry decided for a 40 hours working week and sealed 
up 15', of the looms. The result of it was seen in the fact 
that, while the prices of Raw Jute fell by 5070 between Sep - 
tember, 1929, and March, 1931, that of Jute Manufactures fell 
by only 34% 
IV Export trade in Food Grains. 
The place and importance of India's export trade in 
Food Grains in her export trade in Merchandise during the post- 
war period can be realised from the following table giving the 
total value of these exports of Food Grains in crores of Rupees, 
and the percentage that their value had to the total export 
trade in Merchandise. The wholesale price index of cereals 



















average 46 4.4 21 1914 100 
1919 -20 15 .877 5 1919 163 
1920 -21 25.64 1.487 11 1920 154 
1921 -22 30 1.653 5 1921 145 
1922 -23 42.48 2.6 13 1922 137 
1923 -24 51 3.4 15 1923 114 
1924 -25 65 4.26 16 1924 123 
1925 -26 48 3.06 13.1 1925 136 
1926 -27 39 .24 2.43 13.1 1926 140 
1927 -28 42.92 2.78 13.1 1927 139 
1928 -29 33.69 2.3 10 1928 133 
1929-30 34.79 2.5 11 1929 125 
1930 -31 29.88 2.6 14 1930 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India." 1919 -1931). 
Surveying this table it seems fairly obvious that the 
export trade in Food. Grains of India during the post -war 
period declined in importance from the point of view of value 
and percentage of the total export trade in merchandise. 
While the pre -war average percentage of Food Grains in the 
values of the export trade was 21 >, in every year of the post- 
war period the percentage was very much below it, falling to 
as low as 5% in 1919 -20 and 1921 -22, the highest percentage 
touched being only 16; in 1924 -25. The fact that during the 
period the index number of wholesale cereal prices has com- 
paratively speaking shown a firm tone except towards the end 
of the period and that, during the whole period, the index 
number was well above the July, 1914, figure of 100 makes two 
conclusions obvious; (1) the decline in the volume, that is 
quantities, of the export of Food Grains has been fairly large, 
(2) the index numbers make out the strength of the internal 
demand. The conclusion seems inescapable that the growth in 
population and the rise in the general standard of life on the 
one hand and the increase in the world production of all 
cereals, but particularly in rice and wheat and in wheat more 
than rice, were tending during the period to reduce the margin 
between internal and external prices so as to lead to the re- 
tention for home consumption of increasingly larger quantities 
of the production. When the figures of the Indian_ production 
of the chief food grains come to be considered it will be 
realised that there was no curtailment in the production of 
these/ 
these during the period generally. 
The survey of the tables of figures given makes it out 
that the export trade value of food grains during the period 
falls into two rough divisions, the earlier when export values 
rose from year to year till the peak value of 65 crores was 
touched in 1924 -25 and thereafter when export values fell off 
and declined till they were swallowed up in the debacle of 
the depression. 
It is proposed in this short study to consider among 
food grain exports only those of Rice and Wheat. These to- 
gether make up the bulk of the value of the export trade in 
this commodity. 
In the opening year of the post -war period the export 
trade in food grains had shrunk to a third of its pre -war 
average value. This was due to the monsoon failure of 1918 
and the control that, in view of scarcity, was exercised by 
Government over its export, and to high freight rates. From 
after that tine exports began to recover once control was 
removed in 1921 and reached the peak value of 65 crores in 
1924 -25. Followed a decline. There was a heavy fall in 
1925 -26 in which year, as compared with the previous one, 
while Rice exports increased in quantity and value all other 
food grain exports fell heavily, Wheat by 81, Barley by 90%, 
and Pulse by 52 ¡J. ( "Review of the Trade of India" 1925 -26). 
This decline was followed in the next year by an all -round 
decline, including Rice, so that the total value of exports 
under/ 
under this head fell by 18%. There was some recovery in 
1927 -28. This was, however, only temporary and for the 
rest of the period trade declined in value through the fall 
in prices though the volume rose slightly, till in the closing 
year of the period it stood at two- thirds the value of the 
pre-war average value of food grain exports. Between Sep- 
tember, 1929 and March, 1931, the price of Rice fell by 351',, 
and of Wheat by 47. 





The export trade in Rice may now be briefly con - 
In the export trade of India in food grains Rice 
occupy very different and unequal positions of im- 
This can be realised from the following figures 
values of Rice and Wheat during the period. 
Pre -war average 
Rice 
in 
crores of Rupees 
Wheat 
in 
crores of Rupees- 
25.66 13.96 
1919 -20 10 .2 
1920 -21 18 4.10 
1921 -22 25 1.47 
1922 -23 34 3.44 
1923 -24 35 9.11 
1924 -25 37 17 .19 
1925 -26 39.97 3.6 
1926 -27 33.20 2.7 
1927-28 34.01 4.4 
1928 -29 26 .47 1.69 
1929 -30 31.51 0.21 
1930 -31 25.97 1.95 
( "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
The difference as between the relative world demand and 
and nice 
supply of wheat /during the period is seen in the following 
index numbers of wholesale prices of Rice and Wheat = Statist 
Index Numbers quoted from the "Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society ", part II, 1932, p. 314 : 1867 
Rice (Rangoon). 
-77 = 100. United Kingdom. 
Wheat (America) 
1913 82 65 
1914 91 72 
1919 258 134 
1920 418 165 
1921 184 132 
1922 148 95 
1923 148 84 
1924 167 96 
1925 160 111 
1926 163 105 
1927 159 104 
1928 150 91 
1929 143 91 
1930 130 66 
1931 93 45 
In this table the figures of out -turn, exports and per- 




in Million tons 
Exports 
in Million tons 
of Exports 
to Production 
1913 -14 28.8 2.4 8 
1919 -20 32 .618 2 
1920 -21 28 1.06 4 
1921 -22 33.23 1.366 4 
1922-23 33.7 2.088 6 
1923 -24 28.198 2.177 8 
1924 -25 31.100 2.273 7 
1925 -26 30.4 2.545 8 
1926 -27 29.479 2.035 7 
1927 -28 28.09 2.187 8 
1928 -29 32.145 1.817 6 
1929 -30 31.132 2.298 7 
1930 -31 31.614 2.254 7 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
From this table it is fairly clear that while the pro- 
duction of Rice in India increased in the post-war period 
exports slightly declined, reaching and exceeding the pre- 
war year 1913 -14 export quantity only in one year 1925 -5. 
The decline in the Indian export of Rice occurring in con- 
junction with increased production in the country points to 
certain conclusions. These are - (1) increased consumption 
in the country, (2) the fact of an increase of the production 
of rice 
of rice in the rest of the rice -producing world. If it was 
not for this the rise in price which would surely have 
resulted, as rice is a necessary staple of life for large 
masses of human beings, would have created that margin between 
home and external prices to call forth the necessary exports. 
The fact that, right through the period with the exception of 
one year, Indian rice exports were generally below the 1913 -14 
mark makes it obvious that outside India there was an increase 
in the production of Rice. What makes this a certainty, is 
the fact of the growth of population in rice -eating areas in 
a degree to which it did not happen in allvheat- consuming 
areas. 
In the pre -war period, according to the Imperial Insti- 
tute's Economic Inquiry on Rice, 94, of the exports of Rice 
in 1913 was from India, Siam and Indo- china. In the post- 
war period there was a large increase in the production of 
rice in Spain, Italy, the U.S.A., the Philippines, South 
America and Siam. According to the International Year Book 
of Agricultural Statistics, world production of rice during 
the period, 1909-13, amounted to 774.5 Million quintals. 
In the post -war period the figures of world production were 
as follows:- 
Annual Average. Million Quintals. 
1909 -13 774.5 
1923 -24 798.7 
1924 -25 856.6 
1925 -26 853.6 
1926 -27 845 
1927 -28 856 
1928 -29 884 
1929 -30 866 
average for 
1926 -7 to 1930 -31 866.6 
Thus with an increase in supply there was also an increase 
in demand which maintained the price of Rice. It is here that 
Rice and "iheat part company. In studying the fortunes of 
wheat it will be seen that while there was an increase in the 
production of wheat triat increase had not an equal increase 
in demand from wheat- consuming areas; hence the greater fall 
in the price of wheat during the depression at the end of the 
period. In the case of rice the increase in production, of 
which the figures have been given, was faced by an increase 
in consumption among other things caused by the growth of 
population among rice -consuming Asiatic peoples. Hence the 
difference in the trend of the index of wholesale prices of 
rice and wheat that has been referred to already. 
An effect of the increasingly wider distribution of the 
production of rice in the post -war period was, what may be re- 
ferred to as the rationalisation of the rice trade and its 
effects/ 
effects in the Indian trade in Rice. The understanding of 
this will be helped by a survey of the following table of 
the pre-war and post -war average takings of the different 
countries of Indian rice. 
It would help in this case to take the averages before 
the depression set in. 
INDIAN EXPORTS OF RICE IN 1 000 TONS. 
average. To Pre-war average. Post -war 
The United Kingdom 159 96 
Germany 345 207 
Netherlands 240 31 
Egypt 54 36 
Japan 123 52 
Java 168 75 
Sumatra 10 33 
China 13 68 
Asiatic Turkey 61 1 
Arabia 25 47 
Ceylon 325 311 
Hong Kong 13 50 
Straits Settlements 308 170 
Mauritius 56 50 
Total 2,398 1,462 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1930 -31, p. 219) . 
In understanding this table certain factors have to be 
borne in mind to guard against being misled. This table 
gives the post -war average from the end of the war to 1928 -29. 
Thus the low export figures of the early post -war years when 
trade had not got into its stride and there was Government 
control of the export of food grains have pulled down the 
average of Indian food ;rain exports to a very low figure. 
The actual figures of exports for each year have been set 
down earlier and these will serve to supplement the view 
given by the average . (0 29 
The features of the difference between India's pre -war 
and post -war export trade in rice as revealed by the table 
are the following - the decline in the takings of Indian rice 
by the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, means, that 
in this period, these countries had ,tearer supplies of rice 
which it would be more economical for them to take. For 
example, Germany took larger imports of American rice. The 
decline in the case of Egypt also points to a nearer supply. 
India's trade with Asiatic countries in rice has in the post- 
war period regulated itself on certain principles. Indian 
exports have got reduced to countries growing their rice from 
their own area or from their colonies, as in the case of Japan. 
The increased production in Siam and Indo -china has led to 
countries' 
the decline of Indian exports to the former./ natural markets 
near by. Ceylon, specialising in tea and rubber, is a big 
market for rice and she is naturally India's market. It is 
on these/ 
on these lines that the changes in the distribution of Indian 
exports of rice have to be expected. In the pre -war year, 
1913 -14, out of an export of 2.4 million tons, Asiatic countries 
took .88 million tons. In 1929 -30 out of a total export of 
rice of 2.3 million tons Asiatic countries took 1.2 million 
tons, and in 1930 -31 out of 2.25 million tons they took 1.4. 
To conclude, in the post-war period there was a slight 
increase in the production of rice in India and a slight de- 
crease in the quantity exported. Prosperity and growing 
population in the country were reflected in an internal demand 
that kept rice prices in India well above the pre-war 1913 -14 
level. The increase of the world production of rice led to 
Europe importing less Indian rice and getting supplies nearer 
home. Similarly the increase of production in Siam and 
Japan and the growth of rice in other places weakened Indian 
exports to them. Compensating these weaknesses was the in- 
crease in demand of places like Ceylon, Sumatra, China, Arabia, 
and Hong Kong. 
The following are the Declared Value of Rice Exports per cwt. 
R's annas pies 
1913 -14 5 7 4 
1919 -20 8 0 5 
1920 -21 8 4 5 
1921 -22 8 15 9 
1922 -23 
1923 -24 7 15 3 
1924 -25 8 2 2 
1925 -26 7 12 1 
1926 -27 8 1 7 
1927 -28 7 13 1 
1928 -29 7 5 9 
1929 -30 6 12 4 
1930 -31 5 11 8 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
B Wheat. 
It has been seen in the study of the export trade 
of India in food grains that in the post-war period there was 
a decline both in the value and the volume of the trade. 
In the case of rice it has been seen that, while the pre -war 
percentage of exports to production was 9, the average annual 
percentage for the post -war period was 5. It now remains to 
see the course and condition of the post -war period export 
trade of India in wheat, the second of the two items considered 
here of the Indian export trade in food grains. In doing 
this it is well to bear in mind the difference in the position 
of the country as between rice and wheat. In 1930 -31 the 
area under rice was 81 million acres and under wheat 25 million 
acres. ( "Progress and Condition of India" 1930 -31, p. 168). 
In rice then India is out and away the biggest producer, con- 
sumer, and exporter. In wheat her production in the pre-war 
period was estimated at between 9 and 10s of the world's 
supply. With these facts in mind a consideration of the 
Indian export trade in wheat may be taken up now. 
The following are the figures of Indian exports of wheat 
during the period, their quantities in 1,000 tons, their value 
in crones of Rupees, and the percentage of exports of wheat 
to production : - 










1919 -20 9 0.2 0.08 
1920-21 238 4.1 3 
1921 -22 81 1.47 1 
1922 -23 220 3.44 2 
1923 -24 638 9.11 7 
1924 -25 1,112 17.19 13 
1925 -26 212 3.60 3 
1926 -27 176 2.71 2 
1927-28 300 4.4 4 
1928 -29 115 1.69 2 
1929 -30 13 0.21 1 
1930 -31 197 1.94 2 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
It will be seen from this table of figures (1) that in 
quantity of wheat exports there has been a serious decline in 
the post -war period. It is only in one post -war year, 1924 -25, 
that wheat exports came near those of the pre -war averarce. 
In all the other years they were very much behind that figure. 
(2) In value, wheat exports were in very much the same position 
except for the fact that in 1924 -25, although the volume of 
exports did not quite equal that of the pre -war average, the 
value/ 
value exceeded it, rising to as much as 17.2 crores against 
a pre-war average of 14 crores. The values of wheat exports 
make a better showing than the volume because the average 
annual declared value of wheat exports during all the years 
of the post -war period, except 1930 -31, was well above that 
of 1913 -14 which was Rupees 5 -5 -5 per cwt. (3) "ih.ile the 
pre -war average of exports of wheat to Indian production was 
14;x,, the post -war average was 3 %. 
The factors that brought about this development may now 
be considered. The Indian export trade in wheat in the isst 
analysis depends on the margin between its price in Karachi 
and in London. There must be a difference to pay the in- 
ternal transit from up country to the port, and then over - 
sea to its export market, and still leave a profit to the ex- 
porter. The bigger this margin the greater will be the 
quantity of exports called forth. Now the forces that deter- 
mined the internal and the external prices of wheat during 
the period seem to have worked in opposite directions with . 
the result that the margin got narrowed and the export trade 
was greatly reduced. 
To consider first the factors influencing the world 
wheat market in the post -war period. Throughout the post- 
war period prices of wheat have been generally declining from 
year to year. "The average price per quarter (480 lbs.) for 
the war period, 1915 -19, was 73/6d. The average for 1920 -24 
fell to 64/6d. In 1925 there was a further fall to 61/9d.. 
and by 1930/ 
and by 193o the price had fallen to 34/3d., thus showing a 
decline of 27/6d. in five years". ( "Review of the Trade 
of India" 1930 -31, pp. 92 & 93). This clearly points to a 
position of a supply greater than demand resulting from in- 
creased production or decreased consumption or both. The 
increased production of wheat in the post -war period was a 
result of the extension of the area under wheat during the 
war period in the U.S.A., Canada, Argentina, and Australia 
under the stimulus of high prices to make up for the deficit 
in wheat supply created by Russia going out of the Market in 
1915. The increased production that resulted, more than made 
up for the loss of the Russian supply. After 1924 when 
Europe, excepting Russia, began producing normal wheat crops 
supplies of wheat began to increase considerably. In 1930 -31 
Russian supplies began to arrive and this on an already over- 
stocked market caused the big fall in wheat prices. Speaking 
generally "the post -war period has been marked perhaps by even 
more revolutionary changes in the technique of crop production 
than any that occurred in the past century". ( "The World's 
Meat Situation" R.R. Enfield, "Economic Journal" p. 554, 1931). 
According to the "Review of the Trade of India" the supply of 
wheat in 1930 had increased by 74 million quarters, or 20b. 
as compared with the annual production of the quinquennium 
1910 -14. The increased production resulted in the piling up 
of stocks from year to year and these have acted as an incubus 
on the Market. To make things worse, the Rye supplies of 
Europe/ 
Europe in the closing years of the period increased consider- 
ably and the increasing competition from this cereal tended 
to depress the price of wheat. The heavy import duties and 
the quota system introduced by many European countries have 
raised the price of wheat in these countries and reduced its 
consumption. All these factors contributed to bring about 
the long -term depression in the wheat trade. It must also 
be said that the growth of population in wheat- consuming areas 
has not been anything like what it has been in rice -consuming 
areas; hence the difference between the fall in the price of 
rice end wheat during the depression. For example, between 
September, 1929, and ',larch, 1931, the wholesale price of rice 
fell by 35 and of wheat by 47/. (Index numbers of Wholesale 
Prices of Staple Articles of Export and Import - Calcutta). 
To cone now to conditions in India.. The decline in the 
exports of wheat was in no way an expression of decreased pro- 
duction. It was rather due to increased consumption - an 
expression of a rising standard of life. The following table 
gives (1) the figures of production, (2) Net Imports 4, Net 
Exports -, during the year, (3) Balance available for consump- 
tion during the year: - 
Production of Net Imports .} Balance available 
Previous Crop Net Exports - for consumption 
Year. during the year. during the year. 








to 1918 -19 9,455,000 - 877,000 8,578,000 
1919 -20 7,507,000 + 64,000 7,571,000 
1920 -21 10,122,000 - 324,000 9,798,000 
1921 -22 6,706,000 269,000 6,975,000 
1922 -23 9,830,000 - 269,000 9,561,000 
1923 -24 9,974,000 - 707,000 9,267,000 
1924 -25 9,660,000 -1,219,000 8,441,000 
1925 -26 8,866,000 - 272,000 8,594,000 
1926 -27 8,696,000 - 220,000 8,476,000 
1927 -28 8,973,000 - 317,000 8,656,000 
1928 -29 7,791,000 + 370,000 8,161,000 
1929 -30 8,591,000 4 268,000 8,859,000 
1930 -31 10,469,000 - 32,000 10,437,000 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1930 -31, p. 95) . 
In the case of wheat the exports of a year belong to the 
crops of the previous statistical year. Now the increase in 
the consumption of wheat in the country seems fairly clear 
from the figures given above. 
The export trade in wheat then in India in any year, depends 
on the crops/ 
on the crops of the previous year - and the margin between 
the internal and the external price. To take examples - 
the exports of the year 1924 -25 amounted to 1.112 million 
tons valued at 17.19 crores and was the biggest during the 
post -war period. The crop from which these esports were 
drawn was estimated at 9.6 million tons - a very good crop 
for. India. Equally important is the fact that India had 
had for the two years prior to that year equally good crops 
amounting to 9.8 and 9.7 million tons which meant that there 
were no depleted stores of grain to fill up. As the "Review 
of the Trade of India" for the year has it - "As a result of 
these excellent wheat harvests the granaries of Northern 
India were full and there was ample surplus for export". 
The next question is price. In this connection the "Review 
of the Trade of India" has the following:- "The local con- 
sumption of wheat is appreciably greater than before the war 
and it will take exceptionally large supplies and very temp- 
ting prices before the pre -war average export of 1,308,000 
tons is reached again Reports on the North Anerican 
crops in July and the early part of August were bad, Australian 
supplies were exhausted and prices rose sharply India 
had already shipped considerable quantities to the United 
Kingdom in June and July The firmness in September - 
October and the subsequent further rise in December -January 
brought India strongly, into the wheat market and she made 
considerable shipments in the five months, October - February." 
PRICES OF WHEAT IN SHILLINGS PER 480 lbs. 
c.i.f. Liverpool & London. 
No. 1 Manitoba. Karachi Choice White. 
s-d s-d 
1924 April... 4 45 -0 44 -0 
June.... 6 45 -1 46 -0 
July.... 4 51 -0 49 -0 
August.. 1 60-6 55 -0 
August.. 29 56 -0 53 -3 
October. 10 68 -6 63 -6 
October. 31 61 -10 61 -0 
1925 January. 30 78 -0 70 -4 
February 27 76 -6 69 -6 
March... 27 65 -0 61 -3 
(p. 27, "Review of the Trade of India" 1924 -25) . 
In contrast to 1924 -25 the year of big exports of wheat, 
1929 -30 saw exports of wheat reduced to 13,000 tons valued at 
21 cr. o.re s . That poor export was due to (1) the poor crop of 
1928 -29 which was one of only 7.8 million tons and the three 
crops before that were not very good ones, (2) prices of 
wheat in the world were on a much lower level in 1929 -30 as 
compared with the preceding year. 
PRICES OF WHEAT IN SHILLINGS PER 480 lbs. 
c.i.f. Liverpool & London. 
No. 3 Manitoba. 
s -d 
1929 April... 5 45 -6 
May 3 44 -0 
June 7 42 -0 
July 5 50 -0 




August.. 2 60 -6 53 (Nominal). 
September 6 53 -6 50 ( " ). 
October. 4 50 -3 43 ( " ). 
November 1 49 -0 No quotation. 
December 6 50 -9 
1930 January. 3 51 -4 
February 7 44 -3 44 (Nominal). 
February 28 42 -11- 43 ( " ). 
March... 28 39 -4z No quotation. 
tt 
" 
(p. 95, "Review of the Trade of India" 1929 -30). 
A good index to the poor margin between the price of 
wheat in India and the external price is the poor exports 
in all but one year and the fact that in 1919 -20, 1921 -22, 
1928 -29, and 1929 -30, there were net imports of wheat shows 
that prices of wheat in these years in India were above the 
normal world parity. 
When in 1930 -31 a 102 million ton crop of wheat was 
harvested/ 
harvested the price of wheat fell very badly and the prices 
of Manitoba wheat in Liverpool and London during the year 
fell steadily from 42/- at the beginning of the year to 23/- 
at the close, and in Karachi from 33 Rupees per candy of 656 
lbs. in April to 19 Rupees in March. ( "Review of the Trade 
of India" 1930 -31). Although it was a year of good crops 
the fall in price stimulated the consumption with the result 
that, while India exported only 197,000 tons, she imported 
232,000 tons, and the fact that Australian wheat could be 
placed in the seaport towns at lower prices than those which 
had to be paid for Indian wheat brought long distances by 
rail from the up- country producing areas, made the Government 
of India reduce Railway freights for wheat and pass the wheat 
(import duty) act which levied an import duty of 40 Rupees 
per ton on foreign wheat. 
V The Export Trade in Oilseeds. 
The importance from the point of view of value, 
quantity, and share of Oilseeds exports in the export trade 
in Merchandise of India can be seen from the following table 
of figures:- 
Quantity Value in of the 
Year. in Million tons. crores of Rupees. Export Trade. 
Pre-war 
average 1,453 24.36 11 
1919 -20 .825 26.27 8 
1920 -21 .624 16.83 7 
3 01 
1921 -22 .735 17.40 8 
1922-23 1.177 27.35 9 
1923 -24 1.255 29.82 9 
1924 -25 1.328 33.17 8 
1925 -26 1.250 29.64 8 
1926 -27 .838 19.09 6 
1927-28 1.210 26.69 
1928 -29 1.328 29.63 9 
1929 -30 1.195 26.46 8 
1930 -31 1.037 17.86 8 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31) . 
In the post -war period, 1919 -20 to 1930 -31, the export 
trade in oilseeds did not, even in one year, come up to the 
pre -war average quantity of export of 1.4 million tons. 
And this in spite of the fact that the area under the cul- 
tivation of oilseeds rose during the period from 12.675 
million acres in 1913 -14, ('`I"aterial and T[oral Progress and 
Condition of India" p. 45) to 17.886 million acres in 1928 -29, 
and 16.457 million acres in 1930 -31. ( "Statistical Abstract 
of British India; 1921 -1. In the depression year, 1920 -21, 
exports of oilseeds fell to as low as .6 million tons, and the 
highest exported quantity in the period was in 1924 -25 and 
1928 -29 when it amounted to 1.328 million tons. In value, 
however, oilseeds exports have shown very well rising to as 
high. as 33.17 crores in 1924 -25 when exports totalled only 
1.3 million tons against 24.36 crores for 1.4 million tons, 




of .624 million tons which was less than half the pre -war 
average quantity, the value was 16.83 crores which is more than 
two -thirds of the pre -war average value of 24.36 crores. That 
was because prices during this post -war period were higher 
throw-, out and maintained the value of the exports. The follow- 
ing are the index numbers of Wholesale Prices of Oilseeds, 
(Calcutta). 
End of July 1914 100 












March 1930 142 
December 1930 99 
March 1931 90 
During the depression period from September, 1929, to 
March, 1931, the index number of oilseed prices fell by 49, 
and was second only in the steepness of its fall to Raw Jute 
which fell by 50;.x. Thus except in the last year of the 
period/ 
period under review, Calcutta wholesale prices of oilseeds as 
a whole were appreciably above the prices of July, 1914, and 
helped to sustain the value of the oilseed export trade. 
The area under cultivation of oilseeds increased during the 
period under review and also the total production of oilseeds. 
It has been seen that total exports of oilseeds have not in- 
creased, rather they have declined. There was, therefore, 
a greater internal consumption of oilseeds in the country. 
It will help to see if that has resulted in an export of oil- 
seed manufactures resulting from the increased consumption. 
The pre -war average exports of vegetable oils amounted to 
4 million gallons valued at .6 crores of Rupees. The war 
average of these exports rose to 6.8 million gallons at 1.3 
crores of Rupees. During the post -war period exports of vege- 
table oils declined from 7 million mallons in 1919 -20 steadily 
down to 1.6 million gallons in 1928 -29 and 1.1 million gallons 
in 1930 -31. Exports of oilcakes, however, rose from a pre- 
war average of 140,000 tons valued at 1.06 crores of Rupees 
to 328,000 tons valued at 3.84 crores of Rupees in 1928 -29, 
and closed at 254,000 tons valued at 2.08 crores of Rupees in 
oil -soed 
1930 -31. The failure of any serious -manufacture exports 
to emerge from the increase in the home consumption of oil- 
seeds cannot be a surprise, in view of the existence of older 
and strongly protected oil crushing industries in almost all 
the important countries of Europe and in America. In 1922, 
for example, the Fordney tariff imposed a heavy duty of 
a ton/ 
a ton on Linseed oil (Commercial History and Review of 1922, 
Economist). Again the large Indian market militates against 
any spectacular emergence of an export trade in oilseeds 
manufactures exports. If India had either the monopoly or 
a very strong position in any of the important oilseeds 
perhaps the increased consumption in the country might have, 
by creating a shortage of raw material, led to a shortage of 
such oil supplies and made for the emergence of an export 
trade. But India was in no such position and the increased 
retention for home consumption did not create any such 
situation, for the period was one in which competitive 
supplies emerged on all sides. For example in Linseed the 
Argentine increased her exports from one million tons at the 
beginning of the period to two million tons in the course of 
the period. Indian Grounds -Nuts had the competition of 
Ground -Nuts from Senegal, and Indian Sesamum from the Sesamum 
of China. In addition -b Palm Kernel and Soya Bean entered . 
the field as raw material from which edible oil could be ex- 
pressed. In the course of the period the oil crushing in- 
dustry in all the leading countries of Europe was able to 
get going after the hold -up of the war, and the increasing 
need of oil for food purposes, and for industry in al). its 
phases,kept up,,during the period,a brisk demand for the 
commodities. The first feature, then, to take note of, in 
the oilseeds export trade of India,during the post -war period, 
is the failure of the exports to come up to the volume of the 
pre-war export trade in them, in spite of an increase in the 
production of oilseeds. 
Indian oilseeds exports are made up of exports of Linseed, 
Ground Nuts, Rape seed, Sesamurn, Castor, Copra and Cotton. seed. 
It would be interesting to see which among the more important 
of these contributed strength to the export trade and which 
did not. According to the chart appended to page 126 of the 
"Report of the lt:oral and Material Progress and Condition of 
India" ( 1929 -30) the production of Linseed in India during 
the period under review has not shown any serious advance at 
all. Starting at about 400,000 tons in 1919 -20, it fell 
sharply in the bad L:onsoon and depression year, 1920 -21, and 
increased to about 500,000 tons in 1922 -23 and again during 
1924 -25 and thereafter set into a steady decline touching the 
322,000 tons point in. 1928 -29, the last normal year before 
the depression set in. According to the "Statistical Abstract 
for British India.'; 1921 -22 to 1930 -31, the area under Linseed 
was just 2 million acres in. 1921-22 and rose to 2.6 million_ 
acres in 1923-24 and thereafter declined steadily till in 
1930 -31 it fell to 1.9 million acres. The explanation of 
this decline in the production of Linseed in. India during the 
period lies in the fact that it is produced mainly for export. 
According to the "Review of the Trade of India" the percentage 
of the pre -war average of export to production of Linseed was 
73,. The decline in production then has to be referred to 
the decline of export due to the Linseed market being dominated 
by the Argentine crop. 444. The Argentine and India during 
the period contributed the major part of the exports in Linseed 
and of the two/ 
and of the two the Argentine was easily the major contributor. 
During the period under review the production and exports of 
the Argentine steadily increased. The Commercial History 
and Review of the year 1919" of the "Economist" mentions that 
in that year the Argentine had a crop of Linseed of over a 
million tons and refers to it as "a record crop ". The same 
review for 1924 mentions the Argentine shipments of Linseed 
as amounting to 1,450,000 tons. In 1926 the crop of that 
country was 2 million tons and in 1927 the Argentine exported 
2 Million tons. Thus the Argentine production of Linseed 
was rapidly expanding during the period and came to be about 
five times that of India. Being nearer to the U.S.A. and 
Europe and cheaper in price, in addition to its larger size, 
it dominated the market. The variations in the Indian ex- 
port trade in Linseed depended on the condition of the Argen- 
tine and U.S.A. crops. The U.S.A., having a large oilseed 
crushing industry and a large demand for Linseed oil for the 
manufacture of Linoleum and Oilcloth, had a large demand for 
Linseed, and its takings of the Argentine crop depended on 
If that was a success 
a larger proportion of. the Argentine crop was released for 
the United Kingdom in particular, and Europe in general, and 
that would reduce the takings of the United Kingdom of Indian 
Linseed. The revival of the oilseed crushing industry in 
Europe after the war increased the demand for Linseed and thus 
the increased Argentine production was absorbed. "The Review 
of the Trade/ 
the success of its own Linseed crop. 
of the Trade of India" for 1925 -26, on page 33 says - "Germany 
and other countries are growing more of this seed" This ob- 
viously would tell on the Indian Linseed trade. "The Econo- 
mist Commercial History and Review" for 1923 refers to the 
shortage of the Linseed and Cotton seed crops in the U.S.A. 
and as a result ''more Indian than plate seed was imported 
into the United Kingdom'; "The Review of the Trade of India" 
gives 80 as the percentage of exports to production of Lin- 
seed in the year 1923 -24. The exports from India of Linseed 
for that year were drawn from the crop of the previous year, 
1922 -23, which, according to the "Review of the Trade of India", 
amounted to 533,000 tons. 
To conclude then, among Indian oilseeds Linseed is pro- 
duced mainly for export. The period under review was one 
when there was an increase in the production. of Linseed in the 
world. According to the International Year Books of Agricul- 
tural Statistics the figures of the growth of the production 
of Linseed in the post -war period was as follows: - 
Average for 
1909 -1913 28.2 Million Quintals. 
1923 31.8 " 
1924 33.3 " rr 
1925 40.8 {' " 




1 929 31.2 It 
The export trade in it was dominated by the Argentine 
which produced it mainly for export and was nearer the 
consuming markets. Besides, being a cheaper variety than 
Indian Linseed it was cheaper in price. Indian Linseed was 
a better variety and had to bear a heavier freight charge to 
get to the consuming markets. Needless to say, that, pro- 
duced mainly for export under such conditions, the trade 
evinced these characteristics - (a) it was depressed and the 
competition of more profitable oilseeds led to land devoted 
to Linseed being devoted to other crops like Ground Nuts; 
(b) the export trade in Linseed as a result of this situation 
was, during the period, subject to wide fluctuations. For 
example, exports from India. in 1923 -24, a year of shortage 
of the Linseed crop in the U.S.A., were as high as 371,000 
tons, the highest export figures for the period, and went 
down to 157,000 tons in 1928 -29; 1928 being a year when 
the Argentine exported, according to the "Commercial History 
and Review of the Economist", 2 million tons. In that year 
plate seed ruled at an average price of £15 -17 -6 per ton 
and "Indian Linseed was offered at proYhibition. prices". 
The following table gives the percentage of export to 
production of Linseed and the value of the exports taken 




Value in crores 
of Rupees. 
average 73 1913 -14 6.68 
1919 -20 58 1919 -20 10.46 
1920 -21 45 1920 -21 6.14 
1921 -22 40 1921 -22 4.30 
1922 -23 63 1922 -23 7.35 
1923 -24 80 1923 -24 9.62 
1924-25 69 1924 -25 9.74 
1925 -26 77 1925 -26 8.08 
1926 -27 47 1926 -27 4.02 
1927-28 63 1927-28 4.52 
1928 -29 49 1928 -29 3.30 
1929 -30 66 1929 -30 5.72 
1930 -31 68 1930 -31 5.41 
Cotton seed is a by- product. It has been seen that the 
area under cotton during the period under review rose from 
24.59 million acres for British India in 1913 -14 to 27 million 
acres in 1928 -29. ( "T7aterial and T,:oral Progress end Con- 
dition of India" p. 49, 1913 -14 and p. 93, 1933 -34). 
The course of the Indian export trade in cotton seed was 
as follows:- 
Exports 
quantity in tons. 
Pre -war average 240,000 
1919 -20 248,700 
1920 -21 100.000 
Value in 




1921 -22 92,000 1.02 
1922 -23 183,000 1.97 
1923 -24 150,000 1.71 
1924 -25 161,000 1.91 
1925 -26 197,000 2.18 
1926 -27 50,500 .45 
1927 -28 153,000 1.44 
1928 -29 131,000 1.32 
1929 -30 58,000 .54 
1930 -31 41,000 .22 
From these figures it seems clear that the prices of 
cotton seed have been The in cotton 
seed has been one of a steady decline, the pre -war average 
quantity of export having never been touched. The explana- 
tion of this lies in the fact that during the period under 
review there was a large extension of the area under cotton 
production in the world. The demand for cotton seed is 
mainly from Europe, the U.S.A. having her own supplies to 
cater to her needs.. Freight being a factor, supplies nearer 
to Europe than those of India would be preferred, and the 
Egyptian supply would come in for a natural preference. 
Besides, it has to be borne in mind that in oil content 
cotton seed is inferior to seeds like ground nut, sesame, 
mowra, castor and copra. The competition of these and their 
substitution for it would work to reduce the demand for it. 
As against these there is the fact of the large use of cotton 
seed 
seed in India as cattle feed, and there was a development in 
the cotton seed crushing industry which kept up its price 
internally. All these account for the decline in the export 
trade in cotton seed. In the export trade,the position of 
cotton seed was that of a reserve or substitute supply. Hence> 
the variation in the export trade. The export trade depended 
on the size of the Egyptian supply and of the supply of other 
seeds for which it can be substituted. If the Egyptian 
supply was short its price would rise and the lower price 
parity of Indian cotton seed should the Indian supply be 
large would lead to its preference in place of Egyptian seed. 
In 1926 -27 the price of Indian cotton seed "remained almost 
permanently above the parity of Egyptian seed" and consequent- 
ly exports got reduced to 50,000 tons. ( "Review of the Trade 
of India" 1926 -27, p. 86). In 1927 -28 it was the other way 
round, "an increase in the yield of the Indian cotton crop 
of 1927 -28 and a shortage of the Egyptian crop led to an ex- 
pansion in the exports of cotton seed from India. The average 
price of Egyptian cotton seed in London was higher than in the 
preceding year and this resulted in a greater appreciation of 
of the Indian product ". (p. 86, 1927 -28, "Review of the 
Trade of India "). In the case of cotton seed then, as in the 
case of Linseed, there was a decline in the Export trade. 
According to the chart of production appended to page 126 
of the "Progress and Condition of India during 1930 -31" the 
production of Rape and Mustard seeds was about one million 
tons/ 
tons in 1919 -20 and rose to 1.2 million tons in 1924 -25 and 
then declined to 900,000 tons in 1928 -29. The percentage 
of export to production during the pre -war period averaged 
23 After the period of recovery with not very much change 
in the quantity produced, the percentage of export to pro- 
duction rose to 30 in 1923 -24 and receded in the next year to 
23 and got thereafter into a steady decline and stood at 8;" 
in 1927 -28 and fell to 4% in 1930 -31. Here then is another 
oilseed the export trade of which declined during the period 
under review. According to the Imperial Institute's Indian 
Trade Enquiry into Oilseeds Report India holds a dominant 
position in the world's supply of this oilseed, her supply 
amounting to 65 in 1913 -14. The bulk of the Indian produc- 
tion, even in pre -war years, was locally consumed and the in- 
elasticity of local consumption is evidenced by the decline 
in production as a reaction from the decline of the export 
trade. The decline in the export trade has been attributed 
to the fact that being used in the making of Margarine the 
higher fat content of ground nuts over Rapeseed led to the 
former being substituted for the latter. (p. 33 "Review of 
the Trade of India" 1925 -26) . According to the Imperial 
Institute Report, while ground nut belongs to a group with 
an oil content ranging from 45 % to Rape seed has only 
15; to 40;6. The decline in exports began from 1925 -26, in 
which year the value of exports fell to 2.68 crores, from 
6.03 crores in the previous year and 7.35 crores in 1923 -24. 
The Indian production of Sesamum was almost unchanged 
during the period 1919 -20 to 1930 -31 and amounted to half a 
million tons annually. (p. 99 "Review of the Trade of India" 
1929 -30). The percentage of export to production was 28 in 
1913 -14 and the pre -war average was 25. In 1919 -20 the per- 
centage was 10 and it declined to 2 in 1929 -30 and to 2 in 
1930 -31. As Sesamum oil is more widely consumed in India 
than Rape or Mustard the decline of the export trade has not 
reacted on production to cause a decline in the quantity pro- 
duced. The elasticity of internal consumption has, in a 
sense, contributed to the decline of the export trade for, 
on a price basis, foreign importers have preferred palm 
kernels, ground nuts and Chinese Sesamum to Indian Sesalum. 
Here again is yet another oilseed which lost ground heavily 
in the export trade during the period. 
The export trade in Castor seed during the period is 
different from those recounted above. The pre -war average 
of exports was 114,000 tons valued at 1.66 crones. The pre- 
war average value of Castor seed exports was regained after 
the upset of the war, in 1922 -23. The pre -war average quantity 
of exports was attained in 1925 -26 and rose to 122,000 in 
1927 -28. The export trade quantity has just been maintained 
and the value more than maintained. The difference in the 
fortunes of the export trade in this oilseed is worth close 
consideration. Castor seed does not provide an edible oil. 
If it did} it would have been subject to the competition of 
other/ 
other oilseeds. It is mainly used industrially as it is 
valued as a lubricant and to a certain extent medicinally. 
Besides, according to the Imperial Institute Trade Enquiry, 
India in 1913 -14 was supposed to have almost a monopoly of it, 
exporting 135,000 tons of the world's exports of 137,000 tons. 
It is definite that in the post -war period that advantage has 
been narrowed by outside growths, as, for example, in Manchuria. 
the Indian demand for this seed not being capable of expansion 
in any sense as in the case of edible oils the export trade, 
in spite of outside growths, has been able just to maintain 
itself. The area under the cultivation of Castor seed was 
.54 million acres in 1921 -22, rose to .57 in 1925 -26 and de- 
clined to .45 in the depression year, 1930 -31. 
Very different from all that has been seen till now in 
this study is the trade and production history of ground nuts 
in the post -war period, 1919 -20 to 1930 -31. According to the 
"Statistical Abstract for British India" 1921 -22 to 1930 -31, 
the area under ground nuts rose from 2.06 million acres in 
1921 -22 steadily upward to 5.31 million acres in 1930 -31, and 
the yield rose from 800,000 tons in 1919 -20 to almost 3 million 
tons in 1930 -31. 
The following table gives the percentage of exports to 
production and the values of the exports of ground nuts. 
Pre -war 




Value of Exports 
in crores of Rupees. 
average 35 212,000 3.52 
1913 -14 37 277,800 4.88 
1919 -20 13 111,700 4.23 
1920 -21 13 104,000 2.85 
1921 -22 25 236,000 6.26 
1922 -23 28 267,000 7.56 
1923 -24 24 257,000 7.18 
1924 -25 27 376,000 10.87 
1925 -26 24 455,000 12.02 
1926 -27 16 368,000 9.58 
1927 -28 24 613,000 15.63 
1928 -29 26 783,000 19.36 
1929 -30 29 714,000 16.38 
1930 -31 20 601,000 9.66 
The striking difference in the run of the export trade 
in ground nuts must be attributed to the seed itself as it 
is one in a class by itself among the group of oilseeds ex- 
ported from India. Directly edible in a way other seeds 
are not and belonging as it does to the oilseed group with 
the higher content of oil, the demand for it was far more 
elastic than the others and its advance has been at the ex- 
pense of the other oilseeds. Both production and the exports 
have increased but production has increased more than exports 
so that/ 
so that the percentage of export to productions has declined. 
This is to be attributed to the rising standard of life in 
the country, which has contributed to increasing consumption 
of ground nut. Outside India the substitution of ground 
nuts for other edible fat -producing seeds has increased the 
consumption of the seed. A glance at the export figures of 
Indian- ground nut reveals that the trade took a spurt from 
1927 -28. In 1926 -27 the trade had a set -back on account of 
the coal strike in England and the high freights. In 1927 -28 
the trade leapt up w4.th -a and that was maintained even 
during the last year of the period which was a period of de- 
pression. The increase of the trade in 1927 -28 has been 
attributed to the larger crop, to the large demand following 
resumption of trade, to greater freight facilities and to 
the release of speculative holdings of the produce of 1926 -27 
by exporters. (p. 84 "Review of the Trade of India'' 1927 -28) . 
A change, however, has come in the shares of the importing 
countries. France, till 1926 -27 the largest customer of Indian 
ground nuts, gave place to Germany as the largest consumer of 
the commodity. The increase of Indian ground nuts exports 
is to be attributed to the larger takings of Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands. 
The bulk of India's exports of oilseeds go to the main . 
countries of Europe, and, in order of importance to the ex- 
these 
port trade, /are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
and the Netherlands. 
The survey of the Indian export trade in oilseeds may 
be brought to an end with a. statement of India's export trade 
in vegetable oils. The following is a table of the quantities 
of such oil exports and their values. 
VEGETABT,E OIL EXPORTS. 




crores of Rupees. 
4.02 .65 
1919 -20 7.3 2.2 
1920 -21 3.2 1.02 
1921 -22 1.7 .46 
1922 -23 2.1 .53 
1923 -24 1.4 .51 
1924 -25 1.3 .45 
1925 -26 1.7 .45 
1926 -27 1.3 .30 
1927 -28 1.2 .29 
1928 -29 1.6 .37 
1929 -30 1.3 .31 
1930 -31 1.9 .23 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
The decline in the export trade from the comparatively 
small trade of the pre-war years to even smaller trade is a 
product of the increasing oil consumption in the country on 
the one hand, and the existence of protected oil seed crush- 
ing industries in the countries which generally import Indian 
oil .seeds . 
VI The Export Trade in Tea. 
In considering the Indian export trade in Tea it 
would be well to bear in mind that the Indian tea industry 
is almost wholly financed by British capital and that the 
United Kingdom is the largest consumer of tea "the average 
consumption per head of population in 1927 reaching the 
hi.est figure yet attained, 9.02 lbs, almost double the 
figure for 1880 and nearly eight times that for 1840, the 
year when statistics for tea first began to be kept" (p, 795, 
"Economist" November 3, 1928). Great Britain alone con- 
sumes some 52' of the world's tea, the British Empire 70, 
the Empire and the United States together 77, to 80; 
(p. 362, "Economist" August 24, 1929). Up to 1926 the 
Indiann government levied an export duty on tea of 1.5 Rupees 
on 100 lbs. of tea exported, approximating to about 4d. per 
lb. From 1926 -7 that duty was removed, the "Review of the 
Trade of Indiá' says on p. 7, 1926 -27, "as measures have been 
taken to compensate for the loss of revenue arising therefrom 
by making the whole of the non- agricultural income of the tea . 
companies liable to income tax ". It will early be realised 
that Indian. tea is grown mainly, predominantly for export 
and the United Kingdom imports the bulk of it. Up to 1924 
the import duty on tea was 8d. per lb; Empire grown tea 
being preferred paying 63d. In 1924 the import duty on tea . 
into the United Kingdom was reduced to 4d., preferred Empire 
grown teas paying 3;d. per lb. (p. 29, "Review of the 
Trade of India" 1924 -25) . With these facts in mind the 
features/ 
features of the tea trade of India may now be considered.. 
The following table gives the figures of the value in crores 
of Rupees of the Indian export trade in tea and the percentage 
of that value to the total export trade in Merchandise. 
Year 
Value in 
crores of Rupees. 
of total Export 
trade in Merchandise. 
Pre -war average 13.06 6 
1919 -20 20.56 7 
1920 -21 12.14 5 
1921 -22 18.22 7 
1922-23 22.04 7 
1923 -24 31.5 9 
1924-25 33.3 9 
1925 -26 27.2 7 
1926 -27 29.04 9 
1927-28 32.48 10 
1928 -29 26.6 8 
1929 -30 26.01 8 
1930 -31 23.56 11 
A fuller knowledge of the importance of the tea trade 
to the country may be derived from the figures of the quan- 
tities of Indian production and export of tea. 
Index- Number of 
Wholesale Prices 
Production Export of Tea. (Calcutta). 
in Million lbs. in Million lbs. July 1914 - 100 
1913 -14 305 289 
1919 -20 377 (1919) 379 1919 105 
1920 -21 346 (1920) 286 1920 78 
1921-22 274 (192 1) 314 1921 100 
1922-23 311 (1922) 288 1922 159 
1923-24 375 (1923) 339 1923 206 
1924 -25 375 (1924) 340 1924 205 
1925-26 364 (1925) 325. 1925 180 
1926-27 393 (1926) 349 1926 180 
1927 -28 391 (1927) 361 1927 165 
1928-29 404 (1928) 360 1928 154 
1929-30 433 (1929) 376 1929 140 
1930-31 391 (1930) 356 March 1930 121 
March 1931 114 
(source:- " Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31) . 
The two tables given make out very well the outstanding 
features of the Indian teo export trade and production. 
These are that between 1913 -14 and 1930 -31 the production of 
tea in India increased approximately by 30. Tea. in. India 
is produced mainly for export and the export trade has, 
during the period, grown by about the same percentage as pro- 
duction. On the other hand the value of tea exports right 
up to the depression period, 1928 -29, was, compared to the 
value of exports of 1913 -14, almost double. If allowance 
is made for the 33/ increase in quantity of 1928 -29, the 
54% rise in the tea price as between the end of July, 1914, 
and 1928 should together be sufficient to explain the rise 





course of the tea trade, 1919 -1931, falls into the 
post - 
sions of the difficl4t early /armistice years and the 
period following. The first period is made up of the years 
1919 to 1921. With the decontrol of the tea trade exports 
advanced but the trade was hampered in 1919 by high freight 
charges and congestion in the docks. While in 1914 before 
the war the freight charge for tea from Calcutta to London 
was 27 /6.for 50 cubic feet, in 1919 it wasl3l /31and from 
Colombo 160/ -. In 1920 the vagaries of the Indian exchange 
were one of the difficulties that the export trade had to 
encounter. During Mach to September, 1920, the average 
London tea prices fell rapidly while exchange moved downwards 
but remained comparatively high at 1/9 ;. on 30th September. 
High exchange and falling London prices reduced the Rupee 
value that the Calcutta shipper got for tea. The point is 
made clear by a typical case cited by the "Review of the 
Trade of India" 1920 -21, p. 23. "The London value of a con- 
signment at time of shipment was 1/4d. per lb. A bill was 
prepared at 75J of that value, namely 12d. per lb., and ne- 
gotiated at 2/6d. the rate of exchange then current. The 
consignment actually realised 6- 15-d. per lb. and the deficit 
(at 5 . per lb.) had to be made good by the shipper at 1/7d. 
exchange". 
1920 -21 & 1921 -22 witnessed a decline in production as 
a result of the decline in demand partly because of the slump 
and of the absence of the demand of Russia and decline of the 
demand of Central Europe. The decline in exports and the 
decline in production enabled the clearing away of the stocks 
of/ 
of unsold tea which in India in 1920 -21 were about 40 million 
lbs. and reduced the stocks in the United Kingdom from 230 
in the previous year to 223. 1921 -22 was a year of lower 
and more stable exchange throughout the year; besides, 
freight rates fell from £3 -15 -0 in April, 1921, to £2 -11 -3 
in March, 1922. Thus the slump situation was met by (a) 
curtailment of production activity by the trade, and (b) by 
the return to normalcy in the matter of exchange and freight 
rates. In 1920 it was calculated that the world's produc- 
tion was 25 above consumption and immediately the remedy 
was applied in a reduction of production. In 1922 the 
freight question was settled favourably for the exporter, 
the conference steamship lines having agreed to carry tea 
from Calcutta and Chittagong to London for £2 -2 -6 per ton. 
( "Commercial History and Review of 1922" in the "Economist). 
The moving away from the immediate post -war period saw the 
increase in the consumption of tea and the period of prosperity 
for the industry definitely began. 1922 then is definitely 
the point in the Indian tea trade when recovery merged itself 
into prosperity. Thereafter with increasing consumption 
world exports of tea started increasing. The following 
figures of total tea exports (world) bear this out. 
WORLD TEA EXPORTS. 
1922 = 699 Million lbs. 1925 = 818 M. lbs. 1928 = 912 
1923 = 769 " " 1926 = 851 " " 1929 = 962 
1924 = 820 " " 1927 = 901 " " 1930 = 886 
The Calcutta wholesale price index number of tea tells 
the same story. 1922 saw the price index get back to that 
of July, 1914 (= 100) after the slump of 1921 when it sank 
to 78. Thereafter there was a 50% rise followed by a 471 
rise in 1923 -24. The decline that followed reflects the 
general deflation of prices following the return to the gold 
standard. The tea industry and trade are well organised 
and their points of strength are that both of them represent 
co- operation among producers and a close study of the market 
in the attempts to find new markets and to increase the con - 
sumption of tea in the old ones. The result was that they 
were able to consolidate their position in the prosperity 
period so as to make the best of it. The sign of it is the 
adjustment of production to consumption and the stabilizing 
of prices more than in any other business. The result was, 
that when depression set in,the curtailment of production 
was immediately decided on with the result that, in the de- 
pression year of the period under review, tea prices fell 
by only 12 while jute and oilseeds prices fell by 50. 
"Tea of all the great agricultural industries suffered least 
during the great slump ". (p. 40, "Commercial History and 
Review of 1930 ", "Economist" February 14, 1931). The in- 
effectiveness of the move to restrict production led later 
on, that is in the years of depression after the period 
under review, to a disastrous fall of prices. 
VII The Export Trade in Hides and Skins. 
The following table of figures of total values of 
the Indian export trade in Hides and Skins, its percentage 
of the total export trade in merchandise, and the index number 
of wholesale prices in Calcutta of the general group hides 
and skins serves to introduce the study of the trade and to 
lead on to further inquiry. 
Value in 
crores of Rupees. 
Index number of 
wholesale prices 
of Hides & Skins. 
of the Trade 
to the total Trade 
in Merchandise. 
Pre-war July 
average 14.6 1914 a 100 7 
1919-20 36 1919 = 134 3 12 
1920 -21 8.54 1920 = 147 4 4 
1921 -22 10 1921 ss 108 3 12 
1922 -23 10.88 1922 = 120 2 4 
1923 -24 12.94 1923 = 135 2 4 
1924 -25 14.06 1924 = 124 2 - 
1925 -26 14.21 1925 = 104 2 - 
1926 -27 14.55 1926 = 113 2 4.83 
1927 -28 17.88 1927 = 119 2 5.6 
1928 -29 18.87 1928 = 134 2 5.72 
1929 -30 16.03 1929 = 113 3 5.2 
1930 -31 11.74 Dec. 1930 = 79 2 5.38 
itiarch .1931 = 80 
Looking at the figures of total values, and making allow- 
ance for the fact that during the whole of the period except 
for the depression year, 1930 -31, the index number of whole- 
sale prices of Hides and Skins were higher than in July 1914, 
it is clear that it is only in the years 1927 -30 that the 
export trade in hides and skins just managed to come up to 
the pre -war average in volume. Even with higher prices the 
percentage of the export trade in hides and skins to the 
total export trade in merchandise declined from 7 %, the pre- 
war average, to 20 during most of the period. 
The export trade in hides and skins falls into two 
divisions, the trade in Raw Hides and Skins and that in Tanned 
Hides and Skins. It has to be seen what was the contribution 
of each of these divisions to the general trend in the whole 
trade in Hides and Skins that has been noted already. The 
figures of the quantities and values of the export trade in 
Raw Hides and Skins and Tanned Hides and Skins are set out 
against each other to allow of their consideration. 
Year 









1913 -14 81,600 14,900 11.72 4.25 
1919 -20 91,000 29,000 23.40 12.71 
1920 -21 31,100 7,000 5.25 3.29 
1921 -22 48,500 10,000 5.98 4.03 
1922 -23 45,700 14,600 5.71 5.06 
1923 -24 48,900 18,100 6.93 5.90 
1924 -25 47,700 19,400 6.77 7.18 
1925 -26 50,800 18,500 7.23 
1926 -27 50,627 18,400 7.18 
1927 -28 64,400 23,300 8.81 
1928 -29 66,100 23,500 9.56 
1929 -30 53,100 21,000 7.98 
1930 -31 45,300 17,700 5.47 








If a comparison is made between the pre-war year, 1913 -14, 
and 1928 -29 the last year before the depression settled on the 
world it reveals that the export trade in Raw Hides and Skins 
was in the latter year 25;; less in volume compared to 1913 -14. 
Between the same years the export trade in Tanned Hides and 
Skins was about 60' greater in the latter year than in 1913 -14. 
Thus the post -war period, 1919 -31, has witnessed a reversal 
of the pre -war period trend in the export trade as between 
Raw and Tanned Hides and Skins. The value of the export 
trade in Raw Hides and Skins rose in the pre -war period, 1901 -2 
to 1913 -14, from 5.5 to 11.68 crores and that in Tanned Hides 
and Skins during the same period from 2.7 to 4.2 crores. On 
the other hand between 1913 -14 and 1928 -29 India's export 
trade in Raw Hides and Skins declined from 11.72 crores in 
1913 -14 to 9.56 crores in 1928 -29, while during the same period 
the trade in Tanned Hides and Skins rose from 4.25 to 9.31 
crores. It would help a little more if the comparison is 
studied splitting the export trade of the pre -war and post- 
war period into the trade in Hides and the trade in Skins. 
Raw Hides Tanned Hides Raw Skins Tanned Skins 
in tons. in tons. in tons. in tons. 
1913 -14 55,800 8,700 24,300 6,200 
1928 -29 37,300 16,400 22,900 7,100 
It is clear that a trend was in action to reduce the ex- 
port of both Raw Hides and Skins and to increase exports of 
Tanned Hides and Skins. One peculiarity in this connection 
may be noted. In some commodities like cotton goods, in- 
creased conversion of Indian Raw products into manufactured 
goods limits her Import of like manufactures but does not 
immediately show itself in an increased export trade in those 
manufactures, the increased manufactures being absorbed in 
the large home market and being substituted for like imports. 
The decline in the export of Raw Hides and Skins and the 
simultaneous increase in the exports of Tanned Hides and Skins 
is an index to the fact that leather had not at the time a 
large home market and consequently expressed itself in in- 
creased exports. The Indian Tanning Trade must therefore 
look to foreign markets for the sale of its products". (p. 362 
Indian Industrial Commission Report, Appendix D). To come 
back to the figures given, exports of Raw Hides declined by 
one -third and that of Tanned Hides increased by about 90. 
Absolutely the decline in the exports of Raw Hides was much 
greater than the increase in the exports of tanned hides and 
points to a greater absorption in the country. The same 
trend in the export trade from raw to tanned is observable 
in the/ 
in the Skins trade but to a very much slighter degree than 
characterised the export trade in hides. The first point 
of interest in the survey is the development of the Tanning 
industry in India as evidenced by the shift of emphasis from 
Raw to Tanned. exports. This was a product of the war. In 
the pre-war period Germany was the chief importer of Raw Hides 
and the outbreak of war held. up India's exports of that com- 
modity. On the other hand the United Kingdom was the chief 
importer of Tanned Hides and her greater needs for the pur- 
poses of the war gave a stimulus to the Indian Tanning indus- 
try. The following figures of the exports of Raw and Tanned 
cow hides, the major item in the export trade in hides, bears 
out the change referred to. 
1913 -14 1916 -17 1917 -18 1918 -19 
Exports of Raw Cow Hide 
in. 1,000 cwts 743 582 318 284 
Exports of Tanned Cow 
Hides 158 287 347 500 
So far for the effects of the war. The Indian Industrial 
Commission drew attention in its Report (Appendix D, pp. 354- 
365),,to the potentialities of the country for the development 
of a Tanning industry. The question of tariffs being ex- 
cluded from its terns of reference seems to have chafed the 
Commission. The psychological reaction to this exclusion 
is seen in its report in such statements as - the history 
of the foreign trade is largely a. record of the results of 
fiscal regulations" (p. 354). Again in. page 359, "it is 
not altogether unreasonable to assume that the future of the 
Indian/ 
Indian leather trade can be usefully discussed without any 
reference to tariffs, although these will of necessity play 
an extremely important part in the transition_ period during 
which the export trade is being changed from one mainly in 
Raw hides to one of Tanned hides or finished leather ". 
There was thus (1) the development of the Indian tanning in- 
dustry during the war and (2) the recommendation of the in- 
dustrial commission for the development of the Indian tanning 
industry. There was yet another factor which awakened in- 
terest in the Indian tanning industry. In the pre -war period 
it has been seen that Germany had built up a large Tanning 
industry and was the chief importer of Indian Raw hides. 
In view of this and of the wer there was a desire, as evidenced 
by the Imperial Institute Indian Trade Inquiry Report on Hides 
and Skins, to prevent Germany's resumption of her pre -war Raw 
Hide import trade after the war. The direct product of all 
these factors was the imposition in September, 1919, of an 
export duty on Raw Hides and Skins of 15 based on tariff 
valuation with a 10% reduction of the duty to Empire Countries. 
The Indian Fiscal Commission in its report, paragraph 190, 
condemned this export duty and on March 1st, 1923, reduced 
the export duty on Raw Hides and Skins to 5ïß all round, thus 
doing away with the element of preference in the duty. The 
"Review of the Trade of India" for 1922 -23 after referring to 
this follows it up with the statement that "all prices for 
Raw Hides and Skins firmed up as soon as the export duty was 
lessened " / 
lessened". Before going on to study in detail the trends 
in the Indian trade in Hides and Skins in the post -war period 
it would help to note certain facts as to the relation of the 
Indian supply of Raw Hides and Skins to world supply and de- 
mand. In inquiring into this it is well to bear in mind 
that the 5% duty on the export of Raw Hidea and Skins was re- 
tained right to the close of the period under review. The 
decline in the export trade in Raw Hides between 1913 -14 and 
1928 -29 has already been referred to as also the increase in 
the exports during the same period of Tanned Hide exports. 
That, of course was the result of the export duty plus the 
encouragement given, not only by the duty but outside of that, 
to the Indian tanning industry. All the countries importing 
Indian hides had Tanning industries of their own so that if 
they could get Raw hides nearer home they would get them. 
The total exports of Indian Raw and Tanned hides in 1913 -14 
amounted to 64,500 tons. In 1928 -29 they amounted to 53,700 
tons. This decline in the exports of a very useful Raw 
material points to the fact that in the trade in cow hides 
India had not a very strong position and was just one of the 
suppliers and not even the largest among them. The result 
was, as the "Review of the Trade of India" for 1921-22 ob- 
serves - "New York seems to be reverting to American domestic 
and South American hides and to have dropped the influence 
she possessed in Indian_ markets. Much the same might be 
said of Liverpool and London. India is looking more and 
more/ 
more to the Continent for orders". Again the "Review of the 
Trade of India" for 1922 -23 notes the "decrease in exports to 
the United Kingdom due to River Plate hides being, available 
at distinctly lower prices and also to the competition of the 
Russian hide" . This was before the export duty was reduced 
but it must be borne in mind that the United Kingdom got 10 
of it off. Even so for it to look to River Plate hides 
means that the 5j duty was ruling Indian hides out of her 
markets especially in a commodity in which there were alter- 
native sources of supply. When the duty was reduced it was 
the Continental demand of Germany and Italy that revived the 
Indian Raw Hide:, trade. All this explains the position of 
the Indian Hide exports in relation to world supplies and 
to be 
demand. The position gets /seen in very clear light when 
attention is turned to the reflection of this position in the 
declared values of Indian Hides and Skins exports. The 
figures of the export trade in. Raw and Tanned Skins have al- 
ready been referred to. In 1913 -14 the total exports of 
both amounted to 30,500 tons and in 1928 -29 to 30,000 tons. 
The trade has maintained itself. Between the two years 
there is observable a slight decrease in the export of Raw 
skins and a slight increase in the export of Tanned skins. 
The difference in the trade position of India as between 
Hides and Skins lies in the fact that in "goat skins she is 
the chief source of the world's supply" ( "Review of the 
Trade of India" 1922 -23). The Indian Fiscal Commission in 
paragraph/ 
paragraph 193 recognised this when it went on to say "we 
received a certain amount of evidence to the effect that 
Indian goat skins formed a semi-monopoly". The difference 
in the position of the Indian exports of Hides and Skins in 




table of the declared value per cwt. of Raw 
Hides and Skins. (Prices per cwt. in Rupees). 
Raw Hides. Tanned Hides. Raw Skins. Tanned Skins. 
average 66- 4- 0 85 -10 -10 68- 0- 6 196 -12- 3 
1919 -20 75- 6- 1 164- 0- 0 219- 8- 2 480- 3- 5 
1920 -21 54- 4- 2 140- 9- 5 137 -14- 5 377-11- 4 
1921 -22 35 -11- 5 115- 7- 7 94- 0- 0 308 -11- 4 
1922 -23 45- 7- 2 116- 4- 9 84- 8- 4 294 -10 -11 
1923 -24 51- 3- 4 120- 0- 9 105- 4 -11 277- 8- 4 
1924 -25 56 -10- 0 128- 6- 0 108 -11- 9 302 - 3- 4 
1925 -26 56- 8- 1 125- 9- 7 100 -12- 9 309 -15- 7 
1926 -27 46- 1 -11 122- 9- 0 115 -13- 9 326- 6- 9 
1927 -28 47- 5- 3 130 -10- 2 125 -15- 2 330- 8- 2 
1928 -29 54- 4- 5 134- 2- 8 118- 4- 2 345 - 5- 9 
1929-30 53- 8- 4 120- 7 -11 117 -10- 6 342 -12- 8 
1930 -31 38 -14- 8 112- 8- 4 99- 1- 0 296 -14- 9 
(quoted from the "Review of the Trade of India." 1919 -20 to 1930 -31) . 
From these figures the depression in the export trade 
in Raw hides stands out clearly. Compared with the figures 
of 1913 -14/ 
of 1913 -14 the post -war years reveal a decline in the exports 
of Indian Raw Hides to every one of its export markets. Part 
of this loss, but only a small part, is made up by the increase 
in the exports of Tanned Hides. The main importer of Tanned 
Hides is the United Kingdom, where on account of the high costs 
of tanning and the absence of tariffs it was cheaper to import. 
All the irrporters of Indian Raw Hides decreased their imports 
of the commodity, partly because of the growth of home produc- 
tions as the result of the development of agriculture, and 
partly as the result of the availability of nearer supplies 
developed during the war. The increase in the imports of a 
solitary country like the United Kingdom could not make up 
for the whole of it. Hence the depression in the export 
trade. in Raw Hides which was reflected in the fall in the de- 
clared value of exports. This trend in the price of Raw 
Hides is quite the reverse of that which prevailed before the 
war. The Industrial Commissions Appendix D refers on. page 
354 to the trend of price of Raw Hides when it says that 
during the period 1846 -7 to 1912 -3 the average price of Raw 
Hides rose from Rupees 0 -7 -5 per hide to Rupees 6 -0 -0. The 
strength of India in the world's supply of skins has helped 
to maintain her exports and their prices. 
VIII The Export Trade in Lac. 
In_ this study of the post -war period export trade 
of India so far the outstanding items of export of major 
importance, which are Cotton Raw and Manufactured, Jute Raw 
and Yianufactured, Grain, Pulse and Flour, Oilseeds, Tea, and 
Hides and Skins have been considered. On the average these 
items together make up during the post -war period, 1919 -1931, 
8O of India's exports of merchandise. The percentage of 
these to total exports of merchandise was as low as 73% in 
1921 -22 and as high as 85. in 1924 -25. The rest of 20' of 
India's exports are made up of a number of small items which 
it would be a very arduous and not very profitable work to 
try to study. One item of this group, however, merits con- 
sideration and a short survey of this may be made here. 
This is the Indian export trade in Lac. This item is singled 
out out for certain reasons. The value of the trade by itself 
is a reason for its study and the strength of that point is 
reinforced by the fact that Lac is an Indian monopoly. "Lac 
is a resinous incrustation produced by the lac insect, 
Tachardia (Coccus) Lacca, on certain trees which serve the in- 
sect as host plants in India, Indo -china and Siam. (p. 2 
Imperial Institute Indian Trade Enquiry and Report). Lac 
products consist of Shellac, Button lac, seed lac, stick lac, 
and Gum lac. Indo -china and Siam produce a certain amount 
of stick lac. The chief article of commerce, however, is 
Shellac and it is in this that India has a monopoly (p. 5, 
Ibid ). 
Lac was listed as a practical, if not absolute, monopoly of 
India in "the views of the Government of India on the Ques- 
tion of preferential tariffs" submitted in 1904. In the 
early years of the pre -war period, 1900 to 1913 -14, the 
Government of India classified Shellac and Button lac as 
under the head of articles mainly or partly manufactured 
and stick and seed lac under raw materials, but it seems to 
have had grave misgivings about this classification for on 
page 30 of the "Review of the Trade of India" for 1901 -2 
occurs the following - "to lac indeed the term manufacture 
can perhaps hardly be applied with accuracy for Shell and 
Button lac are obtained simply by triturition in water to 
separate the insect which secretes the lac from the resinous 
secretion the resulting broken resin being then melted and 
cooled in lumps or Sheets". According to the Imperial In- 
stitute's Indian Trade Inquiry Report "Lac is one of the 
most important resins of commerce and owes this position 
partly to properties such as high resistance to the action 
of air and moisture, adhesiveness and high electrical resis- 
tance which it shares with all resins, but chiefly Co the 
fact that its ready solubility in alcohol and its low melting 
point render it easy of application". Further the princi- 
pal uses of Lac resins are - 
(1) As an electrical insulating agent. 
(2) As a stiffening material for felt, straw, etc., for 
hats and for crape. 
(3) As a preservative coating for wood and metal in the 
form of varnishes and lacquers. 
(4) As an adhesive material in special cements, sealing 
wax, dry mountants, gramophone records, etc., 
Naturally then with the growth of these industries in 
the U.S.A., Great Britain, Germany and other countries, the 
Indian Lac trade was greatly stimulated. From this it will 
be realised that in peace times lac is used in the production 
of luxury products and the trade thrives in times of activity 
but a depression in trade tells very heavily on its price. 
The following figures show the fall in Lac prices during the 
depression of 1908 -9 and 1929 -31. 
Average Price Average Price 
Year. per cwt. Year. per cwt. 
1907 -8 107- 4 -10 1929 -30 113 -15 -10 
1908 -9 68 -11- 9 1930 -31 62- 6- 5 
1909 -10 46- 3- 6 1931 -32 43 -11- 6 
1932 -33 31- 3- 9 
Even apart from depressions the lac trade is normally 
exposed to a number of unsettling factors. Like all des- 
tructible articles of relatively high specific value it is 
a subject of speculation. As collecting of the raw material 
can be done at any time after the insects have secreted it, 
in the pre -war period the supply came into the market in no 
regulated way. Being exposed to the influence of the weather, 
the article is one of a precarious supply. Besides there 
was always the danger of the rise of Shellac prices leading 
to the/ 
to the finding of substitutes. This contingency was more 
feared in the post-war period. "The Review of the Trade of 
India" for 1926 -7 stated, "the use of synthetic lacquers though 
growing in importance has not yet appreciably affected the trade 
in Indian Shellac. The enormous increase in the demand for 
automobiles and for nitro -cellulose lacquers has helped to 
maintain the demand for Shellac. As Shellac has advantages 
over synthetic lacquers the best way to meet the competition 
appears to be to increase production and lower the prices ". 
(p. 90) . Right through the pre -war and post -war periods 80 
of India's Lac exports consisted of exports of Shellac, the 
rest being made up of seed, stick and Button lac. 
This table gives the figures of exports of Lac, their 
quantities, values and price of lac for the periods 1900 to 
1913 -14 and 1919 -20 to 1930 -31. 
Quantity Value Average Value 
Year in cwts. in crores. per cwt. 
1900 -1 227,068 1.06 
1901-2 157,071 .96 
1902-3 239,010 1.85 
1903-4 235,620 2.72 
1904-5 240,131 3.07 
1905-6 267,445 3.18 
£ s d 
1906-7 269,276 3.49 8-13- 3 
1907-8 362,748 4.08 7-10- 0 
1908-9 380,816 2.79 4-17-10 
1909-10 554,796 2.77 3- 6- 7 










3 -2 -8 
3- 5- 9 
3 -17- 3 
Quantity Value Average Value 
Year. in cwts. in crones. per cwt. 
Pre-war R a p 
average 434,000 2.20 51- 1- 9 
War average 345,000 2.57 
1919-20 376,000 7.26 202- 6- 5 
1920 -21 309,000 7.50 255- 9- 5 
1921 -22 435,000 7.92 198 -11- 3 
1922 -23 476,000 10.26 242- 0- 7 
1923 -24 486,000 9.06 203- 3- 0 
1924 -25 427,000 7.55 191- 3- 4 
1925 -26 540,000 6.90 138- 5- 3 
1926 -27 592,000 5.47 101 -12- 3 
1927 -28 544,000 6.99 140- 9- 9 
1928 -29 743,000 8.64 128- 6 -10 
1929 -30 669,000 6.96 113 -15 -10 
1930 -31 547,000 3.14 62- 6- 5 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1900 -1931) . 
That substitutes for lac have had little influence, 
even if any did exist, is seen from the increase in the ex- 
ports of Lac. As the average prices of Lac have been well 
above the pre -war average the values of the export trade have 
been big enough for recognition of its importance in the Ex- 
port trade. 
This study of the export trade of India, 1919 -1931 might 
be brought to a close with a short survey of the place of 
manufactured goods in it. That will be realised from the 
following table of the values of exports of merchandise as 
a whole and of manufactured goods in it. 
Exports of 
Merchandise 
Value in Exports of 
Year. crores of Rupees. Manufactures. ó 
Pre-war 
average 219.5 50.61 23 
1919 -20 309 103 33.3 
1920 -21 238 86.9 36.5 
1921 -22 231.4 60.3 26 
1922 -23 299 70.4 23 
1923 -24 348.8 71.9 20.3 
1924-25 384.7 84 21.5 
1925 -26 374.8 89.6 24 
1926 -27 301 85.3 28 
1927-28 319 87.6 27.5 
1928 -29 330 89.6 27 
1929 -30 311 84 27 
1930 -31 220 57 26 
Post-war 
average 286 80 28 
These figures have been quoted from the "Review of the 
Trade of India" and the percentage of Manufactured goods in 
the export trade in merchandise has been calculated from it. 
The figures of the post -war average have also been quoted there- 
from and for the sake of information it may be said that in the 
calculating of that average the figures for the year 1918 -19 
which do not belong to this study have also been included. 
It will be seen that the percentage share of manufactured 
goods in the export trade of India in merchandise has risen 
from a pre -war average of 23 to a post -war average of 28. 
Absolutely the value of manufactured goods in the export trade 
has throughout the post -war period kept well above the pre-war 
average of 50.6 crores of Rupees. Part of this was due to 
the rise in price which in the case of manufactured goods 
tended to be firmer than in the case of raw material. It 
has been estimated that, if the industrial production of 
India in 1920 -21 and 1921 -22 is taken at 100, the production 
of India in 1930 -31 and 1931 -32 would amount to 151. (V. Anstey, 
" Economica" page 240, August, 1936). 
S!Mile manufactured goods have increased in the Indian 
export trade in merchandise from a pre -war average of 23 to 
a post -war average of 28 and from a pre -war average of ab- 
solute value of 50 crores to a post -war average of 80 crores, 
it has to be seen if there has been any serious change in the 
trade, the change looked for being in the diversification of 
manufactured exports and a broadening of the channel of manu- 
factured exports. 
That there was no such change seems fairly obvious. 
The following table makes it clear. It gives the pre -war 
average/ 
average and the post -:var average values in crores of Rupees 
of the main manufactured exports of India. 
Pre -war Average H of 
Value in crores anufactured 
Exports of of Rupees. Exports. 
Post -war average 





Manufactures 20 40% 43 54;ó 
Cotton 
Manufactures 11.4 23 17.07 23 
Tanned Hides 
& Skins 4.3 8.; 6.24 8% 
Chemicals, 
'drugs and 
Medicines 10.5 20 3.20 
Dyes and 
colours 1.17 2.2 
Iron & steel. - - .77 
Other Petal 
Manufactures .31 .r 1.36 1.75?_., 
It will be seen that the items of manufactured exports 
taken into reckoning in this table account together for about 
80% of total manufactured exports. Between the pre -war and 
the post -war periods Jute manufactures have improved their 
place by 161, Cotton manufactures and Tanned Hides and Skins 
have just been able to maintain their percentages by the 
necessary advance of absolute value of exports. Chemicals, 
drugs and medicines fell to a fifth of their pre -war percentage 
and Dyes and Colours have given ground slightly. Iron and 
steel manufactures without a past in the export trade have 
made a modest debut with about three- quarters of a crore and 
account/ 
account for about 1; , and manufactures of other metals have 
advanced from an insignificant percentate of about .6 to 1.75. 
It is clear that thou has been no serious change in the 
character of the Indian export trade. The width of the 
channel of India's export trade in manufactured goods has been 
about the same, the volume of the flow has increased slightly. 
That need not cause any serious surprise for quite a number of 
reasons. This post -war period that is being considered here 
was one of growing industrialism in countries till then pre- 
dominantly agricultural, of increasing industrial developments 
in those that had, even before the war, entered on an indus- 
a heightened 
trial period, of bighlcvc -1- economic nationalism, a severe 
competition for foreign markets, of rising tariffs against all 
goods and certainly manufactured goods, of the development of 
movements for the rationalization of production and of falling 
prices as a combined result of stabilisation and rationalization. 
In such e. period it should have been difficult, but not perhaps 
impossible, to show striking advances in the export trade in 
manufactured goods. India was not in a position, as the result 
of many features of her internal social, political and economic 
position, to be able to do the difficult thing. As has been 
said already in the course of this study, one of the conditions 
laid down by the Indian Fiscal Commission for the grant of 
protection to any Indian industry was that it should be able to 
command a large home market. Naturally then if protection was 
granted to any industry in India and if such protection did 
lead/ 
lead to an increase of industrial production in the particular 
commodity, that increase was more likely to show itself in sup- 
plying the home market and perhaps reducing foreign imports of 
like goods, rather than in any development of an export trade 
in it. For all these reasons it need cause no surprise that 
there was, in the period, no striking change in the export 
trade of India in manufactured goods. 
CHAPTER X. 
THE IMPORT TRADE IN MERCHANDISE, 1919 -1931. 
Index numbers of the total value, volume and prices 
of imports have been given earlier in this study. This 
chapter, therefore, is devoted to a consideration of the trends 
of the import trade in certain co-modities individually. The 
first of these items is the import trade in cotton manufactures. 
I The Import Trade in Cotton Manufactures. 
The trend of the post -war period import trade in 
Cotton manufactures can be grasped from the following table 
of the annual percentages that these imports bore to the total 
imports of merchandise into India during the pre -war and post- 
war periods. 
TABLE SHO \VING THE PERCENTAGE SHARE OF COTTON MANUFACTURE 
IMPORTS TO TOTAL MERCHANDISE IMPORTS. 
Year Year 
1900 -01 39 1919 -20 28 
1901 -02 40 1920 -21 30 
1902 -03 39 1921 -22 21 
1903 -04 37 1922 -23 30 
1904 -05 39 1923 -24 29 
1905 -06 41 1924 -25 33 
1906 -07 38 1925 -26 29 
1907 -08 37 1926 -27 28 
1908 -09 31 1927 -28 26 
1909 -10 34 1928 -29 25 
1910 -11 35 1929 -30 24 
1911 -12 36 1930 -31 15 
1912 -13 38 
1913 -14 36 
Average for Average for 
1900 -1914 37 1919 -1931 26.5 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1900 -1931) . 
A survey of the two sets of figures in the table warrants 
the following conclusions:- (1) In the post -war period cotton 
manufacture imports declined in importance in the import trade 
in merchandise; the average percentage in the post -war period 
was only 26.5 against 37 in the pre -war period, 1900 -1914. 
(2) In the pre -war period there was a great deal of evenness 
and steadiness in these percentages from year to year which 
the post -war annual percentage seems to be without. The 
highest and lowest percentages of the pre -war period were 41 
and 31; those of the post -war period were not only lower but 
had a much bigger difference, being 33 and 15. (3) The pre- 
war percentages have a note of steadiness, the only exception 
to this rule being the depression year, 1908 -9. The per - 
centage of the earlier part of the post -war period is a series 
of ups and downs, and that of the latter part a steady decline. 
The decline from 24 to 15 between 1929 -30 and 1930 -31 is 
worse than 30 to 21 between 1920 -21 and 1921 -22 because of the 
difference/ 
difference between a percentage of 30 and one so low as 24. 
It is interesting to note the similarity of features in the 
situation that brought about the decline of the percentages 
in the two cases even though they are separated by a decade. 
In both cases there was a depression on in full blast, with 
its accompanying feature of a fall in prices. In the 
earlier case the situation was made worse by the fact that 
the importer of cotton manufactures in India was faced, not 
only with falling prices, but also falling exchange. In 
both cases also there was a boycott movement affecting the 
import of cotton manufactures. The fall in the prices of 
the staple Indian exports was worse in the latter occasion 
than in the former. Thus the total decline of merchandise 
imports in 1921-22 over 1920 -21 was 20., while in 1930 -31 
it was 31.5J that of the previous year. In the earlier 
year cotton manufacture imports declined by 44 , that is a 
24 greater decline than that of imports as a whole. In 
1930 -31 cotton manufactures declined by 57,, recording a 
decline of 25.5., more than the decline of imports as a whole. 
The similarity in the features and effects of the 1921 -22 
and 1930 -31 situations seems to be very close. 
The decline in the importance in the import trade of 
cotton manufactures being clear it remains to enquire into 
the factors contributing to bring it about. The following 
table gives the figures of the values of (1) Cotton TIanu- 
f acture imports into India, (2) the index numbers of the 
prices/ 
prices for the period of Grey, white and Coloured Piecegoods 
imports and (3) the index numbers of the prices of Indian 
exports as a whole. The index numbers of the prices of 
imported piecegoods in their three varieties are used here 
because cotton piecegoods imports constitute the bulk of the 
imports of cotton manufactures into India during this period. 
1. 2. 3. 
Index Number 
Value of Cotton Index Number of the of prices of 
Manufactures Imports Declared Value of Export 
in crores of Rupees. Piecegoods per yard. Commodities. 
Coloured, 
Grey ':'dite printed, 
or dyed. 
1913 -14 66.30 100 100 100 100 
1919 -20 59 253 272 288 158 
1920 -21 102.12 275 286 332 140 
1921 -22 57 212 226 256 127 
1922 -23 70 197 206 242 140 
1923 -24 67.5 197 206 239 145 
1924 -25 82 203 203 230 154 
1925 -26 65.7 189 189 202 152 
1926-27 65.05 156 169 180 132 
1927 -28 65.16 147 157 163 130 
1928 -29 63.24 144 151 161 127 
1929 -30 59.49 134 154 146 118 
1930 -31 25.25 113 103 129 94 
(source:- The figures under columns i and 3 are from the 
"Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31. Figures under 
column 2 are quoted from Burnett Hurst "Lancashire and the Indian 
market" Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1932, p. 417). 
Fro?z this table it is clear that the prices of imported 
piecegoods throughout the 1919 -20 to 1930 -31 period are 
above the level of the prices of 1913 -14. The rise in these 
prices was well over 100% down to the year 1924-25. In 
1925 -26 and 1926 -27 they were well over 50¡ more than the 
pre -war year 1913 -14. Between 1927 -28 and 1929 -30 they were 
about 50J more . It was only in 1930 -31 that they fell to 
be less than 50 more than 1913 -14. As against the rise in 
the price of imported piecegoods the index number of the 
prices of exported commodities shows that the highest rise 
was in 1919 -20 when, under boom conditions, these prices 
rose by 58, over the 1913 -14 level of price and ranged be- 
154 and 127 1928 -29 when caught in the vortex of 
the depression they fell by 9 points in 1929 -30 and a further 
24 points in 1930 -31, and in that year the index number of 
these prices was below that of the pre-war year, 1913 -14, by 
6 points. 
In the light of the rise in the prices of imported piece - 
goods as given in the table it would be easy to see what 
should have been the total value of these imports if the 
quantity of these imports had been maintained as they were 
in 1913 -14. The decline, therefore, in the quantity of the 
imports can be realised from the actual figures of the values 
of total cotton manufacture imports. 
The disparity in the rise in the prices of imported 
piecegoods and of India's staple exports was then one factor 
making/ 
making for a reduction in the quantity of these imports. 
With these prices being what they were and the many diffi- 
culties of the year 1919 -20, the import trade was 7 crores 
behind the value of imports of 1913 -14. Although these 
prices in 1920 -21 rose even higher than those of 1919 -20 
imports increased in 1920 -21 by 43 crores over those of 
1919 -20,, this, of course, was the influence of the high 
Rupee -sterling exchange ruling in that year to which refer- 
ence has already been made and which put a premium on im- 
ports. The effect of the fall in exchange and the slump 
that set in towards the close of 1920 is seen in the large 
fall in the imports of cotton manufactures. Imports of 
cotton manufactures are, if it may be said so, the barometer 
of prosperity in the country, other things, such as tariffs, 
being unaltered. The period 1922 -23 to 1924 -25 it will be 
seen was one when the imports of cotton manufactures showed 
strength. The factors contributing to that were - (1) the 
rise in the prices of India's export staples. It will be 
seen that the index number of the prices of these rose 
during the period from 127 in the slump year, 1921 -22, to 
154 in 1924 -25. (2) It was also a period of rising exchange. 
The rise of exchange from the depths to which it fell at the 
close of 1921 began in 1922 and reached 1/6 sterling in 1924. 
The sharp rise in the values of cotton manufacture imports 
in 1924 -25 may be attributed to the rise in the price of 
cotton which is reflected in the index numbers of the prices 
of/ 
of cotton piecegoods imported into India. The outstanding 
feature of the period 1925 -6 to 1929 -30 was the steadiness 
and strength of the import trade of cotton manufacture. 
During that period imports of cotton piecegoods rose steadily 
from 1564 million yards to 1919 million yards in 1929 -30 and 
reached the high -water mark of these imports with 1973 million 
yards in 1927 -28. If, with this quantitative increase of 
imports, import values did not so commensurately increase the 
explanation of it lay in the fall of prices. The index num- 
ber -of imported cloth steadily declined during the period 
and it was this steady decline which maintained the trade as, 
otherwise with the fall in the prices of India's staple ex- 
ports which took place simultaneously, the import trade in 
imported cloth should have shown a steep decline. The de- 
pression set in in full blast in India in 1930 -31 and be- 
tween 1929 -30 and 1930 -31 the index number of India's exports 
fell by 24 points. The fall in the total value of cotton 
piecegoods imports was, as has been said, to the extent of 
57, ", while total imports of merchandise was only to the ex- 
tent of 31.5; . It is clear that the cause of the particular- 
ly heavy fall in the imports of cotton manufactures was the 
"boycott" then in progress in the country. This much is by 
way of a rreneral statement on the features of the import 
trade in cotton manufactures as a whole during the post -war 
period and the factors that contributed to shape them. It 
remains to consider this import trade in greater detail. 
It has been observed that the import trade in cotton 
manufactures/ 
manufactures consists mainly of imports of cotton piecegoods 
and a very much smaller value of cotton yarn and a still 
smaller value of miscellaneous cotton goods. The following 
table gives the figures in crores of Rupees of the total 
values of cotton manufacture imports and, separately, the 
values of imports of cotton piecegoods and of cotton yarn. 
Year 
Value of Cotton 
Manufacture Imports. 
Value of Cotton 
Piecegoods Imports. 
Value of Imports 
of Cotton Yarn. 
Pre -war 
in crores of Rupees. in crores of Rupees . in crores of Rupees. 
average 52.18 45.2 3.77 
1913 -14 66.30 57 .60 4.16 
1919 -20 59 47.4 4.36 
1920 -21 102.12 83.78 13.58 
1921 -22 57 43.16 11.51 
1922 -23 70 58.51 9.26 
1923 -24 67* 56.84 7.94 
1924-25 82 69.42 9 .66 
1925 -26 65.67 54.42 7 .77 
1926 -27 65.05 55.01 6.62 
1927 -28 65.16 55.13 6.79 
1928 -29 63.24 55.81 6.29 
1929 -30 59.49 50.25 6.00 
1930 -31 25.25 20.05 3.08 
Post-war 
average 71.15 58.3 9.32 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1932 -33). 
A The Import Trade in Cotton Yarn, 1919 -1931. 
The table gives a concrete idea of the relative 
values and importance of cotton piecegoods and cotton yarn 
in the import trade. The nature and features of the import 
trade in cotton yarn may be briefly considered before taking 
up a consideration of the main item of the import trade in 
cotton piecegoods. 
The following table gives the quantities in million lbs., 
and values in crores of Rupees, of imports of cotton yarn in- 
to India. It gives also the quantities in million lbs. of 




in Million lbs. 
Value of Cotton 
Yarn Imports 
in crores of Rupees. 
Indian Mill 
Production of Yarn 
in Million lbs . 
average 41.7 3.77 646 
1913 -14 44.1 4.16 682.7 
1919-20 15.09 4.36 635.76 
1920 -21 47.33 13.58 660.00 
1921 -22 57.12 11.51 692.3 
1922 -23 59.27 9.26 705.87 
1923 -24 44.57 7.94 608.62 
1924 -25 55.907 9.66 719.39 
1925 -26 51.68 7.77 686.42 
1926 -27 49.4 6.62 807.11 
1927 -28 52.35 6.79 808.91 
1928 -29 43.76 6.29 648.28 
1929 -30 43.88 6.00 833.54 
1930 -31 29.14 3.08 867.04 
The pre -war annual avera {:e of cotton yarn imports into 
India is 41.7 million lbs., and the annual average of the 
twelve post -war years, 1919 -20 to 1930 -31 is 46 million lbs. 
Thus the import trade in cotton yarn has shown a small in- 
crease in the post -war period and this in spite of (1) the 
price of imported yarn being well above the pre -war prices 
as will be seen from a glance at the total annual values of 
these imports, and, (2) the increase in the internal yarn 
production by Indian hills, (3) tariffs put on yarn imports 
in the post -war period while they had duty -free entry into 
the country in the pre -war period. A 5 import duty on 
imported yarn was levied from 1922 (page 2, "Review of the 
Trade of India" 1922 -23). In 1927 this was changed by the 
Cotton Yarn Amendment Act from "5. ad valorem to 5 ad val- 
oren or 1Ñ armas per lb. whichever is higher" (page 6, "Re- 
view of the Trade of India" 1927 -28) . If, in spite of all 
these, the cotton yarn import trade was able not only to 
maintain itself but even to show an increase of imports, it 
seems worth while to inquire into the factors that contributed 
to give it that vitality. 
The following table gives the percentages of the differ- 
ent counts of yarn in the import trade in yarn and of the 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From the two tables of figures of the yarn import trade 
and of yarn production in India it seems obvious that the 
post -war period was one of increased cotton yarn consumption 
in the country. It will be seen that more than 90% of the 
large total Indian production of yarn is of the lower counts 
1 -20 and 21 -30. With the help of the import duty on cotton 
yarn_ the import trade in yarn of these counts was greatly 
reduced, amounting to 3 in 1930 -31. The effectiveness of 
the 5, duty levied in 1922 is obvious from the figures of 
imports of these yarns after that date. 7 /hen, after 1927, 
this 5` ad valorem duty was converted into a specific duty 
of 1i annas per lb. the import trade in yarn of these counts 
.ere- Cctrw 
get greatly reduced. 
It is different in the case of the trade in yarns of 
the higher counts. In_ two -folds (double) the country re- 
lies on imports as there was no internal production. 1ith 
increasing prosperity the import of this type steadily in- 
creased in percentage in the import trade, and the quantity 
of these imports increased from. 1.2 million lbs. in 1919 -20 
to 13 million lbs. in 1929 -30. In yarns of counts over 40 
internal production increased from 3.5 million lbs. in 
1919 -20 to 15.3 millions in 1929 -30 and 27.3 million lbs. in 
1930 -31. Imports of yarn of this quality increased from 
3.5 million lbs. in 1919 -20 to 9 million lbs. in 1029 -30 and 
4.2 million lbs. in 1930 -31. The pre -war average imports 
of this/ 
of this kind of yarn were 7.6 million lbs to an internal pro- 
duction of 2.6 million lbs. Thus, while in the pre -war 
period 3ths of the consumption of the country of this yarn 
was imported, in 1929 -30 imports accounted for less than 
increased 
half of the countryts /gonsumption. 
The pre -war average position with regard to yarns of 
counts 31 -40 was that of imports accounting for 23.2 million 
lbs. and Indian production for 18.7 million lbs. In the 
post -war period production of these yarns by Indian rills 
advanced from 17 million lbs. in 1919 -20 to 60 million lbs. 
in 1930 -31. The import duty of 1922 seems to have had . 
some influence, but not very much, in checking imports of 
this quality of yarn. The specific duty imposed by the 
Cotton Yarn Amendment Act of 1927, however, did have an 
effect as it was designed to. Reviewing the effect of the 
duty the Tariff Board Cotton Inquiry Report of 1932 said - 
"the avowed object of the specific duty was to discourage 
imports of yarn of counts 31 -40 ". (page 25). Imports of 
these yarns fell sharply till in 1930 -31 they amounted to 
only 14 million lbs. which was a little less than two -thirds 
of the pre -war average of imports of these. 
In the light of this survey the following conclusions 
as regards the import trade in cotton yarn during the post- 
war period seem warranted. It was a period of increased 
yarn consumption in India and yet the import trade, while 
maintaining itself well in comparison with the pre -war 
average of yarn imports, showed very little elasticity. 
This/ 
This lack of elasticity has to be attributed to the fact that 
India became almost entirely self -sufficing in the matter of 
yarns of the lower counts. 90 of the yarn consumption in 
the country belonged to this class of coarse yarns. With 
imports of these cut off by increasing internal mill produc- 
tion and by the import duty of 1922, revised in 1927, the 
room for the expansion of imports of yarn was greatly narrowed. 
Again as has been seen the Indian production of yarn counts 
above 30, especially those between 31 -40, still further nar- 
rowed the room for imports. The fact that, in spite of 
this narrowing of the scope for imports, the yarn import trade 
was able to show some increase is an index to the Indian 
consumption of these yarns on the one hand and the fact that 
in the production of these, although Indian Nills did make 
progress, the difference of efficiency of production as be- 
tween an Indian mill and those of the United Kingdom on the 
one hand and Japan on the other permitted of these imports 
entering the country in spite of the duty levied. 
It may be contended that one factor that contributed to 
the increase in the imports of cotton yarn during the post- 
war period was the greater competition engendered in the 
import trade by the entry of Japan as a competing importer 
to the Indian yarn market. How effective that competition 
was can be realised from the following table of the shares 
of the imports of cotton yarn into the Indian_ market. 
TABLE OF THE PERCENTAGE SHARES OF THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
OF IMPORTS OF COTTON YARN INTO INDIA. 
Year United Kingdom. Japan. 
China including 
Hong Kong. 
1913 -14 86 2 
1919 -20 81 13 
1920 -21 49 42 
1921 -22 70 26 
1922 -23 52 45 
1923 -24 49 46 
1924 -25 37 57 
1925 -26 31 65 
1926 -27 41 54 2 
1927 -28 39 32 25 
1928 -29 53 17 26 
1929 -30 46 25 24 
1930 -31 35 24 40 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
In 1913 -14 the United Kingdom had almost the monopoly 
of the import trade of cotton yarn to India. In 1930 -31 
her share was 35,'; while that of Japan and China put to- 
gether accounted for 64,.. If it is correct to say that the 
imports into India of cotton yarn from China are the pro- 
duction of Japanese mills in China then it is clear that 
Japan has been able in this period to wrest from the United 
Kingdom/ 
Kingdom a big share of her export trade to the Indian market. 
Earlier in this study, while dealing with the Indian export 
and import trade in Cotton yarn during the pre -war period, 
1900 -1914, it was remarked that the 20th Century was not to 
be one of any striking increase in the export trade in cotton 
yarn because of increasing industrialism in the, till then, 
unindustrialised world and because cotton spinning was the 
first step in starting on a career of industrialism for any 
country. Now if that was true of the pre -war period it was 
even more true of the post -war period. Evidence of this is 
furnished by the following figures of exports of yarn by two 
countries which lead in the exports of cotton yarn. 
FIGURES OF EXPORTS OF COTTON YARN 
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN. 
United Kingdom. Japan. 
in Million lbs. in Million lbs. 
1909 -13 216.9 132.2 
1925 189.5 123.3 
1926 168.5 81.6 
1927 200.5 46.7 
1928 169.2 29.0 
(quoted from B. & H. Ellinger "Japanese Competition in 
the Cotton Trade" Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Part II, 1930, p. 187). 
The figures make out a far greater reduction in the 
quantity of cotton yarn exports in the case of Japan than of 
with 
the United Kingdom. The point is then that in e reduced 
exports/ 
exports Japan has been able to wrest a big share of the 
United Kingdom's share of her export trade in yarn to India. 
In the paper on "Japanese Competition in the Cotton Trade" 
referred to above the advantages which Japan had over the 
United Kingdom in the Cotton trade as a whole have been set 
down as consisting of the following:- 
A. Cheaper labour in spinning and weaving. 
B. Greater proximity to the large consuming markets 
in the far -east, particularly China. 
C. Cheaper Cotton. 
D. Organization of the industry. 
Cheaper labour has been attributed to (a) a less ex- 
pensive standard of living making possible an initially lover 
scale of wages; (b) a greater degree of flexibility in the 
Japanese wage structure; (c) a rising standard of productivity 
per worker due to increased efficiency. All these features 
are borne out by the following table reproduced from the far - 
Eastern Social Information Tokyo, Oct. 1934, quoted by G.E. 
Hubbard in "Eastern Industrialisation and its Effects on the 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Of the Lancashire Industry he says - "In contrast to 
the experience of Japan the ratio of labour costs to total 
production cost had in Great Britain remained stationary 
up to 1929". (Ibid. p. 121) . It would help to consider 
this along with the following statement of the Tariff Board 
Inquiry Report about the Indian Cotton Industry in 1932 
which runs as follows - The relative cheapness of Indian 
labour, in spite of its low efficiency, appears to give 
India a considerable advantage over Lancashire and the U.S.A. 
But in the case of Japan, while the level of wages is per - 
ceptably hi g.er than in India especially if it is taken to 
include all expenses incurred by mills for boarding, etc., 
the difference in efficiency far outweighs the higher wages 
paid in Japan". (p. 112) . 
`'thile nearness to the large consuming markets makes 
possible a saving on freight the view is held "that it is 
not to be regarded as a factor of prime importance as freight 
charges are probably at most not more than 2 on the c.i.f. 
value of the finished good". (B. & H. Ellinger, Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, Part II, 1930, p. 192). 
Explaining how Japan gets her cotton cheaper, and giving 
average prices paid by Japan and the United Kingdom for their 
American and Indian cotton the paper referred to makes out 
that the United Kingdom paid more for her cotton at the rate of 
10.20 more in 1925-6 
7.2% " " 1926-7 
9.5% n tt 1927-8 
15.8% " " 1928-9. 
In explaining how the United Kingdom came to pay more in this 
way the Ellingers say - the main explanation of these differ- 
ences is to be found in the quality, that is grade, staple, 
and growth of cotton which the two countries are buying. 
We do not mean to infer that, like, for like Japan is buying 
more favourably than this country but that she has understood 
how to satisfy the world's demand for cheap bulk cloths by 
using a type of raw material which, although not as good as 
what we use, is sufficiently good to satisfy the world's re- 
quirements". (p. 205) . 
Putting together the findings of the Ellingers, Pearse, 
and Hubbard, the various features of organization which con- 
stitute special strength to the Japanese cotton industry may 
be set down as follows: - 
(1) The centralised control exercised over almost the 
entire industry by the Japan Cotton Spinners' Association 
whereby it has been found possible to check over -production 
and uneconomic competition. 
(2) Large manufacturing units working two shifts a day 
and equipped with ring spindles and, to a considerable extent 
also, with automatic looms. This was possible because in 
Japan the textile industry began to expand at a time when 
spinning technique elsewhere in the world was already far ad- 
vanced. It was able therefore to profit by the perfecting 
of the ring spindle - a technical development which had come 
too late to be adopted by Lancashire on the same scale. The 
chief/ 
chief advantage of the ring spindle is said to lie in its 
ability to achieve a higher level of production in spinning 
the low and medium counts. 
(3) Shipping subsidies. 
(4) Concentration of Raw Cotton imports in the hands 
of a few large trading concerns and the system of bulk pur- 
chase whereby the spinner is often able to obtain his raw 
cotton at or below replacement cost. 
(5) Greater efficiency in marketing the finished pro- 
duct resulting from centralisation of marketing agencies, 
from maintenance of closer contact with customers and from 
intimate co- operation between the manufacturing and mercan- 
tile sections of the Industry. 
This survey of the features of the Japanese textile in- 
dustry as a whole has been undertaken to provide the back- 
ground for the understanding of the competition that Japan 
entered into with the United Kingdom in the import trade of 
cotton manufactures into India and its effect on the share 
of the United Kingdom in that trade. So far as cotton yarn 
is concerned it has been seen that the bulk of the yarn im- 
ports into India were made up of counts 31 -40 and above. 
In the yarn trade the United Kingdom's share declined from 
a pre -war average of 89 to 35 in 1930 -31. Apart from the 
other advantages that Japan had, the striking advance of the 
share of Japan in the yarn import trade from 1923 -4 bears 
witness to the incidental advantage that she reaped from the 
fall of the yen exchange. The yen exchange in December, 1923, 
was 
was 152 Rupees per 100 Yen, and it fell to 112 Rupees in 
August, 1924, to 105 Rupees in December, 1924, was 107 Rupees 
in January, 1925, and ranged during the year between 107 and 
118 and firmed up to 136 which was gold parity in 1926. Of 
the depreciation of the yen, the Tariff Board Inquiry into 
the Indian_ Cotton Industry in 1926, said in its report - "It 
need hardly be pointed out that it is impossible to disen- 
tangle the influence of exchange from other factors, but we 
think there can be little doubt that the depreciation of the 
Japanese exchange while it lasted stimulated exports from 
Japan to India". 
The trade in yarn that the United Kingdom lost to Japan 
has been in counts of yarn 31 -40. These it may be said 
constitute the bulk of the yarn imports into India. The 
percentages of the different counts of yarn imports given 
already bears witness to that. The following tables show 
the shares of the United Kingdom, Japan and China in cotton 
yarn imports into India. 
IMPORTS OF COTTON YARN ACCORDING TO COUNTS AND COUNTRIES. 
I Counts 31 -40 in Million lbs. 
1926 -27 1927 -28 1928 -29 1929 -30 1930 -31 
United Kingdom 6 7.1 6.1 5.9 2.3 
Japan 16 7.7 2.2 2.8 2.1 
China and 
Hong Kong .9 10.8 10.5 9.7 10.13 
II Counts above 40. 
1929 -30 1930 -31 1926 -27 1927 -28 1928 -29 
United Kingdom 6.6 7.4 9.2 8.8: 4.09 
Japan .86 .13 .036 .108 .081 
China .007 .10 .010 .074 
III Twofolds (double). 
United Kingdom 2.4 3.6 6.07 3.17 2.9 
Japan 4.5 8.95 5.23 7.8 4.6 
China .011 .8 .8 .722 1.5 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1928 -29 to 1930 -31). 
The competition of Japan was mainly in counts 31 -40 and 
in twofolds. The explanation of Japan concentrating on the 
high counts 31 -40 and giving up the lower counts of yarn lay 
in the fact that the actual saving due to double shift working 
was highest in these counts rather than in the lower ones. 
The Tariff Board inquiry into the Cotton Industry in India in 
1926 estimated that the complete advantages, including Capital 
charges, from double shift working in the spinning of yarns 
of 20s was 10 pies or 9.2% and for 32s,16.55 pies or 10.6; 
12.5: according as price of Japanese or Indian yarn of 32s 
counts is taken. Summing up,the Report said - "these calcu- 
lations show the extent to which the economies obtained by 
double shift working are more apparent in the higher than 
the lower counts and go far to explain why the severity of 
Japanese competition is so much more serious in respect of 
counts over 30s." (p. 64). 
greater part 
Evidence of the taking over of the bulk of the import 
trade into India of yarns of counts 31 -40 by Japan from the 
United Kingdom and the reaction of that loss on employment 
in Lancashire is provided in the following quotation taken 
from a paper by Daniels and Jewkes on the Post -war Depres- 
sion in the Lancashire Cotton Industry (Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Part II, 1928, p. 162). "The produc- 
tion of the finer and coarser qualities of yarn and piece- 
goods in the Lancashire Cotton Industry is so intensely 
localised that it is possible by comparing employment in 
different areas to gain a general idea of the varying degrees 
of industrial fortune which has been experienced by the 
different sections of the industry. On the spinning side 
Bolton is the centre for the production of the finer yarns 
made from Egyptian cotton and Oldham is the centre for the 
production of the coarse yarns made from American cotton... 
In Bolton employment has been comparatively stable 
since 1922 whereas in Oldham it has fluctuated with, if any- 
thing, a general downward trend". 
Again on page 166 - "That increased competition would 
be experienced most acutely in the American section - that 
which produces the coarser qualities of goods - is to be 
expected. The comparative advantages, natural and acquired, 
of the Lancashire cotton industry belong pre -eminently to the 
Egyptian section - that which produces the finer qualities of 
goods - with consequences that normally th.s section is in a 
stronger/ 
stronger position than the other section". 
To conclude;- in the post -war period the import trade 
in cotton yarn has expanded compared to the pre -war period. 
The expansion was within fairly restricted limits. There 
was increased production of cotton yarn in India and if 
along with this there was an increase of imports it points 
to an increase in the internal consumption. According to 
the Tariff Board Cotton Inquiry Report in 1932 "of the cotton 
yarn consumed in India 6.6 was handspun yarn, 85.2, mill 
spun by Indian mills, and 8.2 ̀ was imported". (p. 159) . 
Another development in India referred to by the Report was 
"that the average count of yarn spun in India, has increased 
from 18.4 in 1925 -6 to 20.5 in 1931 -32, and in Bombay from 
17.2 to 20.6". (p. 146). All that was left to the import 
trade was the imports of yarns 31 -40 and above and the com- 
petition between the United Kingdom and Japan so divided 
the import trade that in the main the bulk of the imports 
of yarn of counts above 40 carne from the United Kingdom 
and, in spite of the Cotton Yarn Amendment Act of 1927 
which fell more heavily on counts 31 -40, the import trade 
in yarns of these counts and of double -folds fell to the 
share of Japan. (The Amendment "meant on current prices 
an approximate increase of 8. on 16s, 7% on 12s, 5 ,, on 32s, 
4.5 on 40s, and 22 on 42s". í,rno S. Pearse, "Cotton I 
dustry Report - Japan and China", p. 127). 
B The Import Trade in Cotton Piecegoods, 1919 -31. 
In the previous section the import trade of India 
in cotton yarn was considered. It was seen that on the 
average imports of cotton yarn in the post -war period was 
greater than in the pre -war period and this occurred in a 
period when the internal production of yarn was steadily in- 
creasing. The explanation of this quite interesting feature 
lay in the following position. The spinning of cotton yarn 
is truly the first step in a country's entering upon indus- 
trial development. So far as India was concerned the bulk 
of the yarn used by the hand -loom weavers who are the main 
consumers of cotton yarn is of the coarser type consisting 
of the lower counts. It has been seen that even in the pre- 
war period India had begun to supply herself with her own 
yarn of this type. That considerably narrowed the scope of 
imports of cotton yarn into India. It has also been seen 
that India made some advance in the spinning of yarn of the 
higher counts. Thus imports of cotton yarn into India in 
the post -war period was almost entirely of the higher counts, 
the consumption of which in the country was very small com- 
pared to the consumption of yarn of the lower counts. What 
caused the increase in yarn imports was (1) the increase in 
the consumption of these in the country, and, (2) the com- 
petition of Japan in the import trade in cotton yarn. Japan 
by the efficiency of her production, especially in counts 
31 -40, was able to wrest part of the United Kingdom's share 
in the/ 
in the import trade and win for herself a place in the import 
trade of India in cotton yarn. This was very definitely one 
factor that contributed to the increase of the post -war average 
of yarn imports into India. It seems fair to say that, so 
far as the yarn import trade was concerned, if it was not for 
the entry of Japan into it the share that she was able to 
appropriate for herself would most probably have been divided 
between the United Kingdom and India in which case the average 
of yarn imports into India would have been lower and perhaps 
lower than the pre -war average. 
This was the position in yarn. The Position in the im- 
port trade in cotton piecegoods in the post -war period was 
different. Different in the sense that, while the lines 
along which Indian_ cotton yarn production and piecegoods 
production developed were more or less the same, they did not 
synchronise in time and the development in piecegoods pro- 
duction in India began later in time and was slower at the 
start. One reason for the later and slower development of 
the production of cotton piecegoods was that this was a more 
advanced form of industrial production and as such perhaps had 
to come later. In Japan weaving of cloth in mills came later 
than spinning and the explanation is given by saying ''the 
Japanese government recognised that changes in cotton weaving 
were to be much less radical than those in spinning (where 
the difference in the individual worker's output between 
power and hand is very much more pronounced)". J.E. Orchard. 
It has/ 
It has been seen that India turned her attention to the increas- 
ing weaving of cloth only when the China market for her yarn 
began to show signs of weakness. Thus, while India supplied 
herself with the bulk of the yarn needed for consumption in 
the country at the close of the 19th century, that position 
with regard to cotton piecegoods was a development of the 
post -war period and that explains the difference that while 
the post -war average of yarn imports into India was larger than 
the pre -war average that for cotton piecegoods was smaller. 
The following table compiled from the Indian Tariff Board 
Inquiry Reports into the Indian Cotton ì; ill Industry in 1926 
and 1932 provides corroboration of the contention put for- 
ward. 
Percentage Shares of Imports, Indian Mill Production, 
and Indian Handloom Production in the Cloth. Consumption of India. 
Imports. Indian Mills. 
Handloom 
Production. 
1899-1900 64% 9% 27% 
1913-14 60 21 19 
1921-22 26 42 32 
1926-27 33 40.6 26.4 
1931-32 13.7 56.6 29.7 
Surveying these percentages it is seen that at the be- 
ginning of the 20th century Imports of cloth and internal 
production consisting of both Mill and Handloom production 
stood/ 
cloth 
stood in a relation of 16 *9. Of the - supply of the 
country provided for internally, three -quarters was Handloon 
woven and one -quarter by the power in Indian weaving mills. 
By 1913 -14 there was a slight change in the proportion of 
imports and internal production which came to stand at 11 : 1. 
The share of Indian ?`,mills in the total supply advanced from 
9 to 21, 8; of this gain was at the expense of the Handloom . 
weaver and 4.', from imports. The free -trade period seems to 
have fallen very heavily on the Handloom weavers. The 
early post -war position revealed outstanding changes. The 
share of Indian Trills had doubled itself in 1921 -22 over 
1913 -14. The Handloom weaver had also increased his share 
from 19 to 32% and imports declined by 34`. to 26. The 
share of imports made some advance in 1926 -7 but was not 
itself 
able to maintain end in 1931 -32 the share of imports fell 
to 13; The lion's share of what was lost by imports fell 
to the lot of Indian Mills, the Handloom weaver coming in 
for the crumbs of the master's table. 
Thus the decline in the share of imports was small in 
the pre -war period but was heavy in the post -war period and 
it is difficult to dissociate this decline in the percentage 
of imports in the post -war period from the fact that, while 
the pre -war period was a free -trade period with a 31,' import 
and excise duty on imported and Indian Mill cloth, the post- 
war period was one very different. The duty on cotton piece - 
goods was raised during the war from 31 to 7'> in 1917, and to 
11;x/ 
11jß in.1921. The excise duty on internally produced mill 
cloth was retained at 314 unchanged. In 1930 the duty on 
cotton piecegoods was raised to 15ó with, in addition, a 5 
protective duty against all cotton piecegoods imported from 
outside the United Kingdom,with a minimum of 32 annas per lb. 
on all plain grey goods imported. In March, 1926, the ex- 
cise duty of 31gß on internally produced cloth was abolished 
but in that year the exchange rate was fixed at 1/6. Of the 
abolition 
ahs.o.l3..1.t ian of the excise duty and the raising of the exchange 
rate and their effects on the Indian cotton industry the 
Tariff Board Report on the Inquiry into the Cotton Industry, 
1926, quotes Sir Victor Sassoon as saying - "I have worked 
out the difference between the present 1/6 and 1/4 rate as 
very little less than the excise. So to -day with the ex- 
cise removed all we are getting is, I think, a .03 ad- 
vantage over what we would have had if the excise had been 
left and we had our 1/4 gold as we had last year ". (p. 72). 
Thus it will be seen that the post -war period was different 
from the pre -war and, although so far as cotton piecegoods 
imports were concerned a partial protective duty of 5; came 
only 
on on non -British imports, /in 1930, the raising of Revenue 
duties from 31 to 15 in the course of the period has had a 
protective effect. 
With this background the change in the place of imports 
of cotton piecegoods in the total cloth consumption of the 
country may now be considered. The following table gives 
the/ 
the figures of total cloth consumed in the country, the net 
imports of piecegoods, the quantity of Indian mill -made 
cloth available for consumption and the estimated production 
of cloth by the handlooms in the country. (In Million Yards). 
Net available 
Net available Indian Mill 




1913-14 5,280 3,130 1,080 1,070 
1919-20 2,990 990 1,440 560 
1920-21 4,030 1,450 1,430 1,150 
1921-22 3,780 1,020 1,570 1,190 
1922-23 4,420 1,520 1,560 1,340 
1923-24 3,970 1,420 1,540 1,010 
1924-25 4,820 1,770 1,790 1,260 
1925-26 4,480 1,530 1,790 1,160 
1926-27 5,150 1,760 2,060 1,330 
1927-28 5,440 1,940 2,190 1,310 
1928-29 4,730 1,910 1,740 1,080 
1929-30 5,590 1,900 2,290 1,400 
1930-31 4,720 870 2,460 1,390 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1930 -31 p. 37) . 
It will be seen that in the post -war period the re- 
tained import of cotton piecegoods declined considerably, the 
highest import of the period being 1,940 in 1927 -28 and the 
lowest 870 millions in 1930 -31. The pre -war average for 
these/ 
these imports was 2,632 million yards and the post -war average 
(1918 -19 to 1930 -31 average) was 1,352 million yards. Con- 
sidering these averages the post -war import of cotton piece - 
goods average was half the pre -war average. The factors 
contributing to this decline may be stated as consisting of 
(1) the decline in the per capita consumption of cloth (2) 
the increase in the home production of piecegoods as a result 
of favourable conditions which contributed to a striking de- 
velopment in the home production of piecegoods. The tariff 
levied on the commodity was one factor tending to create the 
conditions which made for such development. The "Review of 
the Trade of India for 1933 -34" (p. 37) gives the following 
figures of the per capita consumption of imported and home- 


















1913 -14 9.78 yds. 3.38 yds. 3.34 yds. 16.50 yds. 
1919 -20 3.09 4.50 1.75 9.34 
1920 -21 4.53 4.47 3.59 12.59 
1921 -22 3.19 4.90 3.72 11.81 
1922 -23 4.61 4.73 4.06 13.40 
1923 -24 4.30 4.67 3.06 12.03 
1924 -25 5.36 5.43 3.82 14.61 
1925 -26 4.50 5.27 3.41 13.18 
1926 -27 5.18 6.06 3.91 15.15 
1927-28 5.71 6.44 3.85 16.00 
1928-29 5.46 yds. 4.97 yds. 3.09 yds. 13.52 ,yds. 
1929-30 5.43 6.54 4.00 15.97 
1930-31 2.49 7.03 3.97 13.49 
It is clear that the per capita consumption of cloth has 
fallen off to a certain extent during the pre -war period from 
the consumption of the year 1913 -14. It has been seen earlier 
in this study that, although in the pre -war period the price 
of the cloth generally showed a tendency to rise, the greater 
rise in the price of India's export staples made the purchasing 
power of the people more than equal to the occasion with the 
result that it expressed itself in an unmistakable increase 
in the consumption of cloth. In the post -war period that 
position was changed. Earlier in this chapter on the import 
trade in cotton manufactures the index numbers of the prices 
of imports of Grey, VVhite and Coloured, printed and dyed piece - 
goods have been given as also the index numbers of the prices 
of India's exports. Although in the post -war period imports 
of cotton piecegoods declined yet as the country still depended 
on imports to supply a part, if even a small part, of the total 
cloth consumption of the country the prices of Indian cloth 
generally followed the prices of imported cloth. The Tariff 
Board Report of 1926 on the Cotton Industry in this connection 
says - "Experience as well as theoretical reasoning shows that 
the price of Indian manufactured cloth is influenced by the 
price of imported cloth even when the classes are not in direct 
competition ". Thus one reason of the decline in the consumption 
of cloth/ 
of cloth was that, generally speaking, their price during the 
whole of the post -war period was not only well above the pre- 
war price of cloth but well above the index numbers of prices 
of agricultural products. "Index numbers of the prices of 
imported cloth varied from 325 in 1920 to 210 in 1925, of 
Indian cloth from 313 -213 and of Indian exports from 175-145". 
(Tariff Board Report of 1926 on the Cotton Industry). 
disparity between agrarian and industrial prices since 




factors, and a very powerful factor, in keeping down the con- 
sumption of cloth, for a decline in purchasing power is more 
prone in the case of India to show itself in the consumption 
of cloth. Other things remaining the same, the decline in 
the purchasing power of the country as the result of the dis- 
parity between agrarian and industrial prices on the one hand 
and the growth of population on the other should have, on the 
whole, contributed to an absolute increase in the net imports 
of piecegoods. The large decline in piecegoods imports is 
then a product of the new position created in the post-war 
period by the tariff levied on imports of cotton piecegoods 
which rose from 7 to 11 and to 15. 
The trends of the import of piecegoods into India may 
now be briefly surveyed. The war, the failure of the I,onsoon 
in India, and the influenza epidemic of 1918 all combined to 
reduce imports so that in 1919 -20 imports of cotton piecegoods 
stood at the low level of 990 million yards. The influence 
on/ 
on imports of the high sterling exchange in 1920 is unmistak- 
able in the year 1920 -21 when imports rose to 1450 million 
yards. In 1921 -22 there was a slump. Prices fell but ex- 
change fell also and in addition there was a boycott in India 
and imports fell away to 1,020 million yards. In the year 
also the import duty was raised from 7;:, to 11%. Thereafter 
the import trade recovered to 1,520 millions in 1922 -23 and, 
under the influence of rising exchange and the depreciation 
of the yen, continued on a career of advance to 1,940 million 
yards in 1927 -28. In 1923 -24 the high price of cotton caused 
a partial decline in both.nill production in India and imports, 
and in 1926 -27 the Indian industry got a slight encouragement 
from the abolition of the excise duty and the freeing of Mill 
stores and machinery from import duty, while imports also got 
an encouragement by the fixing of exchange at 1/6. In 1929 -30 
imports declined to 1,900 million yards and in 1930 the tariff 
was raised to 150 with a 50 more for non -British imports and 
a specific duty for grey goods of 3i annas. A word must be 
said about this discriminatory tariff. The Tariff Board 
Report on the Cotton Mill Industry in 1932 stated in its re- 
port that "a given class of cloth made by an Indian mill com- 
petes with a variety of imported cloths of similar and of 
different qualities, designs and dimensions. The price 
actually realised by the Indian mill may be presumed to re- 
flect the competition which arises from every class of cloth 
likely to be considered by the purchaser more or less equally 
suitable/ 
suitable for his purpose". In view of that the tariff ought 
to have been levied on all imports. The Discriminatory tariff 
in 1930 whereby British goods were taxed less and Japanese more, 
devised by the British government of India, points its own 
moral. In addition there was a fall of prices of exports and 
a boycott and, under the combined onslaught of all these factors, 
imports touched the lowest water mark of 870 million yards. 
In attempting to find out how the decline in imports of 
cotton piecegoods affected the import trade in the different 
classes of imports of Grey, White, and Coloured goods it may 
help to put down the shares of the United Kingdom and Japan in 
the import trade in piecegoods. 
PERCENTAGE SHARES IN THE IMPORT TRADE IN PIECEGOODS. 
Years United Kingdom. Japan. 
Pre-war average 97 .4 0.1 
1913 -14 97.1 0.3 
1919 -20 90.3 7.0 
1920 -21 85.6 11.3 
1921 -22 87.6 8.3 
1922_23 91.2 6.8 
1923 -24 88.8 8.2 
1924 -25 88.5 8.5 
1925 -26 82.3 13.9 
1926-27 82.0 13.6 
1927-28 78.2 16 .4 
United Kingdom. Japan. 
1928-29 75.2 18.4 
1929-30 65.0 29.3 
1930-31 58.8 36.1 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India " 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
The table reveals the remarkable advance of Japan in the 
share she acquired in the import trade to India of cotton 
piecegoods. Her gain was entirely at the expense of the 
United Kingdom. "The enlargement of the production of cotton 
cloth for export constituted in fact the most permanent de- 
velopment that has come to Japanese industry out of the war". 
So said the United States Tariff Commission Report of 1921 
on the Japanese cotton industry. Generally speaking it was 
the great disparity between cost of capital equipment and that 
of labour that held up the development of industries and the 
attainment of higher efficiency. The profits accumulated 
during the war enabled Japanese concerns to re -equip them- 
selves with improved machinery and then Japan began to be a 
factor to be reckoned with in the competition of the world 
market. The process of rationalization which began shortly 
after the war did not make much headway in the early post- 
war period because,the expansionist policy of the Japanese 
government of the time provided no incentive to reduce costs. 
Japan became involved in a financial crisis as the result of 
ill -regulated expansionism. On top of it came the earth- 
quake/ 
quake of 1923. The combined result was the financial crisis 
,uzuki 
of 1927 which brought about the collapse of the -Sal-2+3:14 firm. 
This made the country recognise the need for some form of 
adjustment in the state of agreement to control prices and 
limit output. The Inouye administration in 1927 put an end 
to the inflationist monetary policy. The deepening ecomonic 
depression from 1930 made all this insufficient, and, with 
Government aid, there was then set up the Committee "to study 
and inquire into all important matters relating to rationaliz- 
ation of industry and other measures to promote industry in 
general". Thus it was the ending of the expansionist regime 
that made real the necessity of reducing costs and it is from 
that time that rationalization in industry becar.rie effective. 
The rapid increase of Japan's share in the Indian import 
trade in cotton piecegoods after that time is really striking. 
The working and effects of rationalization in cotton cloth 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All that has been said so far is justification enough 
for the Indian Tariff Board Inquiry into the Cotton Industry 
in 1932 to say, as it does on page 140, "that the cotton in- 
dustry of Japan is one of the most highly rationalized in- 
dustries in the world catering for a large number of export 
markets and therefore is in a position to adjust prices 
quickly so as to meet changing conditions in particular 
countries ". These statements have a bearing on the increase 
in the share of cotton piecegoods imports in India from Japan 
even in the year 1930 -31 when a discriminatory tariff had 
been levied on her goods in the shape of an extra 
British imports of piecegoods. 
In the light of this survey 
5:0 on non- 
it can be safely stated that 
the increasing share of Japan in the piecegoods import trade 
of India was a fact contributing to maintain the trade. For 
example the import quantities for 1930 -31 were what they were 
largely because of Japanese imports, and if it was not for 
the large share that Japan was able to acquire by her lower 
production costs, and if imports of piecegoods came entirely 
from the United Kingdom the decline in the import trade in 
piecegoods into India would have been even more marked. The 
increased competitive strength of the Japanese cotton textile 
industry was recognised in the following terms by the Indian 
Tariff Board Inquiry of 1926 (p. 50) ; "stated broadly the 
position is that the Japanese manufacturers are supplying 
longcloth and shirtings which are only slightly inferior to 
Lancashire/ 
Lancashire goods at prices which are distinctly lower than 
those of the latter and differ very little from the cost of 
manufacture alone of Indian goods to which their quality is 
distinctly superior ". 
It now remains to examine how the decline in the total 
imports of cotton piecegoods affected the import trade in the 
different classes of Grey, White, and Coloured goods. The 
following table gives the figures of the imports of Grey goods. 
There is a difficulty in this case because there are not 
separate figures of Indian mill production of Grey and White 
goods. The two are lumped together. Mr G.S. Hardy, the 
Cotton Tariff Officer, Calcutta, estimated that not more than 
consists of- 
1; of the piecegoods classed as grey and bleached -e bleached goods. 
The Tariff Board Report of the Indian Cotton Mill Industry in 
1932 felt constrained to say - "le believe on the evidence 
we have received in this inquiry that the output of bleached 
goods in India was considerably underestimated by Mr Hardy''. 
(p. 144). When, a little later, the figures of imports of 
bleached goods are given it will be seen that they are com- 
paratively steady and that seems to warrant the conclusion 
that bleached goods, even if not so low as estimated by 
Mr Hardy, constituted a very small part of the total of 
Grey and White goods produced by Indian mills. 
GREY GOODS. 
Years. Imports of Grey Goods. 
Production by Indian Mills 
of Grey & Bleached Goods. 
in million yards. in million yards. 
Pre-war 
average 1,331 
1913 -14 1,534 4 1,164 
1919 -20 534 1,640 
1920 -21 580 1,580 
1921 -22 636 1,731 
1922 -23 931 1,725 
1923 -24 704 1,701 
1924 -25 846 1,970 
1925 -26 709 1,954 
1926 -27 748 2,258 
1927 -28 876 2,356 
1928 -29 839 1,893 
1929 -30 926 2,419 
1930 -31 365 2,561 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
Before coming to a conclusion about the import trade in 
Grey goods it would be well to consider along with the table 
given above the share of the United Kingdom and Japan in the 
import trade in Grey goods and the declared value of imports 
and exports of Grey goods. 
Years. 
Percentage Shares 
in Grey Goods Imports. 
Declared Values 
of Imports & Exports 
of Grey Goods per yard. 
United Kingdom. Japan. Imports. Exports. 
Rs- as -ps. Rs- as -ps. 
1913 -14 98.8 .5 0- 2- 8 0- 2- 7 
1919 -20 87.1 11.8 0- 6- 9 0- 6- 4 
1920 -21 72.4 25.9 0- 7- 4 0- 7- 4 
1921 -22 82.8 13.1 0- 5- 8 0- 6- 6 
1922 -23 89.5 9.6 0- 5- 3 0- 5 -11 
1923 -24 85.2 13.9 0- 5- 3 0- 5- 3 
1924 -25 86 13 0- 5- 5 0- 4 -10 
1925 -26 79.2 20.1 0- 4 -11 0- 4- 5 
1926 -27 78.7 20.7 0- 4- 2 0- 4 -10 
1927 -28 74.4 24.5 0- 3 -11 0- 4- 9 
1928 -29 69.4 28.8 0- 3 -10 0. 4 -10 
1929 -30 56.2 42.5 0- 3- 7 0- 4- 8 
1930 -31 39.2 59.8 0- 3- 0 0- 4- 4 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
Putting these two tables together it seems fair to con- 
clude that the decline in the import trade in Grey goods seems 
to have been made up by increased Indian mill production. The 
loss of the import trade in this line has been a very big one. 
Part of the reason of this big decline is to be found in the 
statement of the Report of the Tariff Board Inquiry into the 
Indian/ 
Indian Cotton i.!i11 Industry in 1926. On page 47 it says - 
"the Japanese are not finding the trade in piecegoods of the 
coarser counts as profitable as formerly and are turning 
their attention more and more to the finer counts and the 
coloured goods for which there is a. better market in Calcutta 
and Rangoon respectively ". Even so it must be said that it 
is the increasing share of Japan in this line of goods in the 
import trade and the evidence of it in the big fall in the 
declared values of imports per yard which was lower than that 
of the declared value of Indian production of like kind which 
not only reduced India's export trade in Grey goods but gave 
a life to the import trade in Grey goods which they otherwise 
would not have had. If the depression year, 1930 -31, is 
left out, the average of the import trade in Grey goods during 
the period 1919 -20 to 1929 -30 was 57 of the pre -war average 
of Grey goods imports. 
The following table gives the figures of imports of 
White goods and the shares in the import trade in this class 
of goods of the United Kingdom and Japan. 
Imports of White Goods Percentage Shares 
Years. in million yards. in White Goods Imports. 
United Kingdom. Japan. 
Pre-war 
average 654 98.3 
1913 -14 793 98 -5 
1919 -20 322 96.6 0.9 
1920 -21 422 96.9 0.9 
1921 -22 306 97.8 0.6 
Imports. United Kingdom. Japan. 
1922-23 402 98.2 0.6 
1923 -24 415 97.0 0.6 
1924-25 549 97.1 0.8 
1925-26 465 96.0 1.0 
1926 -27 571 96.4 0.5 
1927 -28 556 94.7 1.0 
1928 -29 554 94.8 1.0 
1929 -30 474 92.1 2.9 
1930 -31 365 84.6 10.3 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31) . 
The absence of any serious Japanese competition and the 
fact that Indian mills produced comparatively small quantities 
of "(bite goods have served to make the import trade in this 
line of cloth more stable. It will be seen that the rise in 
prices of white goods over the pre -war level was much higher 
than that of Grey goods, hence the import trade, if it shows 
stability, certainly lacks elasticity. The decline in 1930 -31 
was comparatively mild in the case of these goods compared to 
that of Grey goods for which the specific duty was specially 
devised. The average of imports of White goods during 1919 -20 
to 1929 -30 was 70% of the pre -war average of imports of these 
goods. 
To get a. concrete idea of the trend of the trade in Grey 
and White goods certain main items of the trade may briefly 
be considered. The following table gives the figures of 
imports/ 
imports of Grey and White goods imports under the class of 
Longcloth and Shirting and the internal production of these 
goods by the mills in India. 
LONGCLOTH & SHIRTING. 
in million. yards. 
Years. Imports. Indian Rill Production. 
Grey . White . Grey, & White. 
1913 -14 545 115 292 
1919 -20 114 77 444 
1920 -21 181.9 108.5 456.2 
1921 -22 129.4 48.2 487.0 
1922 -23 280 69.4 470.6 
1923 -24 119 67 443.5 
1924 -25 206 122.7 525.5 
1925 -26 171.3 93.8 521.1 
1926 -27 168.8 97.4 580.5 
1927-28 233.4 112.1 620.0 
1928 -29 252.0 123.0 472.2 
1929 -30 340.1 104.0 585.2 
1930 -31 166.3 71..9 642.2 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31) . 
It is clear that in the production of Longcloth and 
Shirting Indian mills got a good start during the war period 
which they consolidated and improved upon in the post -war 
period and thereby appropriated to themselves about 350 
million/ 
million yards of the import trade in these. The import trade 
in White goods in this class has been steadier if more in- 
elastic than that of Grey goods. Table XXXIV (p. 40) in the 
Tariff Board Report Inquiry into the Cotton P,ïill Industry in 
1932 gives the shares in million yards of the United Kingdom 





Total. Japan. China. Japan. 
1926 -27 71 97 - 168 91 1 97 
1927 -28 77 153 3 233 63 2 112 
1928 -29 48 191 12 252 112 3 123 
1929 -30 21 310 8 340 88 9 104 
1930 -31 5 159 2 166 50 18 72 
1931 -32 3 127 3 134 38 39 214 
The conclusion seems fairly clear. The Tariff Board 
summed it up thus - "In Grey Shirting and Longcloth the United 
Kingdom has lost practically the whole of her trade to Japan. 
The great fall in imports from Japan in. 1930 -31 reflects the in- 
fluence of the protective duties of that year for it is to that 
class of goods that the specific duty is applicable" ....p. 41. 
The increasing competition of Japan in ':White goods to which 
the specific duty does not apply is seen in the way imports 
from Japan increased while these from the United Kingdom de- 
clined. 
It is superfluous to multiply examples of the trade in 
the import trade in. Grey and Mite goods. The one given is 
a fair/ 
a fair sample of declining imports and the staying of the de- 
cline that Japanese competition represented. There was how- 
ever a difference in the import trade in the class of Grey 
and White goods consisting of Dhuties, sarees and scarves. 
After reviewing the figures of the import trade in Table 
XXXIII the Tariff Board Report of 1932 concludes by saying 
on p. 40 that the great decline in imports of both Grey and 
White goods in this class from the United Kingdom has been 
made good not by increased import from any other country 
but by increased production in Indian mills. Japan sent in- 
creased imports up to 1929 -30 ". 
Import Trade in Coloured Goods Piecegoods. 
The following are the figures of the import trade 
and internal mill production of Coloured Piecegoods in million 
yards. 
Years. Imports. Indian Mill Production. 
1913-14 832 291.9 
1919-20 208 475.7 
1920-21 489 451 
1921-22 138 446 
1922-23 244 453.5 
1923-24 347 503.6 
1924-25 407 588 
1925-26 366 540 
1926-27 447 681.5 
1927-28 505 681.5 
Imports. Indian Mill Production. 
1928 -29 507 483.7 
1929 -30 483 604.1 
1930 -31 246 556.6 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
A fuller idea of the factors influencing the two sets of 
figures given will be gathered from the percentage shares of 
the United Kingdom and Japan in the import trade and the de- 
clared values of imports and exports of coloured piecegoods. 
Years. 
Percentage Shares 
in the Import Trade 
in Coloured Piecegoods. 
Declared Values of 
Piecegoods per yard. 
United Kingdom. Japan. Imports. Exports. 
Rs -as -ps Rs -as -ps 
1913 -14 92.6 .2 0- 3- 5 0- 5- 0 
1919 -20 89.9 5 0- 9 -10 0- 7- 7 
1920 -21 91.8 3.3 0 -11- 4 0- 8- 7 
1921 -22 88 3.6 0- 8- 9 0- 7- 7 
1922 -23 86.9 6.3 0- 8- 3 0- 7- 6 
1923 -24 87.4 6.7 0-'8- 2 0- 6- 8 
1924 -25 83.1 10 0- 7 -10 0- 6- 5 
1925 -26 73.1 19 0- 6 -11 0- 6- 5 
1926 -27 71.1 19.2 0- 6- 2 0- 6- 1 
1927 -28 69.8 20.3 0- 5- 7 0- 6- 0 
1928 -29 66.2 21.7 0- 5- 6 0- 5 -11 
1929 -30 57.6 31.9 0- 5- 0 0- 5- 9 
1930 -31 60 30.2 0- 4- 5 0- 5- 7 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
In 1913 -14 imports of Coloured Piecegoods were almost 
three times the internal mill production. The gain of 
Indian mills in this line of production during the war period 
is seen in the advance of internal production figures over 
those of 1913 -14. The fall in the figures of internal pro- 
duction in 1920 -21 is to be mainly attributed to the big 
jump up of imports from 208 million yards in 1919 -20 to 489 
million yards in 1920 -21. This was, no doubt, caused by 
the high sterling exchange of that year. In 1921 -22 both 
imports and internal production declined as a result of the 
slump and fall in prices. The greater fall of imports is 
to be attributed to the boycott of that year. Thereafter 
both imports and internal production increased, imports more 
slowly than internal production, and the explanation of this 
difference lies in the lower prices of internal production 
compared to imported coloured goods. Japanese competition 
became serious after 1927 -28 and the effect of it is seen in 
the strength shown by import figures and the comparative 
weakness of the figures of internal production. The ex- 
planation of this lies in the prices of imported coloured 
goods which were lower than those internally produced. 
Partly also the weakness of internal production is to be 
attributed to the increased imports of artificial silk piece - 
goods which was to the extent of 42 million yards in 1926 -27 
and rose to 53 in 1927 -28 and to 56.6 in 1929 -30. Imports 
of coloured piecegoods fell by a half in 1930 -31 from what 
they/ 
they were in 1929 -30. How the decline in the imports of 
imported coloured piecegoods expressed itself in the differ- 
ent items of this trade can be realised from the following 
table of figures. 
IMPORTS OF COLOURED PIECEGOODS. 
in million yards. 
Years. 
Dhuties, sarees, 
and scarves. Cambrics. Shirtings. 
Prints and 
Chintz. 
1913 -14 115.2 113.6 152.6 209.7 
1919 -20 23.5 29.5 28 48.9 
1920 -21 42.4 54.3 71.6 114.7 
1921 -22 21.1 17.7 25.0 28.7 
1922 -23 24.8 36.2 38.2 44.7 
1923 -24 32.9 44.1 51.6 61.5 
1924 -25 46.0 44.5 69.3 59.5 
1925-26 29.9 34.7 72.5 56 
1926 -27 35.5 43.2 90.8 50.5 
1927-28 38.4 50.4 88.7 69.1 
1928 -29 36.3 49.7 95.0 75 
1929 -30 32.6 43.5 105.4 61 
1930 -31 19.1 20.5 54.7 33.7 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
It will be seen that the import trade in shirtings has 
shown less weakness than the other three items of the import 
trade. The Tariff Board Report of 1932 says on page 42 
"Japanese/ 
"Japanese competition is keen in printed drills, jeans, twills 
and shirtings; in dyed drills, jeans, cambrics, flannelettes 
and shirtings and in coloured woven drills, shirting and twills. 
The Japanese share in this trade rose from 10; in 1924 -25 to 
30; in 1930 -31. 
This concludes the survey of the import trade in Cotton 
manufactures during the period 1919 -20 to 1930 -31. 
II The Import Trade in Sugar, 1919 -1931. 
The importance of the import trade in Sugar will 
be realised from the following table of figures of (1) the 
import quantities in tons, (2) their values in crores of 
Rupees, and, (3) the percentage that these bore to the total 




Values. in the Import Trade. 
average 634,000 12.5 9 
1919 -20 408,700 21.84 11 
1920 -21 236,900 16.99 6 
1921 -22 717,600 26.78 12 
1922 -23 442,400 14.89 6 
1923 -24 411,500 14.78 7 
1924 -25 671,000 20.37 9 
1925 -26 732,600 15.20 7 
1926 -27 826,900 18.37 8 
1927 -28 725,800 14.50 6 
1928 -29 868,800 15.86 6 
1929 -30 939,600 15.51 6 
1930 -31 901,000 10.54 7 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1933 -34) . 
Before trying to understand the character of the Sugar 
import trade from the table given it would help to take 
account/ 
account of certain other developments which may be expected 
to have a bearing on the import trade in sugar. These are 
(1) that during the period the internal production of white 
sugar from cane and gur increased steadily. The extent of 
the increase can be realised from the following figures of 
the production. 
1923 -24 94,718 tons. 
1924 -25 67,398 
1925 -26 91,399 
1926 -27 121,026 
1927 -28 119,739 
1928 -29 99,088 
1929 -30 110,918 
1930 -31 151,120 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1933 -34, p. 62) . 
(2) The increase in the production no doubt was aided by the 
rising import duty on sugar. The non- protective special 
duty on sugar was raised from 10 ad valorem in 1919 -20 to 
15 in 1920 -21 and 25': in 1921 -22. In 1924 -25 this special 
ad valorem duty was changed into a specific duty of Rs. 4 -8 -0 
per cwt. for sugar above Dutch standard 23 and Rs. 4 -0 -0 for 
these between 8 and 23 Dutch standard. Those below paid the 
25;6 ad valorem rate. During 1929 -30 the specific duties 
were raised to Rm . 6 and Rs. 5 -8 -0 and the ad valorem rate of 
25V 
25 had a Rs. 1 -8 -0 charge tagged on to it. In 1930 -31 the 
rates were still further raised to Rs. 7/4 , Rs. 6/12 and the 
25 ad valorem rate plus Rs. 2 -12 -0. Such were the Revenue 
duties levied on sugar during the period. The Indian Tariff 
Board that inquired into the claim of the sugar industry of 
India for protection in 1931 gives the following figures of 
the duty levied per Maund of 87 lbs. and the annual average 
price of Java White sugar per Maund at Calcutta. 
Years. Duty per Maund. 







1921-22 2- 2- 5 16- 8- 0 
1922-23 3- 2- 0 15- 9- 9 
1923-24 3- 9-10 18- 0- 8 
1924-25 2-13- 0 14- 1- 7 
1925-26 3- 4- 9 10-13- 9 
1926-27 3* 4- 9 11*13-11 
1927-28 3- 4- 9 10- 6- 0 
1928-29 3- 4- 9 9-12- 6 
1929-30 3- 4- 9 9- 0- 2 
1930-31 4- 6- 5 
The strength of the import trade in sugar during the 
period was due to the fact that in spite of increasing duties 
the average selling price of sugar in Calcutta fell to less 
than a third between 1920 -21 and 1930 -31 and this stimulated 
the consumption of sugar and gave strength to the import 
trade/ 
trade in spite of the internal production of sugar. The 
Tariff Board Report of 1931 on the Sugar Industry, dealing 
with the fall in price of sugar, observes on page 23 - in 
particular the increase of duty of Rs. 1 -8 -0 per cwt. in 
March, 1930, does not appear to be fully reflected in the 
price" . According to it the price per Maund of Java White 
sugar stood in Calcutta at Rs. 8 -3 -6 in February, 1930, and 
after the increase of duty rose to Rs. 8 -14 -6 in Yarch and 
Rs. 9 -1 -6 in April, that is an increase of 11 and 14 annas 
a maund respectively against an increase in duty of Rs. 1 -i -0 
per maund. Thus the fall in the price of sugar during the 
period, while it increased the quantity of the imports, reduced 
their value and the percentap :e that the value of sugar imports 
bore to the total import trade in merchandise. 
For an explanation of the fall in the price of sugar 
which was a feature of the period as a whole one must turn to 
the world production and consumption of sugar. The following 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The position outlined by the figures of production out- 
running consumption, was, in a sense a product of the war when 
the decline of Central European Beet production led to in- 
crease of cane sugar production, especially in Cuba and Java. 
In addition to the extension of the area under sugar -cene 
there was brought about in these countries a rapid reduction 
of costs following the introduction o,f a high -yielding variety 
of cane, Java P.O. J2878, and the installation of improved 
milling, 
me.l.ti.ng machinery. At the same time production of cane sugar 
increased enormously in the Philippines, in Hawaii, and Porto - 
rico and Formosa protected by Tariffs. Protected also by 
steep tariffs, Central Europe began, after the war, turning 
out increased sugar-beet crops. This so far as production 
is concerned. 
Of sugar consum:ption_,the Imperial Sugar -cane Research 
th a. t 
Conference, /?yet in London in 1931, said "the average annual 
increase in world consumption of sugar for several decndes 
before the war was at the rate of about 33. the war 
it has averaged about 4 /0 but bas recently shown a tendency 
to return to the pre -war rate". (p. 16). 
Apart from conditions of world production and consumption 
there was another important feature that affected the sugar 
trade and that is that the actual free market for sugar, came, 
in the post -war period, to be severely restricted. It was 
restricted by import pro .ibitions, as in the case of Australia, 
and by protection and preferences almost everywhere else. 
Yet/ 
Yet another feature influencing the sugar trade and sugar 
prices was referred to by the London Conference mentioned al- 
ready. On page 60 of that report there is the following: - 
"In the former easy conditions of the sugar industry and es- 
pecially in the days of sailing vessels freight was a com- 
paratively unimportant factor But with 
increasing competition and even higher steamer charges a 
sugar market was limited by distance". This explains how 
the Indian merket came to be aa 1 almost the monopoly 
of Java. 
In the light of all these facts the free market for 
sugar in the post -war period came to be estimated by Prinsen 
Geerligs at 3,400,000 metric tons. Under the circumstances 
"even. a small excess in a world production which amounts to 
28 million tons, if faced with a restricted market, may re- 
sult in a completely disproportionate fall of prices ". (p. 9). 
"Indian Tariff Board Sugar Report, 1931". The following 
table gives the annual surplus or deficiency in world sugar 





Average Spot Price 
in New York 
excluding Duty 
Calendar Year. Cents per Lb. 
1924 - 191 4 
1925 +1,513 2.3 
1926 +1,284 2.3 
1927 - 182 2.7 
1928 + 75 2.2 
1929 +1,358 1.8 
1930 41,472 1.4 
1931 +2,595 1 .4 
1932 + 927 0.9 
(source : - p. 852, "Economist" April 22, 1933). 
The Indian tariff impositions on imported sugar during 
the period were intended partly for Revenue purposes and 
partly also to help the Indian sugar industry to rear itself 
and partly as a help to the grower of cane in India "seeing 
that of the cost of producing white sugar direct from cane 
about two -thirds may be taken to represent the cost of cane 
delivered at factory, which in the case of Gur manufacture 
is even higher ". (Indian Tariff Board Report, 1931). The 
Tariff Board of 1931 that inquired into the sugar industry 
in India was convinced that the sugar industry satisfied all 
the conditions laid down by the Indian Fiscal Commission of 
1922 for the grant of protection and granted it. Although 
the bulk of the consumption in the country was of gur and not 
sugar, the steady increase in the import of sugar during the 
30 years from 1900 -1930 makes it clear that as the Tariff 
Board Report puts it "that gur, however plentiful, does not 
replace sugar to any material extent and that only by the 
manufacture of white sugar in India by modern methods can 
imports of foreign sugar be reduced". (p. 25) . 
The following index numbers of wholesale prices of 
sugar help to show the influence of the duties levied in 
India/ 
India on the price of sugar in spite of the large fall in the 
declared value of imports. 
WHOLESATR PRICES. 
Years. 






































(source:- U.K. table 81 p. 27 
Imperial Sugar -cane Research Conference 1931 London, 
India - "Review of the Trade of India ") . 
III The Import Trade in Mineral 011, 1919 -1931. 
In the study here of the import trade in merchandise 
there are two more items to be considered before bringing it 
to a close. These are the import trade in Mineral Oil and 
the import trade in Iron and Steel. The former may be con- 
sidered first although it will be seen that from the point of 
view of value and even of economic importance it should really 
come after the consideration of the import trade in iron and 
steel. 
It has been seen that imports under the head of 
Mineral Oil consist of items such as (1) Kerosene oil which 
is an article of general use in the country, and, (2) fuel 
and batching oils which during the period under review were 
of growing importance in a way they were not in the pre -war 
period. The importance of the import trade in this group 
of imports can be gathered from the following figures of 
their percentage shares in the value of the import trade in 
merchandise as a whole. 
PERCENTAGE OF MINERAL OIL IMPORTS IN THE TOTAL VALUE 
OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS. 
Pre -war average 3 
1919 -20 4 
1920 -21 2 
1921 -22 3 
1922 -23 3 
1923 -24 4 
1924 -25 4 
1925 -26 4 
1926 -27 4 
1927 -28 4 
1928 -29 4 
1929 -30 5 
1930 -31 6.6 
(source : - "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
Mineral Oil imports it will be seen belong to the class 
of imports that, during the period, have improved their 
position in the import trade, steadily rising from a value 
of to 6.6 in the last year of the period. 
The following table gives the percentage shares of the 
different items in the import trade in Mineral Oils. 
PERCENTAGE. SHARES. 
Lubricating Oil. Kerosene. Fuel Oils. 
1923 -24 38 48 11 
1924 -25 38 48 11 
1925 -26 39 47 11 
1926 -27 35 49 13 
1927 -28 41 46 11 
1928 -29 43 43 11 
1929 -30 42 43 11 
1930 -31 41 44 11 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" for the period) . 
Of the three items referred to here, which are the out- 
standing items in the import trade in Mineral Oil, Kerosene 
from the point of view of value is easily the most important 
even thouEt its percentage share is less than that of fuel 
oil. The increase in the percentage share of Kerosene oil 
imports may be expected materially to influence the value of 
total imports of Mineral Oil imports. 
The increase in the total volume and value of Mineral 
Oil imports are given in the table below, along with separate 
figures of the imports of Kerosene oil and their values. 
Mineral Oil Kerosene.Oil 
Imports Values Imports Values 
in Millions in crores in Millions in crores 
Years. of Gallons. of Rupees. Of Gallons. of Rupees. 
1913 -14 95 4.12 68.8 2.8 
1919 -20 144.5 9.26 94.1 6.62 
1920 -21 125.9 8.34 57.2 4.31 
1921 -22 122.9 7.3 46.5 3.46 
1922-23 132.9 6.8 50 3.38 
1923 -24 169 8.4 69 4.42 
1924 -25 187 9.4 72 4.77 
1925 -26 200 10.05 79 5.17 
1926 -27 183 8.89 64 4.3 
1927 -28 232 10.44 94 5.39 
1928 -29 242 10.70 104.6 5.76 
1929 -30 253 11.04 106.5 5.88 
1930 -31 242.5 10.48 98.9 5.34 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
So far as the Mineral Oil import trade is concerned, 
the striking feature in it has been the remarkable growth 
during the period of the import trade in Fuel oil. In 
1913 -14 out of the total Mineral oil imports of 95 million 
gallons, 69 million gallons were Kerosene oil and 7.8 million 
gallons were fuel oil. In 1919 -20 fuel oil imports rose to 
34 million gallons and with steady increase imports amounted 
to 110 million gallons in 1929 -30 with a value of 2.09 crores. 
Even in spite of the striking increase in the imports of 
fuel oil, Kerosene oil retained its place as the most important 
item of the import trade in Mineral oil. It may seem, when 
considering the import trade in Mineral oil during the pre -war 
period, that the steady increase in the coast -wise imports of 
Burma oil into India made foreign imports have a slightly 
downward trend in the import trade in Kerosene. In the post- 
war period the position was the other way about. Foreign 
imports of Kerosene oil showed more strength than the coast- 
wise imports from Burma. The fact that imports from Burma 
were not able to improve their figures rather suggests the 
thought that it was not capable of any greater expansion and 
from the point of view of increasing supply. 
was almost at the end of its tether The following tables 
showing figures of world production of crude oil and the 
Indian production which includes the production of Burma 
lends weight to that idea. 
World Production 
of Crude Oil in Barrels of 
Annual Output of Crude Oil 
in India including Burma 
42 U.S. Gallons. in Million Gallons. 
1919 545 Million Barrels 306 Million Gallons. 
1920 693 " " 283 tt it 
1921 765 It tt 306 " II 
1922 851 
If If 
298 If It 
1923 1018.6 " It 294 tt " 
1924 1013.6 " tt 294 It It 
1925 1067 " It 289 If If 
1926 1098 tt It 280 't It 
1927 1254 " 
It 
281 t' It 
1928 1322 tt tt 
1929 1484 tt it 
1930 1403 tt It 
(source:- "Economist Commercial Review and History" 
for each year). 
The following table gives the total Indian consumption of 
Kerosene, their index number and the percentage share of it 
contributed by Burma and foreign countries. (1900 -1 base - 100). 
Years. 
Supply available 
for Consumption ó supplied 
in India Index by Indian " of 
in Million Gallons. Number. Production. Imports. 
1921-22 164.47 209 72 27.9 
1922-23 174 221.6 71 28.3 
1923-24 200 254.6 67.6 32.4 
1924-25 205 261.1 65.3 34.7 
1925-26 216 274.7 64 36 
1926-27 205 261.7 69 30.8 
1927-28 228 290.8 59 40.8 
1928-29 215 273.6 52 48 
1929-30 250 318 57.8 42.2 
1930-31 227.8 289 57 43 
(source:- p. 808 "The Statistical Abstract for British India" 
1921 -1931). 
So far as the import trade of India in Kerosene oil is 
concerned it seems fair to conclude that it was influenced 
mainly by the increase of the world supply of oil and the 
inelasticity of Burma production. In an article on the 
world's oil resources ( "Economist" p. 201, January 29, 1927) 
the world's supply of oil is estimated as having increased 
at the following rates. 
Increase in the World's Supply of Mineral Oil. 
1912 = 9%. 1913 = 4;ó. 1915 = 5b. 1916 10;% 
1917 = 2%. 1918 a 8%. 1919 e 26%. 1920 = 12 . 
1921 9% 1922 = 18%. 1923 = O.C. 1924 = 5%. 
1925 = 0.2%. 
About 80.E of the world's supply of oil belonged to the 
U.S.A. but the share of other countries was also expanding 
as, for example, during 1923 -26 the share of other countries 
expanded from 14% to 21%. The figures of world production 
given/ 
given already help to realise how the increase in the pro- 
duction was kept up during the remainder of the 1919 -1931 
period. This provides the clue to the increase in the im- 
port trade of India in Kerosene oil. 
Kerosene oil, being an article of general consumption, 
it naturally was subject to Revenue tariffs and the changes 
in the Revenue tariffs may be noted here. The import duty 
on Petroleum was 1 anna 6 pies per gallon from 1910. In 
1917 the duty was raised to 2 annas 6 pies and an excise duty, 
which had not been imposed till then, was levied in 1922 -23 
of one anna, and this was raised to 1 anna 6 pies when the 
import duty was lowered to 2 annas 3 pies in 1930. The 
duties in Motor Spirit were raised from 4 annas per gallon 
in 1924 -25 to 6 annas in 1928 -29 and to 8 annas in 1930 -31. 
Imports of Botching oil had a duty of Rs. 10 per ton imposed 
in 1925 -26 and this was raised to Rs. 12 -8 -0 per ton in 
1930 -31. The import revenue from i;'ineral oil rose from 
1 crore in 1919 -20 to 2.11 crores in 1930 -31. This is a 
fair index to the expansion of the import trade during the 
period. 
Even in spite of a world consumption expanding in a very 
healthy way, over- production became serious in the latter 
part of the period under review and resulted in a Rate war 
during 1927 -28 which stimulated imports. It will be seen 
by a reference to the figures of imports of Kerosene that 
foreign imports increased in that year by 30 million gallons. 
In the/ 
In the pre -war period the price -war between the Burma Oil 
Company and the Shell Group led to an understanding by which 
the Shell Group was to make up any deficiency of supply 
should the resources of the Burma Oil Company not be able to 
meet the Indian demand. The importing of Russian oil into 
India by the Standard Oil Company in 1927 led to a price -war 
initiated by the Shell Group which was the unit whose trade 
would suffer by the incursion of the Standard Oil Company 
into the Indian market. When the incursion took place the 
Indian Mineral Oil Companies applied for protection to the 
Tariff Board in India which was turned down. An agreement 
between the warring companies was formed in 1928. That 
Tariff Board Inquiry estimated the annual burden on the 
consumers in India of the monopoly of the oil companies, at 
Rs. 5 crores per annum. (p. 88). In spite of large in- 
creases in the world production of oil one index to the 
large monopoly element in the production and sale of it is 
seen by the fact that, throughout the period under review, 
the average declared value of Kerosene oil imports kept well 
above the declared value of 1913 -14. The following table 
gives the figures of the annual averare declared value of 
imports of Kerosene oil per gallon;- 
Declared Value of Kerosene Oil per Gallon - Annual Average. 
Rs- as -ps. 
1913 -14 0- 6- 8 
1919 -20 0 -11- 3 
1920 -21 0 -12- 1 
1921 -22 0 -11- 1 
1922 -23 0 -10- 9 
1923-24 0 -10- 3 
1924 -25 0 -10- 8 
1925 -26 0 -10- 5 
1926 -27 0 -10- 9 
1927 -28 0- 9- 3 
1928 -29 0- 8- 9 
1929 -30 0- 8 -10 
1930 -31 0- 8- 8 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 - 1931). 
IV The Import Trade in Iron and Steel, 1919 -1931. 
The import trade in Iron and Steel was not included 
in the survey of the import trade of India in merchandise in 
the pre -war period. In the post -war period this item of the 
import trade acquired, as a result of various developments, an 
interest and importance that demands its inclusion in it. 
Some of the developments that have contributed to invest the 
import trade in Iron and Steel with a larger interest and 
greater importance in this period are the following : - (1) 
From the point of view of value the trade in this has acquired 
a greater importance in the import trade. The following 
table gives the value in crores of Rupees and the percentage 
share of this in the total import trade in merchandise into 
India and the quantities in tons of imports of Iron and Steel 
and manufactures thereof:- 
Quantities Value in crores 
of these Values to 
total values of 
Years. in tons. of Rupees. Merchandi se Imports. 
Pre -war 
average 808,000 12.48 7 
1913 -14 1,016,000 16.00 
1919 -20 427,000 16.32 8 
1920 -21 712,000 31.29 9 
1921-22 613,000 21.13 8 
1922 -23 746,000 18.37 8 
1923 -24 756,000 17.92 8 
1924 -25 869,000 18.93 8 
1925 -26 884,000 18.06 8 
1926 -27 845,000 16.75 7 
1927 -28 1,197,000 21.43 9 
1928 -29 1,170,000 20.24 8 
1929 -30 973,000 17.20 7 
1930 -31 614,000 10.88 7 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31) . 
In the post -war period India consumed a larger quantity 
of Iron and Steel manufactures than in the pre -war period. 
That was because the post -war period was a period of pros- 
perity in India except towards the end of the period. It 
was a period also when the pace of industrial development 
was quickened. In the pre -war period the country relied ex- 
clusively on imports for Iron and Steel manufactures and the 
need of the country was recognised by keeping the revenue 
tariff on these imports as low as 1? ad valorem. Towards 
the close of the pre -war period an Indian Iron and Steel 
company came into being and, with the stimulus given by the 
war, began rapidly to rear itself. In the post -war period 
the orientation of the economic policy of the country in the 
light of the necessity of industrial development led to a 
recognition of the view that this Indian industry should have 
the first claim to supply the Indian market with iron and 
steel goods. This led to the grant of protection for it. 
In the pre -war period 60 of the imports of iron and steel 
into India came from the United Kingdom. In the post -war 
period there was a far greater competition for the Indian 
market 
market. The grant of protection to the Indian Iron and Steel 
Industry accelerated the pace of its development and its out- 
put. These then justify and explain the inclusion of this 
item of the import trade in a survey of the import trade of 
the post -war period and its non -inclusion in that of the pre- 
war period. 
Before going on to consider the trade in detail it would 
help to take account of the Tariff changes affecting the im- 
ports of Iron and Steel during the period. In 1894 an import 
duty of l ad valorem was imposed on imports of Iron and Steel 
and manufactures thereof. This duty was much lower than the 
general 5jß ad valorem rate of the time and was so because it 
was felt that higher duties might impede the development of 
the country. In 1916 the duty was raised to 2K and in 1922 
to 10. After the findings of the Indian Fiscal Commission) 
the Iron and Steel industry in India was the first to apply 
for the grant of protection against imports. The Indian 
Tariff Board that inquired into the claim of this industry 
for protection was satisfied that on the principles laid 
down by the Indian Fiscal Commission the industry was entitled 
to protection and recommended that, to bridge the differences 
between the price at which these imports are likely to enter 
India without a duty and the price which gives the Indian 
manufacturer a fair return on his capital, protective duties 
should be imposed and, in the case of rails, bounties also 
granted. The duties proposed for the principal products 
compared/ 
compared to the then existing position is summarised as under - 
Prices at which 
Steel is likely 
to enter India Existing 
without a Duty. 105 Tariff. Proposed Tariff. . 
Rs. per ton. Rs. per ton. Rs. per ton. 
Bars 
Angles, Beams, 
140 13.8 to 15 40 
channels 145 15 30 
Rails 30 lbs. & over 140 14 14 
plus bounty. 
Plates - ordinary 150 15 30 
Sheets - Blacl' 200 17.8 to 40 30 
Sheets - galvanised. 300 30 to 42 -8 -0 45 
( "Report of the Tariff Board Inquiry Report" 1924). 
In broad effect the proposal amounted to a doubling of 
the 10: ad valoren rate which ruled up to that time. The 
Steel Industry (Protection) Act rIV of 1924 care into force 
from the 13th June, 1924. The proposals were limited to a 
period of 3 years because of the uncertainty of the course 
of world prices and the probability of a fall in the cost of 
production. 
As enacted, a fresh inquiry into the protection necessary 
for the Indian Steel Industry was undertaken by the Tariff 
Board in 1926. This became necessary because the protection 
afforded became ineffective and inadequate with the continued 
depression in the steel industry in Europe, the continually 
depreciating/ 
depreciating exchanges and the rise in the value of the Rupee. 
The features of its recommendation were (1) a continuance of 
protection on the lines recommended for a further period of 
seven years, (2) the system of bounties to be abolished and 
protection was to be afforded by means of customs duties 
only, (3) a double scale of duties was proposed, that is (a) 
a basic duty with reference to the price of British steel and 
leviable on steel coming from all countries, and (b) an ad- 
ditional duty based on the difference between British and 
Continental prices and leviable on non -British steel only. 
The differential duties as between British and non -British 
steel was defended by the Board by saying - 'bur enquiry is 
confined to economic issues and if a system of differential 
duties is desirable in the interests of India on economic 
grounds we do not feel debarred by politi- 
cal considerations from recommending it ". The Board main- 
tained that in their opinion these differential duties were 
necessary "in order to secure an equitable distribution of 
the burden over the different classes of consumers and to 
ensure the stability of the scheme of protection". (1926 
Steel Report). The new duties compared with the existing 






New Duties. Existing Duties. 
Basic. Additional. 
Rs. per ton. Rs. per ton. Rs. per ton. 
13 14 
plus bounties. 
6 (min.) - 14 
plus bounties. 
19 11 30 
Galvanised 
sheets 38 - 45 
Bars 26 11 40 
Black Sheets 35 24 30 
Plates 20 16 30 
The Board also recommended that the basic duty should 
not be modified until after a statutory enquiry to be held 
not earlier than 1933 -34 but suggested that the Governor 
General in. Council should be vested with power to vary the 
additional duty in either direction on a consideration of 
variations in the price of non -British steel. `Ihe Board 
proposed very little material change in the list of protec- 
ted Iron and Steel manufactures except that in the case of 
plates and sheets the protection was proposed to be extended 
to chequered plates and to sheets of all descriptions, ex- 
cluding those coated with metal other than tin or zinc. 
In the case of these plates the protective duty was to be 
reduced from Rs. 85 to Rs. 48 per ton. The Bill embodying 
the se/ 
these proposals came into force on the 1st April, 1927. In 
view of the Protective Measure of 1924 and that of 1927 it 
is imperative to see how the import trade into India of Iron 
and Steel Manufactures was distributed among the exporting 
countries. The following table gives the shares through 
the period 1919 -20 to 1930 -31 of the exporting countries in 
the Indian import trade in Iron and Steel Manufactures. 
SHARES OF THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN THE INDIAN IMPORT TRADE 
IN IRON AND STEEL AND T +MANUFACTU. + S THEREOF. 
U.K. Germany. Belgium. U.S.A. 
1913 -14 59.8 19.6 17 2.2 
1919-20 63 .2 3.1 32 
1920 -21 70 2.1 9.7 16 
1921-22 45.7 9.8 26 13.7 
1922 -23 48.1 12.1 30.7 5.1 
1923 -24 56.7 8 28.7 2.4 
1924 -25 50.5 10 31.4 2 
1925 -26 55.3 7.8 25.9 2.6 
1926 -27 48 9.3 30.4 3.4 
1927 -28 57.2 6.6 26.4 1.4 
1928 -29 55.5 6.0 28.5 1.5 
1929 -30 49.9 6.0 32.1 1.6 
1930 -31 43.8 7.2 33.7 2.4 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31) . 
It has been seen already that the protection given to 
the Indian steel industry was intended only to equalise costs 
so as to help an infant industry to rear itself. The figures 
of the import trade in iron and steel have also been given and 
reveal that the tariffs did not prevent imports from increasing. 
A survey of the shares of the different countries in the 
import trade in iron and steel manufactures shows that, in 
spite of differential duties, the share of the United Kingdom 
in the import trade declined from 6O. in 1913 -14 to 50; in 
1929 -30 and 44, 1930-31. It seep t F. fairly obvious that 
what the United Kingdom lost Belgium gained. The truth was 
that in the post -war period the British Iron and Steel indus- 
try was in a state of depression. In the immediate post -war 
years, especially the years following the slump of 1920 -21 and 
reconstruction in Central Europe, the shares of the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Belgium in the Indian iron and steel im- 
port trade advanced at the expense of the U.S.A. The share 
of the latter fell from 32;: in 1919 -20 to 2 in 1924 -25. 
Obviously under peace conditions all the European competitors 
of the U.S.A. in the Indian import trade in iron and steel 
may be expected to be in a position of advantage,compared to 
the U.S.A., in the Indian market, as a matter of nearness.- 
Besides the U.S.A., having thrown off the effects 
of the slump earlier than European countries, had a good home 
market to concentrate on. After 1924 -25 the progress of 
Belgium and Gern any in the Indian trade was at the expense of 
the/ 
the United 1 <ingdom. It will be seen that in 1924, the year 
when for the first time protection was granted to the Indian 
steel industry, imports of iron and steel into India rose by 
115,000 tons stimulated by rising exchange and in anticipation 
of the new duties. The share of the United Kingdom fell by 
6.2 in that year and that of Germany rose by 2,4 and of Belgium 
by 2.71: . 1926, the year of the general and coal strikes, 
also depressed the share of the United Kingdom in the Indian 
trade and saw the shares of Belgium and Germany advance. 
The differential duties devised by the Tariff Board helped 
to strengthen the share of the United Kingdom but the United 
Kingdom did not seem able to consolidate the position for by 
1930 -31 her share touched the lowest water -mark of 43.8, with. 
Belgiur only 1O;Ó behind her. The reason why the United 
Kingdom was not able to consolidate the advantages which she 
got during 1923 -24, the year of the occupation of the Ruhr 
by France, and following 1927, when differential duties were 
imposed giving her the advantage, was really due to the de- 
pressed state of the British steel industry in the post -:^gar 
period. The roots of the depression go back into the war 
period when production was greatly expanded in all the pro- 
ducing countries to meet the war demand. The result was 
that "the aggregate production capacity of continental Europe 
is almost 50 greater that it was in 1913. So is the 
British capacity. The American increase is probably 60 ". 
( "Economist" p. 382, September, 1, 1928). The reason for 
the/ 
the depression of the British iron and steel industry is "not 
primarily due to lack of demand" but "to causes which enable 
the total demand to be met to an increasing extent from foreign 
sources". ( "The Iron and Steel Industry since the War" p. 383, 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Part III, 1930, 
Y. S. Birkett) . These causes have been made out to be "the 
advantages continental producers possess in lower capital 
charges, lower charges for rates, taxes and social services, 
the disparity in the internal and external purchasing power 
of French and Belgian currencies, and especially the laver 
wages and longer hours worked on the Continent. Wages on 
the Continent have a tendency to rise but even now the rates 
paid in the U.K. are 337 higher than those prevailing in 
Germany which in turn are higher than those in France and 
Belgium ". ( "Iron and Steel in 1928" p. 331, February 16, 
1929, "Economist "). This is enough to suggest the explanation 
of the decline in the strength of the United Kingdom in the 
import trade in iron and steel manufactures. The Tariff 
Board reports on the increase of the steel duties in 1924 and 
all the other reports of later inquiries into the steel in- 
dustry give the figures of the disparity of prices between 
British and Continental steel. 
A consideration of the main items of the import trade in 
iron and steel may now be taken up. The post-war period saw 
India change from being an importer of pig -iron to being an 
exporter. Pig -iron imports amounted to nearly 13,000 tons 
in 1913 -14/ 
in 1913 -14 and nearly doubled themselves in 1921 -22. They 
fell to a half of this in 1922 -23 and a third of this reduced 
figure in 1923 -24 at which figure they maintained themselves 
for the rest of the period. 
Pig -iron. 
The production of pig -iron in India during the post- 
war period rose from 358,000 tons in 1920 -21 steadily to 
1,376,000 tons in 1929 -30 and exports increased from 42,000 
tons in 1919 -20 to 569,000 tons in. 1929 -30. Thus in the pro- 
duction of pig -iron, which is the first step in the develop- 
ment of an indigenous heavy industry, India was able to show 
tangible results. This development was aided by a 10; 
revenue duty on pig -iron imports which enabled the Indian 
supply to capture the home market. India produced during 
the period a supply of pig -iron that needed an export market 
to take it off. This was also possible mainly because during 
the period the older iron and steel industries of other coun- 
tries in the world began to concentrate on the production of 
finished steel manufactures and found it worth while to im- 
port pig -iron and fabricate it rather than to produce it 
themselves. "The Report of the Indian Tariff Board on the 
Removal of the Revenue Duty on Pig -iron" gives, on page 3, 
Rupees 6'7 as the C.I.F. landed price of imported pig-iron 
and the average price realised for exported pig -iron was 
Rs. 42 per ton for the i ysore Iron work (p. 10) . The Tata 
Iron and Steel Company during the eleven months of 1928 -29 
exported/ 
exported to foreign countries 103,424 tons for which it realised 
Rs. 38 -4 -4 per ton (p. 7). Even if this export price was a 
depressed price due to having to export it still reveals a 
substantial difference in costs of productions of pig -iron in 
India and its export markets, which was the reason for such 
a striking development of an export trade in pig -iron. 
During the period the markets for India's pig -iron were main- 
ly Japan, Australia, New Zealand and to a certain extent the 
United States of America. 
Galvanised Sheets. 
Quite the most important item in the import trade 
in iron and steel and manufactures thereof is that of Gal- 
vanised Sheets. Imports of this commodity amounted to 
278,000 tons in 1913 -14 and in 1925 -26 to 283,000 tons and 
reached the record figure of 331,000 tons in 1927 -28. There- 
after it steadily declined till it reached 147,000 tons in 
1930 -31. It could, therefore, be said that imports of gal- 
vanised sheets averaged about between 20; : and 25 of the 
total imports of iron and steel. Of the demand in India 
for this commodity the Indian Tariff Board Report on Addition- 
al Protection to Galvanised Sheets in 1930 wrote as follows 
"We have carefully considered the trade returns with a view 
to ascertaining to what extent the demand for galvanised 
sheets is influenced by price. It is quite clear that the 
demand is a fluctuating one and depends not so much on price 
as on industrial development, Railway expansion, and the out - 
turn and price of certain crops particularly Jute and Rice the 
prevailing/ 
prevailing crops in those districts in which galvanised 
sheet is mainly used. The demand for galvanised sheets 
can frequently be postponed and when depression exists in 
certain trades the demand falls off. Similarly the culti- 
vator replenishes his requirements of galvanised sheets in 
those years in which his crops are good and prices satisfac- 
tory, in years of bad crops he makes no purchase however 
favourable the price. The demand is not constant and the 
price of galvanised sheet does not form the most i:porta.nt 
factor in determining the demand curve of the agriculturist" 
(p. 7) . The graphs on page 174, appendix III, of the 
Tariff Board Report on the Iron and Steel Industry bear out 
the contention in the statement quoted above. 
The Indian iron and steel industry had not begun to 
manufacture galvanised sheets in 1926 and in 1927 its pro- 
duction was only 12,000 tons. The 1930 report referred to 
above said that so far the production of these sheets had 
not exceeded 25,000 tons annually. Thus the country de- 
pends mainly on imports for galvanised sheets and the United 
Kingdom supplied practically the entire imports, so much so 
that when in 1926 differential tariffs were levied on British 
and non- British steel no provision was deemed necessary in 
the case of galvanised sheets. "Continental competition 
which in 1926 scarcely existed has now made itself felt in 
a marked degree. Until recently, through the action of the 
British Sheetmakers' Association, the price of British gal- 
vanised/ 
vanised sheets was maintained at about £1 per ton above the 
Belgian C.I.F. level". (p.3, The Report of 1930) . On 'account 
of the fall in prices this report said " the protection now 
received by the Indian ïíianufa.cturers falls short of the pro- 
tection required by Rs. 37 per ton. We recommend that ad- 
ditional assistance to this extent should be granted." (The 
Report of 1930, pp. 3 & 4) . The Board felt that its terms 
of reference would not permit it to propose differential duties. 
Between 1926 -27 and 1929 -30 imports of galvanised sheets from 
Belgium increased from 10,000 tons to 51,600 tons. 
Imports of Tinned Sheets. 
Also an item of some importance in the import trade 
Tinned Sheets in certain ways showed trends different from that 
of galvanised sheets. In 1913 -14 the imports were 53,000 tons, 
In_ the post -war period that figure was not touched at all, the 
highest import figures being 49,000 tons in 1920 -21. Up to 
1923 -24 imports maintained themselves somewhat, thereafter a 
decline set in and in 1930 -31 the imports were about 17,000 
tons. The main reason for the subdued character of the im- 
port trade in Tinned ?late was the fact that the Indian demand 
was not as big as that for galvanised sheets and the progress 
of Indian production. The Tariff Board Steel Report of 1926 
said "the tin- plate industry affords a notable illustration 
of the industrial progress attainable within a comparatively 
short period under the policy of discriminating protection". 
Production/ 
Production increased from 9,000 tons in 1923 to 35,000 tons 
in 1926 and 46,000 tons in 1932. The Report of 1926 suggested 
a reduction of duty from Rs. 85 to Rs. 48 where the duty stood 
during 1930 -31. In the import trade in this item the imports 
fror:L the U.S.A. rose in 1930 -31 to double those of 1920 -21 
while those of the United Kingdom showed great weakness and 
fell to a half and a fifth in 1929 -30 and 1930 -31 respectively 
from what they were in 1920 -21. 
Another item of importance in the import trade was that 
in sheets not galvanised or tinned. These imports amounted 
in 1913 -14 to 100,606 tons. In the year when protection 
was granted to the Indian steel industry imports exceeded the 
1913 -14 figure and amounted to 118,000 tons. From that time 
it declined, falling to 39,000 tons in. 1930 -31. In the year 
of the general strike British imports fell to half that of 
those from Belgium. The figures of imports in the following 
years suggest the influence of (1) increased Indian production, 
and (2) the differential duties and in 1930 -31 British imports 
were 26,000 tons and those from Belgium barely 11,000. 
Steel Bars (other than steel castings) were imported in 
the year 1913 -14 to the extent of 204,000 tons. That figure 
was not reached at all in the post -war period. In 1922 -23 
imports amounted to 192,000 tons and stood at 181,000 in 
1927 -28 and 170,000 tons in 1928 -29. In 1930 -31 these im- 
ports fell by a half. A survey of the declared value of 
these imports shows that after 1925 -26 these were not very 
much/ 
much above the pre -war level. The failure of imports to 
expand is accounted for by the internal production. In 
this item of the import trade Belgium was the main source of 
imports a.nd accounted for more than half of the imports. 
The effect of differential duties imposed in 1926 is seen by 
the fact that in 1928 -29 British imports doubled themselves 
as against the previous year and imports from Belgium and 
Luxemburg declined heavily. 
The last item of imported iron and steel manufactures 
considered here is structural steel goods. Imports of these 
in 1913 -14 amounted to 90,000 tons. In spite of the im- 
position of protective duties in 1924 imports rose from 80,900 
tons in 1924 -25 to 98,100 tons in 1925 -26. This increase of 
imports is to be mainly attributed to the fall in prices for 
Rupees 
their declared value fell from 153 /in 1924 -25 to 125 in 1925 -26. 
In the general strike year, 1926 -27, imports fell to 72, 100 
and doubled themselves in the next year. The large importa- 
tions in anticipation of the tariff charges of 1926 delayed 
the effectiveness of the differential tariffs imposed in 
1926. It was only from 1928 -29 that they expressed them- 
selves and the imports from Belgium declined while those from 
the United Kingdom increased. In the depression year, 1930 -31, 
imports of structural steel stood at 87,000 tons, that is to 
say they were only 3,000 tons short of the importations of 
1913 -14. On the whole then it is right to say that these 
imports have maintained themselves well in spite of internal 
production/ 
production and tariffs. The explanation of this lay in the 
facts (1) that the demand during the period in the country 
was an increasing; demand, and (2) the elasticity of the de- 
mand was maintained by the fall of prices for structural 
steel that belonged to that group of iron and steel manu- 
factured imports in which the declared value of imports fell 
to the pre -war level very early in the period, which in this 
case was the year 1925 -26. 
In concluding this survey of the import trade in iron 
and steel manufactures it mig .t help to take stock briefly of 
the effect of protection and the growth of an infant steel 
manufacturing industry in India in the various items of the 
import trade in this group. Considering the figures of the 
quantities of total imports and an internal manufacture 
estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000 tons, it is safe to 
say that there was an increased demand and consumption in 
the country of iron and steel manufactures. The internal 
production in every item of this group was not the same. 
It was more in some and less in others. In the case of 
imports of sheets and plates (a) tinned, and (b) not tinned 
or galvanised, the import was made to a certain extent in- 
elastic by the growth of internal production - this was more 
pronounced in tinned sheet and plate than in the other group. 
It has been noted that, late in the period, there was a small 
quantity of internal production of Galvanised sheets. Con- 
sidering the importance of this item of imports as evidenced 
by its/ 
by its large quantity and the scope for the increase in the 
demand for it, internal production does not seem to have had 
any, or rather seems to have had very little, influence in 
limiting imports. That is true of galvanised sheets seems 
also true of structural steel imports. In this case the 
limited internal production and the elasticity of demand 
generally, stimulated by the large fall in price, made the 
quantity of imports elastic and internal production seems to 
have had almost no influence on the elasticity of import 
quantities. In the case of steel bars the fact that imports 
in none of the post-war years touched the pre-war figure of 
204,613 tons warrants the conclusion that internal production 
did have an influence in limiting imports and this in spite 
of an early and big fall in prices which restored prices to 
the pre -war level. Internal production seems to have seriously 
limited imports of pipes and fittings cast for in this case 
while the import figure for 1913 -14 was 56,000 tons the highest 
post -war import figure was 27,000 tons in 1922 -23 and the 
lowest 3,000 in 1930 -31. Similarly nails, rivets and washers 
definitely declined from 25,000 tons in 1913 -14 to 19,000 in 
1927 -28 and 14,000 in 1930 -31. In the case of an unprotected 
item like,tubes and fittings wroughtjimports increased from 
the 1913 -14 figure of 18,000 to 47,000 in 1927 -28 and 38,000 
in 1930 -31. Similar was the position in imports of angle 
and spring which increased from 44,000 in 1913 -14 to 68,000 
in 1927 -28. Another unprotected item in which the import 
trade/ 
trade more than maintained itself was in hoops and strips 
for even in the depression year imports were greater than 
those of 1913 -14. In the light of the growing demand in 
the country for these imports and the smallness of the 
internal production it is not difficult to understand that 
the import trade as a whole in this group of iron and steel 
was able more or less to maintain itself, if not at the 
pre -war 1913 -14 level, at least at the pre -war average figure 
of import quantities. 
When an hitherto agricultural country embarks on in- 
dustrialisation, the course of industrialisation has been 
supposed to take a standardised form beginning with light 
manufactures of which cotton spinning and weaving is generally 
supposed to come first. Such a development may be expected 
to express itself in the foreign trade of the country especi- 
ally in the form of causing a shift, so far as imports are 
concerned, from light manufactures to the heavy means of 
producing them. Such a development seems to have taken 
place in Indian production and trade during the period. The 
study of the import trade of the country in cotton piecegoodT 
has already been taken into account. The following are the 
figures of imports of cotton textile machinery. 




































(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1919 -20 to 1930 -31). 
Corroborating the contention made above is the following 
evidence. In their book, "Re- adjustment in Lancashire ", the 
members of the Economics Research Section of Manchester Uni- 
versity say "The partial collapse of the cotton industry 
naturally produced general disturbance in the pre-war inter- 
dependence of the industries of the area. The textile 
finishing industry found that a large part of its market had 
disappeared although its decline proved to be less marked 
than that in cotton manufacture. The domestic market for 
textile engineering almost completely disappeared exports 
of textile machinery appear however to have been fairly well 
maintained/ 
maintained up to 1929 for the average annual export between 
1922 and 1929 was nearly 80% of the average for the years 
1911 to 1913 ". (pp. 17 & 18). 
In the light of the general contention of the preceding 
pages, this study of the import trade of India in merchandise 
may be brought to a close with a survey of the figures of the 
values of imports of three typical items of finished and heavy 
goods to illustrate the contention that, while in the post- 
war period cotton manufactures as an example of light manu- 
factures showed weakness in the import trade, finished and 
heavy goods to a certain extent offset that by showing 
strength. 
Table showing the pre -war and post-war averages of 
values of imports of (1) Machinery and Millwork, (2) Motor 
Vehicles, and (3) Instruments, Apparatus and Appliances. 
1. 
Pre --war average 5.6 crores 
Post-war average 21.64 
" 
2. 3. 
1.00 crores 1.35 crores 
4.00 " 3.91 it 
(source:- "Review of the Trade of India" 1932 - 1933) . 
CONCLUSION. 
An attempt has been made here, to study the Foreign 
Trade of India during the period 1900 -1931. The Foreign 
Trade of a country is the sale and purchase of goods, by in- 
dividuals in a country to and from those outside it. Par- 
ticularly in the period following the Depression from 1929 
onwards quotas, prohibitions, state- trading have become 
h 
prominent and narrowed the liberty of the individual in the 
matter of Foreign Trade in certain parts of the world. 
Signs, of the coming of these, were not wanting in the Post- 
war period that comes within the scope of this study but 
they did not get set in any serious measure to call for a 
modification of the definition of Foreign Trade as the trade 
between individuals in one country with those of the rest of 
the world. 
The Foreign Trade of a country is a product of its 
economic individuality and personality, modified by the 
economic policy pursued in the country. Of these o factors, 
conditioning the character of its foreign trade, easily the 
more important and fundamental one is the economic personality 
of the country. The factors going to the make -up of this 
personality may be said to consist of (1) the size of the 
country, (2) its natural resources, (3) the population, its 
aptitudes and tradition, (4) the economic limitations of the 
country, which express themselves in the inability, as $ 
l an economic proposition, to produce certain class 
of goods./ 
of goods. 
It can reasonably be expected that the economic policy 
pursued in a country is not a thing apart, but is almost 
dictated by its economic individuality and is a reflex of it. 
Normally, a country has not much choice in the matter and 
therefore it could be presumed to be implied and therefore 
included in its economic personality. Broadly and theoreti- 
cally, the contention seems undeniable. Actually, from a 
survey of the economic policy pursued in many countries and 
the main economic features of those countries, there seems 
enough justification for regarding economic policy by itself 
and as a thing apart. That is not to say that the economic 
policy pursued in a country can be utterly -rte relsted to the 
economic personality of a country, for that simply cannot be. 
The history of the economic policy pursued in many countries 
of the world, during roughly the last hundred years, lends 
a great deal of weight to the contention that, while the 
economic individuality of a country will always be the main . 
factor determining the lines of the economic policy pursued 
in it, it may not be exclusively so. It cannot be denied 
that political motives and ambitions, internal or external 
to the country, do influence the shaping of the economic 
policy of a country. The extreme economic nationalism in 
some countries, with its exaggerated flair for economic 
self -sufficiency and resorting freely to state interference 
with the nstural course of production and trade is e. case in 
point ./ 
point. Economic Imperialism dictating to an overseas pos- 
session an economic policy devised to hold up its economic 
development so as to subserve the economic interests of the 
imperial country, is another. In the light of these examples 
it seems right to consider the economic policy pursued in a 
country separately. Such a policy cannot in any case, any- 
where, be utterly unrelated to the economic personality of a 
country, On the other hand it may not be exclusively deter- 
mined by it. In view of this, the early chapters of this 
study have been devoted to an attempt to a study of the 
economic policy pursued in India as the necessary background 
for the understanding of its Trade. 
Looking back on 't'lorld Foreign Trade from the period 
following the Industrial Revolution to the present time,one 
unmistakable trend revealed by it is the steady growth of 
the appreciation and popularity of the ideal of economic 
self- sufficiency on the part generally of all countries. 
It may be said that self-sufficiency, as understood and 
desired now, by the peoples of many countries, merely means, 
thet, as the people of a country have in the main to live 
and be accommodated in work and wages in it, therefore, it 
would be right for them to aim at producing as many and a.s 
much of all the varieties of wealth they need for themselves, 
pursuing the ideal so long as there results a net increase 
of wealth from their efforts. 
The growth of population in the countries of the world 
till now,/ 
till now, and the resultant intensity of the economic problem, 
has made the ideal of economic self- sufficiency express itself 
in an attempt to diversify economic activity and thus, hitherto 
agricultural countries have set themselves out to turn a.s many 
21ßh 
of their raw products into manufactured goods, themselves. 
At the start they could turn out only light manufactures. 
The reaction of this on countries till then exporting these 
light manufactures, has been that the loss of their export 
trade made them give up, to a certain extent, light manufactures 
in favour of heavier and more finished ones. An example of 
this has been referred to earlier in this study. 
It has been stated that, in the present world order, the 
people of a country have to find themselves in work and wages 
in their own country. There is a strong pull compounded of 
many factors that makes people want to live in "Their own 
country ". Partly also, not to complicate the problem of 
the people of a country having to find themselves in work and 
wages at home, the country prohibits or limits immigrants. 
The net result is that the people of a country have to look 
to their own country to be accommodated with a means of 
earning their living. The only method by which the growing 
population could thus be accommodated is by a diversification 
of economic activity in tr.e country and thus countries seem 
naturally committed to the ideal of self -sufficiency as has 
national 
been said in so far as that does not reduce the iilt4litaasl wealth 
permanently. 
Fundamental as this position is, the recognition of the 
essential validity of it has, in the past, been held back by 
certain circumstances. The main factor that has worked 
against an early recognition of this fundamental position 
was due to the fact that, in the years following the Indus- 
trial Revolution, the world came to consist of a number of 
industrialised and a number of un- industrialised countries. 
With manufactured goods generally commanding a. higher price 
than raw material, among other things, some of the indus- 
trialised countries like Great Britain committed themselves 
more or less fully to specialisation in manufactures, hoping 
to be able always to find other countries who would take 
their manufactures and give in return the raw produce to feed 
their population and keep their industries going prosperously. 
Such countries, when they had committed themselves to special- 
isation in production, realised how vital trade was to them. 
But it takes two to trade and trade could thrive only between 
two countries economically different from each other. Be- 
sides a country that at one time is ready to export its raw 
produce and import manufactures may surely come to a time 
when it may desire to manufacture its raw material itself 
and thus find an occupation for its increasing population. 
Countries like Great Britain, aware of the possibility of a 
future envisaged above, tried to meet it by acquiring large 
overseas possessions among undeveloped areas and peoples and 
devise for them an economic policy whereby they would, if not 
for all time, at least for a long time be producers and exporters 
of/ 
of raw material and importers of all manufactured goods. 
All this, r._=.--_,__-_...__-ti.=. .-w did not 
reduce the instability or nervousness of countries that had 
chosen the path of industrialifiatlan, for the necessity to 
diversify economic activity with growing population was 
insistent for the undeveloped countries and economic Imperial- 
ism could only delay, but could not permanently hold up, such 
diversification as it was a fundamental need and had to be 
met. 
The need to diversify economic activity on the part of 
independent agricultural countries, was, in a severely com- 
petitive world, met by the rearing of industries under the 
shelter of Tariff walls. 
How the necessity was met in a dependant country like 
India has been recounted at length in the study. It has 
been seen that, early in the 19th century, the attempt was 
made to get rid of Indian industries When some Indian p Loa-9 
industries did rise th . - - . . _- . . - 
sC,c-r7 , 
a-`°4 
and o f T a.i-^ fittvtre 
Thus the diversification of economic activity in India was 
delayed. When, however, India was accorded the right to 
rear protective duties, the effectiveness of these was 
weakened in some cases by differential duties between 
British and non -British manufactured imports. Diversi- 
fication of economic activity was thus delayed but could 
not be prevented and that proves the essential validity of 
the/ 
the contention that if the people of a country have to find 
themselves in work and wages at home then it is only by the 
diversification of economic activity that this can be achieved 
and even economic imperialism had to recognise this. The 
trend of world foreign trade following the Industrial Revol- 
ution and the inauguration of Free Trade by Great Britain 
shows unmistakably the increasing faith of the countries of 
the world in the ideal of self- sufficiency as expounded here. 
Before the rising tide of this thought "Free Trade" as ex- 
pounded by Great Britain (in her history) has receded and 
after holding the field precariously had to retire. 
Under the stress of the thought that has moulded the 
national attitude to foreign trade, that trade has steadily 
changed its character. gith the development of the means 
of transport and communications and the consequent ease with 
which scientific advance anywhere could be easily appropriated 
and assimilated elsewhere, the diversification of economic 
activity has gone on at a greater pace and has reacted on 
trade. If this development could go on freely and not be 
interfered with in any way and the countries of the world 
could diversify their economic activity in terms of their 
ability and of the natural resources of their country, the 
foreign trade of the world would really approximate to inter- 
regional trade, and an exchange of regional specialities,m- ---0 -- 
and, under these conditions, Free Trade would carry with it 
no/ 
no serious threat to the economic life of any country and 
as such would have a greater chance of becoming a feature 
of World Trade. 
There should result no serious diminution of world 
trade under these circumstances, seeing that human wants 
are very many and the economic limitations, in the way of 
a country being able to produce everything for herself and 
being absolutely self- sufficient, very definite. 
Surveying Indian foreign trade during the period, 
certain features characteristic of it may be set down. 
With Great Britain ruling India and her industries having 
a large stake in the Indian market it is quite obvious that 
,ou2 a- d- -0 ( e 01 71,L01_c,a..,. 
ruling would not allow radical or swift changes 
;¡--W T, ^r r3(+nnnmi aye . Under the circumstances 
one cannot expect such. In the measure of possible de- 
velopment permitted to her, India was able to show in her 
Foreign trade the effects of it. So far as the import 
trade in India during the period was concerned there was an 
unmistakable shift from imports of light manufactures to 
those of heavy and more finished ones. Cotton goods, sugar 
and Pig Iron are examples of light manufacture imports, and 
Machinery and Millwork, Motor vehicles, Hardware, and Iron 
and Steel manufactures are of heavy and finished goods. 
The following table gives the annual average imports during 















Sugar 270,000 tons. 633,500 tons. 443,000 tons. 
Pig Iron 19,500 tons. 12,881 tons. 10,553 tons. 
Machinery and 
Millwork 3.08 crores. 5.61 crores. 21.64 crores. 
Motor vehicles - 1.00 crores. 4.79 crores. 
Hardware 1.9 crores. 3.17 crores. 5.7 crores. 
Iron & Steel 379,403 tons. 808,000 tons. 661,000 tons. 
(Averages from "The Review of the Trade of India ") . 
The figures make out the shift in the import trade from 
light manufacture imports to heavy and more finished ones 
fairly clear. Industrial development in India was pronoun- 
ced in the protectionist period but that does not warrant the 
conclusion that Free Trade is inimical to industrial develop- 
ment. If Industrial development in India was delayed in the 
w 
n,_F pre-war period it was due to the p- a-e 
"1 
and Laissez faire which washes for India.c.,AJ c r" 
